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LOGIC, 



OB THE 

ART OF REASONING SIMPLIFIED. 



ilT THIS WOBK REMARKS ARE MADE OJf 
DISTINCTIOIfS BETWEEN 

REASONING BY 

INDUCTION, ANALOGY, AND iSYLLOGISM, 

ILLUSTRATED ; THE 

Ancient and Modern Modes of Argumentation Contrasted, 

AND THE 

General Process of Reasoning, and its susceptibilityof Improvement from Art stated. 

IT ALSO CONTAINS THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN 

Metaphysical, Moral, and Mathematical Demonstration, the Method of 

Detecting Fallacies or Deviations from Correct Reasoning, 

and the Rules of Interpretation, Controversy, and Method. 

CLOSING WITH 

On a variety of interesting topics, to guide and develope the reasoning powers of thfe 
youthful inqui^rer after truth. 

BY S. E. PARKER, 

AUTHOR OP THE ARTICLES PROSODY, 'aUANTITT, AND VERSIFICATION IN 
DR. REES' CYCLOPEDIA. 



Robert Davis, Publisher. 



WiLLIAia STAVELY, PRINTER AND GENERAL AGENt, 

No. 12 Fear street. 

SOLD BY GEORGE &, BYINGTON, CORNER OF CHESNUt AND FIFTH SXS. 

iSOSTON — JAS. B. DOW, 362, AND C. STIMpSON, 72 WASHINGTON STREEt. 



1831'. 



5=^'^ 



^ 



Ts 



Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1837, by Rev. Robert Davis, 
in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 



PREFACE. 



That man is an intelligent creature, or a being capable of receiv- 
ing intelligence to an indefinite extent, is not only a well known 
and established fact, but also one which involves the most important 
consequences. This single attribute of human existence not only 
elevates man in the scale of being, constitutes him capable of unli- 
mited improvement, and of communicating it to others, but at the 
same time, as to the discharge of his duties, grants him the privi- 
lege to increase not only his respectability, but also his usefulness 
to the society with which he is connected. Though, on the one 
hand, it would be impossible duly to appreciate a gift so inestima- 
ble, yet on the other, be it remembered, that there is nothing given 
to man, there is no talent with which he is endued, but what re- 
quires cultivation. Not only our corporeal but also our mental fa- 
culties, unless they have salutary exercise, are liable to decline. 
The body for want of it is liable to wane into the most lamentable 
state of langor and imbecility ; and the mind, for reasons perfectly 
analogous, through the want of exercising the means, with which 
we are so abundantly privileged, becomes inert and capable of 
being not only deceived by others, but also irrevocably injured 
through our own neglect. It cannot for a single moment be doubt- 
ed, that man, as a sentient, intelligent being, stands as a candidate 
for happiness. All men seek it, in one way or the other : a single 
exception would be a parodox in the history of humanity. Accord- 
ing to the extent precisely of our mental vision, not only happiness 
on the one hand, is before us, until it prospectively rise into all the 
excellency of a prize whose value is ineflfable, but also on the 
other, the risk of losing that at which all, in one way or the other 
aim, is felt with a vigilant sensibility that constitutes the best guar- 
antee of success. Attention is an important act in the mind of 
man ; when that is gained much is done, yet not all. Though the 
prospect of success, from attention, immediately rise above zero in 
the scale of expectancy, yet more is wanting. An object the most 
desirable may be proposed, yet information of the means of its 
attainment may be either wanting, or we are not possessed of the 
method of so connecting the several parts of that information to- 
gether, as from thence to deduce a conclusion such, as shall infalli- 
bly lead to the attainment of the object desired. Hence man, 
though capable of intelligence, infallible : but especially is that man 



4 PREFACE. 

fallible, who through want of a/fenf ion, through negXeci of informa-- 
Hon, and of the method of deriving correct and practical conclusions 
from the same, is as the field, which though capable of producing grain, 
wheat, and the most luxuriant fruits, remains, through want of cul- 
ture, not only barren, but encumbered with the most noxious 
weeds. And happy indeed would it be, were this mere nega^ 
tive loss, this simple unproductiveness and sterihty, all ;^happy, 
in this case, would it he, were we warranted by truth and fact, to 
consider that this would be all the consequence ; as if man, man 
to whom so much is given, could be irresponsible, when his respon- 
sibility rises precisely in proportion to his intellectual superiority, 
and the privileges of which it is his indispensable duty to avail him-« 
self. 

It is no pait of our present object to define what happiness is, for 
which we are all, in one way or the other, candidates ; nor to say, 
from whence we are principally expecting it ; whether in one, or 
in many ways. It is suflficient to affirm that we are all waiting for 
that, which questionless is the very fruition of our being, and whose 
loss renders it even desirable that that being had never existed^ We 
are all either expecting it, in an object, purely intellectual, or per- 
haps we in viewing ourselves as members of a society, from whose 
interests we are not isolated, contemplate it, at least as to all its minOr 
sources, divided into diverse branches of secular and civil polity. 
In each and in all these, and in all the various departments of hu- 
man life, we are surrounded by various means of artifice and de- 
ception, and our security from their subterfuges, and the possibili- 
ty of our ultimate attainment of intellectual excellency and happi- 
ness, entirely depend on the correct and successful culture of the 
inestimable talent with which we are endued, and th€ attentive and 
diligent use of the privileges with which we are so highly favored. 
Truth and Error stand so pre-eminently opposed to each other 
that nothing more than their simple juxta-position is requisite to in- 
dicate their immutable hostility. Truth implies and comprehends 
that which is of the highest importance to man : and the more ac- 
curate and ready our methods of detecting and exposing errors are, 
the more certain are we of being armed against the most fatal ene- 
mies not only to ourselves, but to the human family at large. Truth, 
one would imagine, is so remote from error, or so totally distinct 
from it, that every rational being, every one capable of discrimina- 
tion, could need no Rule, no Art, no System, to assist him to 
separate the one from the other. Yet the experience, not of 
a day, nor yet of a life, but the history of centuries past, informs 
us that nothing is more imperatively needed than such Rule, Art, 
or System, 

However opposite the characters of Truth and Error may be, yet 
there is no fact in history more important and striking, than that 
man, notwithstanding his capability of intelligence and information, 
has not always distinguished the one from, th^ other. The pages 



PREFACE. 5 

of history, the schisms in the church, the divisions in the schools, 
the countless tomes of controversy, the opposition of counsel at 
the bar, and the conflicts of party in politics, and even the very wars 
and bloodshed in which they have too often issued, all rise in volu- 
minous testimony of this serious and melancholy fact. Error, how- 
ever opposed to Truth, yet nevertheless may be so disguised, so 
diluted, so presented under the illusions of twilight or so mixed up 
with what is true, that unless we are possessed of the means to ex- 
pose the counterfeit, the test to detect the ingredient that vitiates, 
we are liable to be deceived through semblances the most specious 
and imposing. Error is not inaptly compared to poison. In the 
extent of their destruction they may differ ; the latter kills a few 
bodies, the former its thousand, its myriad souls. *' Poison," ob- 
serves one, " in its concentrated state, nauseates at once, but diluted 
it may deceive and destroy a city." Thus error exists, even in the 
present age, diluted, disguised, throughout the whole of human 
society, to an extent such, that on no subject, theological, political, 
philosophical, domestic, or foreign, can we find two men, that in 
all points agree : yet truth in each subject is only one, whilst error, 
sophistry, or the mistake of a figure in the calculation, may be 
multiplied, blended, and distorted to an extent indefinite, proportion- 
ate to the opacity in the mental vision, or to the means neglected to 
point out the fallacy and rectify the whole. 

That for ages past Error and Sophistry have imposed their de- 
structive effects on myriads reputed rational, is one proof out of 
many, of the necessity of an aid, which unassisted nature does not 
ordinarily bestow. Even in the political department how often may 
it be observed, that one speaker advocates measures diametrically op- 
posed to the other ; and the address of each perhaps is so plausible, 
as to gain half the house. Are both right ? Certainly not, per- 
haps neither, but, at least, half the house is deceived ! and that half, 
if it prevail, will, on a vital question mislead the nation, and involve 
it in privaiion and suffering. Are there no means then of analyz- 
ing the address that contains the fallacy ; no mode of discovering 
either the false premises assumed ; or if they are right, of showing 
that the conclusion does not logically follow from them ? Was 
there no fallacy, whether of composition, division, or accident, no 
begging the question, nor of building consequences on a mistaken 
one ? Impossible ; these, or one or more of them, must have been 
concealed, possibly even from the speaker himself, in one or the 
other of these orations. And the question yet remains, is there no 
means of more frequently and successfully exposing error, which 
in its whole extent may be justly pronounced to be, the most griev- 
ous curse that afflicts humanity. 

How does it happen that in matters which immediately affect our 
secular interest, or touch dishonestly our pocket, we provide laws 
and a vigilant police to detect the offender, that has practised on us 
to our injury, the artifices of deception, whilst in a thousand cases 

a2 



O PREFACE., 

whose consequences may not be so tangible, yet not less impor- 
tant, we suffer so many that will only take the trouble to think and 
dress up their theory with plausibility,. to practise on our credulity ? 
Though any man as a free agent, should have the liberty to think as 
he pleases, yet that constitutes no reason that another should fol- 
low in his wake. Is not this, however, a case general to a very 
lamentable extent. Could a history of the world be so constructed 
as to point out, on the one hand, the heresiarchs in the church, the 
demagogues in politics, or the principal leaders in opinion or par- 
ty ; and on the other, the multitudes on whose credulity, for want 
of examination, they have practised ; that history would be lamen- 
tably libellous on humanity. Could we allow this history to pass 
in panoramic vision before us ; could we enter ourselves on the 
long travel, or penetrate the deep vista of time that it involves ; — 
could we view the mournful shades that have veiled the truth ; — 
count the myriad suns that have risen and set without imparting one 
ray to the benighted mind ; — could we enter into the grave assem- 
blies of the ancients, and view the gloom of error resting on the 
whole ; — could we count the myriad tongues, the thousand pens 
that have labored to disseminate its influence, or the countless presses 
that have groaned beneath its volumes counted by the ton : — if in 
addition to this, we could take another estimate, and scan or mea- 
sure the reign, the tyranny of error, not by the year, nor yet by 
the age, but by the century ; and with alarm discover, that even at 
present, and under the same insidious guise as ever, it is undermin- 
ing our interests of every kind ; and that deception in its every 
form is as sedulously at work now as a thousand years ago ; we 
should then indeed form some faint idea, faint as to the magnitude 
of its importance, of the necessity of every aid to enable us and 
others to inculcate truth on the one hand, with all the force of that ar- 
gument of which it is so happily susceptible, and to expose, on 
the other, the common enemy, that has with such artful diguise, im- 
posed on so many myriads of our fellow men, to all the contempt 
and abhorrence to which its mendacity and deceit so justly entitle it. 
On the sacred page, we read, indeed, of the ^^ times of igno- 
norance.'^ And we are likewise aware that a considerate parent 
does not expect as much from his infant child, as he does from his 
mature offspring. *' Of them to whom much is given," however, 
*' much is required." But we cannot with propriety call this the 
time of ignorance. Wilful ignorance, indeed, may and does ex- 
ist ; yet not necessary ignorance. We have not only the means of 
information at command, but may possess ourselves with the mode 
of rightly using it, to our own advantage, and to the benefit of the so- 
ciety to which we belong. Can we then possibly take a view of 
past ages and of the lamentable consequences of ignorance and er- 
ror on the myriads who are now " minish'd from the sons of men,'* 
without feeling, without compassion, without philanthropy ? In 
honor, in compliment toourselves^ we presume that we have not 



PREFACE. 7 

only self-interest, but philanthropy too ; and both are involved in 
the argument. It is no uncommon case that we knowbest how to se- 
cure our neighbor's interest, when we know how to secure our 
own ; and his being secured, will often promote ours also. We 
are not, and cannot be, isolated beings : both our own interest and 
that of others are in one common stake. The success of fallacy 
through the supineness of times past, the examples of past ages, 
and the superior privileges of this, our own interest, and those of 
the thousands with whom we are connected, all rise in proof that 
our welfare and happines are dependant on, if not identified with, 
our strenuous exertions. Our whole life is, or ought to be, con- 
cerned either in the acquisition of truth, or in the detection of 
what is contrary to its precepts, to whatever department of life 
those precepts belong. 

Enough no doubt has already been said, for the conviction of 
every ingenuous and liberal mind relative to the utility and im- 
portance of Logic. But to our own remarks on this point, we shall 
take the liberty to add the following given by Dr. Whately. " If 
it were inquired what is to be regarded, as the most appropriate 
intellectual occupation of man, as man, what would be the answer ? 
The statesman is engaged with political affairs; the soldier with 
military ; the mathematician with the properties of numbers and 
magnitudes ; the merchant with commercial concerns, &;c.; but in 
what are all and each of these employed ; employed, that is as 
men? for there are many modes of exercising the faculties, men- 
tal as well as bodily, which are in great measure common to us 
with the lower animals. Evidently, in reasoning ; men are all em- 
ployed in deducing, well or ill, conclusions from premises ; each 
concerning the subject of his own particular business. If, there- 
fore, it be found that the j)rocess going on daily, in each of so 
many different minds, is, in any respect the same; and if the 
principles on which it is conducted can be reduced to a regular 
system, and if rules can be deduced from that system, for the bet- 
ter conducting of the process, then it cannot be denied that such a 
system and such rules must be especially vjorthy the attention, not 
qjf^ the members of this or that profession merely, but of every 
one who is desirous of possessing a well cultivated mind. 
To understand the theory of that which is the appropriate in- 
tellectual occupation of man in general, and to learn to do that 
well, which every one will and must do, whether well or ill, may 
surely be considered as an essential part of a liberal education. 

" But many who allow the use of systematic principles in other 
things, are accustomed to cry up common sense as the sufficient 
and only safe guide in reasoning. Now, by common sense is 
meant, an exercise of the judgment unaided by any art or system 
of rules ; such an exercise as we must necessarily employ in 
numberless cases of daily occurrence ; in which, having no estab- 
lished principles to guide us, — ^no line of procedure distinctly chalk- 



8 PREFACE. 

ed out, — we must needs act on the best extemporaneous conjectures 
we can form. He wlio is eminently skilled in doing- this, is said 
to possess a superior degree of common sense. Bnt that common 
sense is only our second-best guide; that the rules of art, if judi- 
ciously framed, are always desirable when'they can be had, is an as- 
sertion, for the truth of which I may appeal to the testimony of 
mankind in general ; which is so much the more valuable, inasmuch 
as it may be accounted the testimony of adversaries* For the 
generality have a strong predilection in favor of common sense,- ex- 
cept in those points in which they respectively possess the know- 
ledge of a system of rules, in which they deride any one who trusts to 
unaided common sense. A sailor will perhaps, despise the pre- 
tensions of medical men, and prefer treating a disease by common 
sense ; but he would ridicule the proposal of navigating a ship by 
common sense without regard to the principles of the nautical art. 
A physician again, will perhaps contemn systems of political 
economy, of logic or metaphysics, and insist on the superior wis- 
dom of trusting to common sense in such matters, but he would never 
approve of trusting to common sense in the treatment of diseases. 
Neither again would the architect recommend a reliance on com~ 
mon sense alone, in building, nor the musician in music, to the 
neglect of those systems of rules, which in their respective arts,, 
have been deduced from scientific reasoning aided by experience. 
And the induction might be extended to every department of prac- 
tice. Since, therefore, each gives the preference to unassisted com- 
mon sense, only in those cases where he himself has nothing else 
to trust to, and invariably resorts to the rules of art, whenever he 
possesses the knowledge of them, it is plain that mankind univer- 
sally bear their testimony, though unconsciously and unwillingly,. 
to the preferableness of systematic knowledge to conjectural judg- 
ment. 

" There is, however, abundant room for the employment of com- 
mon sense in the application of the system. To bring arguments,, 
out of the form, in which they are expressed in conversation, and 
in books, into the regular logical shape, must be of course, the 
business of common sense, aided by practice; for such arguments 
are, by supposition, not as yet within the province of science ; else 
they would be already strict syllogisms. To exercise the learner 
in this operation, I have subjoined, in the appendix, some exam- 
ples, both of isolated argument, and of the analysis of argumenta- 
tive works. 

" The cause of truth universally, and not least of religious truth, 
is benefitted by every thing that tends to promote sound reasonings 
and facilitate the detection of fallacy. The adversaries of our faith 
would, I am convinced, have been on many occasions, more satis- 
factorily answered, and would have had fewer openings for cavil, 

* " Fas est doceri ab hosteJ* 



PREFACE. 



had a thorough acquaintance with Logic been a more common 
qualification than it is. Not only all those who are engaged in or 
designed for the sacred ministry, but all others who are sensible 
that the cause of true religion is not a concern of the ministry 
alone, should remember that this is no time to forego any of the 
advantages which that cause may derive from an active and judici- 
ous cultivation of the faculties. It is not, however, solely or chief- 
ly for polemical purposes that the cultivation of the reasoning 
faculty is desirable ; in persuading and investigating, in learning or 
teaching, in all the multitude of cases, in which it is our object 
to arrive at just conclusions, or to lead others to them, it is most im- 
portant. A knowledge of logical rules will not indeed supply the 
want of other knowledge, nor was it even proposed, by any one 
who really understood the science, to substitute it for any other; 
but it is no less true that no other can be substituted for it : that it 
is valuable in every branch of study ; and that it enables us to use 
the knowledge we possess to the greatest advantage." 

We cannot here forbear to mention that it was our privilege to 
be personally acquainted with one, who, if ever man was, was a 
master in Logic ; and very fortunately so, for no man, since the 
seventeenth century was ever more engaged in controversy; and what 
was the consequence ? It is immediately and every where appa- 
rent. The ease with which he, on every occasion, managed his 
adversary ; the dexterity he displayed in immediately detecting the 
fallacy, wherever and however concealed ; the facility he evinced 
in dissipating his illogical conclusions, and the suavity and temper 
which were prevalent through the whole, left him decidedly, in the 
estimation of every rational and candid mind, in undisputed posses- 
sion of the field; — -and why ? — He was an eminent Logician. 

But however we would advocate the acquisition of truth, it is by 
no means our intention to intimate that Logic, or the Art of Rea- 
soning, is the only means by which Truth, in every sense, is dis- 
covered. To the representation of Logic as the method of discover- 
ing Truth, as if it were the only method ; or even a method, with- 
out stating what are those truths we are to expect from the process 
which Logic institutes, may be in no small degree attributed the 
misunderstanding of the specific object it proposes. Truths are 
either those of Information or Instruction. The former we de- 
rive from observation or testimony, or even from experiment insti- 
tuted at the time, by a conjectural conclusion deduced from as- 
sumed premises. The latter, truths of Instruction, we derive from 
data, which though they may be in the possession of others, yet 
probably have been employed either to no purpose, or misemploy- 
ed by fallacy and incorrect reasoning, to a wrong one. These 
data fall within the province of Logic, either from them to deduce 
a truth not before perceived as a necessary consequence of the 
premises they afford ; or to detect an error resulting from their 
misapplication. 



10 PREFACE, 

*' When it is asked," says Dr. Whately, " whether such great 
discoveries as have been made in Natural Philosophy, were ac- 
comphshed or can be accomplished by Reasoning ? the inquirer 
should be reminded that the question is ambiguous. It may be 
answered in the affirmative, if by Reasoning is meant to be in- 
cluded, the assumption of Premises. ^^ To the assumption of pre- 
mises, frequently scientific men, in search for some new or undis- 
covered truth, are indebted ; from which, though at first, nothing 
better than sl probable conjecture can be inferred, yet that conjec- 
tural inference may institute a course of experiments, which may 
ultimately establish the fact. " Thus Sir Humphrey Davy finding 
that the flame of hydrogen gas was not communicated through a 
long slender tube, conjectured that a shorter, but still slenderer 
tube, would answer the same purpose. This led him to try the 
experiment, in which by successively shortening the tube, and at 
the same time lessening its bore, he arrived at last at the wire- 
gauze of his safety-lamp." Now throughout the whole of this pro- 
cess, assumed premises^ conjecture, experiment, it is evident that 
a kind of inductive reasoning was going on, that is, so far as rea- 
soning hypothetically, and in a necessary case, from assumed pre- 
mises, is acting until positive ones can supply their place ; yet it is 
not that strictly, in which Logic, that pretends not to the discovery 
of new Truths in an unrestricted sense, is concerned. 

Truths of Information belong to the sciences ; to Theology, 
Ethics, Jurisprudence, to the Arts, and to the Business and Experi- 
ence of common life ; and a distinct class of them to each. For the 
acquisition of these, the sciences, and the several sources respec- 
tively to which Truths of Information belong, must be duly con- 
sulted. These are the volumes from which we have to cull this 
kind of intellectual furniture, and nothing else can properly com- 
municate it. It is here too that we not only have to derive our 
Information, and all the truth which it implies, but, moreover, 
clear and distinct ideas of each individual, both in its isolated and 
relative position, without which all our knowledge is vain. The 
Instructor in Logic takes it for granted that his pupil comes pre- 
pared with these, that he has them not to seek, or at least that he 
is furnished with as mani/ as are necesmry for his immediate 
purpose. 

It is of considerable importance in this early stage of our in- 
quiry, to state distinctly that it is to the sciences, and to the proper 
sources that we must look for Information ; but it is ihe peculiar 
province of Logic to teach the most salutary and practical use of 
the knowledge we possess, either for the purpose of instructitig 
ourselves or others, by that only argumentative process, which 
must necessarily, in every rational mind, demand conviction ; or 
for the refutation of conclusions, whether deduced from irrelevant 
premises, or falsely derived from true ones ; sophisms which are 
00 frequently exemplified by those who are dispossessed of that 



• PREFACE. 11 

^discrimination, and unacquainted with the mode of detecting fal- 
lacy which it is the business of Logic to impart. 

When we, on first opening the pages of Euclid, read, " a line is 
length without breadth ;" *' a plane rectilineal angle is the inclina- 
tion of two straight lines to one another that meet in a point ;" 
** that a triangle is a plane figure bounded by three lines," &c. ; 
from hence we derive Ideas, and Truths of Information ; but it 
is not the business of Logic to teach us these : these are nothing 
but the mere furniture, the requisite data, that we must possess, 
before we can oommence and successfully employ to any benefi- 
cial purpose, the argumentative process. But when we are once 
furnished with the prerequisite terms and premises, and come to 
read, "If two triangles have two sides, and the included angle in 
the one, equal two sides and the included angle in the other, the 
triangles will be equal and identical in all respects," we require the 
demonstrative or argumentative process ; the result afforded by 
which is a Truth of Instruction, which it is the province of 
Reasoning or Logic to establish on premises from which the proof 
is legitimately derived. 

Nothing is more calculated to throw into the shade, if not most 
unjustly into disrepute, an art or science, than misrepresenting its 
distinct and specific object; loading it with more than it professes 
to perform, imputing to it obligations which are either inconsistent 
with itself, or disreputable in themselves. A time was, when the 
object of Astronomy was not distinguished from that of Astrology ^ 
or the pretended art of divining futurities from the configurations 
and motions of the heavenly bodies. And had not Astronomy 
been happily rescued from this misconception, and established on 
the basis of its own independent reputation, it might to the present 
day, in the estimation of the uninformed, have ranked in a grade 
equally low with that of palmistry, legerdemain or necromancy. 
A time existed in which even the respectable science of Chemis- 
try was merged into the mystified shades of Alchemy, whose most 
popular and ostensible object was to find the secret of turning all 
things into gold ; or the panacea, the universal cure of all diseases 
to which humanity is subject, without excepting even mortality it- 
self. Chemistry, however, very fortunately has emerged from this 
eclipse, and presents itself disencumbered of distortions not its 
own, in that elegant form in which it is at once so interesting and 
useful to society. 

But who are they, that from want of proper discrimination, have 
for a period nearly equal to the night of Alchemy, succeeded to 
throw the shades of misrepresentation on the peculiar and specific 
object of Logic, and that so artfully, as to convert characters, in 
other respects of considerable respectability and importance in the 
Republic of Letters, to their own heresy ? Had these been the 
mere tyros in the art, those who had contented themselves with 
merely some hasty glances at an introductory chapter, there would 



12 PREFACE. 

have been nothing in the circumstance uncommon, and they would 
have verified only the ancient adage, so general in its application, 
" damnunt quod non intelligunt," they condemn what they do not 
understand. For the honor of those, however, who have professed- 
ly undertaken to teach the art, or to write voluminous treatises.on 
the science, we could wish that we had it not to say, that the charge 

lies exclusively at their door, 2y u o iiS'a'niaM?^ Ka.i rccvra. ov ytvaxruiis, "Art 

thou a teacher, and knowest not these things ?" implies a charge 
equally applicable at present as in former times. Amongst them 
we could mention one, who has written a volume with no other 
effect, than to evince the possibility of a man's writing more than 
300 pages on a subject, which he, from the first time he took up 
his pen to the last page it had written, evidently did not understand* 
To discover a ship at sea, 300 miles from the port whence she had 
sailed, without any one on board knowing either where they were, 
or whither they were going, would lead to the inference that neither 
compass was in the binnacle, nor navigator in the cabin ; but to find 
a being reputed intellectual, navigating over 300 pages of heteroge- 
neous and irrelevant matter, performing a sort of zig-zag traverse 
wide of the mark, and having no bearing on the object originally 
proposed, is merely one example, among the many thousands 
which might be added, of the danger of following any one, merely 
because he is a teacher, without the test of our own examination 
and scrutiny, and the exercise of that function which it is the spe- 
cific object of Logic itself to develope and explain. 

No science can be expected to make any considerable progress^ 
which instead of being regularly cultivated on right principles, has 
been liable to the misrepresentation of those who never correctly 
understood its specific object themselves, nor therefore could teach 
it to others. From the time of the schoolmen, censured by Bacons 
rather for their abuse of the art, than for any legitimate purpose 
to which they applied it, down to the present, we meet with a host 
of authors, who have either written expressly on the same, or more 
or less made remarks thereon ; which leads to a discovery no less 
strange than true, that very few clearly understood the subject ! ! 
Only two writers, the former about the ^middle of the last century* 
and the latter. Dr. Whately, have proved that they were aware 
that Logic is chiefly concerned with the third act of the mind^ 
ARGUMENTATION ; and with SUCH EXPRESSION OF IT as correctly to 
convey its conclusiveness to others. These two alone appear to 
have cleared the equation from the co-efficients with which it was 
encumbered, from quantities foreign to its distinct intention, and 
that concealed it in mists of metaphysical irrelevancy. 

It is therefore not unreasonable to hope, that as the age at last 
arrived, when Astronomy threw away the anamorphosis of Astro* 
logy, by which she was disfigured ; and Chemistry of Alchemy^ 
so Logic, with equal success, will divest herself of all the volumi* 
nous mysticisms quite foreign to her definite design, and that hejf 



PRBPACE. 13 

claim to utility will appear not less clear, than does the precious 
metal when detached from the ore, that has for ages concealed it 
from the use and general benefit of mankind. 

Of all the preceding Treatises on Logic, Dr. Whately's* may 
be justly entitled the chef-d'oeuvre. To his work, this is, through- 
out avowedly indebted. His remarks on the specific intention of 
the art, and on the identity of the process of argumentation in the 
mind, whether expressed artificially or not, are at once too im- 
portant and interesting to be omitted ; and their value alone will 
be a sufificient apology for their insertion. 

*' With the exception of Aristotle, scarcely a writer on Logic can 
be mentioned, who has clearly perceived, and steadily kept in view 
its real nature and object. Before his time, no distinction was 
made between the science of which we are speaking, and that 
which is now called metaphysics. It is not, therefore, much to be 
wondered at, that in still later times, several ingenious writers, form- 
ing their notions from professed masters of the science, and judging 
of its value from their failures, should have treated the system, as if 
it were the Aristotelian, with such unwarrantable reprobation. 
Therefore they have assailed the study with a host of objections, 
so totally irrelevant, as might excite astonishment in any one who 
did not fully estimate the force of prejudice," having no other 
basis than that of misconception. 

*'By these objectors, Logic has been considered to furnish a 
peculiar method of reasoning, instead of a method of analyzing 
that mental process, which must invariably take place in all cor- 
rect reasoning. For Logic does not bring forward the regular Syl- 
logism, as a distinct mode of argumentation, designed to be substi- 
tuted for any other mode, but as the form to which all correct rea- 
soning may be ultimately reduced ; and which consequently serves 
as a test to try the validity of any argument ; in the same manner 
as by chemical analysis we develope, and submit to-a distinct ex- 
amination the elements of which any compound body is constituted, 
and are thus enabled to detect any latent sophistication or im- 
purity." 

"One of the chief impediments to the attainment of a just view 
of the nature and object of Logic, is the not fully understanding ^Ae 
SAMENESS of tJic reasoning process in all cases. If as the ordina- 
ry mode of speaking would seem to indicate, mathematical, theo- 
logical, metaphysical and political reasoning were essentially dififer- 
€nt from each other, or different kinds of reasoning, it would fol- 
low that there must be so many different species of Logic. And 
such is perhaps the most prevailing misconception. Others again, 
who are aware that the simple System of Logic, may be applied to 

* " Elements of Logic, comprising the substance of the article in the Ency- 
clopedia Metropolitana, by R. Whately, D. D. Principal of St. Alban's Hall, 
and late Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford." 



14 PREFACfi. 

all subjects whatever, are yet disposed to view it as n peculiar me- 
thod of reasoning, and not, as it is, a method of unfolding and an- 
alyzing our reasoning : whence many have been led, as the author 
of the Philosophy of Rhetoric, to talk of comparing Syllogistic 
Reasoning with Moral Reasoning ; taking it for granted that it is 
possible to reason correctly without reasoning logically ; which is, 
in fact, as great a blunder, as if any one were to mistake grammar 
for a peculiar language, and to suppose it possible to speak cor- 
rectly without speaking grammatically. They have in short con- 
sidered Logic as an art of reasoning ; whereas, so far as it is an 
art, it is the art of reasoning ; the Logician's object being, not to 
lay down principles by which one inay reason, but by which all 
must reason, even though they are not distinctly aware of them : 
to lay down rules, not which may be followed, but which cannot 
possibly be departed from in sound reasoning." 

" Supposing it then to have been perceived that the operation of 
reasoning is in all cases the same, the analysis of that operation 
could not fail to strike the mind as an interesting matter of inquiry. 
And moreover since apparent arguments which are unsound and 
inconclusive, are so often employed, either from error or design; 
and since even those who are not misled by these fallacies ^ are so 
often at a loss to detect and expose them in a manner satisfactory 
to others, or even to themselves ; it could not but appear desirable 
to lay down some general rides of reasoning, applicable to all 
cases, by which a person might be enabled the more readily and 
clearly to state the grounds of his own conviction, or of his ob- 
jection to the arguments of his opponent, instead of arguing at 
random, without any fixed and acknowledged principles to guide 
his procedure. Such rules would be analogous to those of arith- 
metic, which obviate the tediousness and uncertainty of calcula- 
tions in the head, wherein after much labor, different persons might 
arrive at different results, without any of them being able distinct- 
ly to point out the error of the rest. A system of such rules, it is 
obvious, must, instead of deserving to be called the art of wrang- 
ling, be more justly characterized as ' the art of cutting short wrang- 
ling,' by bringing the parlies to issue at once, if not to agreement ; 
and thus saving a waste of time and ingenuity." 

Whatever is an enemy to truth is an enemy toman. Prejudice* 
is an enemy to truth ; and, therefore, Prejudice is uniformly an 
enemy to man. Consequently, wherever, and on whatever subject, 
prejudice is found to exist, it is there that we have an enemy to 
suspect. Prejudice stands opposed to judgment in no feature more 

* " Erroneous judgments are denominated prejudices, or rash judgments, or 
judgments passed before we have duly examined all the circumstances of the 
case on which we intend to decide. Prejudice generally relate to opinions; 
prepossessions to attachments ; the former refers chiefly to things, the latter t» 
persons." — Jamieson, p. 188. 



PREFACE. 15 

than in tl^is, that if prejudice be entitled to be termed judgment at all, 
it is a rash judgment^ a judgment formed without adequate ex- 
amination. Arithmetic itself could not be more usefully employ- 
ed, than to calculate, if it could, the quantity of good already lost to 
man, and which he is daily losing, through prejudice. Precisely 
then in proportion to the number of prejudices we have, or to their 
strength, have we, if we would secure the benefit of which other- 
wise they will assuredly deprive us, the more numerous and power- 
ful enemies to overcome. From these considerations it cannot be 
otherwise than evident that, whatever object or purpose we find 
most frequently rejected through mere prejudice or want of ex- 
amination, it is in that, that we have reason to believe a benefit is 
lost to us. And no science more frequently than Logic has been 
rejected through prejudice. And consequently, it is the science, 
in which we have reason to believe, that through want of examina- 
tion we have been deprived of advantage ; an advantage too that 
refers to all the interests in which we are concerned. 

The history of a science so important as Logic cannot fail to be 
interesting ; and none was so capable of giving it, combined with 
as much instruction, as one possessed of the discriminative powers 
of Dr. Whately. To omit it, would be an injury to this work; 
but to substitute our own phraseology instead of his, would be an 
act of temerity which we decline. We shall therefore insert it 
without further apology. 

" Zeno, the Eleatic, whom most accounts represent as the ear- 
liest systematic writer on the subject of Logic, or, as it^was then 
called. Dialectics, divided his work into three parts ; the first of 
which, on consequences, is censured by Socrates [Plato, Parmen,] 
for obscurity and confusion. In his second part, however, he fur- 
nished that interrogatory method of disputation, ['igoerna-tc*] which 
Socrates adopted, and which has since borne his name. The third 
part of his work was devoted to what may not be improperly term- 
ed the art of wrangling, [ igicrTtK>i,-\] which supplied the disputant 
with a collection of sophistical questions, so contrived, that the 
concession of some point which seemed unavoidable, immediately 
involved some glaring absurdity. This, if it is to be esteemed as at all 
falling within the province of Logic, is certainly not to be regarded, 
as some have ignorantly represented, as its principal or proper bu- 
siness. The Greek philosophers generally have unfortunately de- 
voted too much attention to it ; but we must beware of falling into 
the vulgar error of supposing the ancients to have regarded as a se- 
rious and intrinsically important study, that which in fact they con- 
sidered as an ingenious recreation. The disputants diverted them- 
selves in their leisure hours by making trial of their own and their 
adversary's acuteness, in the endeavor mutually to perplex each 

* Reasoning by interrogation. 

I Wrangling, a disputation instituted on purpose to perplex. 



16 PREFACE. 

other with subtle fallacies ; much in the same way as men amuse 
themselves with propounding and guessing riddles, or with the 
game of chess ; to each of which diversions the sportive disputa- 
tions of the ancients bore much resemblance. They were closely 
analogous to the wrestling exercises of the Gymnasium ; these last 
being reckoned conducive to 'the bodily vigor and activity, as the 
former were to habits of intellectual acuteness ; but the immediate 
object in each was a sportive not a serious contest; though doubt- 
less fashion and emulation often occasioned an undue importance to 
be attached to success in each. Zeno, then, is hardly to be regarded 
any further as a logician than as to what respects his erotetic* me- 
thod of disputation ; a course of argument constructed on this 
principle being properly an hypothetical Sorites,t which may easily 
be reduced to a series of syllogisms. 

" To Zeno succeeded Euclid of Megara, and Antisthenes, both 
pupils of Socrates. The former of these prosecuted the subject of 
the third part of his predecessor's treatise, and is said to have been the 
author of many of the fallacies attributed to the Stoical school- Of 
the writings of the latter nothing certain is known. If, however, we 
suppose the above mentioned sect to have been his disciples in this 
study, and to have retained his principles, he certainly took a more 
correct view of the subject than Euclid. The Stoics divided all 
KiKctT, every thing that could be said, into three classes : 1st. The 
Simple Term ; 2d. The Proposition ; 3d. The Syllogism, viz. 
the hypothetical, for they seem to have had little notion of a more 
rigorous analysis of argument than into that familiar form. We 
must not here omit to notice the merits of Archytas, to whom we 
,.are indebted for the doctrines of the Categories. He, however, as 
^11 as the other writers on the subject, appears to have had no dis- 
tinct vie^w of the proper object and just limits of the science of 
Logic, but to have blended with it metaphysical discussions not 
strictly connected with it ; and to have dwelt on the investigation of 
the nature of terms and propositions, without maintaining a constant 
reference to the principles of Reasoning ; to which all the rest 
should be made subservient. 

" The state then in which Aristotle found the science, if indeed 
it can properly be said to have existed at all before his time, appears to 
have been nearly this : the division into Simple terms. Proposi- 
tions, and Syllogisms, had been shghtly sketched out ; the doc- 
trine of the Categories, and perhaps that of the Opposition of 
Propositions, had been laid down, and, as some believe, the Ana^ 
lysis of species into Genus and Difference, had been introduced by 
Socrates. These at best were rather the materials of the System 
than the System itself; the foundation of which he indeed distinct* 
ly claims the merit of having laid, and which remains fundamen- 
tally the same as he left it. 

* Interrogatory. 

I From 2«§o?, a pile : Sorites, a pile or Series of abridged Syllogisms* 



PREFACE. 17 

** It has been remarked that the logical system is one of those 
few theories which have been begun and perfected by the same in- 
dividual. The history of its discovery, as far as the main princi- 
ples of the science are concerned, properly commences and ends 
with Aristotle ; and this may perhaps in part account for the subse- 
quent perversions of it. The brevity, and simplicity of its fundamen- 
tal truths, to which point indeed all real science is perpetually tend- 
ing, has probably led many to suppose that something much more 
complex, abstruse and mysterious remained to be discovered. The 
vanity too, by which all men are prompted unduly to magnify their 
own pursuits, has led unphiiosophical minds, not in this case alone, 
but in many others, to extend the boundaries of their respective 
sciences, not by the patient development and just application 
of the principles of those sciences, but by wandering into ir- 
relevant subjects. The mystical employment of numbers by 
Pythagoras, in matters utterly foreign to arithmetic, is per- 
haps the earliest instance of the kind. A more curious and im- 
portant one is the degeneracy of astronomy into judicial astrology ; 
but none is more striking than the misapplication of Logic, by 
those who have treated of it as ' the art of rightly employing the 
rational faculties,'' or who have intruded into it the province of 
Natural Philosophy, and regarded the Syllogism as an engine for 
the investigation of nature ; while they overlooked the boundless field 
that was before them within the legitimate limits of the science ; 
and perceived not the importance and difficulty of the task, of com- 
pletintr and properly filling up the masterly* sketch before them. 

*' The writings of Aristotle were not only absolutely lost to the 
world for about two centuries, but seem to have been but little 
studied for a long time after their recovery. An art, however, of 
Logic, derived from the principles traditionally preserved by his 
disciples, seems to have been generally known, and to have been 
employed by Cicero in his philosophical works ; but the pursuit of 
the science seems to have been abandoned for a long time. Early 
in the Christian era, the Peripatetic doctrines experienced a con- 
siderable revival; and we meet with the names of Galen and Por- 
phyry as logicians : but it is not till the fifth century that Aris- 
totle's logical works were translated into Latin by the celebrated 
BoETiiius. Not one of these seems to have made any considera- 
ble advances in developing the theory of reasoning. Of Galen's 
labors little is known ; and Porphyry's principal work is merely on 
the Predicables. We have little of the science till the revival 
of learning among the Arabians, by whom Aristotle's treatises on this 
as well as on other subjects were eagerly studied. 

*' Passing by the names of some Byzantine writers of no great 
importance, we come to the time of the Schoolmen, whose waste of 
ingenuity and frivolous subtilty of disputation need not be enlarged 

* Aristotle's. 
b2 



18 PREFACE. 

upon. It may be sufficient to observe, that their fault did not lie 
in their diligent study of Logic, and the high value they set upon 
it, but in their utterly mistaking the true nature and object of the 
science ; and by the attempt to employ it for the purpose of physi- 
cal discoveries J involving every subject in a mist of words to the 
exclusion of sound philosophical investigation. Their errors may 
serve to account for the strong terms in which Bacon sometimes 
appears to censure such pursuits; but that the censure was intend- 
ed to bear against the extravagant perversions, not the legitimate 
cultivation of the science, may be proved from his own observa- 
tions on the subject, in his advancement of learning. 

" His moderation, however, was not imitated in other quarters. 
Even Locke confounds in one sweeping censure the Aristotelic 
Theory, with the absurd misapplications of it in later years. His 
objection to the science, as unserviceable in the discovery of truth, 
which has of late been often ignorantly repeated, while it holds 
good in reference to many misnamed logicians, indicates that, with 
regard to the true nature of the science itself, he had no clearer 
notions than they had, of the proper province of Logic, viz. Fea- 
soning; and of the distinct character of that operation from the ob- 
servations and experiments which are essential to the study of 
nature. 

*' An error apparently different, but substantially the same, per- 
vades the treatises of Dr. Watts, and other modern* writers on 
the subject. Perceiving the inadequacy of the syllogistic theory 
to the vast purposes to which others had attempted to apply it, he 
still craved after the attainment of some equally comprehensive 
and all-powerful system, which he accordingly attempted to con- 
struct, under the title of " The Bight Use of JReason,'* which was 
to be a method of invigorating and properly directing all the powers 
of the mind: a most magnificent object indeed, but one which not 
only does not fall under the province of Logic, but cannot be ac- 
complished by any one science or system that can even be con- 
ceived to exist. The attempt to comprehend so wide a field, is no 
extension of science, but a mere verbal generalization, which leads 
only to vague and barren declamation. In every pursuit the more 
precise and definite our object, the more likely we are to attain to 
some valuable result ; if, like the Platonists, who sought after the 
tivTxya.^ov, OT the abstract idea of good, we pursue some specious 
but ill-defined scheme of universal knowledge, we shall lose the 
substance while grasping at a shadow, and bewilder ourselves in 
empty generalities. 

" Complaints have also been made that Logic leaves untouched 
the greatest difficulties, and those which are the sources of the 
chief errors in reasoning, viz. the ambiguity or indistinctness of 
Terms, and the doubts respecting the degrees of evidence in va- 

* From this charge, a small work, entitled, " A Compendium of Logic," 
printed at London about 1780, is entirely free. 



PREFACE. 19 

rious Propositions : an objection which is not to be removed by 
any such attempt as that of Dr. Watts to lay down " rules for form- 
ing clear ideas, and or guiding the judgment," but by replying that 
no art is to be censured for not teaching more than falls within its 
province, and indeed more than can be taught by any conceivable 
art. Such a system of universal knowledge as should instruct us 
in the full meaning or meanings of every term, and the truth or 
falsity, certainty or uncertainty, of every proposition, thus super- 
seding all other studies, it is most unphilosophical to expect or 
imagine. And to find fault with Logic for not performing this, is 
as if one should object to the science of Optics for not giving sight 
to the blind ; or as if, like the man of whom Warburton tells a story 
in his Div. Leg. one should complain of a reading-glass, for being 
of no service to a person who had never learned to read, 

*' In fact the difficulties and errors alluded to are not in the pro- 
cess of Reasoning itself which alone is the appropriate province of 
Logic, but in the subject-matter about which it is employed. This 
process will have been correctly conducted, if it has conformed to 
the logical rules, which preclude the possibility of any error creep- 
ing in between the principles from which we are arguing, and the 
conclusions we deduce from them. But still that conclusion may 
be false, if the principles we start from are so. In like manner, no 
arithmetical skill will secure a correct result to a calculation unless 
the data are correct from which we calculate : nor does any one on 
that account undervalue arithmetic ; and yet the objection against 
Logic rests on no better foundation. 

" There is in fact a striking analogy in this respect between the 
two sciences. All numbers, which are the subject of arithmetic, 
must be numbers of some things, whether coins, persons, mea- 
sures, or any thing else ^ but to introduce into the science any no- 
tice of the things respecting which calculations are made, would 
be evidently irrelevant, and would destroy its scientific character : 
we proceed, therefore, with arbitrary signs respecting numbers in 
the abstract. So also does Logic pronounce on the validity of a 
regularly constructed argument, equally well, though arbitrary 
symbols may have been substituted for the terms ; and consequent- 
ly, without any regard to the things signified by those terms. And 
the possibility of doing this, though the employment of such- arbi- 
trary symbols has been absurdly objected to, even by writers who 
understood not only arithmetic but also Algebra, is a proof of the 
strictly scientific character of the system. But many professed lo- 
gical writers, not attending to the circumstances which have been 
just mentioned, have wandered into disquisitions on various 
branches of knowledge ; disquisitions which must evidently be as 
boundless as human knowledge itself, since there is no subject in 
which Reasoning is not employed, and to which, consequently, 
Logic may not be applied. The error lies in regarding every thing 
as the proper province of Logic, to which it is applicable, A si- 



20 PREFACE. , 

milar error is complained of by Aristotle, as having taken place 
with respect to Rhetoric ; of which, indeed, we find specimens in 
the arguments of several of the interlocutors in Cic de Oratore^ 

It would appear from the numerous treatises on Logic to which 
we have adverted, that the majority of them have been written for 
the adult reader exclusively, or for the advanced student at the 
University or College ; without the consideration on the part of the 
author, how much might be done, consistently with every other 
design, through the medium of method, arrangement, and all the 
advantages derivable from typographic distinction, further to facili- 
tate and render more general, the acquisition of a science whose 
importance is co-extensive with every interest existing in society. 
In numerous schools and respectable seminaries, it is no uncom- 
mon thing to find boys of fourteen or fifteen years of age, that 
have creditably passed through several of the first books of Eu- 
clid, and the more difficult parts of algebra; and in a very reputa- 
ble academy* in this city, several young ladies of a similar age, 
have with much benefit to themselves and credit to their instruc- 
tor, successfully studied Euclid, Algebra, Fergus's Nat. Philo- 
sophy, and Butler's Analogy. Now we would ask, what i& 
there in Logic more difficult, than in any of the sciences and 
works just mentioned? If there be any difficulty, it is not in 
the art itself certainly, but it may exist in the obscure and in- 
judicious manner of exhibiting it. Every art has its definitions, 
axioms, rules, and a few technicalities peculiar to itself, but these 
once learned, and their use by a little practice become familiar, the 
difficulty is over, the rest is a pleasure, a and permanent advantage. 

In addition to every other reason calculated to render a science- 
less generally studied, is the want of proper method and judicious 
arrangement. In every treatise we find matter of principal, se- 
condary and remote importance. A work with the whole of this- 
blended indiscriminately, is at once forbidding, inconvenient in the 
business of tuition, and can never be used as a book of reference 
A reader to whom a work of this description is presented, though 
his design is only to learn the general scope and intention of the 
author, has only one alternative ; that is to read the whole through, 
whether the whole, in his case, be necessary or not. Very pos- 
sibly, on first opening the book,, his object might be, particularly if 
his time be not very ample, to discover merely what are the leading 
points, or what has the first claim to his attention ; but if this be 
mixed up, without distinction, in the general mass, and he a learn- 
er, he is supposed neither to have the discrimination nor the leisure 
to make this selection for himself; and the consequence is, either 
that he closes the book in discouragement,, or has the fDrtitude 
patiently to wade through matter of first, second and third rate im^ 
portance, and after a dozen readings of this kind, the cloud proba- 

* Special reference is made: tft the semiaary of Rev. C. H. Alden. 



PREFACE. 21 

biy remains, and his memory cannot be refreshed by easy and 
ready reference. The work, therefore, is finally abandoned, not 
because its subject had no intrinsic merit, but because its author 
never anticipated the peculiar exigencies of the learner, nor knew 
how to adapt the arrangement to the circumstances of those whose 
time is limited. Whoever became accurately acquainted with the 
French by toiling through the 540 octavo pages of Chambaud's 
Grammar, where Rule^ Exception, Illustration, Example, lie- 
mark, Exercise and Note are crowded into one chaos ? Or what 
mere learner has the power to separate so much ore from the more 
precious metal ? The mere want of judicious method alone, has 
done more to disserve the cause of Education, to impede the teach- 
er and discourage the learner, than is commonly imagined. 

Since we cannot perceive any peculiar difficulty in the science or 
art of Logic itself, at least, certainly nothing greater than what is 
implied in learning the simple art of English Grammar, it remains 
only to remove whatever prejudices may have arisen from the mis- 
representations of those who never understood the science them- 
selves, or the obscurities of others, who, in accommodation to the 
learner or the man of business, never knew how to exhibit it. By the 
latter, a man of business, we are addressed. He says, " what is 
Logic, its nature and object? To read that book, would not suit 
me : I have look'd at its pages in vain : I have not time : I want 
something to strike the eye at once. Show me the picture, the full 
length portrait : if there be a cloud, or dust, remove it : let me see 
not only it at one look, but its shape, features, color, &c.: and then, 
by a few glances, by looking at a picture, I read a whole book, an 
entire volume : my first intention is answered : and if I am satisfied 
I will return, and view the picture again, or many times, till the 
picture is no longer on canvass only, but painted on my eye, my 
memory, my understanding ; and what I know, I can surely ex- 
plain to others. But if you cannot treat me in this way ; if you 
hand me that heavy prosing volume, where instead of a single line 
visible or distinct, or anything like the ready picture, all lines and 
all colors are put on with one brush, for such a painter's pi I have 
no time, business calls, and though I was ' almost persuaded' to 
become a logician, I shall be compelled to remain ' altogether,' 
what I was, unacquainted with the nature and design of logic." 

Logic is certainly an essential part of a liberal education, and de- 
sirable for all who wonld possess a well cultivated mind. And if, 
as is certainly the fact, there is less difficulty in it, than there is in 
arithmetic, and the impediments to a clear view, and ready attain- 
ment of it may be removed, as we have laboured to effect in this 
volume, we see no reason why it should not become, to the advan- 
tage and credit of this nation, a general study : no reason why, 
that all possessing any native talent, or those at least that are com- 
petent to attend to the study of arithmetic or grammar, should not 
learn it ; nor any reason why it could not with advantage be intro- 



22 PREFACE. 

duced into the schools as well as into the colleges : that all, not 
only the Divine, the Barrister, the Senator, the Politician, the Lec- 
turer, the Author, and the Teacher, who would eminently find their 
account therein, should not thorougly understand it ; but also the 
merchant, the tradesman, and the mechanic, many of whom are 
men of considerable talent, and know not yet what social or civil 
duties they may have to fulfil ; and in short, all who are aware that 
the mind is an endowment so much more valuable than the body, 
and that it is infinitely more worthy of the ornaments of every 
mental excellency and acquisition, than the latter can be of the 
finest and most costly apparel. 

To promote this object, and furnish every facility that students 
of every class, and persons in every situation can require, the fol- 
lowing arrangement will be found to prevail throughout the present 
volume. 1st. The definitions and rules and whatever, in the de- 
velopment of the science, calls for principal attention, will be dis- 
tinguished on the page from the illustrations, notes and examples ; 
and the former, for the convenience of those who wish to impress 
them on the memory, will be expressed with the utmost brevity, 
and numbered throughout for the purpose of reference. 2dly. The 
whole work will be divided into chapters, and each chapter will 
close with an interrogatory exercise on the subjects it explains, ac- 
companied with apposite examples to evince that the pupil not only 
remembers but also understands the rule or definition he recites. 
This brings again under consideration and inquiry, and that in a 
diff"erent or inverse manner, every subject that was more directly 
treated by the chapter to which it refers. The very nature of a 
recapitulatory exercise is to require, at some convenient stage of 
the student's progress, a repetition of what he has already learned, 
in order to prove that he retains his past acquisitions. It is of the 
nature of those cross examinations, that prevail in our courts of 
judicature, by which the evidence that before appeared plausible or 
correct, often proves to be fallacious. A similar necessity obtains in 
the classical department: a boy must be in the habit of both read- 
ing and writing Latin before he can be proficient. In reading he 
attends chiefly to the sense of his author ; but in writing, he be- 
comes solicitous about the mood, tense, case and concord ; and thus 
what the first method left undone, is effected by the second. 3dly. 
To furnish every accommodation that can be requisite, a small 
key to the problems or examples proposed for solution, will be given 
at the end of the volume. 4thly. A synopsis, or 7nemorial view 
of all the principal points of the science, will be furnished for 
practical purposes, in its proper place. 5thly. And additional ex-. 
ercises will also be added at the end of the work, consisting either 
of examples not in syllogistic form, proposed for reduction into 
regular order ; or of apparent syllogisms for the detection of 
the fallacies they contain. 6thly. And to the work will also be 
added, for the convenience of all engaged in teaching, exam.ples^ 
of logical parsing with suitable parsing exercises. 



PREFACE. 23 

Throughout the whole of this work, it has been the endeavor of 
the author to afford every facility for the purpose of either private 
or public instruction. In the latter, or for young persons, it will be 
proper, 1st. That the learner should every evening, commit to 
memory and study, two or more, according to his capacity, of the 
definitions, axioms or rules, contained in the treatise, and repeat 
them on the following morning. 2dly. And at the end of every 
section, that he should repeat the whole of that section, by learning 
it the second time, in order that it may be more completely infixed 
in his memory. 3dly. Before he proceeds to a higher class, it is re- 
commended, that his proficiency should be examined and his recol- 
lection confirmed, by the interrogatory exercise at the close of 
the chapter. 4thly. It is peculiar to this volume to be arranged for 
the purpose of enabling the tutor to convene together, once a week, 
all his pupils learning the art, in classes or otherwise, for the pur- 
pose of collective examination, and mutual argument or dispu- 
tation, on subjects or syllogisms that might be selected for the 
purpose, at the discretion of the tutor. 

It was the intention of the present writer to notice particularly the 
several authors to whom he is, in the production of this volume, more 
or less indebted. But in a work, the original intention of which was 
to unite as far as possible the various excellencies of every treatise of 
eminence, quotations would naturally abound. In such cases it is 
usually deemed sufficient to make the acknowledgment once for 
all. The frequent alterations made in the language, and the incon- 
venience of crowding the page with names, tend to justify the ex* 
elusion of perpetual reference. To concentrate every useful illus- 
tration and improvement is a duty indispensably incumbent on every 
author. We infer the propriety from its evident advantage, the sanc- 
tion from universal custom, and the warrant from Seneca, who ob- 
serves, " we ought to imitate the bees, that wander up and down, 
and taste the flowers eligible for the production of honey. What 
they collect, with a certain mixture and peculiar property of their 
own, they change into its sweetness. These bees we ought to 
imitate, and to analyze whatever we from various reading treasure 
up. Then the care and energy of our own genius being added, to 
transfuse these various extracts into one flavor. So that even if it 
should appear, from whence it had been taken, it may, however, 
appear, something else than those from whence it was taken."* 

* " Apes debemus imitari, quae vagantur, et flores ad mel faciendum idoneos 
carpunt : et quae collegerunt, in hunc saporem mixtura quadam et proprietate 
spiritus sui mutant, nosque has apes deberaus imitari, et qusecunqiie ex diversa 
letione congessimus, separate, Beinde adhibita ingenii nostri cura et facultate, 
in unum saporem varia ilia libamenta confundere ut, etiam si apparuerit unde 
sumptum sit, aliud tamen esse, quam unde sumptum est, appareat."— ^e«tfca. 



ANALYSIS OF THE WORK. 



For p. read page ; for a. article ; and for n. read note. p. 

lKTEODtJCTIO]!f, - - - 25 

Importance of the science, p. 27 ; analysis of argument, p. 28 ; pro- 
position, p. 29 ; subject and predicate, p. 30 ; major, minor and mid- 
dle terms, p. 30 ; major and minor premiss and conclusion, p. 31 ; 
Aristotle's general law, p. 31 ; mistakes of certain writers on this 
subject, p. 31, and seq. ; method of finding the middle term, p. 35 ; 
distribution of terms, p. 35 and seq. : the principal kinds of proposi- 
tions, p. 38 ; rule for distribution, p. 39 and 41 ; how to mark terms 
distributed, p. 41 ; irregular arguments examined, p. 42 and seq. 

PART I. ON TERMS, &c. 

PKELiMiJfARx Chapter; on the operations of the mind, &c. - - 49 
Apprehension, a. 2 ; judgment, a. 3 ; argumentation, a. 4 ; language, 
a. 5 ; definition of logic, a. 7 ; its province, a. 7, n. 1, and seq. 

Chapter I. On terms simply, ...----54 
A term, a. 8 ; singular, a. 9 ; universal, a. 10 ; relative, a. 11 ; abso- 
lute, a. 12; positive, a. 13 ; privative, a. 14; negative, a. 15 ; ab- 
stract, a. 16 ; concrete, a. 17; indefinite, a. 18 ; definite, a. 19. 

Chapter II. On the opposition of terms. ^^ 

Definition, a. 20; consistent terms, a. 21 ; opposite terms, a. 22; 
opposition of terms fourfold, a. 23 ; relative opposition, a. 24 ; con- 
trary opposition, a. 25 ; privative opposition, a. 26 ; contradictory 
opposition, a. 27. 

Chapter III. On the generalization of terms, and on terms predicable, 61 
Generalization, a. 28 ; comprehension of terms, a. 28, n. 6 ; exten- 
sion of terms, a. 28, n. 7 ; terms predicable, a. 29 and 30 ; genus, a. 
31 ; species, a. 32; essential difference, a, 33 ; property, a. 34; ac- 
cident, a. 35; highest genus or subaltern, a. 36 to 38 ; additional 
notes on predicables, p. 65 and seq. 

Chapter IV. On the division and definition of terms, - - 68 

Division of a universal term, a. 40 ; rules of division, a. 41 ; defini- 
tion of terms, a. 42 ; nominal definition, a. 43 ; real definition, a. 44 ; 
accidental definition, a. 45 ; essential definition, a. 46 ; physical 
definition, a. 47 ; logical definition, a. 48 ; rules of definition, a. 49. 

PART II. ON PROPOSITIONS. 

Chapter I. On the nature and parts of a proposition, - - 76 

Definition, a. 51 ; matter of a proposition, a. 52 and a. 58 ; its ex- 
tremes, a. 56; its parts, a. 53; subject, a. 54; predicate, a. 5&; 
copula, a. 57. 

Chapter II. On the principal kinds of propositions, - - - 80 
Propositions, 1st, absolute, a. 60 ; 2d, hypothetical, a. 61 ; quality 
of propositions, a. 62 ; quantity of propositions, a. 63 ; propositions, 
aflirmative, a. 62, n. 1 ; negative, a. n. 2 ; universal, a. 64 ; par- 



326 ANALYSIS OF THE WORK. 



P- 



licular, a. 65 ; universal affirmative, a. 66 ; universal negative, a. 
67 ; particular affirmative, a. 68 ; particular negative, a. 69 ; memo- 
rial symbols, a. 70; singular propositions, a. 72 ; indefinite proposi- 
tions, a. 73 ; additional remarks on universals, p. 84. 

Chapteh III. On the secondary kinds of propositions, - - 88 

Propositions, pure or simple, a. 74 ; modal, a. 75 ; complex, a. 76 ; 
compound, a. 77 ; copulative, a. 78 ; discretive, a. 79 ; disjunctive, 
a. 80 ; conditional, a. 81 ; causal, a. 83 ; relative, a. 83 ; reciprocal, 
a. 83, n. 3 ; identical, a. 83, n. 4. 

Chapter IV. On the distribiUion of the terms of a proposition, - 96 

A term when said to be distributed, a. 84 ; inquiry of distribution 
implies comprehension or extension, or both, a. 84, and notes; rules of 
distribution, a. 84 or 85 ; necessary, impossible or contingent matter 
of a proposition, a. 86 ; rules as to indefinite and singular proposi- 
tions, a. 87 to 89. 

Chapter V. Section I. On the opposition of propositions, - - 106 
Opposition of propositions defined, a. 90 ; kinds of opposition, a. 
92 and 93; schemes of opposition, p. 108 to 110; rules of opposi- 
tion, a: 94; summary rules of opposition, a. 95 and 96 ; subalterna- 
tion, a. 96, notes. 

Section II. On the conversion of propositions, - - - - 114 
Conversion of propositions defined, a. 97 ; original and converse pro- 
position, a. 98 ; inferential conversion, a. 99 ; hmits of conversion, a. 
100 and seq. ; examples of inferential conversion, a. 100, n. 3 and 
seq. ; simple conversion, a. 102; particular conversion, a. 103; con- 
version by negation, a. 103, notes; summary rules of conversion, a. 
104. 

ON evidence. 

Chapter VI. On the evidence necessary in the affirmation or negation of 
a proposition, - - - - • - -- - 123 

I*articulars implied by evidence, p. 123 ; what testifies, a. 105 ; 
TESTIMONY, a. 106 ; necessity of the exercise of the faculties of per- 
ception, a. 105, n. 7 and seq.; evidence, a. 107 ; eaculties op 
PERCEIVING EVIDENCE, 3.108; sensation, a. 108, n. 2 and seq. ; 
Cartesian philosophy, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, a. 108, n.-4 and 
seq.; consequences of scepticism, p. 133 and seq.; conscio7isness,\). 
134; conception, ibid. ; imagination, Tp. 135; attention, ibid.; as- 
sociation of ideas, p. 136; memory, ibid; comparing, ibid ; ab' 
straction, Tp. 137; analysis, p. 140; passions, p. 141; assent, a. 
109; CONVICTION, a. 110 ; opinion, p. 147 ; certainty, ibid ; scale 
of assent, p. 148; coNSEatiENCEs or conviction, a. Ill; scepti- 
cism of Pyrrho, p. 152 ; writings of Buffier, Keid, Butler, Beattie, 
Campbell, Paley, and Stewart, p. 152 and seq. 

Chapter VII. Ori intuitive evidence, - - - -- -155 

Definition of intuitive evidence, a. 133 ; its kinds, a. 133, n. 1 ; in- 
tuitive evidence not always comparison, p. 157 and seq. ; evidence 
of sensation, a. 114; evidence of consciousness, a. 115; evidence 
of memory, a. 116; evidence of axioms, a. 117; sceptic's millenni- 
um, a. 117, n. 4. 

Chapter VIII. On dedtictive evidence, - . - - - 168 

Deductive evidence defined, a. 118; founded on intuitive, p. 168; 
examples, p. 169 to 173 ; its kinds, a. 119 ; mathematical evidence, 



ANALYSIS OF THE WORK. 327 

p. 
a. 120 ; moral evidence, a. 121 ; its evidence not inferior to mathe- 
matical, a. 121 and seq[. ; protest against the term "probable evi- 
dence," p. 178 and seq. ; probable testimony, a. 122; human testi- 
mony, a. 122, n. 2. 

PART III. ON ARGUMENTATION. 

Section I. On induction, - - - - - - - -183 

Definition of induction, a. 123 ; discursive induction, a. 124; illus- 
tration, a. 124, notes; argumentative induction, a. 125;, illustra- 
tions, a. 125, notes; contrast between induction and syllogism, p. 
187 and seq. 

Section II. 0?i analogy, 190 

Definition, a. 126 ; illustrations, a. 126, notes ; cases wherein analo- 
gy is proper, a. 126, n. 7 and seq. ; Butler's Analogy, a. 126, n. 9 ; 
its use in inference from things known having a resemblance to 
things less known, a, 126, n. 10 and seq. 

Sectioin- III. On argume?iis. 

Chapter I. On the nature, parts and rules of syllogism, - - 197 
A premiss, a. 127; argument, a. 128; the three terms, major, mi- 
nor and middle of a syllogism, a. 129 and 130; properties of the 
middle term, a. 131 and notes ; of the minor, a. 132 ; the three pro- 
positions of one argument, a. 133; their office, a. 134 ; Aristotle's 
law, a. 135 ; its converse, a. 136 ; perfect syllogism, a. 137 ; gene- 
ral principles, a. 138 and 139 ; rules of syllogism, a. 140 and seq.; 
analysis of syllogism, p. 208. 

Chapteu II. On the moods and figures of syllogism, - - - 210 
Introductory remarks, p. 210 and seq. ; illustration of the general 
law of syllogism by a diagram, p. 212 ; mood, a. 145 ; figure of a 
syllogism, a. 146; the first figure, a. 147; the second and third 
figures, a. 148 ; the fourth figure, a. 149 ; memorial line for figures, 
a. 151 ; the same for moods, a. 152 ; examples of the four figures, p. 
219 and seq. 

Chapter III. On the reduction of syllogism, - . . _ 222 

Definition, a. 153; kinds of reduction, a. 154; explanation of the 
memorial lines for reduction, a. 154 and notes; rule for reduction, 
a. 155 ; examples of reduction, p. 224 and seq. ; reduction ad im- 
possible, a. 157, 

Chapter IV. On hypothetical syllogisms, 230 

Definition, p. 230 ; conditional syllogism, a. 159; its parts, a. 160 ; 
rules, a. 161 ; constructive and destructive hypotheticals, a. 163 ; dis- 
junctive syllogisms, a. 165 ; dilemma, a. 167; reduction of hypo- 
theticals, a. 168. 

Chapter V. On the enthymeme, sorites, epichirema, &c. - - 238 

The enthymeme, a. 169 ; sorites, a. 170; the epichirema, a. 171 ; 
reasoning a priori, a posteriori, &c. p. 241 ; directand indirect, eJu// 
argumentum ad hominem — ad verecundiam — ad ignorantiam — ad 
populum — ad judicium, &c. p. 242. 

Chapter VI. General remarks on argumentSj - - - . 243 
Identity of all arguments when complete or reduced to regular form 
with the syllogism, p. 243 and seq. ; contrast between the enthyme- 
me and syllogism, p, 246 and seq. ; privilege of man not only as a 



328 ANALYSIS OF THE WORK. 



rational, but as a reasoning being, p. 247 and seq. ; identity of all 
reasoning, p. 250 and seq. ; the general law, p. 253 and seq. ; truth 
single and indivisible, and reasoning when correct the same, p. 253 
and seq. ; progressive advancement of rationality by reasoning, p. 
256 and seq. ; necessity of reduction into syllogistic form to detect 
fallacy, p. 257 and seq. ; one act of law is one act of reasoning, or 
one syllogism, p. 261 and seq.; objections founded on misconcep- 
tion answered, p. 262 and seq. 

Chapteh VII. On fallacies, - 266 

Definition, a. 172 ; limits, a. 173 ; possibility of excluding fallacy, 
when the truth of the premises is known, a. 173, notes; special 
rules for the syllogisms of each figure, a. 174 and seq. ; Dr. Whate- 
ly's table of fallacies, p. 273 ; general analysis of fallacies, a. 180. 

Gr.xrs I. Fallacy from ambiguity in one term, ... 274 

Species 1. The fallacy of similar expression, a. 182 ; species 2, fal- 
lacy of interrogation, a. 183 ; species 3, fallacy of equivocation, a. 
184 ; species 4, fallacy of division and composition, a. 185 ; species 
5, fallacy of the accident, a. 186. 

Genus II. Fallacy from a term imdistributed, ... 2S0 

Species 1, fallacy from an undistributed middle term, a. 187 and seq. ; 
species 2, fallacy from illicit process, ibid. 

Gk>"us III. Fallacy from improper premises^ .... 282 
Species \. Fallacy of begging the question, . . . - 282 
Variety 1, arguing by what is not granted, a. 189, notes; variety 
2, arguing from a synonymous word, ibid ; variety 3, from some- 
thing equally unknown, 26zV/; variety 4, from what is more un- 
known, ibid ; variety 5, arguing in a circle, a. 189, n. 7 and 8. 
Species 2. Fallacy of undue a$su7nptio?i, ... - 283 

Variety 1, assigning a false cause, a. 190, n. 2 ; variety 2, substitu- 
tion of a false premiss, a. 190, n. 3; variety 3, of partial reference, 
a. 190, n. 4 ; variety 4, combination with a mistake of the question, 
a. 190, n. 5 ; variety 5, infering a greater from a less probability, a. 
190, n. 6. 

Species 3. Fallacy of mistaking the question, .... 285 
Variety 1, ignorance of the question, a. 194. n. «4 ; variety 2, wilful 
mistake of the question, a. 194, n. 5 ; variety 3, combination with 
begging the question, a. 194, n. 6 ; variety 4, by appeal to the pas- 
sions, a. 194, n. 9 ; variety 5, fallacy of shifting ground, a. 194, n. 
10 ; variety 6, of partial objections, a. 194, n, 11 ; variety 7, of un- 
fair representation, a. 194, n. 13 ; summary of fallacies, p. 290; the 
possibilities of deception numerically illustrated, p. 291. 



APPENDIX. 



Section I. Synopsis of Logic, 

Section II. Metaphysical, moral and mathematical reasonin 
Section III. Rules of interpretation, .... 

Section IV. Rules of controversy, - . . 

Section V. Rules of method. 

Treating on a simple theme, p. 302 ; on problem, p. 304 
Section VI. Logical parsing, with examples. 
Section VIII. Syllogistic exercises. 



293 

295 
298 
300 
301 

311 
317 



Logical analysis applied to the first part of Paley's Evidences, - 317 



ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 



Whether the Analytic or Synthetic mode of communica- 
ting instruction, at least for initiatory purposes, is the more 
eligible, is a question that may frequently demand the consi- 
deration of those on whom that important duty devolves. The 
former mode presents a whole subject, or, at least, as much of 
it as is essential to the purpose ; and after the necessary re- 
marks on its nature and object as a whole, proceeds to de- 
velope that nature, and to point out how that object, through 
the proper connexion, is ultimately acquired, by a methodical 
and judicious analysis and dissection of the whole subject into 
its component parts and subdivisions. The Synthetic method, 
on the contrary, begins with those several subdivisions and 
parts, pointing out the particular use of each and its de- 
pendancy on another, until from the smaller we arrive at the 
larger divisions, and from these to the whole, and to the ex- 
emplification of its use and service in the business of private 
and social life. On this plan it is sometimes necessary that the 
patience of the learner should be a little exercised, whilst he 
is attending to the mere elements, of the ultimate advantage 
of which he can form no conception, until he arrive at that 
stage of the science, where he can perceive all that benefit 
and service it may be of to himself and others, which before he 
could by no means appreciate. To obviate, however, this 
temporary inconvenience, and to embrace every advantage 
cirising from the Synthetic process, otherwise the more perfect 
of the two, lecturers about to deliver an entire course on 
any science, frequently preface the series with an opening or 
introductory lecture, in which the Analytic mode, the more 
preferable for an initiatory purpose, is first adopted j that is 



26 INTRODUCTION. 

the whole subject, or as much of it as is possible, is presented, 
and afterwards its parts are consecutively developed. Atten- 
tion being thus secured, the lecturer is afterwards at liberty to 
employ the Synthetic or any other mode more eligible for his 
purpose. 

The beautiful introduction of Dr. Paley to his Natural 
Theology is a subject of frequent remark. We have, as it 
were, at once a picture before the imagination. We see an 
Indian — one altogether unacquainted with the arts and pro- 
ductions of civilized life — a watch, what he had never seen 
before, and that too in movement, implying pre-existent de- 
sign, is lying on the ground before him ! And he, as might be 
expected, is in a state of wonder and astonishment. At what ? 
At the watch as a whole, certainly, and that whole in a state 
of successful and instructive operation. Now, on the contra- 
ry, if the watch, instead of being there in its whole and en- 
tire state, in which it exemplified utility and design, had been 
previously taken to pieces and disconnected, exemplifying 
neither motion nor design in its construction, the state of his 
surprise or excitement would have been very different, his at- 
tention wbuld have been withdrawn and transferred to his 
bow, his arrows, and the chase, and he would have remained 
an Indian still. 

For reasons, therefore, now explained, we shall devote this 
introductory chapter to the analytic explanation of Logic. 
The necessary consequence not only of the intellectual cha- 
racter of man, but of the singular peculiarity of the situation 
and circumstances in which he is placed ; — placed not only 
before one or many watches, but surrounded by systems, small 
and great, above, below, and on every hand, in endless train 
and countless succession, is, that he is a reasoning being, one 
necessarily employed in successive argumentation. Man rea- 
sons, argues, necessarily, unavoidably, not only as it refers to 
his own mind, but also to the numberless characters with whom 
he is or may be engaged. But that man necessarily reasons, 
and reasons always rightly, are as much two things, as that 
watches go, and go always rightly. Were the movements of 
jOur reasoning as ordinarily correct as those of the chronome- 



INTRODUCTION. 27 

ter, there would, comparatively, be little need of Logic ; but 
the uniform testimony of history and common experience de- 
clare that, in this case, there are many watches out of repair, 
and that, therefore, not only a regulator, but all the regulation 
we can attain, is as well for the benefit of the individual, as 
for that of society at large, imperatively required. 

If man is, and has been always reasoning, he has been rea- 
soning now for near six thousand years. And this fact alone 
presents a serious and very important inquiry. We perceive 
in a moment a defect of a very alarming nature ; for except 
as to the arts, and to the exact sciences, and to certain con- 
cerns of a mercenary character, to how little purpose, as to 
all the moral and intellectual excellencies of which we are ca- 
pable, have thousands of our fellow men, in this and every 
preceding age, reasoned ! and how little has every succeed- 
ing generation learned from the foibles of all that have pre- 
ceded it ! Had all this great defect been supplied, from age 
to age, hy men not only reasoning, but reasoning accurately, 
and on subjects most important to themselves, we should not 
to this day, whether in governments or in the domestic circle, 
have inherited, to so lamentable an extent, all the failings of 
our fathers. Is this then a proof that common sense, in many 
cases, a sense too common, is a sufficient guide ? 

It will not be inferred by any reflecting character, that we 
mean by this to intimate that the mere art of Logic, however 
excellent in its place, could, without its practical applica- 
tion, adequately supply a defect so alarming in extent as the 
one to which we have just alluded. Neither Logic merely in 
the book, nor Logic unapplied to subjects that essentially con- 
cern us, nor without carrying out into practice the precepts, 
that we may, if we will, correctly deduce from proper pre- 
mises, will do any thing. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that 
the art of Logic, and the principles it affords, rightly under- 
stood, correctly applied, and conscientiously obeyed, would, 
though not the only regulator, have a powerful influence on 
the human mind, and a more extensive and happier influence 
in every department of society, than it is, at present, possible 
to appreciate. 



28 INTRODUCTION. 

Neither do we intend to deny that men can reason without 
the art of Logic, on some subjects correctly, though on others 
the reasoning is blended with fallacy, which they themselves 
are unable to detect. But they are liable also, as every day's 
experience testifies, to be imposed on by the sophisticated rea- 
sonings of others, without being able to expose their illogi- 
cal conclusions: or to anticipate precisely on what ground an. 
opponent may meet an argument apparently correct and com- 
plete in itself. 

Every argument terminates with a conclusion relative to 
which our inquiries have been directed. And every conclu- 
sion is deduced from two propositions, called premises. In 
an argument briefly expressed, though one of these premises 
is suppressed, it is nevertheless understood as admitted. That 
this is the fact becomes evident by supposing a denial of the sup- 
pressed premiss, which immediately invalidates the argument.. 
Suppose that one unfolding the vast volumes of nature, arrives 
by the inductive process, which we shall hereafter explain, at 
the conviction that " the world exhibits marks of design ;" the 
irresistible conclusion, in his own mind, from this is, that 
*^ therefore it must have had an intelligent authorP The 
whole argument in this state may be expressed in one com- 
pound proposition, which is the form in which it is called an 
Enthymeme, or an argument with one of the premises sup- 
pressed. In this state it stands thus: 

" The world exhibits marks of design ; therefore 
It must have had an intelligen^t author.'^ 

One inquiring, if this argument, as it is, is complete, will 
readily perceive, that if it be denied, that " Whatever exhi- 
bits m,ar7is of design must have had an intelligent author, ^^ 
that the affirmative of this proposition is necessary to the va- 
lidity of the argument. Thus then we have, by merely sup- 
plying the suppressed premiss, the complete Syllogism or ar- 
gument, as follows : — • 

*' Whatever exhibits marks of design must have had an intelligent author. 
" The world exhibits marks of design ; therefore 
The world must have had an intelligent author." 

It is evident, therefore^ that the Syllogism is not a peculiar 



INTRODUCTION. 29 

kind of argument, but only a peculiar /or m, to which every 
argument may be reduced. 

Whilst the argument remains in the form of the Enthymeme, 
viz : 

" The world exhibits marks of design ; therefore 
It must have had an intelligent author," 

the atheist must accept one or the other of the two following 
alternatives : he must deny either, Ist, that the world does ex- 
hibit marks of design ; or 2dly, that it follows from thence that 
it had an intelligent author. In the former ease he denies the 
force of the expressed premiss ; in the latter, of the suppress- 
ed: if both be admitted, the conclusion properly connected 
with them, inevitably follows. By supplying the suppressed 
premiss, and reducing the whole to the Syllogistic form, the 
whole of the atheist's opposition must be met within the scope 
of the first proposition ; if he fail there, his cause is lost. 

We have now the whole syllogism before us, and are en- 
abled to discover something relative to the difference between 
a common argument, or enthymeme, and a complete argu- 
ment, or syllogism. But as syllogisms as well as enthyme- 
mes may be incorrectly as well as correctly constructed, we 
should be able, if we would be successful in argumentation, to 
take a syllogism to pieces, examine its component parts, dis- 
cover if a part is wanting, or there is one too many, and if the 
parts are properly connected. This is analysis, from which, 
prior to our attention to further explanation, we may derive 
much instruction. 

The first thing that will occur in our analysis of the regular 
syllogism is, that it consists of three propositions, the two for- 
mer of which, when regularly constructed, are the premises, 
and the last is the conclusion. By a proposition we are to 
understand, a sentence containing two terms, the subject 
and the predicate, whereof one is affirmed or denied of the 
other, as 

First Term. "= Second Term. 

r ^ -^ ^ r^f^ 

All rational animals are men. 

* The Copula is that verbal connection of the subject and predicate of a 
proposition, which affinns or denies the latter of the former.^ 

c2 



30 BNTRODUCTIOK". 

And with equal facility we shall perceive the distinction be- 
tween the Subject and the Fredicate, or the two terms that 
must exist in every proposition, by remembering, that, the 
subject of a proposition is that term of which something is 
affirmed or denied and that the Predicate of a Proposition is 
that term which is affirmed or denied of its subject; as 
Subject. Predicate.. 



All rational animals are men. 



And lastly, by a term, we are to understand^ any word or 
words which may be the subject or predicate of a proposition : 
so in the above example, the word " men" is a term, and " ra- 
tional animals" is another, though that term consists of more 
words than one. 

If a syllogism then consists of three propositions, and each 
proposition of two terms, there must be six terms in the full 
extent, though not sia^ distinct terms, in every proposition ; as 



All thinking beings are spirits. 
3 4 

A -A 



The mind is a thinking being ; therefore 
5 6 

The mind is a spirit. 

But of these six, only three are distinct terms :■ to render 
this evident, we shall mark them again ; as, 

3 



All thinking beings are spirits. 
The mind is a thinking being j therefore 
2 I 

1^^ ^ r^\^ 

The mind is a spirit. 
And in a proper syllogism, it will be impossible to find any 
other term distinct from the three principal terms of the syl- 
logism ; which are tbe major, the minor, and the middle 

TERMS. 

The major term is the predicate of the conclusion ; in the 
above example "spirit," the minor term is the subject of the 
same conclusion^ viz: " mind ;" and the middle term is that with 



INTRODUCTION. 31 

which each of the other terms are separately compared in the pre- 
mises ; as ** thinking beings." 

Middle Term. 



All thinking beings are spirits. 
The mind is a thinking being ; therefore 
Minor. Major. 

f ^ ^ r^A>-^ 

The mind is a spirit. 

The major term is commonly more comprehensive than the 
medium ; as the medium is than the minor. This, however, 
will be better explained hereafter. 

Knowing now these several ternls, and to which reference 
can at any time be made> we shall be able to attach the names 
given by logicians to each of the propositions respectively : we 
have to remember, that the major premiss is that which 
compares the major term with the middle term ; the minor 
pre?niss is that which compares the minor term with the 
middle term ; and the conclusion compares the minor term 
with the major ; as 

Middle Term. Major Term. 

f ^ ^ /'^A^ 

Major Premiss : All thinking beings are spirits. 
Minor Term. Middle Term. 

Minor Premiss : The mind is a thinking being ; therefore 

Minor Term. Major Term. 

f — -^ ^ rv-n 

Conclusion : The mind is a spirit. 

For the establishment of the general law for the regulation 
of the syllogism, we are indebted to Aristotle : it may be 
thus expressed. 

" Whatever is predicated, affirmed or denied, universally, 
of any class of things, may he predicated in like m,anner, 
affirmed or denied, of any thing comprehended in that 
class J'^ 

As a frequent reference to this principle will be found gene- 
rally serviceable, it should be well remembered. Relative to 
this general rule, Dr. Whately makes the following remarks : 

" It is not a little remarkable that some, otherwise judicious 



32 INTRODUCTION. 

I 

writers, should have been so carried away by their zeal 
against that philosopher, as to speak with scorn and ridicule of 
this principle, on account of its obviousness and simplicity ; 
though they would probably perceive at once, in any other case, 
that it is the greatest triumph of philosphy to refer many, and 
seemingly very various phenomena to one, or a very few, sim- 
ple principles; and that the more simple and evident such a 
principle is, provided it be truly applicable to all the cases in 
question, the greater is its value and scientific beauty. If in- 
deed, any principle he regarded as not thus applicable, that 
is an objection to it of a different kind. Such an objection 
against JlristotWs dictiim, no one has ever attempted to es- 
tablish by any kind of proof. But it has often been taken for 
granted. It has been commonly supposed, without examina- 
tion, that the syllogism is a distinct kind of argumenty and 
that the rules of it accordingly do not apply, nor were intend- 
ed to apply, to all reasoning whatever. Under this misappre- 
hension. Dr. Campbell* labors with some ingenuity, and not 
without an air of plausibility, to show that every syllogism 
must be futile, because the premises virtually assert the con- 
clusion : little dreaming of course, that his objections, how- 
ever specious, lie against the process of reasoning itself 
universally ; and will therefore, of course, apply to those 
very arguments which he himself is adducing, 

" It is much more extraordinary to find another eminent 
authorf adopting expressly the very same objections, and yet 
distinctly admitting, within a few pages, the possibility of re- 
ducing every course of argument to a series of syllogisms. 
The same writer brings in an objection against the dictum of 
Aristotle, which it may be worth while to notice briefly, for the 
sake of setting in a clearer light the real character and object 
of that principle. Its application being, as has been seen, to 
a regular and conclusive syllogism, be supposes it intended to 
prove and make evident the conclusiveness of such a syllogism ; 
and remarks how unphilosophical it is to attempt giving a 

* Philosophy of Rhetoric. 

t Dugald Stewart : Philosophy, vol. ii. 



INTRODUCTION. 33 

demonstration of a demonstration. And certainly the charge 
would be just, if we could imagine the logician's object to 
be, to increase the certainty of a conclusion which we 
are supposed to have already arrived at by the clear- 
est possible mode of proof. But it is very strange that 
such an idea should ever have occurred to one who had 
even the slightest tincture of natural philosophy, for it might 
as well be imagined that the design of a natural philoso- 
pher or chemist is to strengthen the testimony of our senses 
by a priori reasoning, and to convince us that a stone 
when thrown will fall to the ground, and that gunpowder will 
explode when fired ; because they show that according to 
their principle those phenomena must take place as they do. 
But it would be a mark of the grossest ignorance and stupidity 
not to be aware that their object is not to prove the existence 
of an individual phenomenon, which our eyes have witnessed, 
but, as the phrase is, to account for it, i. e. to show according 
to what general principle it takes place, and therefore eannot 
be otherwise ; to refer, in short, the individual case to a 
general law of nature. The object of Aristotle's dictum is 
precisely analogous : he had, doubtless, no thought of adding 
to the force of any individual syllogism ; his design was to point 
out the general principle on which that process is conducted 
which takes place in each syllogism. And as the laws of na- 
ture, as they are called, are in reality merely generalized 
facts, of which all the phenomena coming under them are 
only particular instances, so the proof drawn from Aristotle's 
dictum is not a distinct demonstration brought to confirm 
another demonstration, but is merely a generalized and abstract 
statement of all demonstrations whatever falling under that 
law ; and is, therefore, in fact the very demonstration which 
(mutatis mutandis) accommodated to the very subject-matter, 
is actually employed in each particular case. 

*^ It is a mistake, which might appear scarcely worthy of 
notice, had not so many writers fallen into it, to imagine that 
Aristotle, and other logicians, meant to propose that the form 
of unfolding arguments should universally supersede in argu- 



34 INTRODUCTION. 

mentative discourses, the common forms of expression, Aris- 
totle has even been charged with inconsistency for not uni- 
formly doing so. As well might a chemist be charged with 
inconsistency for making use of any of the compound sub- 
stances whose quahties are already ascertained, without pre- 
viously analyzing on every occasion, and resolving them into 
their simple element. The chemist keeps by him his tests, 
and his method of analysis, to be employed when any substance 
is offered to his notice, the composition of which has not been 
determined, or in which adulteration is suspected. Now a 
fallacy may be aptly compared to some adulterated compound: 
it consists of an ingenious mixture of truth and falsehood, so 
entangled, so intimately blended, that the falsehood is, in the 
chemical phrase, held in solution: one drop of sound logic is 
that test which immediately disunites them, makes the foreign 
substance visible, and precipitates it to the bottom." 

B^ing now furnished with the regular form of the syllogism, 
its analysis into the parts of which it is composed, and the gene- 
ral law given by Aristotle, it will be proper to compare with 
that law the syllogism already quoted, viz: 

Whatever exhibits marks of design had an intelligent author. 
The world exhibits marks of design ; therefore 
The world had an intelligent author. 

" In the first of these premises, we find it assumed univer- 
sally of the class of things which exhibit marks of design, 
that they had an intelligent author ; and in the other premiss, 
the world is referred to that class as comprehended in it : now 
it is evident that whatever is said of the whole class, may be 
said of any thing comprehended in that class; so that we are 
thus authorized to say of the world, that it had an intelligent 
author." 

Now change this argument to one with a negative conclu- 
sion, viz : 

Nothing which exhibits marks af design could have been produced by chance. 
The world exhibits marks of design ; therefore 
The world could not have been produced by chance. 

The conformity of this syllogism to the general law as 



INTRODUCTION. 35 

given by Aristotle, and the process of reasoning it institutes, 
are equally correct ; since it is evident that whatever is de- 
nied universally of any class may be denied of any thing that 
is comprehended in that class. 

Having obtained this introductory view relative to the na- 
ture and proper construction of a syllogism, and its conformity 
to the Arestotelean law, it will be further necessary to the 
more certain exclusion of fallacy, to attend to the following 
two rules, viz: 

I. The middle term must be distributed in one of the 
premises. 

II. The major term must be compared with the middle 
term in the m,aj or premiss ; and the minor term included 
in, NOT EXCLUDED FROM, t/ie middle term, in the minor pre- 
miss. 

The following mode of finding the middle term will be easy 
to the youthful student, viz : look for both the minor and 
the major terms in the conclusion ; for the minor, as we have 
already said, will be found to be the subject, and the major the 
predicate of the conclusion ; and underline them, as in the fol- 
lowing example. 

Whatever is an enemy to truths essential to our welfare, is an enemy to man. 
Prejudice is an enemy to truths essential to our welfare; therefore 
Prejudice is an enemy to man. 

In the conclusion we find two out of the three terms, 1st. 
The minor ("Prejudice;") and 2dly. The major term, ("an 
enemy to man.'') Now as there is only one term remaining 
that is distinct from these two, on looking over the syllogism, 
we perceive, that the term, " whatever is an enemy to truths 
essential to our v^elfare^^ is the only remaining term distinct 
from those we have already marked. As this is a very impor- 
tant term, draw two lines under it, and the syllogism with 
all its terms marked and properly distinguished will stand thus: 
Whatever is an enemy to truths essential to our welfare, is an enemy to man. 

Prejudice is an enemy to truths essential to our welfare; therefore 
Prejudice is an enemy to man. 

We shall give another example, as 



36 INTRODUCTION. 

No neutral* salt retains the property of either of the simplesf composing it* 
The Nitrate of Potassa,^ is a neutral salt ; therefore 

The nitrate of Potassa, retains not the property of either of the simples com- 
posing it. 

We have already the minor and major terms marked ac- 
cording to previous directions. We have yet one remaining 
term, the medium or middle term to mark. On inspection we 
perceive no remaining term distinct, except ** neutral salt," 
found in the major premiss. The whole properly marked, and 
in a state proper for consideration when that middle term is 
distributed, according to the rule, will therefore stand thus : 
No neutral salt retains the property of either of the simples composing it. 

The nitrate of potassa is a neutral salt ; therefore 

The nitrate of potassa retains not the property of either of the simples com- 
posing it. 

Knowing therefore the middle term, it only remains to 
inquire, if according to rule, 1st. the middle term is distri- 
buted in one of the premises ; and 2dly, if the minor term is 
included in, and not excluded from the middle term in the 
minor premiss. 

We shall begin with the former, and inquire if the middle 
term is distributed ^ A term is said to be distributed when 
it is taken universally so as to stand for every thing it is capa- 
ble of being applied to ; and consequently undistributed when 
it stands for a portion only of the things signified by it. To 
understand this correctly is a very important point in the art 
of reasoning ; and as such demands explicit information. Our 
minute attention to it, therefore, requires no apology; we com* 
mence our inquiry with the first syllogism, in the state we last 
left it, viz: 
Whatever is an enemy to truths essential to our welfare, is an enemy to man* 

Prejudice is an enemy to truths essential to our welfare ; therefore 
Prejudice is an enemy to man. 

* A salt is not neutral if it retains an excess of either of its component 
parts, as those distinguished with the prefixes, super or sub ; as the super'' 
sulphate of alumina and potassa ; or the swA-carbonate of soda. These belong 
to distinct classes, which it is the province of chemistry to explain. 

•\ A simple, or simple body, is a component part of a compound body. 

t The nitrate of potassa, in common language, is called sait-pelre : it has 
neither the property of the nitric acid, nor of potassa, of which it is com* 
bined ; the one a powerful acid, the other a strong alkali. 



INTRODUGTIOKT. 37 

Here the middle term is properly marked, and our inquiry- 
is reduced to this one question, is it distributed ? " taken uni- 
versally for every thing it is capable of being applied to V we 
answer, that it is impossible to conceive of any thing, that is 
an enemy to truths essential to our welfare, either by active- 
ly opposing them, or actively or negligently concealing 
them, but what is directly or indirectly, wilfully or negli- 
gently, an enemy to man. For first, nothing, not intellec- 
tual, can be said to be an enemy, though it may be an im- 
pediment; and secondly, that enmity to truths, can only be 
reduced to practice, either directly by opposition, or by con- 
cealment effected either actively and knowingly or negligently. 
If this be admitted, the middle term is distributed, and the 
major premiss stands undisputed, viz : 

<* Whatever is an enemy to truths essential to our welfare, 
is an enemy to man." 

The remaining question is, is the minor term included in, and 
not excluded from the middle term in the minor premiss ? In 
other words, does " Prejudice," the minor term, belong to the 
class described by the middle term ? is it included in, and not 
excluded from the class, " Whatever is an enemy to truths es- 
sential to our welfare ?" Because prejudice is here spoken of 
as one of the several things that are enemies to truths essen- 
tial to our welfare, it belongs therefore to the whole class de- 
scribed by " whatever is," &c. The middle term is therefore 
distributed, and the minor term included ; consequently the 
premises are correct, and the conclusion must inevitably fol- 
low. 

But why is the following Syllogism incorrect or not conclu- 
sive ] 

Food is necessary to life, 

Corn is food : therefore 
Corn is necessary to life.* 

Let us inquire here first, what is the proper meaning and 

* It will be sufficient here, once for all to observe, that we shall, whenever 
it shall be necessary for explanation, to mark the terms, preserve the distinc- 
tions already specified ; viz. the minor and major premises will be marked each 
with one, and the middle term with two lines drawn under them. 

D 



58 INTRODUCTION. 

limit of the major premiss, which is, as it is here expressed, 
what logicians call "an indefinite proposition," or a kind of 
proposition that is sometimes universal, and sometimes j»ar/2- 
cular in the extent of its meaning, according to its obvious 
signification. The sense is here, not all kinds of food, nor 
every kind of food , is necessary to life, either of which would 
constitute a universal propositi on ; but some food or some 
kind of food is necessary to life ; i. e. a particular pro- 
position. Here then, "the rule has not been comphed with, 
since that which has been predicated not of the whole, but 
only of apart of the class, cannot be, on that ground, predi- 
cated of any other part of that class. 

This is at once not only the most important, but also the 
most difficult, if not the only difficult point in Logic. To re- 
move this difficulty, if such it be to any, no exertions of ours 
shall be omitted ; and with a little attention on the part of the 
learner, we do not despair of success. If this bridge be pass- 
ed, we have no other toll, worthy of the name of difficulty or 
exertion, to pay ! We have then to attend only to the follow- 
ing rules, which in a short time we shall make plain to every 
ohe. 

Propositions may, for the present purpose, be reduced to the 
following, viz. 1st, A universal affirmative; 2d, A universal 
negative; 3d, A particular affirmative ; 4th, A particular 
negative. 

Logicians mark these as follows : 

A universal affirmative by A, 
a universal negative by E, 
a particular affirmative by I, 
a particular negative by 0. 

To remember these symbols, which is of importance, the 
following memorial lines will assist us : 

Universally, A affirms and E denies. 
Particularly, I affirms and O denies. 

A universal affirmative is a proposition wherein the predi- 
cate is affirmed of the whole of the subject : its usual signs 
are, all, each, every, &c. ; or it may be an indefinite proposi- 
tion, understood, according to its sense, universally, as, 



INTRODUCTIOK. 39 

All tyrants are unhappy, 
Every wicked man is miserable, 
Cuba is an island. 
**Cuba is an island/* though an indefinite proposition, yet 
in sense, it is equal to, " all Cuba is an island ;" the proposition 
is therefore a universal affirmative. 

A universal negative is a proposition v^rherein the predicate 
is denied of the v^^hole of the subject ; its usual signs are, 7io, 
none, neither^ &C., as, 

No discontented man is happy, 
None of the ancient philosophers understood Fluxions. 
Cuba is not a continent. 
A particular affirmative is a proposition wherein the predi- 
cate is affirmed of only part of the subject ; its usual signs 
are, some, several, many, most, few, &c., or it may be an 
indefinite proposition, understood according to its sense, par- 
ticularly ; 

Some metals are heavier than iron. 
Many parrots can talk. 
Few men are truly wise, 

Fowl lo xt.\j\jXjaaa,t. J- -i^ UA;>. 

The last proposition, " food is necessary to life, evidently 
does not mean, all food, or every kind of food, is necessary to 
life, but " some food is necessary to life ;" the proposition is 
therefore a particular affirmative. 

A particular negative is a proposition wherein the predicate 
is denied of only a part of the subject ; its negative sign is com- 
monly joined to the predicate ; as 

Some difficult things are not evils. 
Many parrots cannot talk. 

We shall now be able to understand the rule for the distri- 
bution of the middle term ; viz : 

All universal propositions distribute the subject, all ne- 
gative the predicate. 

If we apply this rule to the four following cases, and draw 
a line over every term, which according to it, we find distri- 
buted, they will stand thus. 



40 INTRODUCTION. 



A. All birds are animals. 



E. No animal is a tree, 

I. Some food is necessary to life. 

0. Some metals are not heavy. 

The first proposition is a universal affirmative, and therefore 
marked A. As it is a universal, according to the rule, the 
subject is distributed ; i. e. all kinds of birds, eagles, parrots, 
ravens, sparrows, &c., are animals ; since an animal is a being 
that has life, sensation and motion ; and all birds have these 
properties. The subject, therefore, is here distributed ; but 
not the predicate, for the term animal is applicable to millions 
of beings besides birds. No greater extension of the predicate 
is, therefore, here implied than is sufficient to embrace the 
subject, " birds." This will be immediately perceived by in- 
verting the proposition ; thus — 

All animals are birds. 

The falsity of this proves that the predicate of the original 
proposition, "all birds are animals," is not distributed. 

The next proposition, " No animal is a tree,^' is a universal 
negative, and therefore marked E. As it is a universal, ac- 

coz^lng to tho I (aIc;, tlic c3iAbjt<_t lb dlsii ibuted ; fur ijo ani- 
mal of any kind, is a tree. But as it is also a wc^a^iue pro- 
position, the predicate likewise, according to the same rule, is 
distributed. For the predicate not being restrained by a sub- 
ject, to which it is declared inapplicable, is taken in the whole 
of its extension, and consequently distributed. 

The third proposition, " some food is necessary to life," is 
a particular affirmative, and therefore marked I. It is not a 
universal; therefore according to the rule, the subject, 
<' some food," is not distributed. " Some" evidently implies 
a portion of what is called food ; the genus food, there- 
fore, is not distributed. And as the proposition is not a nega- 
tive, according to the rule, the predicate, "necessary to life 
implying other things beside food, or some food, is not distribu- 
ted. The proposition must consequently stand as we found it, 
without a mark signifying distribution, thus- 
Some food is necessary to life. 

The last proposition, "Some metals are not heavy," is a par- 
ticular negative, and marked accordingly O, It is not a univer- 



INTRODUCTION. 41 

sal, consequently its subjects is not distributed : we do not mean^ 
any kind of metal, nor most kinds of metals, for most kind of me- 
tals are heavy. It is, however, a negative proposition, its predi- 
cate, " not heavy," is therefore distributed. For every thing 
implied in not heavy, that is, not heavier than water, is appli- 
able to these metals, viz. the metals Potassium, and So<s!ium. 

But the whole doctrine of distribution may be abundantly 
simplified ; and by recollecting the signification of the symbols 
A. E. I. O., already given, viz. in the distich. 

Universality A affirms and E denies. 
Particularly y I affirms and O denies. 

It may be comprised in the following line, 
A distributes the subject, the predicate, I neither, and E both. 

These three lines well remembered, and practised, as we 
shall proceed to exemplify, will enable us to overcome more 
than half of the difficulty implied in learning the art of logic. 

In this exercise, and in the application of the above rules 
contained in the three lines just given, to determine whether 
the following syllogisms are correct or not, or, if there be fal- 
lacy, to point out the reason why the conclusion is illogical, 
proceed thus. First mark the minor and major terms, and 
also the middle term, as directed at page 35 ; then mark the 
propositions, according to their character by A. E.* I. or O. 
Lastly by the rule, A distributes the subject, O the predi- 
cate, I neither, and E both ; find what term is distributed, at 
least if the middle term is distributed or not, and mark* it, if 
distributed, with a line over it. Then, if the middle term be 
not distributed, or there be two middle terms, or the minor 
term in the minor premiss excluded from the middle term, no 
conclusion can logically follow : 

E. No ruminant animals are predacious, 



A. The lion is predacious ; therefore 
E. The lion is not ruminant. 



Here the minor term is ^Hion,^' the major " ruminant,'' and 
are accordingly underlined with one line ; no term distinct 

* These marks we intend to adopt, whenever necessary, throughout this 
work. Their signifiation should therefore be remembered. 



42 INTRODUCTlOir. 

from these two remains, but " predacious ;" it is therefore the 
middle term, and marked with two lines below ; it is found also 
to be the predicate of the major premiss which being a nega- 
tive proposition, it is therefore distributed according to rule, 
(E distributes both) and therefore marked also with a line 
above. The minor term also, " lion," in the minor premiss, is 
included in the middle term, or class of animals called " pre- 
dacious " in the major premiss ; the syllogism therefore is va- 
lid, and the conclusion regularly deduced ; the syllogism, how- 
ever, is reducible to a form, more strictly according to the 
Aristotelian dictum, thus, 



E. No predacious animals are ruminant, 

A. 'the lion is a predacious animal; therefore 
A. The lion is not ruminant. 

The three terms are found and marked as before. But 
why is the middle term, " predacious animals," here the sub- 
ject of the proposition E, distributed I Because the rule says 
E distributes both \ i. e. both subject and predicate. The 
minor term in the minor premiss also, is included in the mid- 
dle term in the same premiss ; the argument is therefore con- 
clusive. 

The following are not regular, 
I. Some food is necessary to life, 

A. Corn is food ; therefore 
A. Corn is necessary to life. 

The proposition I, according to the rule, distributes neither, 
i e. neither the subject nor the predicate ; therefore the sub- 
ject, or middle term, in the major premiss, is not distributed, 
does not amount to a whole class, but to only a part of the 
class, " food ;" and " food" in the minor premiss, may be ano- 
ther part of the same class, not the same part of that class ; 
there are here then two middle terms, and the minor term is 
included in a middle term food, which middle term is not ne- 
cessarily the same middle term as we find in the major premiss. 
For some food, not specifying what part of food, is affirmed to 
be necessary to Ufe, but corn may be another part, not the 



INTRODUCTION. 43 

$ame part which is affirmed to be necessary to life. The whole 
syllogism, therefore, logically, proves nothing ; and the con- 
struction is not that of the regular form of the Aristotelian 
dictum : again ; 

A. Every rational agent is accountable. 

E. Brutes are (not rational agents.) 
E. Brutes are not accountable. 

We find here, that " rational agents'' in the major premiss 
is the middle term. It is distributed ; because A distributes 
the subject. But from the whole class of beings, by the mid- 
dle term designated " rational beings," the minor term is ex- 
cluded in the minor premiss and compared with another term 
or class, viz. " not rational beings,'' very distinct from the for- 
mer. Consequently here are four terms instead of three, and 
nothing is proved. If the above could prove any thing, so could 
the following, 

A. Every horse is an animal. 

E. Sheep are (not horses.) 
E. Sheep are not animals. 

Here the minor term is not included in, but excluded from 
the middle term in the major premiss: thus there are four terms, 
horse, not a hor^j sheep, animals, and consequently no proof: 
neither would the case be otherwise by alteration to, 

A. Every horse is an animal. 

E. No sheep is a horse. 
E. Sheep are not animals. 

For the minor term is again excluded from the middle term. 



A. All capable of deliberate crime are responsible. 

E. An infant is (not capable of deliberate crime.) 
E. An infant is not responsible. 

Though nothing in any single proposition is here denied, yet 
nothing is proved. Here the term " responsible" is affirmed 
universally of those "capable of deliberate crime;'* it might, 
therefore, according to Aristotle's dictum, have been affirmed 



44 INTRODUCTION. 

of any thing contained in that class ; but in the instance be- 
fore us, nothing is mentioned as contained under that class, 
only the term " infant" is excluded from that class ; and though 
what is affirmed of a whole class, may be affirmed of 
any thing that is contained under it, yet there is no 
ground for supposing that it may be denied of whatever 
is not so contained ; for it is evidently possible that it may be 
applicable to a whole class and to something else besides ; to 
say that all trees are vegetables, does not imply that nothing 
else is a vegetable. Nor when it is said that all who are car 
pable of deliberate crime are responsible, does this imply 
that no others are responsible ; for though this may be very 
true, it has not been asserted in the premiss : and in the analy- 
sis of an argument we are to discard all considerations of what 
might be asserted ; contemplating only what actually is laid 
down in the premises. It is evident, therefore, that such an 
apparent argument as the above does not comply with the rule 
laid down, nor can be so stated as to comply with it, and is 
consequently invalid. 

A. All wise legislators suit their laws to the genius of their nation. 

A. Solon suited his laws to the genius of his nation, 
A. Solon was a wise legislator. 

Nothing contained in any proposition here, taken singly, is 
contradicted, yet thus connected nothing is proved ; for the 
middle term, the predicate of a universal, is not distributed, for 
" A distributes the subject," not the predicate. The follow- 
ing is of the same character. 

A. All vegetables grow. 

A. An animal grows, 

A. An animal is a vegetable. 

These are both eases of undistributed middle, and therefore 
contrary to rule, and prove nothing. And though it is not de* 
nied that Solon was a wise legislator, yet this is no more proved 
by the former syllogism, than by the latter it is proved that 
an animal is a vegetable. 

Relative to the apparent argument, "all wise legislators suit 
their laws to the genius of their nation : Solon suited his laws 



INTRODUCTION. 45 

to the genius of his nation ; therefore, Solon was a wise legis- 
lator ;" we have said that nothing in each of these three pro- 
positions is contradicted, viz : it is not contradicted, that all 
wise legislators suit their laws to the genius of their nation ; it 
is not contradicted, that Solon suited his laws to the genius of 
his nation ; nor is it contradicted that Solon was a wise legis- 
lator ; yet these three propositions thus combined constitute 
no argument, and however true it was that Solon was a wise 
legislator, yet there is nothing here to prove it : the syllogism 
as expressed is irregular, and proves nothing. Since the rea- 
son of this may not appear evident to every one, some further 
explanation may be here requisite, which we shall give by 
examining first the following argument. 



A. A religion attested by miracles is from God. 



A. The Christian Religion is a religion attested by miracles. 
A. Therefore, the Christian Religion is from God. 

On examination of this syllogism, according to the rules al- 
ready given, we find, that "a religion attested by miracles'- 
is the middle term ; it is the subject of the major premiss, a 
universal affirmation, or A, and therefore distributed, for " A, 
distributes the subject. "We here, in this major premiss, find 
it asserted universally of a whole class, that " a religion attested 
by miracles," is from God : in the minor premiss, the Christian 
Religion is referred to, and included in that class ; and accord- 
ing to the general law " whatever is said of the whole class, 
may be said if any thing comprehended in that class :" there- 
fore we are duly authorized to say of the Christian Religion, 
that it is from God. 

But will the following equally well bear examination 1 

A. All wise legislators suit their laws to the genius of their nation. 

A. Solon suited his laws to the genius of his nation ; therefore 
A. Solon was a wise legislator. 

We here find that, *^ suit their laws to the genius of their 
nation," is the middle term, and being the predicate of a uni- 
versal affirmative, or of A, is consequently not distributed ; 
for " A distributes the subject,'" not the predicate. Though it is 



46 



INTRODUCTIOir. 



not easy to conceive that laws are suited to the genius of a 
nation by any other than wise legislators, yet there is nothing 
in the expression thus to limit it ; indeed it is possible that 
some might suit laws to the genius of their nation to answer 
some sinister purpose, in which they would not be wise legis- 
lators. But whether this might or might not be the case, the 
expression does not limit it. And Logic, as we have already 
said, has chiefly to do with the third act of the mind, reason- 
ing, and that mode of expression which duly compares, by dis- 
tribution, the middle term with the major term in the major 
premiss ; and includes the minor term in the said middle term 
in the minor premiss ; from two such premises a conclusion 
may logically follow. 

But if the following proposition could be proved, viz : that 

None but wise legislators 



esuit their laws to the genius of their nation. 



we could proceed with the argument, for the above pro- 
position being a universal negative, or E, has the predicate, 
or middle term, as well as the subject, distributed ; for E dis- 
tributes both. 

On this point Dr. Whately remarks, " it is a universal rule 
that the predicate of a negative proposition is distributed, 
and of an affirmative undistributed. The reason of this may 
easily be understood by considering that a term which stands 
for a whole class may be applied to or affirmed of any thing 
comprehended under that class, though the term of which it is 
thus affirmed may be of much narrower extent than that other, 
and may, therefore, be far from coinciding with the whole of 
it: thus it may be said with truth, that *the negroes are 
uncivilized,' though the term * uncivilized' be of much 
wider extent than negroes, comprehending besides them, Hot- 
tentots, &c., so that it would not be allowable to assert, that 

* all who are uncivilized are negroes;' and the same reasoning 
applies to every affirmative proposition ; for though it may so 
happen that the subject and predicate, in some cases, are of 
equal extent ; as ' all men are rational animals,' *all equila- 
teral triangles are equiangular;' (it being equally true, that 

* all rational animals are men,' and that all *all equiangular 



INTRODUCTION. 47 

triangles are equilateral') yet this is not implied by the form 
of the expression ; since it would be no less true that * all nrien 
are rational animals/ even if there were other rational ani- 
mals besides men. These propositions which are reciprocal, 
however, are not very common: we may say, * all parrots are 
birds,' but we cannot say, <all birds are parrots.' " 
The same defect applies to the Syllogism, 

A. All vegetables grow. 

A. An animal grows. 

A. An animal is a vegetable. 

viz : an undistributed middle. The middle is here, the pre- 
dicate of a universal affirmative, and A distributes the subject ; 
the middle term " grow," therefore, is not distributed : there is 
vegetable growth and animal growth ; in the former sense it is 
taken in the major premiss, in the latter in the minor ; conse- 
quently here are two middle terms, not "owe and the same 
third^''^ and therefore there are four terms, instead of three in 
the syllogism. That the term " grow" is not distributed in 
the major premiss, we immediately perceive by inverting it 
thus — 

There is nothing that grows but vegetables. 

And from a false premiss, of course, nothing can be proved. 
This subject will be resumed under the chapter of Fallacies. 
" It is, therefore," says Dr. Whately, " not sufficient for the 
middle term to occur in a universal proposition ; since if that 
proposition be an affirmative, and the middle be the predicate 
of it, it will not be distributed. If, however, one of the pre- 
mises be negative, the middle term may then be made the pre- 
dicate of that, and will thus be distributed.* All reasoning 
whatever, then, rests on the one simple principle laid down 
by Aristotle, that < what is predicated, either affirmatively or 
negatively, of a term distributed, may be predicated in like 
manner, affirmatively or negatively, of any thing contained 
under that term.^ So that when our object is to prove any 
proposition, i. e. to show that one term may rightly be affirm- 

* See the rule page 41, or the rule, A distributes the subject, O the predi- 
dicat*, I neither, and £ both. 



48 INTRODUCTION. 

ed or denied of another, the process which really takes place 
in our minds is, that we refer that term (of which the other is 
to be thus predicated) to some class, (i. e. middle term) of 
which that other may be affirmed or denied, as the case may 
be. Whatever the subject matter of an argument may he, the 
reasoning itself considered by itself is in every case the same 
process: and if the writers against Logic had kept this in mind, 
they would have been cautious of expressing their contempt 
of what they call * syllogistic reasoning,' which is in tryth 
all reasoning ; and instead of ridiculing Aristotle's principle 
for its obviousness and simplicity, would have perceived that 
these are, in fact, its highest praise ; the easiest, shortest, and 
most evident theory, provided it answers the purpose of ex- 
planation, being ever the best ;" and it is the most effectual, 
certainly, for the detection of fallacies, which constitutes no small 
part of its excellency. 

So much of the system of Logic, as may serve for an in- 
troduction is now explained by the preceding analytic devel- 
opement ; we now therefore proceed to the more regular and 
complete discussion of the subject, according to the synthetic 
mode of instruction. 



SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 
PART I. 

CHAP. I. 

On the operations of the mind. 



(Art. 1.) The operations of the mind immediately concern- 
ed in argument are three. 1st, Apprehension* 2d, Judg" 
ment. 3d, Argumentation, 

1. Logic is not concerned with any faculty or act of the 
mind except those employed in argumentation. Jamiesonhas 
enumerated not less than twelve distinct powers of Ihe mind 
besides the passions, (li. c. vii.) But to determine what these 
are, or how they should be distinguished, is the province of 
mental philosophy or metaphysics, and irrelevant to our pre- 
sent purpose. See Jamieson's Grammar of Intellectual Phi- 
losophy, Reid on the Powers of the Human Mind, and Dugald 
Stewart's Elements of Mental Philosophy. 

(Art 2.) Apprehension is that act of the mind by which 
the idea of an object is formed ; it it is either simple, as of a 
maU) a horse; or complex, as of a man on horseback. 

1. By apprehension we may form an idea of material oh' 
jects, as, a mountain, a tree, a field, an animal ; of qualities, 
as high, low, swift, clear ; of acts or passions, as, to build, to 
be built; of beings or qualities, abstract or intellectual, 2i^ 
space, time, motion, justice, virtue, mercy, spirit, &c. 

2. By writers on mental philosophy, the media through 
which we are said to receive and retain ideas, are perception, 
consciousness, attention and reflection. Perception is the 
medium through which we receive ideas of the powers and 
qualities of the material objects about us : its instruments are 
the five corporeal senses, seeing, hearing, feeling, tasting and 



50 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 

smelling. By some sensation and perception are distinguished. The 
change immediately produced in the mind by the impression 
of an object, hard or soft, rough or smooth, hot or cold, on the 
organ of sense, is denominated sensation. The word percep- 
tion, in contradistinction to this, is by them employed to de- 
note the knowledge that we gain by the sensation, of some 
quality in the object, retained after the object is removed. 
By consciousness is signified the faculty of noticing things of 
an immaterial character. And by attention^ that which de- 
tains for our examination ideas to the exclusion of others that 
would solicit our notice. Dr. Reid says that attention to 
things external is properly called observation, and attention 
to the subjects of our consciousness, reflection. 

3. But what is received through the medium of sensation 
perception, and consciousness, or retained through attention 
and reflection, is an idea. It is sufficient, therefore, for the 
logician to employ a general expression, or generic term, 
comprising all these, viz : " apprehension^^ meaning simply 
that act of the mind by which an idea, by whatever medium, 
is received. 

(Art. 3.) Judgment is that act ot the mind by which two 

ideas are determined to agree or disagree ; 

1. Take for example these two ideas, jt?ic/wre, beautiful ; it 
they agree, the judgment is expressed by pronouncing that 
picture is beautiful ; or these other two, war, beneficial ; if 
they do not agree, our judgment is declared by saying the war 
is not beneficial. 

2. Judgment can only be expressed by a proposition ; and 
a proposition is a complete sentence ; but simple apprehen- 
sion may be expressed by a word or words, which make no 
complete sentence. When simple apprehension is employed 
about a proposition, which it may be by two distinct acts, 
every one knows that it is one thing to apprehend a proposi- 
tion, that is to conceive what it means ; but it is quite another 
thing to judge if it be true or false. 

(Art. 4.) Argumentation is the act of proceeding from one 

judgment to another, consequent on the former. 

1. Argumentation, instead of the term reasoning, is here 
employed to avoid an ambiguity. We have already re- 
marked that though with " assumed premises," " conjec- 
tural conclusions," "experiment," &c., reasoning, scientific 



ON THE OPERATIONS OP THE MIND. 51 

men and others are frequently concerned, yet argumentation 
or Logic is not. 

2. The assertion that " man is accountable for his actions," 
is not proved from any thing in the proposition that contains 
it. But if it has been previously proved, 1st, "That every 
creature possessed of reason and liberty is accountable for his 
actions :" and 2dly, that " man is a creature possessed of rea- 
son and liberty," and consequently included in the whole class 
concerning which a judgment in the first proposition has been 
declared ; it must necessarily follow from the two preceding 
premises, 3dly, that " man is accountable for his actions." 
This is argumentation regularly expressed, 

(Art. 5.) Language affords the ^zg-?!* by which apprehen- 
sion, judgment and argumentation are expressed, 

1. *' In introducing the mention of language previously to 
the definition of Logic," says Dr. Whately, " I have departed 
from established practice, in order that it may be clearly un- 
derstood that Logic, as an art, is entirely conversant about 
language : a truth which most writers on the subject, if in- 
deed they were fully aware of it themselves, have certainly 
not taken due care to impress on their readers." 

2. Hence treatises on Logic have been encumbered with vo- 
luminous chapters on ideas, springs of false judgment, general 
directions to assist us in judging aright, special rules to direct 
our conceptions, &c. In one work of this kind, entitled a 
Grammar on Logic, 211 pages are occupied before we per- 
ceive anything exemplified that was promised in the title-page. 
However excellent disquisitions of this character, in their pro- 
per place, may be, yet as to Logic, as we have already re- 
marked, they are irrelevant. 

3. The futility of such attempts is readily perceived by 
remembering that ideas are the mere types of the beings, ma- 
terial or immaterial, which they represent. To have the ideas 
we must be acquainted with the things of which they are the 
patterns ; and to be intimate with these we must be conver- 
sant with the whole circle, the whole encyclopaedia of human 
knowledge. To be acquainted too with a fact, or to have an 
object before us, and yet not a clear idea of it, implies some 
neglect in attention, or some defect in the mind ; and Logic 
no more professes to supply a defect in the mind, than it does 
to create a mind, or to supply it with the sciences respective- 
ly which are the sources of our ideas ; but it professes merely 



52 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 

to teach us, by a correct use of language, the deduction of ar- 
gumentative consequences from such ideas or knowledge as we 
have. 

4. But mere irrelevancy is not the only charge against such 
injudicious impropriety. The consequences have been, as facts 
have verified, that hundreds have taken up such works to as- 
certain what Logic is, or what it is not, and thus lost in fields 
of metaphysical discussion have either never obtained any defi- 
nite idea of its specific and limited object, or misunderstand- 
ing it, have ignorantly loaded the art with the abuse, due ra- 
ther to those who had mystified it in the clouds of their own 
misconceptions. 

(Art. 6.) An act of apprehension, expressed in language, 
is called a term; of judgment, ?i proposition ; and of argumen- 
tation, when regularly expressed, a syllogism. 

1. Whereas in the expression of our apprehension, terms are 
liable to be indistinct ; of our judgment, propositions to be false; 
and of our argumentation, deductions tobe inconclusive, — Logic 
undertakes directly and completely to guard against this last de- 
fect ; and incidentally, and in a certain degree against the 
others, as far as can be done by the proper use of language* 
Logic might, therefore, could it only be regarded as an art, be 
defined to be, the art of employing language correctly for the 
purpose of argumentation* 

(Art. 7.) Logic, as a science, is that which comprises the 

principles on which argumentation is conducted ; and as an 

art, it is that of employing the rules furnished by that science 

to secure the mind from error in its deductions. 

1. " Logic instructs us in the right use of terms, and distin- 
guishes their various kinds. It teaches the nature and varie- 
ties of propositions; explains their properties, modifications, 
and essential parts. It analyzes the structure of arguments, 
and shows how their truth may be discovered, or their fallacy 
detected. Lastly, it describes those methods of classification 
and arrangement, which will best enable us to retain and ap- 
ply the knowledge which we have acquired." 

2. "Though the understanding would be incapable of any 
high degree of improvement, without the aid of rules and 
principles, yet these are insufiicient without practice and ex- 
perience. The powers of the mind like those of the body 



ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE MIND. 53 

must be strengthened by use. The art of reasoning skilfully 
can be acquired only by a long and careful exercise of the 
reasoning faculty, on different subjects and in various ways. 
The rules of Logic atford assistance to this faculty not less im- 
portant than that which our animal strength derives from 
the aid of mechanical powers. They guide its operations and 
supply it with suitable instruments for overcoming the difficul- 
ties by which it would be ipipeded in its search after truth." 
— Hedge, 



INTERROGATORY EXAMINATION 

ON 

Chap. I, Part L 

Question 1st. What are the operations of the imnd that are immediately 
concerned in argumentation ? Art. 1. 

Q. 3. What is apprehension 1 2. 

Q. 3. What act of the mind is that called by which we form an idea of an 
object 1 2. 

Q. 4. State the difference between simple and complex apprehension. 2. 

Q. 5. What is implied, in treatises on Logic, by the word judgment 1 3. 

Q. 6. What act of the mind is that called by which two or more ideas are 
determined to agree or disagree 1 3. 

Q. 7. By what act of the mind is it by which you decide that, a Jieldi^ 
green, or a river is tvide ? 3. 

Q. 8. What do you mean by argumentation ? 4. 

Q. 9. What act is that by which we proceed from one judgment to ano- 
ther T 4. 

Q. 10. What affords us the signs by which apprehension, judgment and 
argumentation are expressed 1 5. 

Q. 11. When an act of apprehension is expressed in language, what is it 
called 1 6. 

Q. 12. When an act of judgment is expressed, what is it called ?< 6. 

Q. 13. When argumentation is regularly expressed what is it called 1 6. 

Q. 14. What is Logic ] 7. 

Q. 15. What is that art which employs rules to secure the mind from 
error 1 7. 



e2 



PART II. 

ON TERMS. 

Chap. I! 

On Terms simply. 

(Art. 8.) A TERM is one or more words expressing the 
subject of a sentence, or what is said of that subject* 

1. First the subject itself may be expressed by one or more 
words; as wisdom, m,an, am^anan horseback, a troop of 
cavalry ; so also may what is said of any subject; as valu- 
able, rational being, passing, crossing the bridge. All 
these, whether expressed in one or more words, are terras ; so 
that one term may consist of many words. If we unite these 
several subjects, and what is said of them respectively, in 
sentences, w^e shall have two terms in each sentence and no 
more; as 

1 2 

Wisdom is valuable. 

Man is a rational beinjr. 

A man on horseback is passing. 

A troop of cavalry is crossing the bridge. 



(Art. 9.) A SINGULAR TERM is that which expresses one in- 
dividual, not considered as an individual of any class ; as /Sb- 
crates, the Mississippi, this tree, this city. 

1. So likewise, this river, the city of London, the conqueror 
of Pompey, are singular terms, or terms which cannot be said 
or predicated of any thing else besides themselves ; and are 
therefore to be denied of any thing else. We may say, this 

* The above definition and mode of explanation are given to prevent the 
anticipation of the parts of a proposition, which cannot be here explained, as 
subject, copula and predicate : subject being a grammatical word is not liable 
to the same objection. For a term is any xvovd or xvords^ -which may be the 
subject or predicate of a proposition. Were it to require twenty words to 
express either the subject ov predicate, still they would be only one term. 



OS TERMS. 55 

river is the Mississippi, or Caesar was the conqueror of Pompey ; 
but we cannot say of any thing else, that it is the Mississippi, 
or of any one else that he was the conqueror of Pompey. 

(Art. 10.) A UNIVERSAL TERM is what can be applied to 
any individual or to all individuals of the same class ; as maUf 
river, great 

1. So tree, city, bird, conqueror. Universal terms, there- 
fore, are called predicables, because they may be predicated 
or affirmed of others; as the Mississippi is a river, the Ganges 
is a river. So the term, city or conqueror, applies or may be 
predicated or affirmed of any or all that compose each of those 
classes respectively. Though any term singular or universal, 
may be a subject, none but a universal term can be affirma- 
tively predicated of several others. But a singular term may 
be negatively predicated ; as " the first born of Isaac was not 
Jacob." 

2. " Universal terms make the greatest part of the words 
of every language. Every production of nature and art, and 
every property of mind and body, is an individual. Each has 
some properties peculiar to itself; and others, which it possesses 
in common with many other beings. By discarding the pecu- 
liar properties and retaining under distinct names those which 
are common^ we reduce to a limited number of classes the 
innumerable objects which fall under our observation. This 
distinguishing things into classes forms what logicians call the 
genera and species of things." 

(Art. 11.) A RELATIVE TERM is onc which expresses an 
object in reference to another to which it is related ; as hus- 
band, father, patron. 

1. They are relative terms, since husband is related to wife, 
father to son, and patron to client: so rider, commander^ 
guardian, king, are terms relating to horse, the forces com- 
manded, ward, and subject. Nouns are sometimes called cor- 
relatives, when the co-existence of each term referred to is 
essential to the other ; as king and subject 

(Art. 12.) Ant absolute term is one which expresses an 

object or quality without reference to any other ; as horse,^ 

riveTy roundness, strength* 



56 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 

1. Thus the relative term father may be expressed abso- 
lutely, as man ; or a son as boy. 

(Art. 13.) A POSITIVE term is one which expresses an ob- 
ject or its attribute as actually existing ; as, speech^ a man 
speaking. 

1. A positive term denotes at least that this view might 
conceivably be taken of the object ; so " seeing" is spoken of 
a man, since the faculty of sight is a possible and common at- 
tribute of the being spoken of 

(Art. 14.) A privative term is one which expresses the 

absence of an attribute from a subject capable of it ; as, a 

deaf man, a hlind horse. 

1. Since the terms " deaP' and " blind" express the absence 
of faculties from creatures commonly capable of them, they 
express a privation, and are therefore privative terms. 

(Art. 15.) A negative term is one which expresses the 
absence of an attribute from a subject not capable of it ; as 
a dumb statue, a lifeless carcass. 

1. As should it be said of a stone that it is inanimate, or 
blind or deaf; or of a clown, that he is unlearned, &c.,* these 
are negations or negative terms. 

(Art. 16.) An abstract term is one which expresses a 

quality or attribute, without reference to any subject in which 

it may be found ; as justice, zvisdom, folly. 

1. So whiteness, roundness, hardness, equality, firmness, 
length, breadth, depth, mortal ; so the abstract terms, folly, 
knavery, philosophy, correspond to the concretes, fool, knave, 
philosopher. 

(Art. 17.) A concrete term is one which expresses both 
the quality or attribute and the subject to which it belongs ; 

as just, wise, foolish or fool. 

1. Concrete terms are not always adjectives in a grammati- 
cal sense; for fool, knave, or philosopher, though nouns, are 
concrete terms, referring to the subject as well as to the 
quality of it. 

2. " Sometimes they express the subjects directly and the at- 



ON TERMS. 57 

tributes indirectly; and sometimes the reverse. Thus states- 
man, mechanic, are concrete terms, which directly denote 
persons, and indirectly the attributes for which they are dis- 
liinguished. But valiant, swift, hard, are concretes, immedi- 
ately signifying certain attributes and indirectly intimating the 
persons or things to which they belong. 

(Art 18.) An indefinite term is one to which the par- 
ticle not, (either expressly or in sense,) is attached, serving 
merely to exclude one individual or class, and leaving it un- 
determined what other individual or class should be under- 
stood.; as ^* not CcBsar/' " unorganized.^^ 

1. Every thing that can be conceived must be either Caesar, 
or not Caesar : if it is not Caesar, who or what is it ? There 
is nothing that can be both ; so is there nothing that can be 
either. In like manner every thing is either organized or un- 
organized ; corporeal or incorporeal. " In this way a com- 
plete two-fold division may be made of any subject, being 
certain, as the expression is, to exhaust it. And the repetition 
of this process, so as to carry on a subdivision as far as there 
is occasion, is thence called by logicians, * abscissio infiniti,' 
i. e. the repeatedly cutting ofFof that which the object to be ex- 
amined is not ; e, g*. This disorder either is, or is not, a dropsy 
— and for this or that reason, it is not ; 2dly. any other dis- 
ease either is, or is not, gout ; this is not : then 3dly. It either 
is, or is not, consumption, &c. &c." This procedure is fre- 
quently serviceable in judicial pleadings. 

(Art. 19.) A DEFINITE TERM is oue to which the particle 
not, is not attached, and determines what individual or class, 
is understood ; as, " C^sar," "organized being.^^ 

1. "Terms are also distinguished into univocal, equivocal, 
and synonymous. Univocal terms are such as have invari- 
ably the same signification annexed to them. Thus indivi- 
duality, genus, electricity, are univocal terms ; for they al- 
ways signify the same thing. Equivocal words are such as are 
employed in different senses; of this sort is the word head which 
may signify a part of a nail, of an animal, or of a discourse. 
So the words post and shore are equivocal, for they are used in 
various senses. That some words should be used in different 
senses is unavoidable on account of the scantiness of lan- 
guage, which does not afford a distinct name for every idea. 



58 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 

Notwithstanding this, we sometimes find two or more words 
applied to the same thing ; as, wave and billow, dwelling and 
habitation. These are called Synonymous." 

2. " The usual division of terms into univocal, equivocal and 
analogous, and into nouns of the first and second intention, are 
not strictly speaking divisions of words, but divisions of the 
manner of employing them. The same word may be employ- 
ed either univocally, equivocally, or analogously ; either in 
the first or second intention. The ordinary logical treatises 
often occasion great perplexity to the learner, by not noticing 
this circumstance." Every thing necessary on these distinc- 
tions will be found in the chapter on Fallacies. 



INTERROGATORY EXAMINATION 

At the end of 
Chap. I. Part. IL 

Q, 1. What is meant by a term 1 Art. 8. 

\ci. ». May c toi?m «onGiet of more than one vrorA 'i 8. 

Q. 3. In the declaration that " man is a rational being," how many terms 
are there 1 8 note 1. 

Q. 4. What is understood by a singular term 1 9. 

Q. 5. What is implied by a universal term? 10. 

Q. 6. Which of the following two terms is singular, and which is univer- 
sal, " this tree," " tree" ?— so of " this river," « river?" 9.10. 

Q. 7. What is signified by a relative term ! 11. 

Q. 8. What do you imply by an absolute term ? 12. 

Q. 9. Of the two terms, « father," " man," which is relative, and which lis 
absolute? 11 and 12. 

Q. 10. What is meant by a positive term ? 12. 

Q. 11. What is expressed by a privative term ? 14. 

Q. 12. How do you explain a negative term ? 15. 

Q. 13. Of the three expressions, " a man speaking," " a deaf-man," " a 
dumb statue," which is positive, which privative, which negative ? 13. 14. 15. 

Q. 14. Assign your reasons for the one being positive, another privative, 
and the third negative. 

Q. 15. How is a concrete term defined ? 17. Note 1. 

Q. 16. What is the definition of an abstract term 1 16. 

Q. 17. Are concrete terms always adjectives? 17. 



ON TERMS. 59 

Q. 18. Of the following pairs, distinguish which is a concrete, and which 
an abstract term, viz : just, justice ; white, whiteness ; round, roundness ; fool, 
folly ; knave, knavery. 

Q. 19. Explain what is meant by an indefinite term. 18. 

Q. 20. What do you understand by such expressions, as " not Alexander ;" 
this disease is " not a dropsi/ P" 

Q. 21. What is understood by a definite term 1 19. 

Q. 22. Of the two expressions as, Caesar, not Csesar, which is an indefinite 
and which a definite term 1 

Q. 23. For what reason is " organized" a definite term and unorganized an 
indefinite one 1 



CHAP. II. 
On the opposition of Terms^ 

(Art. 20.) The opposition of terms is that which exists be* 
tween two terms that cannot both be applied to one single 
object at the same time ; as young and old» 

(Art. 21.) Consistent terms are those which may be, at the 
same time, affirmed of the same thing ; as cold and di^y. 

(Art. 22.) Opposite terms are those which cannot be, at the 
same time, affirmed of the same thing ; as " black and white.^' 

(Art. 23.) The opposition of terms is fourfold, between 
relative^ contrary , privative and contradictory terms. 

(Art. 24.) Relative opposition is that which is between two 
relatives that cannot both, at the same time, be applied to 
the same subject: one may be hoth master and servant, hxxt not 
at the same time to the same person. 

(Art. 25.) Contrary opposition is that which is between 
two absolute terms, which expel one another from a subject 
capable of either ; as wise and foolish. 

(Art. 26.) Privative opposition is that which is between 
a positive and privative term ; as seeing and blind. 



60 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 

(Art. 27.) Contradictory opposition is that which is be- 
tween a definite and an indefinite term ; as "a man and not 
a manP 

1. This is the greatest of all oppositions; that which takes 
place " between any two terms, which differ only in having 
and wanting the particle not, either expressly or in sense, at- 
tached to them; as Cicero, or not Cicero ; organized, or not 
organized ; corporeal or incorporeal ; for not only is it impos- 
sible for both these views to be taken at once of the same 
thing, but also, it is impossible but that one or the other should be 
applicable to every object." This opposition admits of no 
medium, neither a medium of participation, such as is grey be- 
tween black and white ; nor a medium of abnegation, such as 
is a stone between seeing and blind. 

2. Relative terms, on the other hand, produce the least op- 
position, for relative terms are not opposites, unless they are 
considered with respect to the same thing, and at the same 
time. 



INTERROGATORY EXAMINATION. 

Q. 1 . What is meant by the opposition of terms 1 Art. 20. 

Q. 2. What kind of terms are those which are called consistent? 21. 

Q. 3. What do you understand by opposite terms 1 22. 

Q. 4. How many kinds of opposition are there ? 23. 

Q. 5. What is relative opposition 1 24. 

Q. 6. What is contrary opposition ? 25. 

Q. 7. What is privative opposition ? 26. 

Q. 8. What is contradictory opposition 1 27. 

Q. 9. What kind of opposition is the most complete ? 27 note 1. 

Q. 10. What kind of opposition is the least ? 27 note 2. 



CHAP. III. 

On the generalization of terms : and on terms predi- 

cable. 

(Art. 28.) Generalization is that process by which the mind 
arrives at the idea of a whole class, species or genus, expressed 
by a universal term. 

1 . Thus in the contemplation of a large number of animals 
we observe that some of them are distinguished from the rest, 
because they have wings, are covered with feathers, and lay 
eggs. These by abstraction from the rest, we generalize by 
giving them a general name, or universal term, as " bird." 

2. Generalization, it is plain, may be indefinitely extended 
by a further abtsraction applied to common terms : e. g. as by 
abstraction from the term " Socrates," we obtain the universal 
term ^^ philosopher ;" so from " philosopher" by a similar process 
we arrive at the more general term " ma?i ;" from " man" we 
advance to " animal ;" from animal to " created being" &c. 

3. We may thus generalize into whatever genus, species, 
or class we please, according to our purpose. " Any indivi- 
dual person to whom we direct our attention may be consider- 
ed either in a political point of view, and accordingly refer- 
ed to the class of merchant, farmer, lawyer, &c., as the case 
may be ; or physiologically, as, negro or white man; or theo- 
logically, as Pagan, Mahommedan, Christian : or geographical- 
ly, as European, American, &c. Thus it may suit a farmer's 
purpose to class his cattle with his ploughs, carts, and other 
possessions, under the name of ' stock / the naturalist suitably 
to his purpose classes them with ' quadrupeds,^ which term 
would include wolves, bears, &c., which to the farmer would 
be a most improper classification ; the commissary again would 
class them with corn, fish, cheese, &c., as ^ provisions,^ that 
which is most essential to one view being subordinate in ano- 
ther." 

4. Though generalizationis usually said to be the business of 
abstraction, it is only one of the purposes to which abstraction 
is applied. Thus a person when a rose is before him, may 
make the scent a distinct object of attention, laying a«ide all 

F 



62 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM- 

thought of color, form, &c., and this, though it were the only 
rose he had ever met with, he would effect by abstraction. 
But if in contemplating several objects, and finding that they 
agree in certain points, we abstract, or chiefly regard the 
circumstances of common agreement, diregarding those where- 
in they differ from other objects, giving to the former a name 
applicable to them in respect of this agreement ; i. e. a uni- 
versal term, as rose, by this abstraction, we are said to ge- 
neralize, by giving a general nam.e wherein they all agree 5 
abstraction, therefore, does not necessarily imply generaliza- 
tion, though generalization implies abstraction. 

5. In the distribution of beings into genera and species, re- 
gard is had to the comprehension and extension of universal 
terms. 

6. Bt/ the comprehension o/'« term is meant the aggre- 
gate of all the known properties of a genus, species or 
class to which it is applied. Thus if to be covered with fea- 
thers, to be oviparous, and to have wings, are properties com- 
mon to all birds, the genus bird must comprehend no species 
to which these properties do not belong. When we say of 
any man, that he is a mathematician^ this appellation com- 
prehends all the attributes that belong to him, as an animal, 
as a man, and as one who has studied mathematics. 

7. The extension of a term regards the number of spe- 
cies into which a genus, or the number of individuals into 
which a species is divided. Thus when we are taught that 
the three angles of a plane triangle are equal to two right 
angles, we are aware that this proposition extends to every 
species of plane triangle, and to every individual plane trian- 
gle which has existed, which does exist, or which can exist. 

8. " A universal term, as ' man,' denotes no real thing, (as 
the Realists maintained) distinct from each individual, but 
merely any man, viewed so as to admit all that is peculiar to 
each individual ; by which means the term becomes applica- 
ble alike to any of several individuals, or, in the plural, to se- 
veral or all composing the order, genus or class together." 

(Art. 29.) All universal terms are called predicables, because 
they may be affirmatively jorec^zcGf/et/ of any or of all the in- 
dividuals of the class they respectively contradistinguish. 

1. Thus " quadruped" is a universal term, and therefore a 
predicable, because it may be predicated of horses, dogs, ele- 
phants, &,c., or of any or all of them ; as " all elephants are 



ON THE GENERALIZATION OP TERMS, &C. 63 

quadrupeds;" *'this, that or the other horse is a quadruped;" 
or " horses, dogs, camel s, deer, elephants, are quadrupeds." 

(iVrt. 30.) There are five sorts of predicable words ; as 
genus, species, essential difference, property and accident. 

(Art. 31.) A genus is a term which is predicated of several 

classes or species as the common part of their essence ; as 

animal, which includes man, beast, bird, fish, insect. 

1. The naturalist, whether in the science of Zoology, Orni- 
thology, Ichthyology, Entomology, Conchology, Botany, Mi- 
neralogy, &c., as well as the grammarian, the logician, the 
rhetorician, the moralist, the jurisconsult, the physician, and 
the mechanic, and in a word every man that professes any art 
or science, must have general and also special terms for ex- 
pressing his sentiments in every branch of knowledge he would 
communicate to others. The several crimes, such as theft, 
murder, robbery, piracy, perjury, forgery, treason, &c., are 
only certain combinations of human actions, each having se- 
veral subordinate species, defined in criminal law, and which 
it is found convenient to classify, as genera and species. 

(Art. 32.) A SPECIES is a term which is predicated of seve- 
ral individuals, as their whole essence ; so man, beast, bird, 
fish, insect, are the several species composing the genus animal. 

1. In this distribution of things into genera and species, it is 
evident that the name of the species comprehends more attri- 
butes than the name of the genus. The species comprehends 
all that is in the genus, and those attributes likewise which 
distinguish that species from others belonging to the same ge- 
nus ; and the more such divisions we make, the names of the 
lower become still more comprehensive in their signification, 
but the les's extensive in their application to individuals. 

2. Thus of animal, man, European, Frenchman, Parisian, 
every subsequent term comprehends in its signification all that 
is in the preceding and something more ; and every antece- 
dent term extends to more individuals than the subsequent. 

8. Hence it is an axiom in logic that the more extensive 
any general term is, it is the less comprehensive: and on the 
contrary, the more comprehensive the less extensive. 

(Art. 33.) The essential difference is a term which is 

predicated of a species, as that part of its essence, which dis- 



64 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 

tinguishes it from any other species of the same genus ; as 

" rational^^ which distinguishes the species, man, from any 

other of the genus animal. 

1. Essential difference, as will be seen in the next chapter, 
always is indispensable in a logical definition. Thus by join- 
ing the genus, " animal,'' and the essential difference " ration- 
al," man is logically defined to be a "rational animal," for 
we do not apply the term rational to any other species, whe- 
ther beast, bird, fish or insect of the genus " animal." So, 
" roundness" is the essential difference of a sphere, ball or 
globe, which distinguishes it from any other species of mathe- 
matical figures. \ 

(Art. 34.) A PROPERTY is a term predicated of a species, as 
an attribute necessarily joined to its essential difference ; as 
" risible^^ dependant on " rational," the essential difference 
of the species man. 

1. So volubility or aptness to roll, is the " property'' of a 
sphere, ball or globe, and dependant on its essential difference 
" roundness." And " shape" or " figure" is the property of 
matter, dependant on its essential difference, " solid extension." 

(Art. 35.) An accident is a term predicated of one or some 
indidividuals only of a species, as an attribute accidentally 
joined to the essential difference ; as " tall or short." 

1 . An accident is such a mode as is not necessary to the 
being of a thing, for the subject may be without it, and yet 
remain of the same nature as it was before ; so smoothness, of 
roughness, blackness or whiteness, motion or rest, are the ac- 
cidents of a ball, or sphere, for these may be all changed of 
abolished, and yet the body may remain a ball still. So learn- 
ing, ignorance, justice, folly, sickness, health, are the accidents 
of a man. 

(Art. 36.) A GENUS is either the highest or a subaltern : a 
SPECIES is either a subaltern or the lowest. 

(Art. 37.) The highest genus is that which is not consi- 
dered as a species of any thing ; as substance : the lowest 
SPECIES is that which is never a genus, as greyhound. 

(Art. 38.) A subaltern genus or species, is a genus when 



ON THE GENERALIZATION OP TERMS, &C. 65 

predicated of a lower species, as every man is an animal : or 

a species when subjected to a higher genus; as eve7y animal 

is a substance. 

1. That general nature wherein one thing agrees with most 
other things, is also called its more remote genus : so substance 
is the remote genus of bird or beast, because it agrees not only 
to all kinds of animals, but also to inanimate things ; as sun, 
stars, metals, stones, water, &c. But "animal" is the proxi- 
mate or nearest genus of bird, beast, &c.; since "animal" 
agrees with nothing that has not life, sensation and motion. 
Those general natures, which stand between the nearest and 
most remote, are called intermediate. 

ADDITIOWAL NOTES. 

1. Hence the ^^ essential differences^ is either g^enerical, 
which added to the genus constitutes a subaltern species ; as 
sensible predicated of animal when considered as a species of 
substance ; or specific, which constitutes the lowest species, as 
^^rationaV^ predicated of man as a species of animal. 

2. A property likewise is either generical, which is neces- 
sarily joined to the essential difference of the highest or sub- 
altern genus ; as moveable : specific, which is joined to that 
of the lowest species ; as " risible.'''' 

3. "But a property is commonly said to be four-fold. 1. Such 
as belongs to one species only, but not to every individual of it ; 
as to be a gram^marian ;" this however should be regarded as 
an accident. 2. " Such as belongs to every individual of a 
species, but not to that species only, as to have two feet. 

3. Such as belongs to one species and ev^ery individual, but 
not always, as to turn grey haired,^^ consequently an accident. 

4. *• Such as belongs to every individual of one species only, 
and that always; as ^risibility.'' It is such a property as 
this, which constitutes the fourth predicable.^' — Wesley. 

4. " That is most strictly called a property," says Whately, 
" which belongs to the whole species, and to that species alone ; 
as polarity to the magnet ; for its essential difference as a 
species of mineral, is its * attracting iron.' And such a '/?ro- 
perty,' it is often difficult to distinguish from the ' essential 
difference.'' But whatever you consider, as the most essential 
to the nature of a species, to contradistinguish it from other 
species of the same genus, " you must call the essential differ- 
ence : as 'rationality' to man,",contradistinguished by this essen- 
tial difference from any other species of the genus animal ; 

p2 



66 



SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 



and whatever you consider as rather dL result consequent on 
that essential difference^ you must call the property, as the 

* use of speech' seems to be a result of rationality." 

5. *' But very many properties which belong to the whole 
of a species are not peculiar to it ; as * to breathe air' be- 
longs to every man, but not to man alone ; and it is therefore 
strictly speaking, not so much a property of the species 

* man,' as of the higher or more comprehensive genus, as of 

* land animal :' see No. 2 of note 3, page 65. Other properties, 
as some logicians call them, are peculiar to a species, but do 
not belong to the whole of it ; e. g. man alone can be a poet, 
but it is not every man that is so. These, however, are more 
commonly reckoned as accidents" See No. 1. of note 2. page 65. 

6. " That is more properly called an accident which may 
be absent or present, the essential difference of the species 
continuing the same ; as for a man to be * walking^ or a * na- 
tive of Paris ;' of these two examples, the former is what 
logicians call a separable accident, because it may be sepa- 
rated from the individual : (e. g. he may be sitting down ;) the 
latter is an inseparable accident, being not separable from the 
individual (i. e. he who is a native of Paris can never be other- 
wise ;) * from the individual,' I say, because every accident 
must be separable from the species, otherwise it would be a 
property. " 

7. Some of the above remarks will be illustrated by refer- 
ence to the subjoined syllabus. 

ANIMAL, 



MAN. 

C to 
a n 



BEAST. 



ill- 






2 02 n H O ra g 

g P ., -, tD M 






,r 



BIRD. 

a 

c 
n 






FISH. INSECT. 



? 3 






ON THE GENERALIZATION OF TERMS, &C. 67 



INTERROGATORY EXAMINATION. 

Q. 1. What process is to be understood by generalization 1 Art. 28. 

Q. 2. When we are contemplating many objects, as all living creatures or 
animals, and perceive that one class of them, containing many individuals, 
differs from another class also containing many individuals, by a common pe- 
culiarity that reriders that class distinct from any other ; and proceed thus di- 
viding all animals into classes, by what process is this done 1 28. 

Q. 3. With what terms does generalization supply us ? 28. 

Q. 4. What terms are they which are called predicables 1 29. 

Q. 5, Why are common terms called predicable 1 29. 

Q. 6. How many sorts of predicable terms can you enumerate 1 30. 

Q. 7. What is to be understood by a genus ] 31. 

Q. 8. Can you define the term species ] 32. 

Q. 9. Explain what you mean by essential difference. 33. 

Q. 10. All birds have feathers, but the other species of the genus animal, as 
man, beast, fish, insect, have not ; what then is that called which distinguishes 
birds from any other species of the same genus 1 33. 

Q. 11. What is the logical distinction of genus and species ] 33. 

Q. 12. State what you mean by the property of a species. 34. 

Q. 13. Is "property" what is dependant on the essential difference of a spe- 
cies'? 34. 

Q. 14. If " rationality" distinguishes man from any other species of the 
genus animal, and " risibility" is a result of rationality, which is the essential 
difference, and which is the property 1 33 and 34. 

Q. 15. If " roundness" distinguishes a ball from any other figure, and an 
" aptitude to roll" is a result of roundness, which is the essential difference, 
and which the property 1 33 and 34. 

Q. 16. Explain what you mean by accident. 35. 

Q. 17. Is accident necessarily connected with each and all the individaals of 
a species, or only with some and that occasionally ? 35. 

Q. 18. Were it said, " that man is a rational animal, risible, and also fa//," 
which word would indicate t\iQ genus, which the species, which the essential 
difference, which ihe property, and which the accident? 

Q. 19. Were it said, " that a white round ball is a figure having an apti- 
tude to roll,^' what words would respectively express genus, species, essential 
difference, property and accident. ? 

Q. 20. State what you mean by the highest genus. 37. 

Q. 21. What is understood by a subaltern genus ? 38. 

Q. 22. What is a subaltern species 1 38. 

Q. 23. What is the lowest species 1 37, 



CHAP. IV. 

On the Division and Definition of Terms. 

(Art. 40.) The division of a universal term is that process 
by which we enumerate the distinct parts of which it con- 
sists. 

1. Thus the universal term animal, is divided into the ge- 
nera, man, beast ,bird, fish, insect, &c. Again, any of these 
genera, as man, may be divided into European, Asiatic, Afri- 
can or American. And any one of these, by regarding it as 
a genus, into other divisions, as European, in English, French, 
German, Spaniards, &c : and so on till we come to the lowest 
species, which is never a genus and contains only individuals, 
as John, Thomas, William, &c. 

2. '' This operation is directly opposite to generalization ; 
for as in that you lay aside the differences by which the indi- 
viduals are distinguished so as to obtain the common term com- 
prising the whole of a class, species or genus; so in division, 
you add on the differences, so as to enumerate them by their 
several particular names. Thus ' mineral' is said to be divid- 
ed into stones, metals, fossils, &c. and metals into gold, silver, 
copper, iron, lead, &c. and these, when complete, are called 
the parts, or members, of the division." 

(Art. 41.) The rules of division are three, viz : 

Rule 1st. Let the members of the division, severally contain 

less (be of a narrower signification) than the word divided. 
Rule 2d. Let them conjointly contain neither more nor less 

than the divided. 

I. Therefore we must be careful to ascertain that the high- 
est genus implied may be predicated of every term placed un- 
der it, and of nothing else. 

Rule 3d. Let them be opposite, i. e. not contained in each 

other. 

1. Were you to divide " book," into poetical, historical, folio, 
quarto, French, Latin, &c., the members would be contained 
in each other : for a French book may be a quarto, and a 



ON THE DIVISION AND DEFINITION OP TERMS. 69 

quarto, historical, &c. ; you must be careful therefore to keep in 
mind the principle of the division with which you set out, e. gl 
whether you begin dividing books, according to their matter, 
their language, or their size, &c. : all these being so many 
cross divisions. 

2. *< When any thing is capable, as in the above instance, 
of being divided in several different ways, we are not to reckon 
anyone of these the proper one, without previously ascertain- 
ing what the object is which we have in view : for one mode 
of dividing may be the more suitable for one purpose, and ano- 
ther for another ; as, e. g. one of the above modes of dividing 
books would be the most suitable for a book-binder, another 
in a philosophical, and the other in a philological view." 

3. Illustration. Gratitude may be divided into 1st. a con- 
sciousness of favor received. 2. A disposition to acknow- 
ledge it on every proper occasion. 3. And a resolution to 
seize the tirst opportunity of returning a similar favor to the 
benefactor. 

4. " Care must be taken not to confound a physical division 
with a logical; which beginners are apt to do, by introducing 
into the course of a division, the mention of the real parts of 
which an individual consists, andof each of which accordingly 
the whole cannot be affirmed." 

5. Division, as employed in Logic, is a metaphorical expres- 
sion. For to divide means literally to separate the compo- 
nent parts, each of which is, of course, less than the whole : 
e. g. a tree, might be divided physically into root, trunk, 
branches, leaves, &c. Now it cannot be said that a root or a 
leaf is a tree. But if the genus, animal, be divided logically 
into man, beast, bird, fish, insect, it may be said of each of 
these, that it is an animal. Moreover, in a logical division 
each of the members is in reality more, i.e. of greater com- 
prehension than the whole ; for by the word animal we under- 
stand only what may be affirmed of any of its kinds, but by 
the word beast we understand not only that, but in addition a 
quadruped ; i. e. the idea of animal is only that of the genus, 
but of a part or species, that of genus and essential differ- 
ence, 

6. ^^li is plain then, that it is /og-ica//^ only, i. e. in our mode 
of speaking, that a genus is said to contain (or rather com- 
prehend) its species ; while metaphysically (i. e. in our con- 
ception) a species contains, i. e. implies its genus." 



70 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 

DEFINITIONS. 

(Art. 42.) A DEFINITION is a sentence distinguishing a word 
or thing from any other ; and is either nominal or real. 

1. It has been said that " a definition is a sentence explain- 
ing the word defined ;" this, however, is only an explanation^ 
and an explanation is not a definition ; for an explanation 
may be such as to include some other individual, species or 
genus, whereas a definition must absolutely limits and con- 
sequently exclude every word or thing but that defined, other- 
wise it would be equivocal or ambiguous, 

2. Definition literally (from " finis*' a limit) signifies " lay- 
ing down a boundary," and is used in Logic to signify " an ex- 
pression which so distinguishes any term, as to separate it from 
every thing else ;'* as a boundary separates one field from 
another. 

(Art. 43.) A nominal definition is that which distinguishes 

the MEANING OF A WORD from that of any other. 

1. Thus the word " decalogue" might be defined to be the 
ten commandments ; "telescope," an instrument for viewing 
distant objects; "microscope," an instrument for viewing 
small or minute objects ; since there are no other words sig- 
nifying the same things. 

(Art. 44.) A REAL DEFINITION is that which distinguishes 

the NATURE OF A THING from that of any other ; and is either 

accidental or essential, 

1. Definitions are divided into nominal and real, ac- 
cording to the object accomplished by them ; whether 
to distinguish merely the meaning of a word^ or the na- 
ture of the thing, A real definition of any thing belongs 
to the science or system which is employed about that thing. 
It is to be observed, that in mathematics, and indeed in all the 
exact sciences, as well as in Logic, Jurisprudence, and Ethics, 
the nominal and the real definition exactly coincide; the mean- 
ing of the word^ and the nature of the things in expression, 
being exactly the same. 

(Art. 45.) An accidental definition is that which distin- 
guishes a thing from any other by its properties or accidents. 

1. Thus a ball may be defined to be a " figure that has an 
aptitude to roll." Or man, by his property, as a " risible ani- 



ON THE DIVISION AND DEFINITION OF TERMS. 71 

mal,'* or an " animal endued with speech ;" or by an accident, 
as, an ** animal using fire to dress his food." 

2. In defining a whole species, you cannot mention any 
thing which is strictly an accident, because if it does not be- 
long to the whole of the species, it cannot define it ; but in de- 
fining only some of the species, or an individual, accidents may 
be employed as distinctive criteria, because it is by them, that 
one individual or some individuals differ from others, and in 
this case you add the species : e. g. " Philip was a man of Ma- 
cedon, who subdued Greece.'' 

(Art. 46.) An essential definition is that which distin- 
guishes a thing from any other, by those parts that constitute 
its essence ; and is either physical or logical. 

(Art. 47.) A PHYSICAL DEFINITION isthat which distinguishes 
a thing from any other by the really distinct parts of its es- 
sence. 

1. Thus man may be defined to be " a being consisting of an 
organized body and a reasonable soul," in the same way a plant 
may be physically defined, by enumerating the leaves, stalks, 
roots, &c. of which it is composed ; and a proposition may be 
defined physically^ to be " a subject and predicate combined 
by a copula :" the parts here enumerated being actually se- 
parable. 

(Art. 48.) A LOGICAL definition is that which distinguishes 

a thing from any other by assigning its genus and essential 

difference. 

1. Thus man is logically defined, viz. "man is a rational 
animal ;" for the genus is assigned by the word " animal," the 
essential difference by the term " rational," by which man is 
considered as essentially distinct from other animals ; again, 
" a plant is an organized being, destitute of sensation," is a lo- 
gical definition, assigning both the genus, " organized being," 
and essential difference, " destitute of sensation." And " a pro- 
position is a sentence which affirms or denies," is a logical de- 
finition, assigning the genus, " sentence," and the essential dif- 
erence, " which affirms or denies." And these two parts of 
the essence, genus and essential diflference, are distinguished 
only by the understanding ; whereas the parts of the essence 
enumerated by a physical definition, are in reality distinct, 
(see 47 note 1) as the " subject," " predicate," and " copula," 



72 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 

may be physically and in reality separated ; so the leaves, 
stalk?, and roots of the plant enumerated as the realli/ separa* 
ble parts of its essence by a physical definition. 

2. " Here it must be observed," says Dr. Watts, " that when 
we speak of the genus and essential difference, as composing 
a definition, it must always be understood that the nearest ge- 
nus is required. Thus to define wine, what is the genus? 
" Liquid" is too remote, and " substance," still more so. Nei- 
ther of these two remote genera would make any distinction 
between wine and a thousand other " liquids'^ or " substances :" 
a remote genus leaves the thing too much undistinguished. 
To prevent this, therefore, we take the nearest genus, viz. 
^^juiceP 

3. Juice^ however, is only the genus ; what then is the essen- 
tial difference, the next point requisite to compose a complete 
logical definition ; for of "^wzce^," there are many : cider, 
for example, is a juice, so is perry ; the former is a juice press- 
ed from apples, the latter from pears : but the juice which is 
wine, is pressed from grapes. Wine, therefore, may be logi- 
cally defined to be "a juice pressed from grapes." 

4. Thus a square may be logically defined : a square is a 
figure which has '•'•four equal sides, and four right angles.''^ 
By this definition the square is considered to,be of one genus, 
and that genus is expressed by the word ^'Jigvre." But the 
second part of the definition expresses the essential difference, 
which distinguishes that figure from any other species of the 
same genus. 

5. "Mathematicians,"saysMnWesley, ^' in all their writings, 
follow this method; 1st, they fix the meaning of their words, 
defining their terms, each in its place, and make it an inva- 
riable rule, never afterwards to use any term but in the sense 
to which it is limited by that definition. 2dly, They lay 
down the axioms which there will be occasion to use in the 
course of their work. 3. They add their postulata, which they 
also demand to be granted, as being evident of themselves. 4. 
They then demonstrate their propositions in order, and as far 
as may be, afiirmatively, contenting themselves with this rule, 
that whatsoever they have to prove, they take care to demon- 
strate from some of the truths, which have been granted or 
proved before. If the same method cannot be strictly observed 
in other sciences, yet doubtless it may be imitated. And the 
nearer any method approaches to this, the more perfect and 
useful it is." But the whole of this perfect method is built on 
correct definition. 



ON THE DIVISION AND DEFINITION OP TERMS. 73 

6. It is scarcely conceivable how much confusion, misunder- 
standing and inconvenience have arisen from a neglect of ac- 
curate definitions, in writings and debates of a controversial 
character. Had correct definitions been strictly attended to 
in limine, and correct argumentation understood, tons of use- 
less volumes and cargoes of newspaper debates, never would 
have misled so many thousands, nor have distracted the pub- 
lic attention from one age to another. 

7. The whole scheme of these several kinds of definition, 
may be illustrated as follows : let in each the being to be de- 
fined be man. 

SCHEME OF DEFINITIONS. 

Nominal, - " man is a human heingr 

rAccidental, . - - - « man is a risible animal" 

J r Physical, " man is a bei7i^ consisting of an or- 

Real, ^, Essential, < ganized body and a reasonable soul." 

\_ ([^ Logical, ... " man is a ra^ioraa/ flmwia/," 



RULES OF DEFINITION. 

(Art. 49.) The rules of definition are three. 

Rule 1. Let the definition be adequate to the defined. 

\. i. e. ^^ neMhev too extensive YiOT too narrow for the thing 
defined :" e. g. to define *' fish," " an animal that lives in the 
water," would be too extensive, because many insects, &c. live 
in the water ; to define it " an animal that has an air bladder," 
would be too narrow, because many fish are without any. Or 
*' an animal which breathes through gills, and is scaly " would 
likewise be too narrow, since all fishes have not scales. But 
to define wine to be " the juice of grapes" is adequate, and 
agrees to all proper wines, whether red, white, French, Span- 
ish, Florence, &c.; currant wine, gooseberry wine, &c. are 
imitations and not proper wines, or what is from the vine ; as 
o/yoc implies. 

Rule 2. Let the definition be plainer than the defined. 

1. That is in itself, because to some persons the term defined 
may be even more familiar than the definition. The advan- 
tage, however, obtained by definition is not so much explana- 
tion^ as limitation ; a matter of the utmost importance in dis- 



74 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 

course and controversy. This rule seems chiefly a check to a 
species of verbose and loose definition sonnewhat prevalent a 
century ago ; as "white is a color arising from the prevalen- 
cy of brightness ;" a definition not only obscure but also un- 
philosophical. 

Rule 3. Let the definition be contained in a fit number of 

proper, not figurative words. 

1. Figurative words are altogether inapplicable to correct 
definition especially on account of their tendency to produce 
ambiguity and indistinctness. By a " fit number of words,'' 
we are to understand that medium which is equidistant from 
obscure brevity on the one hand, and that redundancy on the 
other, which is productive oi prolixity or tautology. Tautology, 
a distinct fault from prolixity, consists in inserting too much, not 
in mere words, but in sense ; whereas prolixity is the use of 
more words than is necessary to express the sense. The ex- 
tremes, therefore, to be avoided are obscurity and redundancy. 

2. Thus to define a parallelogram, *' a four-sided figure 
whose opposite sides are parallel and equal," would be tautolo- 
gical, because, though it is true, that such a figure, and such 
alone, is a parallelogram, the equality of their sides is implied 
in their being parallel, and may be proved from it. Now 
the insertion of the words "and equal," leaves a reader to sup- 
pose that there may be a four-sided figure whose opposite sides 
are parallel but not equal. Though such a definition asserts 
nothing false it leads to a supposition of \vhat is false; and 
consequently is to be regarded as a redundant definition. 



INTERROGATORY EXAMINATION. 

Q. 1. What is understood by the division of universal terms 1 40. 

Q. 2. How would you divide the universal term animal 1 40, n. 1. 

Q. 3. How many rules of division are there 141. 

Q. 4. Repeat the rules of logical division. 41, 1. 2. 3. 

Q. 5. What do you understand by a definition 1 42. 

Q. 6. Wherein does a mere explanation or description differ from a defini- 
tion 1 42,1. 

Q. 7. What is a nominal definition ? 43. 

Q. 8. When a man is said simply to be a human being, what kind of a de- 
finition is that r 48, 7. . 



ON THE DIVISION AND DEFINITION OF TERMS. 75 

Q. 9. What is a real definition T 44. 

Q. 10. Wherein is the distinction between a nominal and a real definition 1 
43,44. 

Q. 11. How many kinds of real definition are there 1 44. 

Q.. 12. What do you mean by an accidental definition 1 45. 

Q. 13. By what kind of definition is man defined to be " a risible animal 1" 

48, 7. 

Q. 14. What is the meaning of an essential definition 1 46. 

Q. 15. How many kinds of an essential definition can yoa enumerate 1 46. 

Q. 16, What is a physical definition I 47. 

Q. 17. By what kind of a definition is man said to be " a being consisting 
of an organized body and a reasonable soul 1" 48, 7. 

Q. 18. What is a logical definition 1 48. 

Q. 19. How is a logical definition composed 1 48. 

Q. 20. When the essential difference and the genus are combined to contra- 
distinguish a thing, what kind of definition do they constitute 1 48 . 

Q. 21. By what kind of definition is man said to be " a rational animal 1" 
48, 7. 

Q. 22. Which word of the phrase " rational animal," points out the genus 
and which the essential difference ] 

Q. 23. If the genus to which a triangle belongs, is expressed by the word 
"figure,^ and its essential difierence by " bounded by three right linesy'*' how 
will you define a triangle \ 

Q. 24. If the genus to which a circle belongs is expressed by " figure ," 
and its essential difference by "bounded by a curved line, everywhere equi- 
distant from the centre," what is your definition of a circle 1 

Q. 25. If the genus to which a solid belongs is expressed by "figure," and 
its essential difference by " having length, breadth and thickness," how do you 
define a solid % 

Q. 26. If the genus to which painting belongs is expressed by " art" and 
its essential difference by " of delineating a resemblance on a plane surface," 
how do you define painting *? 

Q. 25. If the genus to which optics belongs is expressed by " science" and 
its essential difference by " which teaches the theory of vision and colors," how 
will you define optics 1 

Q. 28. If the genus to which mathematics belongs is expressed by " science," 
and the essential difference by " which teaches to compute numbers and quan- 
tity," how would you define mathematics % 

Q. 29. Are correct definitions in writings and debates of importance 1 48, 6. 

Q. 30. May all definitions be comprised under the four classes, nominal, ac-- 
cidental, physical, and logical % 48, 7. 

Q. 31. How many rules are there of definition 1 49, 

Q. 32. What is the first rule of definition ] 49, 1. 

Q. 33. What is the second rule of definition ? 49, 2. 

Q. 34. What is the third rule of definition ? 49, 3.. 



PART II. 

ON PROPOSITIONS. 

CHAP. I. 

On the nature of a proposition, and its several parts. 

(Art. 50.) The second part of Logic treats of the proposi- 
tion, which " is judgment expressed in words." 

(Art. 51.) A PROPOSITION is a sentence containing two terms, 
whereof one is affirmed or denied of the other. 

1 2 



-A^. 



/■ ^ ^^ — 

1. As, " all rational animals, are men ;'^ 
1 2 

" Cicero was an orator," 
1 2 



'' No man, is infallible ;" 
1 2 

^. /^ 



" Every angle is formed by two lines meeting ;" 
1 2 

" Thomas is not a geometrician." 
That a term may be either one or more words has been 
already stated. Art. 8 and note 1. 

2. A proposition with strict logical accuracy, might have 
been defined, " a sentence indicative,''^ consequently excluding 
commands and questions ;* where " sentence" is taken to be 
the genus, and " indicative" the essential difference : or " a 
sentence affirming or denying," where " affirming or denying" 
is equivalent to the essential difference. But " containing 
two terms whereof one is affirmed or denied of the other" is 
an essential difference more consistent with the second rule of 
logical definition. 

(Art. 52.) A proposition, as to its matter, is either true or 

* Sentences containing questions or commands have nothing to da with 
Logic. 



ON THE NATURE OF A PROPOSITION, &C. 77 

false : it must not be ambiguous, for then it would be sentences ; 
nor maimed, for then it would be without signification. 

1. Neither of the terms of a proposition must be ambiguous, 
for if it have two or more significations,, it is capable of re- 
duction into as many sentences : " His meat was locusts," as it 
stands in the present translation may mean either, " His meat 
was locusts," implying the winged ijisect so called, or " His 
meat was locusts," signifying the contents of the pod of the 
locust tree. By " maimed" is to be understood, dther " im- 
perfecf or ungrammatical f in either case the sense, of course, 
is destroyed. 

2. To the former defect may be refered the whole of a sen- 
tence so constructed as to admit of two meanings ; as, the ce- 
lebrated response of the oracle, " Aio te, ^Eacida, Romanos 
vincere posse ;" or Shakspeare's witch-prophecy. '^ The duke 
yet lives that Henry shall depose." Now what did this witch 
mean 1 " The duke is living that shall depose Henry," or 
" Henry shall depose the duke that yet lives ?" 

(Art. 53.) A proposition, as to its parts, consists of two 

terms, the subject and the predicate, connected by the copula* 

Subj. d,. Pred. 

, — -^ , a , -^ — , 

1. " Isaac Newton was the Inventor of Fluxions. 

(Art. 54.) The subject of a proposition- is that term of 

which something is affirmed or denied. 

1. Thus in the last mentioned proposition," Isaac Newton" 
is the subject. In the proposition quoted in art. 51, note 1, 
"all rational animals," "Cicero," "no man," "every angle," 
" Thomas," are the subjects of the propositions in which they 
respectively occur. 

(Art. 55.) The Predicate is that term which is affirmed. 

or denied of the Subject. 

1. Of the propositions quoted under Art. 53, "the Inventor 
of Fluxions," is the predicate; and of the propositions under 
Art 51, *« men,"—" an Orator,"—" infallible,"—" formed by 
two lines meeting," — "a Geometrician," — are the predicates 

respectively. 

.* 
(Art. 56.) The Subject and the Predicate are the two, 

terms or extreTues of the proposition. 

g2 



78 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 

1. Each term may consist of a single word, or of a collec- 
tion of words, representing some person, thing or attribute ; as 
in the following examples, 

Body is divisible. 
A good Government is effective of the happiness of the governed. 
Sir Humphrey Davy was the discoverer of the metallic bases of the alkalies. 



The spherical figure of the Eye is best adapted to its motion in all directions. 

2. " It is not every word that is capable of being employed 
by itself as a term. Adverbs, prepositions, &c. and also 
nouns in any other case besides the nominative, can only form 
part of a term: A nominative noun may be by itself a term." 

3. " A verb, all except the substantive verb used as the 
copula, is a mixed word, being resolvable into the copula and 
predicate, to which it is equivalent ; and indeed is often so 
resolved in the mere rendering out of one language into an- 
other; as ipse adesf, he is present:" sum, I am; scribebat, he 
wrote; equivalent to, "/am existing,^' "Ae was writing.'^ 

4. " It is to be observed, however, that under the verb, we 
do not include the infinitive, which is properly a noun substan- 
tive ; nor the participle, which is a noun adjective. They are 
verbals, being related to their respective verbs in respect of 
the things they signify ; but not verbs, inasmuch as they 
differ entirely in their mode of signification.^^ 

5. " An infinitive, though it often comes last in the sentence, 
is never the predicate, except when another infinitive is the 
subject : e. g. 

subj. pred. 

r ^"~^ t ■ \ 

«I hope to succeed:" i. e. "to succeed is what I hope." 

6. " An adjective or participle cannot, by itself be made the 
subject of a proposition ; but is often employed as a predicate : 
as, Crassus was rich.'^ 

(Art. 57.) The Copula is that verbal connective of the sub- 
ject and predicate of a proposition, which affirms or denies the 
latter of the former. 

1. The copula indicates the act of judgment ; as by it the 
predicate is affirmed or denied of the subject; it itnites the 
two terms of the proposition, to show their agreement or dis- 
agreement ; as the copulative or disjunctive conjunction 
does the different parts of a sentence ; as 

Man is fallible. 
Man is not omniscient 



ON THE NATURE OF A PROPOSITION, &C. 79 

2. *' The copula must be either is or is not, or some tense 
of the substantive verb, (to be,) the only verb recognized by 
Logic : all others are resolvable, by means of this verb, and a 
participle or adjective: e. g. 'The Romans conquered:' — the 
word conquered is both copula and predicate, being equiva- 
lent to 'vs^ere/ (cop.) ' victorious,' (pred.) Socrates disput- 
ed, is equal to Socrates was disputing ; Rome is, to Home 
is existing ; ambulat, to ille est ambulans, or Ae is walking.'''' 

(Art. 58.) The subject and predicate taken together are 

called the matter of the proposition. 

1. That is, the subject and predicate are the materials of 
w^hich the proposition is composed. 

2. The subject and predicate ought always to be two dif- 
ferent ideas, or two different terms. For if both the terms 
and both the ideas are the same, it is what is called an 
identical proposition ; as "a rule is a rule^^ which is mere 
trifling. But though the terms are the same, if the ideas are 
different, the proposition is not strictly identical; as ^'home is 
home^'' which is equal to " no place is like home" or home is 
more eligible than any other place. ^'Socrates is Socrates 
still ; i. e. "^Ae man Socrates is still a philosopher y — 
" What is done is done ;" i. e. *' it cannot be undone.^' 

3. The subject and predicate are not always distinguished 
by the mere position they hold in the sentence, but by reflect- 
ing rather on the sense and design of the speaker or writer ; 
e. g. the meaning of " in Africa are many lions," is, " many 
lions are existing in Africa" Of the sentence, "7if is proper for a 
philosopher to understand Geometry" the word " proper " is the 
predicate; i. e. the knowledge (^geometry to a philosopher is 
proper. 



INTERROGATORY EXAMINATION 

ON 

Chap. I. 

Q. 1. On what does the second part of Logic treat 1 Art. 50. 

Q. 2. State what you mean by a proposition. 51. 

Q. 3. How many tenna does a proposition contain 1 51. 



80 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 

Q. 4. Is a sentence that does neither affirm or deny, a proposition 1 51. 

Q. 5. Is a sentence that contains only a question or demand,a proposition? 51. 

Q. 6. Why is this sentenccj with which I now address you, not a propo- 
sition! 51. 

Q. 7. What should a proposition, as to its matter, be 1 52. 

Q. 8. If a proposition is ambiguous, what is the consequence 1 52. 

Q. 9. If a proposition is maimed, that is imperfect or ungrammatical, what is 
the consequence 1 52. 

Q. 10. Of how many parts does a proposition, as to its form, consist 1 53. 

Q. 11. What is the subject of a proposition 1 54. 

Q. 12. What is the predicate of a proposition 1 55» 

Q. 13. What constitutes the matter of a proposition 1 56. 

Q. 14. What is the copula of a proposition 1 57. 

Q. 15. What is the only verb, which properly can be the copula of a propo- 
sition ? 57,1. 

Q. 16. In the proposition, Isaac Newton was the inventor of Fluxions, state 
which is the subject, which the predicate, and which the copula. 

Q. 17. In the proposition, Sir Humphrey Davy was the discoverer of alkaline 
bases ; distinguish the subject, the predicate, and the copula. 

Q. 18. In the proposition, every angle is formed by two lines meeting; 
distinguish the subject, the predicate, and the copula. 

Q. 19. Divide the proposition, all rational animals are men, into its three 
parts, subject, proposition and copula. 



CHAP. II. 

On the principal Mnds of propositions concerned in 
argumentation. 

(Art. 59.) Every proposition is either absolute or hypo- 
thetical 

(Art. 60.) An absolute proposition predicates absolutely ; 
as man infallible: man is not omniscient, 

(Art. 61.) A hypothetical proposition predicates condition- 
ally ; as " If he is wise, then he is happy." 

1. Absolute propositions are divided into pure, which assert 
simply or purely, that the subject does, or does not, agree 
with the predicate; as, a true Christian is an honest 



ON THE PRINCIPAL KINDS OF PROPOSITIONS, &C. 81 

man ;" and modal, which expresses, in what mode or manner, 
it agrees ; as, " it is necessary that a true Christian should 
be an honest man. " " t^n intemperate man will probably 
be unwelV For modal and hypothetical propositions, see the 
next chapter. 

(Art. 62.) A proposition is either afpirmative or negative : 
true or false : this is the quality of it. 

1. An affirmative proposition is one whose copula is affir- 
mative; as, *^all men are sinners;" "not to advance, is to 
go back." 

2. A negative proposition is one whose copula is negative; 
as, ** man is not innocent ;" " no miser is happy," since this ia 
reducible to, " a miser is not happy." 

2. *' Sometimes the negative particle is placed so far from 
the copula, that it appears to have no immediate connection 
with it, but rather to belong to some other part of the propo- 
sition; as, 

" Not all the troops united were able to defend the fortress." 

Here the negative word is placed before the subject,, but 
still its influence falls wholly on the copula, and makes the 
proposition signify the opposite to what it would without it. 
This will be made evident by stating the proposition thus, 

" All the troops united were not able to defend the fortress." 

3. If the negative particle, not, be added to the copula of 
a universal affirmative, it reduces it to a particular affirma- 
tive; as, <'^all men are not wise," signifies the same as ^'some 
men are not wise^ 

4. In English, two negatives connected in one sentence, 
make an affirmative ; as, " no man is not mortal," which is 
identical in meaning with " man is mortal." But in Greek, 
and often in French, two negatives render the negation inten- 
sive. 

(Art. 63.) A proposition also is either universal or par- 
ticular: THIS is the quantity OF IT. 

(Art. 64.) If the predicate is said of the whole of the 

SUBJECT, the proposition is universal. 

1. As, " all free agents are accountable f* " every sin is a 
violation of the divine law ;^' "no miser is riehf^ ^^ no 
wicked man is a happy man.^^ Here the predicate is said 
of the whole of the several subjects respectively ; they are, 
therefore, universals. 



82 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 

(Art. 65.) If the predicate is said of a part only of the 
SUBJECT, the proposition is particular. 

1. As, ^^ some islands are fertile; — ^^ some difficult 
things are. virtues*^ — ^^some who prefer faith are not true 
believers'' — ^' several animals are amphibious" are parti- 
cular propositions, since the predicate is said of a part of the 
subject only. 

2. Thus it appears (Art. 62 and art. 63) that there are four 
kinds of absolute propositions ; viz. a universal affirmative, 
a universal negative, a particular affirmative, and a 
particular negative. 

(Art. QQ.) A UNIVERSAL AFFIRMATIVE is a proposition, whose 
subject is a universal term, of the whole of which the predi- 
cate is affirmed : its usual signs are, all, each, every, what- 
ever, Sfc, 

1 . As, all animals have the power of m,otion ; — each of 
the class was instructed ; — evej^y creature had a beginning ; 
— whatever is produced by regular laws, is a proof of an 
intelligent agent, 

(Art. 67.) A UNIVERSAL negative is a proposition, whose 
subject is a universal term, of the whole of which the predi- 
cate is denied : its usual signs are, no, none, neither, 8fc. 

1. As, no sins are excusable ; — none of the ancient philo- 
sophers understood fluxions ; — neither of the Bernoullis 
proved the case against Newton. 

(Art. 68.) A particular affirmative is a proposition, whose 
subject is a universal term, of a part of which only the pre- 
dicate is affirmed : its usual signs are, some, many, most, 
few, several, there are, which, <§r. 

1. As, some stones are heavier than iron ; — many par- 
rots can talk ; — most m^inerals are heavy ;^few men are 
truly wise ; — several kinds of animals are amphibious / — 
there are metals which are lighter than water. 

(Art. 69.) A PARTICULAR negative is a proposition whose 
subject is a universal term, of a part of which only the pre- 
dicate is denied : its usual signs are those of a particular 
affirmative with the particle not annexed to the copula. 



ON THE PRINCIPAL KINDS OF PROPOSITIONS, &;C. 83 

1. As, SOME difficult things are not evils ; — many parrots 
CANNOT talk ; — most of the Turks are not learned ; — few 
of the graduates were not instructed in geometry ; — seve- 
ral troops were not armed ; — there are conjunctions 
WHICH are not signs of the subjunctive. 

2. To express these principal and most useful distinctions of 
propositions in argumentation, logicians employ the symbols 
A. E. I. and 0. That is, t/5. represents a universal affirma- 
tive ; E. a universal negative ; I. a particular affirmative; 
and O. a particular negative. 

3. It will be found of considerable importance to remember 
this, particularly with reference to the distribution of the 
middle term, and the mood and figure of any syllogism : for 
the convenience of the memory, therefore, it will be expressed 
in the following memorial lines. 

(Art. 70.) Universally^ A affirms, and E denies ; 
Particularly i I affirms, and denies. 

(Art. 71.) Some universal or particular propositions are 
singular, some indefinite. 

(Art. 72.) A SINGULAR proposition is one whose subject is 
a singular term. 

1. As, Descartes was an ingenious philosopher ; — the 
palace at Hampton Court is a pleasant dwelling ; — this 
day is very warm ; — Sir Isaac Newton was the author of 
the Principia. 

2. A demonstrative pronoun in the singular number, as this 
or thatf prefixed to the subject of the proposition, renders it 
lingular ; as " that General was defeated. " 

3. Singular propositions are reckoned as universal, because 
in them we speak of the whole of the subject ; e. g. when we 
say, " Brutus was a Roman^' we mean the whole of Brutus : 
this is the general rule : but some singular propositions may 
be fairly reckoned particular ; i. e. when some qualifying 
w^ord is inserted, which indicates that you are not speaking of 
the whole of the subject ; as, Csesar was not wholly a tyrant ; 

THIS MAN IS OCCASIONALLY INTEMPERATE ; — " NoD Omnis Mor- 

iar" Horace, i.e. 1 shall not altogether die. 

(Art. 73.) An indefinite proposition is one that has no 
sign expressed to indicate whether its subject is to be taken in 
^^ universal or particular sense. 



84 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 

1. As, beasts have four feet ; i. e. all beasts. A planet 
is ever changing its place ; i. e. all planets. These then 
are universal. The Chinese are ingenious silk weavers ; 
L e. SOME Chinese. The stars appear to us when the twi- 
light is g^ne ; i. e. those stars only which are above the hori- 
zon. These, therefore, are particulars. 

2. When there is no sign, as in the case if an indefinite, 
the quantity of the proposition is ascertained by the matter of 
it ; i. e. the nature of the connexion between the extreme 
terms, which is either necessary, impossible or contingent. 

3. The matter of a proposition is said to be necessary, 
when its two terms essentially agree ; as, birds have wings, 
i. e. ALL. 

4. The matter of a proposition is said to be impossible, 
when its two terms essentially disagree ; as birds are not 
quadrupeds ; i. e. none. 

5. The matter of a proposition is said to be contingent, 
when its two terms agree or disagree accidentally ; as, birds 
sing ; i. e. some do. 

Q. In necessary and impossible matter an indefinite pro- 
position is understood as a universal ; in contingent matter, 
as a particular; as, anim,als have sensation ; i. e. all; 
quadrupeds have not wings ; i. e. none : birds are not car- 
nivorous ; i. e. some are not. 

7. Indefinite propositions, as well as singular propositions, 
are not in quantity distinct from universals or particulars. 
They differ only in form, but are reducible to one or the 
other, according to their matter or sense. 



Additional remarks on Universal and Particular 
Propositions^ 

Chiefly extracted from Dr. Watts, 

1 . " Universal terms may denote either a metaphysical, 
^physical, or a moral universality. 

2. A metaphysical or mathematical universality is when 
all the particulars contained under any general term, have the 
same predicate belonging to them, without any exception 
whatever ; or when the predicate is so essential to the uni- 



ON THE PRINCIPAL KINDS OP PROPOSITIONS, &C. 85 

versal subject, that it destroys its very nature to be without 
it ; as, " all circles have a centre and circumference y" " all 
spirits in their own nature are immortal^ 

.3. A PHYSICAL OR NATURAL UNIVERSALITY is when, accord- 
ing to the order and the common course of nature, a predicate 
agrees to all the subjects of that kind, though there may be 
some exceptions accidental or preternatural; as, "«// men 
use words to express their thoughts,^^ yet dumb persons are 
excepted; *^ all beasts have four feet ^^^ yet there maybe 
some monsters with five ; or maimed, who have but three. 

4. A MORAL UNIVERSALITY is whcu the predicate so agrees 
to the greatest part of the particulars which are contained 
under the universal subject, as to constitute its general cha- 
racter; as, "a// men are governed by affection rather than 
by reason f^ ^^ all the Romans loved their own country. ^^ 
Now it is evident, that a special or singular conclusion cannot 
always be drawn from a moral universality, nor always and 
infallibly from a physical one ; though it may be always in- 
ferred from a universality which is metaphysical, without any 
danger or possibility of mistake. 

5. In common language, little or no distinction is made be- 
tween a subject that is physically or metaphysically universal. 

6. A universal term is sometimes taken collectively for all 
its particular ideas united together into one whole ; and some- 
times distributively, meaning each of them singly and alone; 
for example, collectively, '^ all these apples will fill a bushel f^ 
not each apple nor every apple singly, but all collectively. 
But a distributive universal vvill allow the word all to be 
changed into every, or into one ; for *' all men are mortal^^ 
means " every man is mortal^ 

7. The universality of a subject is often restricted by the 
peculiar import of the predicate; as, "«// men learn wisdom 
by experience^'' i. e. all those men who do learn wisdom ; for 
it is what, alas ! many never learn. This phraseology is 
also used in Scripture ; as, " all men being justified by the 
righteousness of one ^"^ Rom. v. 18 : that is, «// men who are 

justified obtain it this way. So when we say, " all the 
Dutch are good seamen : all the Italians are subtle poli- 
ticians:'' i. e. those among the Dutch that are seamen, 
are good seamen: those among the Italiaiis, who are poli- 
ticians, are subtle politicians, i. e. they are generally so. 

8. The universality of a term is frequently restricted by 
some circumstance, as of time, place, &c., expressed or implied 
in the context; so that those who dwell in London may say, ''all 



86 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 

the vjeavers went to present their petition^^ i. e. all who 
dwell in the city: surely not those who reside at Macclesfield, 
So when it is said in the Gospel, ''all men did marvel ^^ Mark 
V. 20, it extends to those only who saw or heard of the mira- 
cles there spoken of. <- 



INTERROGATORY EXAMINATION 

ON 

Chap. II. 

Q. 1. Into what two principal divisions are propositions divided 1 59. 

Q. 2. How do you distinguish between absolute and hypothetical propo- 
sitions 1 60, 61. 

Q. 3. Of the two propositions; the Scythians were herdsmen; and if 
they are warlike, then are they cruel ; which is an absolute, and which a hypo- 
thetical proposition 1 60, 61. 

Q. 4. "What is the division of propositions as to quality ? 62. 

Q. 5. What is meant by the quality of a proposition ? 62. 

Q. 6. What do you mean by an affirmative proposition 1 62. 1. 

Q. 7. What do you mean by a negative proposition ? 62. 2. 

Q,. 8. Of the two propositions, the earth is a planet — the sun is not a 
planet ; which is affirmative, and which is negative 1 

Q. 9. What is meant by the quantity of a proposition \ 63. 

Q. 10. What is the division of propositions as to quantity 1 63. 

Q. 11. What is a universal proposition ? 64, 

Q. 12. What is a particular proposition? 65. 

Q. 13. Of the two propositions, — all plants are vegetables ; — and, some birds 
are aquatic ; which is a universal, and which a particular proposition '? 

Q. 14. Define a universal affirmative. 66. 

Q. 15. What is your definition of a universal negative! 67. 

Q. 16. Of the two propositions, — every animal is a creature of sensation,— 
no vegetable has the power of motion ; which is a 'universal affirmative, and 
which a universal negative ? 

Q,. 17. What do you mean by a particular affirmative 1 68. 

Q. 18- Define a particular negative- 69. 

Q. 19. Of the two propositions, — some trees are evergreens. — many trees do 
not bear flowers ; which is a particular affirmative, and which a particular ne- 
gative 1 

Q. 20. What symbols do logicians employ to signify these four principal 



ON THE PRINCIPAL KINDS OF PROPOSITIONS, &C. 87 

kinds of propositions, viz. universal affirmatives, universal negatives, particular 
affirmatives, and particular negatives 1 

Q. 21. Can you repeat the useful memorial lines relative to these sym- 
bols? 70. 

Q. 22. What does A signify 1 70. 

Q. 23. What does E indicate ? 70. 

Q. 24. What does I denote ] 70. 

Q. 25. What is intimated by O ? 70. 

Q. 26. Write down the four following propositions, and prefix their proper 
letters : 

All vegetables grow. 
All men are not learned. 
Some men are philosophers. 
Some metals are not heavy. 

Q. 27. What kind of a proposition is, all men are sinners ] 

Q. 28. What kind of a proposition is, all men are not happy T 

Q. 29. What kind of a proposition is, some men are learned 1 

Q. 30. What kind of a proposition is, few stones are not lighter than iron 1 

Q. 31. What is a singular proposition 1 72. 

Q. 32. What kind of a proposition is, Demosthenes was a Grecian orator 1 

Q. 33. Do you understand the last proposition to be universal or particular 1 

Q. 34. Why do you understand that the proposition, Demosthenes was a 
Grecian orator, is universal 1 72. 3. 

Q. 35. What is an indefinite proposition 1 73. 

Q. 36. What kind of a proposition is, birds are covered with feathers'! 

Q. 37. Why do you understand this indefinite proposition to be equivalent 
to a universal] 73.2. 

Q. 38. When the matter of an indefinite proposition is necessary or impos- 
sible, is that indefinite proposition universal or particular '{ 73. 6. 

Q. 39. When the matter of an indefinite proposition is contingent, is that 
indefinite proposition to be understood as universal or particular 1 73. 6. 

Q. 40. What are the usual signs of a universal affirmative 1 66. 

Q. 41. What are the usual signs of a universal negative 1 67. 

Q. 42. What are the usual signs of a particular affirmative 1 68. 

Q. 43. What are the usual signs of a particular negative ] 69. 



CHAP. III. 

The Secondary Division of Propositions. 

The only kinds of propositions that in Logic or Argumen- 
tation, chiefly, require attention, are the universal affirma- 
tive, i\\& universal negative, ihe particular affirmative, and 
\he particular negative ; under one or the other of which, 
we are always able, as before observed, to class the singular, 
and the indefinite proposition. We shall, however, in the 
course of practice, meet with modal, compound, complex and 
conditional propositions, which, when necessary, are easily re- 
ducible to the four principal classes already given. 

(A rt. 74. ) A PURE or simple proposition is one wherein the 

predicate is simply affirmed or denied of the subject. 

1. As, Thomas killed John. Every eye is a natural 
telescope. 

(Art. 75.) A MODAL proposition is one wherein the predi- 
cate is affirmed or denied, in a certain way, mode or man- 
ner, of the subject. 

1. As, Thomas ACCiTHE^TALLY killed John ; Tho7nas wil- 
fully killed John : or Thomas maliciously killed John. 

2. Modality, or the manner in which the predicate is con- 
nected with the subject, may express, necessity or contingen- 
cy, possibility or impossibility, certainty or uncertainty , 
probability or improbability, lawfulness or unlawfulness, 
conveniency or inconveniency , Sfc, as it is necessary 
that a globe should be round; that a globe be made 
of wood is an unnecessary or contingent thing : it is pos- 
sible that a globe should be made of glass : it is impossi- 
ble that a globe should be square. 

3. "A ;?20fl?a/ proposition may be stated as 3. pure one by 
attaching the mode to one of the terms : and the proposi- 
tion will, in all respects, fall under the rules of pure proposi- 
tions given in Chap. II, as ' Thomas killed John wilfully 
and maliciously ;' here the mode is to be regarded as part 
of the predicate. ^ \t is probable that all knowledge is use- 
ful ;' is in sense the same as all hiowledge is probably useful, 
where probably useful is the predicate. * Man is necessari^ 



THE SECONDARY DIVISION OP PROPOSITIONS. 89 

ly mortal,' is the same sis, ' all men are mortal.' * Injustice 
is in no case expedient;' corresponds to * no injustice is ex- 
pedient.' " 

sub. cop. pred. subject 



4. It is impossible that all men should be learned is the same 
Subject. cop. predicate. 

, ^ , , ^ , 

as that all men should be learned is an impossibility. The 

sub. cop. 



interesting declaration of the Apostle Paul, " This is 
predicate. subject. 



■^ , , ^- 



a faithful saying, &c. that Jesus Christ came into the world 

subject. 

s , ^ 

to save sinners, will correspond to that Jesus Christ came in- 

cop. predicate. 

to the world to save sinners, is a faithful saying, &c. 

5. " The English word m is often used in expressing one 
proposition combined with another, in such a manner as to 
make one proposition equal to two in sense ; as 'you will have 
a formidable opponent to encounter in the Emperor : this in- 
volves two propositions; viz. 1st. ' You will have to encoun- 
ter the Emperor ;' 2dly. ' He will prove a formidable op- 
ponent." 

6. It will often happen that two or more propositions ex- 
pressed in a single sentence, may require to be distinctly 
stated and proved separately : e. g. 

"Thomas killed John wilfully and maliciously." 
The advocate may have to prove first the /cfc^ that 

" Thomas killed John." 
And then the character of that act, that 

" The killing was wilful and malicious. ^^ 

(Art. 76.) A COMPLEX proposition's one which has one or 
both of its terms complex. 

1. As every sincere penitent is pardoned: no man alive 
u perfectly innocent. Every pious m,an will be happy. 

2. " They are formed in different ways. A proposition is 

h2 



90 SYNTHETICAI. COMPENDIUM. 

sometimes rendered complex, by having for its subject or pre- 
dicate some other proposition or words equivalent; as 

" That one man should be punished for the crimes of 
another is unjust. 

" The words which precede is^ and which form the subject 
of this example, obviously contain an entire proposition." 

3. "Frequently the subject of a proposition is first repre- 
sented by the pronoun it, and afterwards distinctly expressed ; 
as in the following expression : * It is impossible to guess at the 
limit, to which our forbearance would have extended.' " 

The words constituting the real subject are here represent- 
ed by the word it, which being omitted, and the subject stat- 
ed first, the proposition will stand thus : 

'^ To guess at the limit to which our forbearance would 
have extended, is impossible.^' 

4. The subject or predicate is sometimes made complex, 
by limiting it with a relative clause ; or by any other qualifica- 
tion or restriction ; as, 

Napier, who was Baron of Merchiston in Scotland, was the 
inventor of logarithms. 

Pious men are respected. 

The mind is an indivisible substance. 

The words introduced by the relative, in the first example, 
form a complete proposition, called the incident, viz : who was 
Baron of Merchiston, and is equivalent to Napier was 
Baron of Merchiston : and the whole proposition in refer- 
ence to its relative or incidental part, is callec} primary or 
principal. As the design of the 2 ?2c/G?e?7/ or relative propo- 
sition, is merely to explain, limit or restrict the subject or pre- 
dicate, as the case may be, of the primary, it can be con- 
sidered only as a part of the term in which it is placed. 

The subject of the second example, and the predicate of 
the third, are also restricted ; but by other means, viz : by the 
adjective J02OW5 in the first, and indivisible in the second pro- 
position. Still, " Napier, who was Baron of Merchiston in 
Scotland ;^^ — ^^ pious men'' — ''^indivisible substance,^^ are 
each respectively only one term. 

(Art. 77.) A COMPOUND proposition is one, that has two or 
more subjects or predicates, or both ; and may, therefore, be 
resolved into two or more distinct propdsitions. 

1. As, 

Spring, summer, autumn and winter, are seasons of the year. 



THE SECONDARY DIVISION OP PROPOSITIONS. 91 

This is divisible into 

Spring is a season of the year. 

Summer is a season of the year, &c. k. r- x. 

Alfred was prudent, valiant, just and benevolent. 

Which we may thus divide : 

Alfred was prudent. 

Alfred was valiant, &c. x. r. x. 

2. " Every compound proposition may be reduced to as 
many single ones as it contains subjects, to which the whole 
predicate will apply, and predicates to which the whole sub- 
ject will apply ; or as there are parts in each, which are se- 
parately applicable to each other; as, 

* Beasts, birds, and insects, have life, sense, and motion.* 

This example contains three subjects and three predicates, and 
may be reduced to nine distinct propositions." 

3. If, however, two or more words are so connected as col- 
lectively to constitute only one subject or one predicate, this 
forms a complex, not a compound proposition ; as, 

" Joy and sorrow are opposite passions." 
" Ye cannot serve God and Mammon." 

Neither of these is capable of division, the two parts which 
constitute one subject in the former example, and the predi- 
cates in the latter must be taken conjointly. 

4. In this point the distinction exists between a compound 
and a complex proposition. In the former, the parts which 
constitute the subject or predicate, are independent, and may 
be taken separately or conjointly; which cannot be done in 
complex propositions. In either the subject or predicate of 
complex propositions, certain words are either joined together 
necessarily constituting one integral subject or predicate, 
which is, consistently with its sense, indivisible ; or one part 
of the proposition is limited, by a relative or explanatory word. 
In either of which cases, the words which render the proposi- 
tion complex, must be regarded as essential parts of the term 
in which they occur. 

5. Wherever a complex proposition is composed of a pri- 
mary/ and an incidental one, (see art. 76, note 4.) the inci- 
dental proposition may be false, while the primary^ always 
having reference to its relative or incidental part, is true ; as, 

A horse, which has wings, might fly over the Mississippi. 



92 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 

On the contrary in compound propositions, there exists no dis- 
tinction of primary and incidental ; each part being indepen- 
dent of the rest. The compound proposition, therefore, must 
be false, when any of the propositions into which it may be 
resolved, is false, though the others be true. 

6. Compound propositions may be distributed into copula- 
tive, discretive, and disjunctive distinctions, dependent on the 
particle employed in the connection of their parts. 

(Art. 78.) A COPULATIVE proposition is that compound pro- 
position, which has its subjects or predicates connected by 
affirmative or negative con/wnc/eon^. 

1. As, riches and honors are temptations to pride : — 
Cassar conquered the Gauls and Britons : — neither gold nor 
jewels will purchase immortality. 

2. The propositions are evidently compounded ; for each of 
them may be resolved into two propositions ; as, 

" Riches are temptations to pride," and " honor is a tempta- 
tion to pride." The truth of copulative propositions depends 
upon that of all the parts of them ; for if Caesar had con- 
quered the Gauls, and not the Britons, or the Britons and not 
the Gauls, the second proposition had not been true. 

(Art. 79.) A DISCRETIVE proposition is that compound pro- 
position which expresses more judgments than one, connected 
by the particles, but, though, yet, notwithstanding, &c. 

1. As, *' Travellers may change their climate, 6w^ not their 
temper:" "Job was patient, though his grief was great" — 
" though he was afflicted, yet he did not murmur." 

2. The coherency of a discretive proposition depends on the 
connection of both parts and their relevancy to one another. 
It can be denied only by a negative affecting the conjunctive 
particle ; e. g. " Though he was afflicted, yet he did not mur- 
mur," can only be denied, by affirming either he was not 
afflicted, and therefore his not murmuring implies nothing ; or 
he was afflicted and he did murmur ; or he was not afflicted, 
yet he murmured. 

(Art. 80.) A DISJUNCTIVE PROPOSITION IS that compound 
proposition which asserts that a subject agrees with one of 
two or more predicates, or a predicate with one of two or 
more subjects. 

1. As, " it is either day or night:'* either the sun or the 



THE SECONDARY DIVISION OF PROPOSITIONS. 93 

moon will be eclipsed on midsummer d^iy." — '* The weather 
will, at that time, be either clear or cloudy." 

2. The truth of disjunctives depends on the necessary oppo- 
sition of the parts. Wherefore the first of these examples is 
not strictly true, since it may be denied by contradicting the 
necessity of the alternative ; thus, 

It is neither day nor night, for it is twilight. 

(Art. 81.) A CONDITIONAL PROPOSITION is onc whose parts 
are united by the conditional particle, if. 

1. As, "if the sun were fixed, the earth must move" — " if 
there be no fire, there will be no heat." 

2. The first of these propositions, or that wherein the con- 
dition is contained, is called the antecedent; the other is call- 
ed the CONSEQUENT ; the connection between them the conse- 
quence. 

3. The rules of conditional propositions are three. 

1. If the antecedent be granted, so is the consequent. 

2. If the consequent be taken away, so is the antecedent. 

3. Nothing can be inferred either from taking away the 
antecedent, or granting the consequent. 

4. The directions given for conditional propositions, serve 
equally for disju7ictive. For any disjunctive is easily turned 
into a conditional : for example : 

It is either day or night. 
But it is day : therefore it is not night. 
But it is night : therefore it is not day. 
It is not day ; therefore it is night. 
It is not night : therefore it is day. 

Instead of this, it is easy to say — 

If it is day, then it is not night. 
If it is night, then it is not day. 
If it is not day, then it is night. 
If it is not night, then it is day. 

5. The truth of conditional propositions, however, depends 
not exclusively on the truth or falsehood of their two parts, 
but on the truth of the connection ; for each part may be false, 
and yet the whole proposition, as it stands with false parts, 
true ; as, " If there be no Providence^ there will be no future 
judgment.''^ 

(Art. 82.) A causal proposition is one who^e parts are con- 
nected by causal particles. 

1. As, ** Houses were not built, Ma^ they might be de- 



94 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 

stroyed." " Rehoboam was unhappy because he followed evil 
counsel." 

2. " The truth of the causal proposition arises not from the 
truth of the distinct parts, but from the causal influence that 
the one part has on the other : for both parts may be true, yet 
the proposition may be false, if one part be not the cause of 
the other." 

(Art. 83.) A RELATIVE PROPOSITION has its parts connected 
by particles expressing a relation or comparison. 

1. e. g. " Jis much as you are worth, so much shall you be 
esteemed :" " *ds is the Father, so is the Son :" " Where there 
is no mistake of the truth, heresy will cease." Duncan and 
Hedge object to conditional, causal, and relative propositions 
being considered as different kinds of compound propositions. 
The latter observes what are usually termed conditional, 
causal, and relative propositions, are nothing more than dif- 
ferent modes of connecting two entire propositions together. 
It is essential to the individuality of a proposition that it have 
but one copula. However compounded or complicated the 
subject or predicate may be, they must be connected by a sin- 
gle affirmation or negation. This rule is violated in every in- 
stance of what are called conditional, causal, and relative pro- 
positions. 

3. The reciprocal and identical proposition will be proper- 
ly noticed here. A reciprocal proposition is one which will 
admit of inversion ; or of its subject being changed for its pre- 
dicate, or vice versa, without any change in its sense ; as, all 
birds are feathered animals, which is the same as all fea- 
thered animals are birds. Thus the proposition, three times 
three are nine, is the same as 7iine are three times three : 
these therefore are reciprocal propositions. But though we 
may say, all birds are animals, yet we cannot consistently 
with truth say all animals are birds : this proposition there- 
fore is not reciprocal. 

4. An identical proposition is one whose subject and 
predicate are composed of the same words expressive of the 
same ideas. Thus the philosopher when interrogated relative 
to the connection between magnetism and electricity, could 
only reply by saying that all he knew about it was that 
" magnetism was magnetism.^* But if, notwithstanding the 
identity of the terms, the ideas are diiferent, the proposition 
is not identical ; as the ^^ hero was not a hero" signifying 



THE SECONDARY DIVISION OP PROPOSITIONS. 95 

that he, who by report was a hero, did not, by his courage, 
maintain this character. 

3. Any further division of propositions is unnecessary; Mr. 
Andrew's enumeration of self-evident, demonstrable, specula- 
tive and practical propositions, is what logicians call a cross 
division. See Andrew's Logic, page 68 and seq. 



INTERROGATORY EXAMINATION 

ON 

Chap. III. 

We have already observed that the universal affirmative, the universal nc 
gUtive, the particular affirmative, and the particular negative, or the propo- 
sitions defined and explained in Chap. II, are of principal importance, and to 
which all the rest are reducible. These, therefore, should claim the first and chief 
attention of the student ; and their definitions and rules, given in the same 
chapter, should by him be committed to memory, and repeated at his examina- 
tion. The propositions which constitute the subject of the present chapter, 
though reducible to the former, could not, on this account, with any propriety, 
be omitted. They are, therefore, according to the usual custom of logical trea- 
tises, inserted here for careful perusal and occasional reference. 

Q. 1. What is a. pure or simple proposition 1 74. 

Q. 2. Describe a modal proposition. 75. 

Q. 3. May a modal proposition be reduced to a pure or simple proposition, 
and howl 75,3. 

Q. 4. What is a complex proposition ? 76. ' 

Q,. 5. Describe a compound proposition. 77. 

Q. 6. Define a copulative proposition. 78. 

Q. 7. What is a discretive proposition 1 79. 

Q. 8. State the nature of a disjunctive proposition. 80. 

Q. 9. Describe a conditional proposition f 81. 

Q. 10. What is a causal proposition ? 82. 

Q. 11. What is a relative proposition 1 83. 



CHAP. IV. 

On the distrihutio7i of the terms of a proposition, 

1. The necessity of distributing the terms of a proposition 
of one of the premises employed in argumentation, depends on 
what is called Aristotle's dictum ; which is \.h?iV^ whatever 
viay he predicated^ (i. e. affirmed or denied) universally 
of any class of things, may be predicated, in like manner, 
(viz, affirmed or denied,) of any thing comprehended in 
that class.^^ This is the principle, commonly called the dic- 
tum de omni et nullo, for the establishment of which we are 
indebted to Aristotle, and which is the key of his whole logical 
system. A principle not of any particular kind, but univer- 
sally of all correct reasoning whatever. 

2. If by predication, we understand, either affirmation or 
negation, Aristotle's dictum may be more concisely expressed 
thus ; " Whatever may he predicated universally of any 
class of things, may he predicated of any thing compre- 
hended in that classT 

(Art. 84.) A term is said to be distributed, when it is taken 

universally, so as to stand for every thing to which it is capa- 

pable of being applied ; and undistributed, when that term 

stands for a portion only of the things signified by it. 

1. It has been inquired, "if by 'distribution,' we are to 
understand the division of a term not only into the whole of 
its extension, but also into the whole of its comprehension P' 

2. We have already remarked, that the extension of a 
term regards the division of a genus into its several spe- 
cies: of a species into its several classes: of a class into its 
several individuals. Thus the extension of the genus animal 
is into its species, men, heasts, hirds, fishes, and insects : of 
the genus, quadruped, into elephants, camels, lions, tigers, 
horses, Si'C. : of the genus bird, into eagle, ostrich, swan, 
crane, lark, S^-c. : of the genus, web-footed, into pelican, cor- 
morant, swan, duck, teal, Si-c. 

3. And that by the comprehension of a term is meant 
the aggregate of all its known properties : thus the genus 
ANIMAL includes in its comprehension, the common properties 



ON THE DISTRIBUTIOJf OF A PROPOSITION. 



97 



of life^ sense, and motion : the genus quadruped, the proper- 
ties conamon to the higher genus animal, and in addition, the 
ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE, having f OUT feet : the genus bird, the 
properties common to animals, and the essential difference, 
having wings ^vA feathers, and being oviparous : the genus 
web-footed, the properties common to birds, and the essential 
difference, being web-footed. 

4. This will be best explained by the four following exam- 
ples: 



Compre- 


Exten- 


Example 1st. 


Compre- 


Extension, 


hension. 


sion. 




hension. 




Life, 


Ostrich, 




Men, 


Sense, 


Eagle, 
Swan, 




Life, 
Sense, 


Beasts, 


Motion, 


All birds are animals. 


Birds, 


Wings, 


Crane, 




Motion. 


Fishes, 


Feathers, 


Lark, 


~. ^. 




Insects. 


Oviparous. 


&c. 








Life, 


Ostrich 


Example 2d. 


Life, 


Elephants, 


Sense, 


Eagle, 




Sense, 


Camels, 


Motion, 

Wings, 


Swan, 
Crane, 




Motion, 

having 


T.innc 


No bird is a quadruped. 


Tigers, 


Feathers, 


Lark, 




foitrfeet. 


Horses, 


Oviparous. 


&c. 






&c. 


Life, 


Ostrich, 


Example 3d. 


Life, 


Pelican, 


Sense, 


Eagle, 




Sense, 


Cormorant, 


Motion, 


Swan, 


Some birds are web-footed. 


Motion, 


Swan, 


Wings, 


Crane, 




Wings, 


Goose, 


Feathers, 


Lark, 


Example 4:th. 


Feathers, 


Duck, 


Oviparous. 


Pelican 




Oviparous, 


Teal, 




&c. 


Some birds are not web-footed. 


■web-footed. 


&c. 



5. The several particulars, in the left hand columns, 
whether of comprehension or extension, refer to the subject 
of the proposition against which they stand, and those in the 
right hand columns to the predicates respectively of the same. 
The subject of Example 1st belongs to a universal, therefore 
it is distributed: the proposition of Example 2d is a universal 
negative, therefore both its subject and predicate are dis- 
tributed. Neither subject nor predicate of Example 3d is 
distributed, because it is a particular affirmative. Only the 
predicate of Example 4th is distributed, because it is a par- 
ticular negative. All the distributed terms are properly 
marked in the above examples. 

6. As to those terms not distributed, no question, in the 
present case, applies; but the inquiry is, how are the subjects 
of the 1st and 2d Examples, and the predicates of the 2d and 
4th Examples distributed, in extension, in comprehension, or 



^& SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 

in both ? No term in Example 3d being distributed, no ques- 
tion applies to it. 

7. A slight inspection of the four examples, will afford 
ocular illustration that the following is the answer to the 
general question, (note 1.) When a term, whether in an 
affirmative or negative proposition is dist7ibuted, that distribu- 
tion is not only of the whole of its extension, but also of its 
comprehension ; for if the whole of its extension be admitted 
or excluded, so must likewise all implied by its comprehension. 
For the extension and comprehension of a genus, species, class, 
or individual, are essentially inseparable. 

8. Thus, on the inspection of Example 1st, we find that, 
corresponding to the rule, "./I distributes the subject^ the predi- 
cate, I neither, and E both,'" its subject is marked as distribut- 
ed, and, accordingly, all things in the columns of comprehen- 
sion and extension, on the left of the subject, are involved in 
the universal term, ^^ birds;" and that birds, in the whole of 
this meaning, are affirmed to be animals, i. e. creatures gene- 
rally having \iCe, sense and motion. 

9. But to render this important point still more clear, we 
shall repeat the examples, with further explanation, 

"All birds are animals." 

On refering to the columns on the left hand, we find, in that 
of comprehension, that birds are creatures having the proper- 
ties of life, sense, motion, having wings and feathers, and being 
OVIPAROUS ; and that the universal term, " bird," includes all 
its species, whether these be ostrich, eagle, swan, crane, lark, 
parrot, linnet, &c., or any or all others whatever, in their 
comprehension, distinguished as birds. Now the universal 
term, or " birds,'^ including the whole of these, whether of com- 
prehension or extension, are affirmed to be animals, creatures 
having life, sense and motion. 

10. In Example 2d, viz. 

"No bird is a quadruped," 

we find, according to the rule quoted above, that both the 
subject and predicate are distributed : we are, therefore, at 
liberty to take all in the columns of comprehension and ex- 
tension belonging to the predicate and subject, or in the right 
and left hand columns; and that as the proposition is negative, 
all things whatever implied in the predicate, quadruped, as 
beings having life, sense, motion, and four feet, whether ele- 
phant, camel, lion, tiger, horse, or any other such creature, are 
denied of the subject " birds," a being of life, sense, motion, 



ox THE DISTRIBUTION OF A PROPOSITION. 99 

having wings, feathers, and also oviparous, whether ostrich^ 
eagle, swan, crane, lark, &.C. 

11. Example 3d being a particular affirnriative, has, accord- 
ing to the above rule, neither ternn distributed; to which 
example, therefore, the present question does not apply. 

12. Example 4th being a particular negative, has, accord- 
ing to the rule, the predicate only distributed, and conse- 
quently marked thus, , 

Some birds are not web-footed. 
The predicate, therefore, being distributed, and the propo- 
sition negative, all things whatever, of comprehension or ex- 
tension, implied in the predicate "web-footed," a being oilife, 
sense, motion, having wiiigs, feathers, oviparous, and also, accord- 
ing to its essential difference, web-footed, whether pelican, 
cormorant, swan, duck, teal, &c., are denied of the subject, 
" some birds," which being particular, is not distributed. 

13. Again, it is evident, that no subject, hut the subject of a 
universal proposition, is distributed: we again appeal to the rule, 
which cannot be too well impressed on the memory, and in 
confirmation shall thus distinguish it, 

" A distributes the subject, O the predicate, I neither, and E both." 

A and E are both universals; O and I not. The subject, 
therefore, of a universal, is understood of the whole of it, 
whether of comprehension or extension. 

14. Andi, no predicate but the predicate of d negative is distri- 
buted; the rule, differently marked, declares the same ; as, 

" A distributes the subject, the predicate, I neither, and E both." 

The whole of which predicate, therefore, whether of com- 
prehension or extension, is denied of its subject. 
• 14. Consequently the predicate of no affirmative propo- 
sition is distributed. It may, however, be observed that " in 
all affirmative propositions, the predicate has no greater ex- 
tension than its subject ; for its extension is restrained by its 
subject ; and thereforeit is always to be esteemed as a particu- 
lar idea : thus in Example 1st. 



All birds are animals. 



Extension. 

Men. 

Beasts. 

Birds. 



Fishes. 
Insects. 



The extension of the predicate is only to that species of ani- 



100 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM, 

mals, denominated by the subject, " Birds :" the proposition,, 
therefore is not reciprocal, (art. 32, n. 3) for we cannot say, all 
animals are birds. It is by mere accident, not by the gene- 
ral rule, if ever, in an affirmative, the predicate be taken 
universally; and cannot happen, but in such universalsas are 
reciprocal ; as all equiangular triangles are equilateral ; as all 
equilateral triangles are equiangular. 

15. '^ It is evident," says Dr. Whately, " that the subject is 
distributed in evet^ universal proposition ; but never in a 
particular ; that being the very difference between univer- 
sal and particular propositions. But the distribution or non- 
distribution of the predicate, depends, not on the quantity, 
but the quality of the proposition : for if any part of the 
predicate agrees with the subject, it must be affirmed and not 
denied of that subject. Therefore, for an affirmative propo- 
sition to be true, it is sufficient that some part of the predi- 
cate agrees with the subject. And for the same reason for a 
negative to be true, it is necessary that the whole of the pre- 
dicate should disagree with the subject: e. g. it is true that 
* learning is useful^ though the whole of the predicate? 
useful, does not agree with the subject * learning ;' for many 
things are useful besides learning : but, * no vice is useful,^ 
would be false, if any part of the predicate, ' useful,' agreed 
with the subject ' vice ;' i. e. if we could find any one useful 
thing which is a vice; or to say, that 'no beasts of prey rumi- 
nate' implies that beasts of prey are excluded from the whole 
class of ruminant animals ; and consequently that * no rumi- 
nant animals are beasts of prey ;' hence the distribution of 
the predicate is implied in negative propositions, and its 
non-distribution in affirmatives.'^ After this explanation we 
present the general rule. 

(Art. 84.) All universal propositions distribute the subject ; 
all negatives the predicate. 

1. It may happen, as we have already observed, that the 
whole of the predicate in an affirmative may agree with the 
subject; but this is merely accidental, as in the case of recip- 
rocal or identical propositions. When, however, a singular 
term is the predicate, it must of course, be co-extensive with 
the subject ; as " Romulus was the founder of Rome ;" 
which also is reciprocal, since it is equally true that, " the 
founder of Rome was Romulus." From the above rule it is 
evident, that the predicate of a negative is distributed, and 
of an affirmative undistributed. 

2. Therefore, in a universal affirmative the subject only 



ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF A PROPOSITION. 101 

is distributed ; in a particularnegative on\j the Predicate ; in 
a. particular affirmative, mEiTKKR term is distributed ; in aiini- 
versal negative, both. 

3. It is therefore sometimes said that the signs of a propo- 
sition determine whether its subject or predicate is distributed 
or not: thus, all, each, every, whatever, (the signs of a 
universal affirmative) mark the distribution of the subject ; 
the signs, no, none, neither, (or signs of a universal negative,) 
mark the distribution of both subject and predicate ; the 
signs, some, many, most, few, several, (the signs of a parti- 
cular affirmative,) mark that neither is distributed ; except 
when accompanied by the particle not (or a particular nega- 
tive,) which then marks the distribution of the predicate. 

4. Only it is to be remembered, that the words, all, each, 
every, &c. which mark the distribution of the subject ; and 
some, many, most, few, &c. which mark its non-distribution, 
are not always expressed ; they are frequently understood, and 
left to be supplied by the context, or meaning of the proposi- 
tion ; thus '* men are mortal," i. e. all men, every man, &c. 
*' Food is necessary to life," i. e. some food. Propositions thus 
expressed, are, as before observed, indefinite or singular, and 
are resolvable by the rules already given for universals or par- 
ticulars, according to their evident scope and signification. 

5. The whole of this doctrine relative to distribution, so 
necessary when we come to argumentation, or to the distribu- 
tion of the middle term of every syllogism, might to some ap- 
pear, if not a little intricate, yet requiring, on every occasion, 
considerable attention and memory to determine whether a 
term be distributed or not. It is, however, fortunate, that 
the whole of it, involving all the mystery, which, if any, it 
contains, may for every practical purpose be expressed in a 
rule of one line. But before we give this rule, it will be pro- 
per to inquire if the learner remembers another previously 
given, viz : " A, represents a universal affirmative ; E, a univer- 
sal negative ; I, a particular affirmative, and O, a particular 
negative? which, for the convenience of the memory, was thus 
expressed: 

Universally A affirms, and E. denies. 
Particularly I affirms, and O denies. 
This heing remembered, we may express the practical rule 
of the whole doctrine of distribution in one short sentence, viz: 

(Art. 85.) A distributes the subject ; the predicate ; I 

neither, and E both. 

i2 



102 SYXTHTETICAL COMPENDIUM. 

1. These two rules well remembered and understood will 
enable the learner to overcome more than half of any difficul- 
ty implied in learning Logic. To enable him to apply and 
exercise these rules, we now present him with the following 
examples. 

Ex. 5. All free agents are accountable. 

Ex. 6, Many buildings were destroyed. 

Ex. 7. The world is not eternal. 

Ex. 8. Some animals are amphibious. 

Ex. 9. Every sin is a violation of the Divine Law. 

Ex. 10. No virtue is an evil. 

Ex. 11. Law is the expression of mind. 

Ex. 12. Every effect must have had an adequate cause. 

Ex. 13. Some difficult things are not evils. 

Ex. 14. Some rich men are not good men. 

Ex. 15. Swammerdam* was an eminent entomologist. 

Ex. 16. To arrange and organize matter is the work of mind. 

Ex. 17. All the Chinese are animals. 

Ex. 18. Some of the Parisians are not learned. 

Ex. 19. Some birds are aquatic. 

Ex. 20. Some trees are evergreens. 

Ex. 21. Some reptiles are not quadrupeds. 

Ex. 22. Gregory! was the first discoverer of the achromatic powers of the 
eye. 

Ex. 23. Dollondi: was the first discoverer of the achromatic telescope. 

Ex. 24. Hipparchus was an inquirer into Egyptian and Chaldean Astrono- 
my. 

Ex. 25, Harvey § was the discoverer of the circulation of the blood. 

Ex. 26. Fohi was the founder of the Chinese monarchy. 

Ex. 27. Chemical affinity never formed an organized being. 

Ex. 28. Nature is that order of things which Supreme Intelligence has es- 
tablished. 

Ex. 29. All marks of design are proofs of intelligence. 

Ex. 30. Nothing but an efficient cause could give existence to what had no 
existence before, 

Ex. 31. The whole is greater than any of its parts. 

Ex. 32. The three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. 

Ex. 33. All the eyes in the world are distinct witnesses that an intelligent 
first cause exists. 

It is recommended that the student should for exercise write these examples 
on paper, and having prefixed to each the letters A, E, I, or 0, as the case 
may require, should according to the rules, A distributes the subject, the 
predicate, I neither, and E both, draw a line over every distributed terra. 

*0f Amsterdam. | A mathematician of Aberdeen, he died in 1675. 
+ A London Optician. 
§ A physician of London, 



ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF A PROPOSITION. 103 

(Art. 86.) Thematter of a proposition is said to be neces- 
sary, when its two terms essentially agree ; impossible, when 
they essentially disagree ; or contingent, when they agree 
or disagree accidentally. 

1. As, a globe is a round figure ; i. e. necessarily so. 
Sheep are covered with wool ; i. e. to be covered with wool is 
essentially necessary to their character. No globe is square; 
the matter here is impossible : no quadruped sings ; impossi- 
ble : insects live on flowers ; it is contingent ; some do, and 
some do not. 

(Art. 87.) In necessary and imposible matter, an indefi- 
nite proposition is understood as a universal ; in contingent 
matter, as a particular. A singular proposition is general- 
ly taken as a universal. 

1. As, birds have wings, i. e. all, for the matter is necessary ; 
birds are not quadrupeds, i. e. none, for the matter is impossi- 
ble ; birds sing, i. e. some do, for the matter is contingent : 
birds are not large animals, contingent, only some are not : — 
therefore, 

(Art. 88.) To an indefinite proposition whose matter is ne- 
cessary or impossible, prefix A or E, according as it is affirma- 
tive or negative, to denote that it is a universal ; but prefix I 
or 0, according as it is affirmative or negative, when its mat- 
ter is contingent. 

(Art. 89.) To a singular proposition, generally, prefix A or 

E, according as it is affirmative or negative, to denote that it 

is universal. 

1. As, Galvani was an Italian: here we speak of the whole 
of Galvani. But when some qualifying word indicates that 
the whole subject is not spoken of, the proposition is particu- 
lar; as C(zsar was not wholly a tyrant ; this man is occasion- 
ally intemperate. 



104 * SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 

INTERROGATORY EXAMINATION 

ON 

Chap. IV. 

Q. 1. When is a term said to be distributed 1 83. 

Q. 2. When is a term said to be not distributed 1 83. 

Q. 3. When a term, understood or taken for every thing to which it is ca- 
pable of being applied, can be predicated of the other term of a proposition, is 
that term distributed or not.1 

Q. 4. When a term understood for only a portion of the things signified by 
it, is predicated of the other term of that proposition, is the term distributed or 
not distributed ■? 83. 

Q. 5. Can you repeat the general rule for the distribution of terms? 85. 

Q. 6. What kind of proposition is signified by A 1 

Q. 7. What kind by E ? 

Q. 8. What kind of proposition is denoted by H 

Q. 9. What kind hjOl 

Q. 10. Which two letters denote universal propositions ? 

Q. 1 1 . Which two letters denote particular propositions 1 

Q. 12. Which two letters denote affirmative propositions 1 

Q, 13. Which two letters denote negative propositions'? 

Q. 14. If A affirms what does E 1 

Q. 15. If I affirms what does ? 

Q. 16. If E. denies what does A 1 

Q. 17. If denies what does I? 

Q. 18. Which two affirm ? 

Q. 19. Which two deny ? 

Q. 20. Of the four propositions denoted by A, E, I, 0, which distributes the 
subject only 1 

Q. 21, Of A, E, I and O which distributes the piedicate only? 

Q. 22. Of A, E, I and O which distributes neither subject nor predicate 1 

Q. 23. Of A, E, I and O which distributes both of its terms, the subject and 
predicate 1 

Q. 24. To the following propositions prefix their proper letters or sym- 
bols, 

All the planets change their places, 
Every metal is fusible. 
No quadruped has feathers. 
Some trees are evergreens, 
Some trees do not bear moss. 

Q. 25. To the following singular and indefinite propositions, prefix their 
proper letters. 

Remus was the brother of Romulus, 
The planets change their places, 



ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF A PROPOSITION. 105 

Good men do not altogether die, 
Abraham did not altogether die, 
Clothes are necessary to warmth. 

Q. 26. What kind of a proposition is " All free agents are accountable," 
and which term is distributed 1 85, ex. 5. 

Q. 27. Why is the subject of the above proposition distributed 1 Rule 85. 

Q. 28. What kind of proposition is, " Some animals are amphibious ]" and 
is either of its terms distributed 1 85, ex. 8. 

Q. 29. Why is no term of the above proposition distributed 1 Rule 85. 

Q. 30. Show what is distributed in the proposition, " No virtue is an evil." 
85, ex. 10. 

Q. .31. Repeat that part of the rule which declares what in the above, propo- 
sition is distributed. 85. 

Q. 32. Show what term is distributed in the proposition, " Some difficult 
things are not evils." 85, ex. 13. 

Q. 33. Repeat that part of the rule which refers to this proposition. 85. 

Q. 34. In the proposition, " Law is an expression of the mind," what is dis- 
tributed ] 85, ex. 11. 

Q. 35. Repeat that part of the rule which refers to this proposition. 85. 

Q. 36. In the proposition, " Some reptiles are not quadrupeds," what is dis- 
tributed ? 85, ex. 21. 

Q. 37. Repeat that part of the rule which refers to this proposition 1 85. 

Q. 38. When may the matter of a proposition be said to be necessary 1 86. 

Q. 39. In the proposition, " All triangles have three sides," is the matter 
necessary, impossible or contingent 1 86. 

Q. 40. When may the matter of a proposition be said to be impossible 1 86. 

Q. 41. In the proposition, " No square is round," is the matter necessary, 
impossible or contingent 1 86. 

Q. 42, When may the matter of a proposition be said to be contingent ? 
86. 

Q. 43. In the proposition, " Quadrupeds have horns," is the matter necessa- 
ry, impossible, or contingent 1 86. 

Q. 44. When may an indefinite proposition be said to be universal 1 87. 

Q. 45. Why is the proposition, " Fishes are animals that swim," univer- 
sal 1 87. 

Q. 46. When may an indefinite proposition be said to be particular 1 87. 

Q. 47. Why is the proposition, " Birds are animals that live on flesh," par- 
ticular 1 87, 

Q, 48, What is the general character of a singular proposition 1 87. 

Q. 49. When is a singular proposition particular 1 89 note 1, 

Q. 50. To the following propositions prefix A, E, I, and 0, according to 
their character, with the words, all, every, no, none, some, &c., as the case 
may require, and then by the rule (85) mark on paper those terms which are 
ilistributed. 

Globes are round. 
Globes are not square, 



106 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 

Quadrupeds have horns, 

Birds are not animals that live on flesh, 

Cicero was a Roman, 

Zoilus vsras not -wholly* red-haired. 



CHAP. V. 

On the opposition and conversion of propositions. 

N. B. Though the introduction of the opposition and conversion of propo- 
sitions, is, in the synthetic order, proper here, yet it is not absolutely necessa- 
ry that the learner should devote minute attention to this part of the general 
subject, until he come to the " reduction of syllogisms." He may, therefore, with 
all propriety, if his instructor prefer it, pass now to the two first chapters on 
argumentation, and before he enters on the third, he should then revert to the 
present chapter, to which he may add the following on evidence, induction, 
and analogy. Afterwards he will be prepared to go through, in the most im- 
pressive and agreeable manner, with that further course necessary to render 
him competent to expose more easily a fallacy concealed in an apparent syllo- 
gism, by its reduction into correct mood and figure. 

SECTION I. 

On Opposition, 

(Art. 90. ) Two propositions are said to be opposed, which 
having the same subjects and predicates, yet differ either in 

QUANTITY or QUALITY, OF in BOTH. 

1. Examples, 

A. All diseases are contagious, 7 . „„„„*:(.„ 
I. Some diseases are contagious, 3 ^ ^* 

A. All diseases are contagious, "5 . _„_ i:*-. 

E. No disease is contagious, 5 *° ** ^' ■ - 



A. All diseases are contagious, ~) 

0. Some diseases are not contagious, 3 

E. No disease is contagious, 

1. Some diseases are contagious, 



in both. 



(Art. 91.) With any given subject and predicate four dis- 
* He was with respect to his head, but not with respect to his beard. 



ON THE OPPOSITION, &C. OP PROPOSITIONS. 107 

tinct propositions may be stated, viz : A, E, I, and O ; any two 
of which may be said to be opposed. 

1. As, A, every vine is a tree; E, no vine is a tree ; I, some 
vine is a tree ; or O, some vine is not a tree. 

(Art. 92.) There are four different kinds of opposition, viz: 
1st, the two universals, A and E, are called contraries ; 2d, 
the two particulars, I and 0, subcontraries ; 3d, A and I, or E 
and O, subalterns j 4th, A and O, or E and I, contradic- 
tories. 

Contra- ") A. Every vine is a tree. 7 These can never be both true togeth- 
ries. 5 E. No vine is a tree. 3 er, but they may be both false. 

Sub- ■) I. Some vine is a tree. "> These may be both true together, but 
contrary. 5 O. Some vine is not a tree. 5 they can never be both false. 

Rules. — 1st. If a universal be true, 
^ . _, • • X -N the particular will be true also : but 

fA. Every vine is a tree. -\ ^^ ^^^ ^^^ 2^^ .^ ^ .ticular 

Sub- j ^' ^^"'^ "^'"^ l^ ^ ^'^^- • be false, the universal must be false ; 

alterns. ^ -p ivr • •''^ f i '^"*' ^^^ °" *^® contrary. 3d, Sub- 

ti. ^o vme IS a tree. j propositions, whether univer- 

10. Some vme is^not a tree. J i *^ ^- i .• , 

V.V. uixi A * ^ g^j ^^ particular, may sometimes be 

both true, and sometimes both false. 
fA. Every vine is a tree. "^ 
Contra- I ^' Some vine^is not a tree. | ^^^^^^ ^^^ ^^^^^ ^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^ 
dictories. ^j ^ ^^ ^.^^ Ys ^ ^^^^^ palse at the same time. 

[I. Some vine is a tree. J 

(Art. 93.) Contrary opposition is that which is between 
two universals; subcontrary between two particulars; 
subaltern between two propositions agreeing in quality, but 
not in quantity; contradictory between two differing both 
in quantity and quality. 

1. The truth or falsity of any proposition, its quantity and 
quality being known, must depend on the matter of it : and 
we must remember that, in necessary matter all affirmatives 
are true, and negatives false ; in impossible matter, all af- 
firmatives are false, and negatives true ; in contingent 
m^atter, all universals are false, and particulars true. 

2. Thus, that " all islands, (or some islands) are surrounded 
with water," must be true, because the matter is necessary : 
but to say, "no island is surrounded with water," or "some 
islands are not surrounded with water," would be false, for 
the matter is impossible. Again ; " some islands are fertile," 
and ** some islands are not fertile," are both true, because the 



108 



SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM, 



matter is contingent, and the propositions particular : but 
put " all" or '' no," instead of sonne, as " all islands are fer- 
tile,'' or <' no island is fertile,'^ and the propositions are false, 
because the matter is contingent and the propositions uni- 
versal. 

3. The whole doctrine of opposition is contained in the fol- 
lowing scheme ; where A, E, I and O denote the four propo- 
sitions, according to their quantity and quality/, which are 
marked t true, £ false, as the matter is n necessary^ i im'pos- 
sible, or c contingent. 

A- _ — contraries.— E 

nt ^ 

if 

cf 




•saTiBnuooqns 



4. " By a careful study of this scheme, bearing in mind, and 
applying the above rule concerning matter, the learner will 
easily elicit all the maxims relating to opposition ; as that, in 
the subalterns, the truth of the particular follows from the 
truth of the universal ; and the falsity of the universal from 
the falsity of the particular ; that subalterns differ in quantity 
alone ; contraries, and also subcontraries, in quality alone ; 
contradictories, in both : and hence, that if any proposition is 
known to be true, we infer that its contradictory is false ; if 
false, its contradictory is true." — Whately. 

5. To assist the student in the study of this scheme, we shall 
give three examples, of necessary, impossible and contingent 



ON THE OPPOSITION, &C. OF PROPOSITIONS. 



109 



matter, arranged after the same order, with the consequences 
true or false, expressed. 

1st. NECESSARY MATTER. 
true. false. 

All birds are animals, (contraries) No bird is an animal. 
A X /E 




I / \0 

Some birds are animals, (sub-contraries) Some birds are not animals. 
true. false. 

2dly. IMPOSSIBLE MATTER. 

false. true. 

All birds are quadrupeds, (contraries) No bird is a quadruped. 

A\ . E 




Some birds are quadrupeds, (sub-contraries) Some birds are not quadrupeds 
false. true. 



110 



SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 

3dly. CONTINGENT MATTER. 

false. ^ false. 

All islands are fertile, (contraries) No island is fertile. 
A\ /E 




1/ \0 

Some islands are fertile, (sub-contraries) Some islands are not fertile. 

true. true. 

(Art. 94.) The rules of opposition are, 

Rule 1. Contradictory propositions are always one true, and 
the other false. 

Rule 2. Four conditions are requisite to constitute a contra- 
diction, viz. to speak of the same thing, l,in the same sense; 
2, in the same respect ; 3, with regard to the same third thing ; 
and 4, at the same time. If any of these be wanting, is and is 
not may agree. 

1. For example, 1, An opinion is and is not faith. It is 
dead faith ; it is not living faith. 2, Zoilus is and is not red 
haired. He is with respect to his head ; he is not with re- 
spect to his beard. 3, Socrates is and is not long haired. 
He is in comparison of Scipio; he is not in comparison of Xe- 
nophon. 4, Solomon was and was not a good man. He was 
in his youth ; he was not in his middle age. 

Rule 3. Contrary propositions are never both true j but in 

contingent matter, they are both false. 



ON THE OPPOSITION, &C. OF PROPOSITIONS. Ill 

Rule 4. Sub-contraries are never both false ; but in contin- 
gent matter, they are both true. 

Rule 5. Subalterns are sometimes both true; sometimes 
both false ; and in contingent matter, the one is true and the 
other false. 

1. In subalterns, the truth of the particular (which is call- 
ed the subalternate, follows from the truth of the universal, 
subalternans ;) and the falsity of the universal from the falsity 
of the particular. 

2. Subalterns differ in quantity alone ; contraries and sub- 
contraries in quality alone; contradictories in both; and hence 
if any proposition is known to be true, we infer that its con- 
tradictory is false ; if false, the contradictory is true. 

3. As frequent mention is made relative to agreement or 
disagreement in quality or quantity, it will be proper to ob- 
serve, that the relative positions of the four principal propo- 
sitions, A, E, I and O, in the above figure, with the connec- 
tives between any two of them, studied as they stand, or the 
whole figure frequently sketched by the learner, and well 
kept in mind, will, with the aid of the four following rules, be 
found very serviceable to the memory. 

Rule 6. Of propositions, affirmatives and negatives indicate 
the quality, universals and particulars the quantity. 

Rule 7. In quality f subalterns agree, contraries and sub- 
contraries disagree. 

Rule 8. In quantity, contraries and subcontraries agree, but 
subalterns disagree. 

Rule 9. In both, contradictories disagree. 

4. The whole doctrine of opposition may, for every practi- 
cal purpose, be thus compressed, 

(Art. 95.) A and E are contraries; I and O subcontraries ; 
A and I, or E and subalterns; A and O, or E and I contra- 
dictories. 

(Art. 96.) In necessary matter, A and I are true, but E 
and O are false} in impossible, A and I are false, but E and 
O are true; in contingent matter, A and E are false, but I 
and are true. 



112 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 

1. In addition to Art. 93, it may not be improper to add, 
that by " sub alternation,^' we are to understand " the deducing 
either a less universal proposition from a more universal; or a 
particular from a universal." Subalternation, therefore, is in 
compliance with Aristotle's dictum, by which we are authoriz- 
ed to predicate of that which is contained, whatever is predi- 
cated of that which contains it ; as of a species, whatever is 
predicated of its genus; of a class, whatever is predicated of 
its species; or of an individual, whatever is predicated of its 
class; or, in short, of a particular proposition, whatever is 
predicated of its universal ; as of I, whatever is predicated of 
its universal A ; or of O, whatever is predicated of its univer- 
sal E: which will hold good whenever the universals are true. 
In this subalternation^ the universal is called the sub alter nans ; 
the particular inferred from it, the sub alternate ; and the 
opposition between them, i. e. between A and I, or E and O, 
subalterns as 

2. SUBALTERNS. 

J\recessary matter. 

Subalternans, A. All bircis are animals, ^ b th t 

Subalternate, I. Some bircis are animals, 5 ^ ' 



or 



3 "^ S (-3 
oi to fa t^ 
^ ^. CD CD 

ETC ^^ 

fl 3 C ff. 



Subalternans, E. No bird is an animal, ^ b th f I p 

Subalternate, 0. Some birds are not animals, 5 ' 

Impossible matter. ^ o 2 S — 

>S2iW^er72aws, A. All birds are quadrupeds, ~) , ^t^ ^ i 

Subalternate, I. Some birds are quadrupeds, 3 ' 



or 



Subalteriians, E. No bird is a quadruped, Z b tli t 

Subalternate, 0. Some birds are not quadrupeds, 3 ^ ^' 



cr o OS 
» o C 
?? o cr" 



Co7itingent matter. 

Subalternans, A. All islands are fertile, : false, I'gg'g'sSDS.^ 

Subalternate, I. Some islands are fertile, : true, | S B ^.«? — ^ Z". "* 

Subalternans, E. No island is fertile, : false, | ' ^ q g ^^ E, %• 

S^ib alternate, 0. Some islands are not fertile, : true, J 1^ E- S- °>. ? J 7 

3. This exemplifies, (Art. 94, Rule 5) " Subalternans are 
sometimes both true, sometimes both false ; in contingent mat- 
ter the one is true, and the other false." 

4. It will be useful to compare the three following remarks, 
relative to subalternation with Aristotle's dictum, viz : that 
" Whatever may he predicated universally of any class of 
things, may be predicated of any thing comprehended in 
that class. " 



ON THE OPPOSITION, &C. OF PROPOSITIONS. 113 

1. The truth of a general or particular proposition may be 
inferred from the truth of the universal which contains it ; as 

Universal, A. All islands are surrounded by water, : true. 
Particular, I. Some islands are surrounded by water : true. 

" For if the predicate contains the whole extension of the 
subject, in its extension, it will likewise contain a part of it." 

2. The truth of a particular does not infer the truth of a 
universal ; as 

Universal, A. All islands are fertile, : false. 
Particular, I. Some islands are fertile, : true. 

Very true : for Aristotle's dictum does not require any rea- 
soning from a particular to a universal. 

3. The falsehood of a universal does not infer the falsehood 
of a particular ; as. 

Universal, A. All islands are fertile, : false. 
Particular, I. Some islands are fertile, : true. 

Equally true, for nothing can be infered from a false pre- 
miss : i. e. nothing can be illatively^ infered, as true, from 
that which \s false. The " Dictum^'' made no provision for 
any such consequence. 

5. It will easily be perceived why the following are 

CONTRARIES. 

JVecessary matter, 

A. All islands are surrounded with water ; true. 

E. No island is surrounded with water ^ : false. 

Impossible matter. 
A. All islands are under water : false. 

E. No island is under water : true. 

Contingent matter, 
A. All islands are fertile ; false. 

E. No island is fertile : false. 

According to (Art. 94, Rule 3,) " Contraries are never both 
true, but, in contingent matter, they are both false." 
SUB-CONTRARIES. 

JVecessary matter. 
I. Some islands are surrounded with water : true. 
O. Some islands are not surrounded with water : false. 

* i. e-. Inferentially ; which in English we express by therefore. The lat- 
ter of the two following propositions is illative, because it is infered by there- 
fore, from the former : 

No virtuous man is a dishonest man ; therefore 

No dishonest man is a virtuous man. 

K 2 



114 



SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 



Impossible matter. 

I. Some islands are under water : false. 

0. Some islands are not under water : true. 

Contingent matter. 

1. Some islands are fertile : true. 
O. Some islands are not fertile : true. 

According to (Art. 94, Rule 4,) " Sub-contraries are never 
both false, but, in contingent niatter, they are both true." 
CONTRADICTORIES. 

JVecessary matter. 
A. All islands are surrounded with water : true. 

0. Some islands are not surrounded with water : false. 

or, 
E. No island is surrounded with water : false. 

1. Some islands are surrounded with water : true. 

Impossible matter. 
A. All islands are under water : false. 

O. Some islands are not under water : true. 



E. No island is under water 

I. Some islands are under water 

Contingent matter, 
A. All islands are fertile 

0. Some islands are not fertile 

or, 
E. No island is fertile 

1. Some islands are fertile 

According to (Art. 94, Rule I 
one true, and the other false." 



true, 
false. 

false, 
true. 



: false. 
: true. 

*' Contradictories are always 



SECTION II. 

On the conversion of propositions. 

The conversion, as well as the opposition of propositions, 
will be found chiefly useful in the reduction of syllogisms into 
correct mood and figure. 

(Art. 97.) A proposition is said to be converted, when its 
terms are transposed. 



ON THE OPPOSITION, &C, OF PROPOSITIONS. 115 

1. i. e. When the subject is made the predicate, and the 
predicate the subject ; as, 

E. No unhappy man is a perfect Christian ; therefore 
E. No perfect Christian is an unhappy man. 

N. B. Both terms in each are distributed, 

(Art. 98.) The proposition to be convertedis the original; 
that into which it is converted, the converse ; as 



Original. E: Nothing useful is vice : therefore 
Converse. E. No vice is useful. 

Both terms in each are distributed. 

'(Art. 99.) *Inferential conversion is that, when the truth 
of the converse may be expressed by the word, therefore, con- 
sequently or wherefore ; or as something infered from the 
truth of the original. 

1. As, 

Original. E. No virtuous man is a rebel ; therefore 
Converse. E. No rebel is a virtuous man. 

2. It should not be supposed from the word " inferential" 
that this conversion is a process of reasoning : it is in fact only 
stating the same judgment in another form. — Whately,p. 58. 

(Art. 100.) No conversion is employed for any logical pur- 
pose when either any term is distributed in the converse 
which was not distributed in the original, or when it is 
not inferential. 

1. If any term be distributed in the converse which was not 
distributed in the original, a term may be employed univer- 
sally in the converse which was employed only partially in 
the original, as 

Original. A. All birds are animals. not 
Cofiverse. A. All animals are birds. 5 inferential. 

In the converse, the term " animals," is distributed which 
was not distributed in the original : therefore, in the original 
it was employed only partially, but in the converse univer- 
sally ; and cannot be inferential. 

2. Conversion is never inferential when any term is dis- 

* This has been called " illative :" thus the particles ergo, idea, igitur, id- 
circo, itaque, quapropter, &c. are said to be illative. The word " inferen- 
tial" however, may be more generally understood. 



116 



SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 



tribuied in the converse which was not distributed in the 
original : a few cases however occur where the conversion 
is not inferential, when the distribution of both propositions 
complies with the condition. 

3. This, however, may be clearly stated in the following 
manner, wherein all the possible conversions, inferential or 
otherwise, which can be made with the four originals. A, E, 
I or O are given, according to the rule, with which it is hoped 
the learner is now well acquainted, viz. " A distributes the 
subject, O the predicate, I neither, andE both,^^ every distri- 
buted term will be marked as usual, viz. with a line above it ; 
and the word therefore will be prefixed to every converse 
which, according to article 100, is inferentially deducible from 
its original. 

CASE I. 
Where A is the Original, 





A. All birds are animals. 


Obiginal. 


Excluded. 


A. All animals are birds. 


Converse. 


Exchided. 


E. No animal is a bird. 


Converse. 


Therefobe 


I. Some animals are birds. 


Converse. 


J\rot inferential. 


0. Some animals are not birds. 

CASE 11. 
Where E is the Original. 


Converse. 




E. No bird is a quadruped. 


Original. 


THERErOBE 


E. No quadruped is a bird. 


Converse. 


J\rot inferential. 


A. All quadrupeds are birds. 


Converse. 


JVoi inferential. 


I. Some quadrupeds are birds. 


Converse. 


Thebeeobe 


0. Some quadrupeds are not birds. 

CASE III. 
Where I is the Original. 


Converse. 




I. Some animals are birds. 


ORIGIIfAL. 


Therefobe 


I. Some birds are animals. 


Converse. 


Excluded. 


A. All birds are animals. 


Converse. 


Excluded. 


E. No bird is an animal. 


Converse. 


Excluded. 


0. Some birds are not animals. 

CASE IV. 
Where is the Original. 


Converse. 




0. Some animals are not birds. 


Origikai. 


Excluded. 


0. Some birds are not animals. 


Converse, 


J\rot inferential. 


A. All birds are animals. 


Converse. 


Excluded. 


E. No bird is an animal. 


Converse. 


JVot inferential I. Some birds are animals. 


Converse. 



ON THE OPPOSITION, &;C. OF PROPOSITIONS. 117 

It is therefore evident that the above rule allows of only 
the following cases of correct conversion ; viz. A into I ; E 
into E, or E into O, and I into I, for in not any of these cases 
is any term distributed in the converse which was not dis- 
tributed in the original ; they are therefore inferential. 

But A cannot be converted into A, nor into E, for in either 
case the converse would have the term " animal" distributed, 
which was not distributed in the original ; for the same rea- 
son cannot be converted into nor into E. 

I cannot be converted into A, into E, nor into O ; for each 
of these has one or more terms distributed, whereas I has none. 

Though in the following examples there is no term distri- 
buted in the converse which was not distributed in the origi- 
nal, contrary to ihejirsf part of rule 100, yet not being in- 
ferentialf they are not consistent with its second part. 
From A. All birds are animals ; it is not inferential that 
O. Some animals are not birds. 

From E. No bird is a quadruped, it cannot be infered 
that A. All quadrupeds are birds, 
or that I. Some quadrupeds are birds. 

From O. Some animals are not birds, it is not inferential 
that I. Some birds are animals. 

(Art. 101.) Inferential conversion is twofold; simple and 

PARTICULAR. 

(Art. 102.) Simple conversion* is that, when, after the in- 
terchange of subject and predicate, E remains E, or T re- 
mains I ; as 

Original. E. No predacious animal is ruminant; ?^ere/bre 
Converse. E. No ruminant animal is predacious. — Or, 



Original. I. Some knowing the Coptic language are Arabians ; therefore 
Converse. I. Some Arabians are men knowing the Coptic. 

2. Simple conversion is sometimes said to be effected when 
neither the quantity nor quality is changed ; as E into E, or I 
into I; this, however, would hold equally good were A con- 
verted into A, or O into O; neither of which, as we have 
already seen, is admissible, on account of terms distributed in 
the converse not distributed in the original, and consequently 
not inferential. 

* By simple conversion here must be understood that which is inferential. 



118 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 

3. The only case where A can, consistently with truth, be 
converted into A, is in reciprocal propositions, or where the 
subject and predicate reciprocate or interchange with one 
another, without a change in sense ; as, Wine is the juice of 
the grape, or the juice of the grape is wine, Jill triangles 
are figures bounded by three right lines, or all figures 
bounded by three right lines are triangles. This is always 
the case in propositions whose predicates are exact definitions 
of the subject. 

(Art. 103.) Particular conversion is that which converts a 

universal proposition into its own particular : as A into I, or 

£ into 0; 1. as, 

A. All chronometers are time-pieces ; therefore 
I. Some time-pieces are chronometers, 
or, 



E. No Yice is a useful thing ; therefore 
0. Some useful things are not rices. 

2. This kind of conversion was formerly called " conversio 
per accidens" or " accidental:^'' also limitation, because it 
limits the quantity; but joar/icw/«r^conversion, indicating that 
it is from a universal proposition to a particular, is a name 
more suited to its character. 

2. There is another mode of conversion, called by some, 
conversion by contra-position : by Dr. Whately, ^'conversion 
by negation. " But since it is in no way serviceable in the 
reduction of syllogisms, we mention, without recommending it 
to notice. It is effected either by the insertion of a negative 
particle, hence called negation, both in the subject and predi- 
cate ; or by the change of a positive into a privative or other 
term, signifying the absence of the attribute expressed in the 
original. Thus O may be converted into I ; E may be con- 
verted this way, 

0. Some members of the university are not learned. 

If **not learned" be considered as the predicate, or the 
privative term unlearned put instead of its positive learned, 
the above proposition becomes I, and may then be simply 
converted; as, 

1. Some members of the university are not learned. 

rather, 
I. Some members of the university are unlearned men. 

which by simple conversion becomes 
I. ^ome unlearned men are memberg of the university* 



OF THE OPPOSITION, &C. OF PROPOSITIONS. 119 

A. Every poet is a man of genius ; therefore 

He who is not a man of genius is not a poet, 
or, none but a man of genius can be a poet, 
or, a man of genius alone can be a poet. 

The original proposition is equivalent to this, 

subj. pred. 

rvA^^ f — ^ ^ 

E. No poet is not-a-man-of-genius, 

which may simply be converted 
subj. pred. 

t ^ ^ (^^ 

E. None, not-a-man-of-genius, is a poet. 

3. Dismissing the whole of this conversion by negation, in- 
troduced by some, as unnecessary, we proceed to state that 
the whole doctrine of conversion may, for every practical 
purpose, be easily remembered by the aid of the following 
summary rule, 

(Art. 104.) By simple conversion E is converted into E, and 

I into I ; by particular conversion, A into I ; and E into 0. 

1. Simple conversion in the reduction of syllogisms is al- 
ways represented by the letter S ; particular conversion by 
the letter P. 



INTERROGATORY EXAMINATION, 

ON 

Chap. V. 

Q. 1. What do you understand by propositions being said to be opposed to 
one another 1 Art. 90. 

Q. 2 . What are the symbols by which propositions are represented ] 

Q. 3. Repeat the memorial lines expressive of the four principal kinds of 
propositions. 

Q. 4. What is meant by the quantity of a proposition 1 

Q. 5. What is meant by the qitality of a proposition 1 

Q. 6. What does A represent 1 

Q. 7. What does E represent % 

Q. 8. What does I represent ? 

Q. 9. What does represent 1 

Q. 10. Are A and E opposed in quantity or quality ? 

Q, 11. Are I and O opposed in quantity or quality 1 



120 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM, 

Q. 12. Are A and I opposed in quantity or quality 1 

Q. 13. Ate E and O opposed in quantity or quality 1 

Q. 14. How are A and opposed ? 

Q. 15. How are E and I opposed 1 

Q. 16. Out of A, E, I and 0, select those two which are universals. 

Q. 17. Out of A, E, I and O select those two which are particulars. 

Q. 18. Out of A, E, I and 0, select those two which are affirmatives. 

Q. 19. Out of A, E, I and O, select those two which are negatives. 

Q. 20. How many kinds of opposition are there 1 92. 

Q. 21. "What is contrary opposition 1 93. 

Q. 22. What is subcontrary opposition ? 93. 

Q. 23. What is subaltern opposition 1 93. 

Q. 24. What is contradictory opposition ] 93. 

Q. 25. What do the other symbols, t, f, n, i, c, represent 1 93, note 3. 

Q. 26. What is the first rule of opposition 1 94, rule 1. 

Q. 27. What is the second rule of opposition 1 94, rule 2. 

Q. 28. What is the third rule of opposition 1 94, rule 3. 

Q. 29. What is the fourth rule of opposition 1 94, rule 4. 

Q. 30. What is the fifth rule of opposition 1 94, rule 5. 

Q. 31. Can you repeat by heart those two rules into which the whole doc- 
trine of opposition is compressed 1 95 and 96. 

Q. 32. What do you understand by the conversion of propositions 1 97. 

Q. 32. Give an example of conversion. 

Q. 33. What is that proposition called which is proposed to be converted 1 
98. 

Q. 34. What is that proposition called which is converted from its origi- 
nal? 98. 

Q. 35. Explain inferential conversion. 99. 

Q. 36. What is the general law of all correct conversion 1 100. 

Q. 37. What is the reason that the proposition A, cannot generally be con- 
verted into A ] 

Q. 38. What is the reason that the following proposition which is A, can- 
not be converted into A ! viz : 

A. All the Pennsylvanians are Americans. 

Q. 39. How many kinds are there of inferential conversion 1 101. 

Q. 40. What is simple conversion 1 102, 

Q. 41. When after the interchange of subject and predicate, which always 
takes place in conversion, E remains E still, and I remains I, what kind of 
conversion is that? 

Q. 42. What is particular conversion ? 103. 

Q. 43. When a universal is converted into its own particular, what kind of 
conversion is that] 103. 

Q. 44. When A is converted into I, or E into 0, what kind of conversion is 
that] 

Q. 45. Can you repeat by heart one rule which comprises, for all practical 
purposes, the whole doctrine of conversion 1 104. 



ON EVIDEl^CE. 

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. 

1. Hitherto the subjects of our inquiry have been propositions 
and their parts ; and a proposition is an act of judgment determin- 
ed on evidence, and expressing that a being, is, or is not ; since 
" sum" is equal to " /am existing, or /am an existent being /" 
or that any two things agree or disagree. 

2. Since every act of argumentation, correctly and fully stated, 
implies two premises, each a proposition, independently of the con- 
clusion, these propositions, therefore, or the two acts of judgment 
which they involve, are the foundation of our reasoning, and of our 
true or false conclusions. 

3. Since the evidence necessary to determine our judgment on all 
the subjects that may claim our attention, is co-extensive with the 
whole range of being of which we can have any knowledge ; or 
with the whole circle of all the several sciences themselves, and 
which it is properly the business of those sciences respectively to 
impart ; and also, since Logic is more strictly concerned with the 
third act of the mind, reasoning or argumentation, Dr. Whately, 
properly confines the whole of his treatise to what is merely ne- 
cessary to explain the correct mode by which that act can be ex- 
pressed, not accounting it his business as an author or lecturer on 
logic, to determine your judgment, as a student, relative to the truth 
or falsity of any proposition, notwithstanding that your conclu- 
sion must be deduced from two premises, or from two acts of judg- 
ment expressed or implied. That is, the lecturer on Logic expects 
you, as a student, to come as fully prepared with ideas, and with all 
that knowledge, evidence and conviction, as are necessary to ena- 
ble you to form your own propositions, of which it is his business 
only to show the correct expression, and if they are duly connect- 
ed with the conclusion. Logic, strictly speaking, is merely con- 
cerned with the distinction of terms, and the form not the matter 
of the proposition. It is the business of the student to see that the 
terms suitably express his own ideas, and that his propositions de- 
clare his judgment of the agreement or disagreement of them ac- 
cording to the knowledge he has. But with the mode in which 
any two of those propositions are or can be connected so as to form 
a syllogism, or an act of argumentation correctly stated, and with the 
detection of such conclusion as is irregularly deduced from them, 
Logic is immediately concerned ; whilst you are at liberty to gain 
all the knowledge and evidence that compose your premises from 



122 ON EVIDENCE. 

science of any kind, and from the universe of things around 
you. 

3. We repeat that Dr. Whately, and before him, Mr. "Wesley,* 
were right in this proper and limited view of the peculiar province 
of Logic ; as much as the Lecturer on Book-keeping, when he ex- 
pects that his pupil comes to him duly prepared with a knowledge 
of arithmetic. The lecturer on Book-keeping, does not account 
it to be his business to instruct his pupil in the science and practice 
of calculation, whether of interest, discount, commission or ex- 
change, but merely in the business of journalizing, posting and 
balancing a set of mercantile books. The very circumstance of re- 
presenting it to be the province of Logic, not only to teach the art 
of reasoning, but also to furnish all the ideas, knowledge and evi- 
dence of the truth of propositions, which, of course, must be as 
extensive as the unlimited science of ontology, is not only in itself 
absurd, but has through mystifying the specific object of Logic, in 
a mass of irrelevancy, from which the discrimination of ages has 
not, until lately, rescued it, done more to deprive men generally of 
the simple art of reasoning correctly, and of detecting fallacies, 
however artfully concealed, than is commonly imagined. For this 
reason, therefore, it is by no means urged on the instructor to arrest 
the pupil's progress, but rather to allow him to proceed immediate- 
ly from the chapters on propositions to those on syllogisms ; after 
which the present chapter on evidence and the two following on in- 
duction and analogy may constitute useful subjects of more leisure 
perusal. 

Neither is it asserted on the other hand, that knowledge and evi- 
dence are not necessary to judgment, and to its correct expres- 
sion in a proposition, since, without them, the latter could not exist. 
Knowledge and experience, it is the business of our mortal, if not 
of our immortal lives to obtain. The various degrees of knowledge 
possessed by different individuals are already indefinite ; but there 
is no necessity on this account that any one should not use, even 
in Logic, whatever degree of knowledge he has, because he has 
not now all he may have. Special evidence, or the evidence which 
belongs to each department of knowledge, would lead us through all 
the sciences, and through the whole path of life, a path which every 
one must travel for himself; and as he travels learn to use what 
knowledge and evidence he has correctly to purposes salutary to 
himself, and to the circle of society around him. In contradistinc- 
tion, however, to special, we shall, in this chapter, merely advert 
to general evidence, or to those general principles and provisions 
in nature which determine our judgment, or enable us to express 
ourselves with confidence and accuracy on that ground where logic 
meets us, namely, on that of the propositions. 

* See Compendium of Logic, 4th edition. Sold by T. Blanshard, City Road, 
London. 



CHAP. VI. 

1. I am ; or, I am existing. 

I think ; or, lama being capable of sense and thought. 

The sun is rising. 

The snow is white. 

That coal is hot. 
A whole is greater than each of its parts. 
[t is impossible for the same thing, at the same time^ to be, 
and not to be. 

A killed B, according to the testimony of C. 
The three angles of a triangle are together equal to two 
right angles. 

Nothing, or that which is not a thing, cannot produce any- 
thing. 

A being powerless cannot opierate. 

What is not an agent cannot act. 

Every effect proceeds from a cause. 

There is a God. 

Man is accountable for his actions. 

2. The above are propositions, each the proceed of a dis- 
tinct act of judgment. Judgment is the result of evidence. 
The evidence, however, that determines the above proposi- 
tions, is of different kinds. What assures me, " that I exist," 
that, " the sun is rising," — " that coal is hot," — " a whole is 
greater than each of its parts," is different from that, which 
informs me, that " the three angles of a triangle are together 
equal to two right angles ;" and that again is likewise different 
from the evidence implied in the proposition, " A killed B, ac- 
cording to the testimony of C." 

3. Our considerations on evidence necessarily involve the 
following particulars : 

1st. That which testifies. 

2d. That which is testified ; or testimony. 

3d. Evidence. 

4 th. The faculties of perceiving it. 

5th. Conviction consequent on that perception. 

6 th. The moral consequences of that conviction. 

(Art. 105.) That which testifies, may beany being, ani- 



124 ON EVIDENCE. 

mate or inanimate, the facts or experience of history, or the 
discoveries and deductions of science duly established. 

1. That which testifies, or is capable of testifying to every 
rational mind, or creature having faculties competent to per- 
ceive, is any being animate or inanimate. Thus we are told 
that " the Heavens declare the glory of God ; and the firma- 
ment sheweth his handy work. Day unto day uttereth speech, 
and night unto night sheweth knowledge. There is no speech 
nor language where their voice is not heard. Their line is 
gone out through all the earth, and their words to the end of 
the world."* " For the invisible things of him from the crea- 
tion of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the 
things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead ; so 

that THEY ARE WITHOUT EXCUSE."f 

"In keason's ear they all rejoice. 
And utter forth a glorious voice ; 
For ever singing as they shine, 
The hand that made us is divine."^ 

This then is their testimony, " the hand that made us is divine^" 

2. Likewise not only the facts that occur during our own histo- 
ry or those of which we read in the history of nations; the axioms 
and truths of science intuitively perceived, or the volumes of 
demonstrative instruction, that are, for our investigation, open 
to us, in common with all that have the power and will to use 
the faculties we possess, are so many separate and distinct 
testifiers, or sources of testimony ; as well as the two all 
important volumes of natural^ and revealecl|| religion, and the 
several and abundant aids that serve to explain them. 'E.mvot 

iiTiv ai /ua^rv^ovirai Trigi iy.ov. — John v. 39. 

(Art. 106.) Testimony is a tacit or express declaration, 

* Psalms xix. 1 to 4. | Rom. i. 20. 4: Addison. 

§See Ray on the Wisdom of God in the Creation, Derham's Astro and 
Physico Theology, Sturm's Reflections, the works of Cambray, Nieuwentyt, 
Bonnet, Swammerdam, Linne, Adams' Philosophy, Paley's Natural Theology; 
and a very excellent volume entitled, " the Class book of Natural Theology" 
by the Rev.H. Fergus, edited by the Rev. C. H. Alden, of Philadelphia. 

II See Cudworth's Intellectual System, Newton and Kershaw on the Pro- 
phecies, Campbell on Miracles, Jennings on internal evidence, and Ditton and 
West on the Resurrection ; the works of Leland and Leslie, Bishop of Lan- 
dolph and Rev. A. Suter in answer to Paine ; Rev. Simpson's (of Macclesfield) 
Plea, and also on the Divinity of Christ ; Jortin on the Truth of Christianity ; 
Drew on Immortality and also on the Resurrection ; Bentley's Boyleian Lec- 
tures, and Jones on the Trinity. These with many others, are testifiers, or 
witnesses of the truth. 



ON EYIDENCE. 125 

having a tendency to establish, or amount to complete evi- 
dence of the truth testified. 

1. A, in a court of law, is accused of killing B, in the town 
Z. E, however affirms that this was not true, since he saw A 
100 miles distant from the town Z, at the time in question. 
This, until contradicted by F, is supposed to be testimony, 
who satisfactorily proves that E has motives in common with 
A, and in addition to E's known want of integrity, that he 
instead of being 100 miles distant, was seen by F, in the town 
Z, at the time specified. The veracity of F is known, that of 
E suspected, and therefore that which was supposed to be 
testimony as given by E, is found to be false or no evidence at 
all. On the contrary, C affirms that he saw A kill B. This 
is the testimony of C, but as yet it is not evidence, since the 
character of C is not known, until D and others give not only 
satisfactory proof as to his integrity, but also further testify 
such corroborative facts, as render the testimony of C suf- 
ficient evidence to the judge and jury. 

2. Thus in philosophy, A affirms that the liquid alkali, as 
well as the fixed, is reducible to a metallic base, and that he 
witnessed an experiment, partially successful, undertaken to 
prove its possibility. This is testimony having a tendency to 
establish or amount to a full proof or demonstration, but not 
certainty or evidence, until B, on whose integrity and veracity 
we have full reliance, assures us that he actually saw ammo- 
nia decomposed into the metal ammonium, and that the verity 
of the fact was tested by every proof that either the analytic 
or synthetic process could afford : this is evidence, and such 
that even A's former testimony is now admitted within the 
integral quantity of evidence which we possess. 

3. Testimony by writers on Mental Philosophy is commonly 
called probable evidence. Testimony or probable evidence 
is distinct from demonstration or evidence. Demonstration or 
full evidence is such as not to admit the possibility of so adding 
demonstration to demonstration as to make the first clearer, 
or without tautology. Demonstration or evidence is so suf- 
ficient in itself that it needs no aid from any other, and it can 
receive none. I see the sun ; so do you ; but your telling me 
this, is to me, no additional proof that the sun is to be seen : 
or if, whilst I see the sun, you shut your eyes, your telling me 
that you see not the sun, does not invalidate my evidence that 
the sun is to be seen. 

4. A affirms to B, C, D, that at such an hour and in such a 

l2 



126 OS EVIDENCE. 

part of the heavens a comet is to be seen. B, at the time 
attends, but without glasses, C takes a refracting, and D a 
reflecting telescope. B testifies that he sees something, 
where he expected to see nothing, but he cannot tell what. 
The testimony of C is, that by his refractor, he discovers 
in that part of the heavens an appearance that he cannot 
account for, according to the catalogues furnished by either 
Flamstead or Cassini. But D testifies that by his powerful 
reflector, he not only sees the comet, but its tail and all the 
usual appendages. B, C, and D now use the reflector, and 
all see the same ; and now the previous testimony amounts 
to evidence. 

5. '^The strength of probable reasoning," says Jamieson, 
" for the most part depends not upon any one testimony, but 
upon many, which unite their force and lead to the same con- 
clusion. Any one of them by itself would be insufficient to 
convince ; but the whole taken together may have a force 
that is irresistible. Who, for example, would now seek, after 
all the previous testimonies, new arguments to prove that 
there were such persons as Maria Antoinette, Q,ueen Char- 
lotte, Charles the first, or Oliver Cromwell V'' 

6. Every testimony, acknowledged to be such, produces a 
proportional degree of assent or belief. The judgment may 
be in suspense between two contradictory opinions, when 
there is nothing to amount to evidence for either. In propor- 
tion as credible testimony prevails on this side or on that, 
assent or belief in degree rises, until the several testimonies 
constitute full integral evidence, when, if the faculties of per- 
ception are sufficient and exercised, testimony rises to evi- 
dence, and assent or belief to certainty. 

7. There are cases, when not in consequence of the want 
of evidence itself, but of the faculties not being able, through 
want of previous exercise, to perceive it as such, or to com- 
prehend it in its integral totality, in which it does not appear 
without our being willing first to apprehend all the several 
testimonies that collectively, as component parts, constitute 
that evidence ; which cannot, in such cases, be on any other 
condition obtained. Thus when tyro informs the mathema- 
tician that he is desirous to learn and practice the peculiar 
application of fluxions, he is informed that this he cannot do, 
unless he first willingly attend to arithmetic, algebra, geome- 
try, and conic sections. C informs both A and B that if they 
will follow him, or embrace his counsel, he will conduct them 
to situations where both their circumstances will be prosper- 



ON EVIDENCE. 127 

ous, and themselves happy. A refuses to do this unless he can 
have at once the full evidence that he shall realize what is 
promised. This full evidence, he is informed, not on account 
of its non-existence, but in consequence of his faculties not be- 
ing strengthened by exercise or previous acquisition to receive 
it, he cannot, in the first case, have : that the successive ac- 
quisitions of truth are obtained only by the successive ex- 
ercises\of the mind, and in no other way ; nevertheless that 
he shall, from time to time, be supplied with so much testimo- 
ny as he can comprehend, until the several testimonies 
amount to full evidence, and his several acts oi assent or be- 
lief ^\\3.\\ am.ount to certainty. To this condition B (the be- 
liever) accedes, and enjoys the present and perpetual advan- 
tages, which A (the atheist) loses for ever. 

8. On this very point may be seen and contemplated a very 
peculiar and important matter relative to our intellectual 
character. Evidence frequently cannot be perceived unless 
the mind expand by exercise, accompanied with an ade- 
quate desire, through the proper means, to obtain the end, 
until it is competent to receive all the evidence it can require. 
The mind of an infant cannot comprehend all that is known 
to an adult, any more than the latter can all that is known 
to the man of mature experience and practice. Should the 
mind of the infant through the whole of its minority be neg- 
lected, it will, when at the period of corporeal maturity, be 
an ignoramus. For the same reason, if the mind of the adult 
be neglected, even should it continue to be connected with 
mortality until it is three or four score, and surrounded too 
with all the mass of evidence it has neglected to use, it will 
" be weighed in the balances and found wanting." If truth 
or evidence is not perceived, it is not because that truth or 
evidence does not exist, and that too to the full extent that 
can concern us. Nor are they not perceived because we 
have not faculties, but because of our neglect or unwilling- 
ness so to exercise them in the proper means, and in the right 
w^ay, as to enable us, from time to time, to apprehend as our 
exercise and consequent ability increase, the several testimo- 
nies that collectively will constitute that evidence, and afford 
us all the conviction and certainty of that truth, that a sentient, 
rational being can possibly desire ; until all that which before 
required testimony added to testimony, and one proof to an- 
other in order that they should constitute evidence or demon- 
stration, is now to us a matter of intuitive conviction, which 
no further testimony, evidence or demonstration can possibly 



128 ON EVIDENCE. 

increase. Once I was blind, but now I see! Consequently, 
with my own unborrowed eyes, I see that sun ; and therefore 
need not either any, nor all the glasses, spectacles or tele- 
scopes found in the store of the optician. Without thenn, or 
the need of any other help, I have unclouded evidence that 
there is a sun that shines on me, on all ; and if some, either 
through a defect in the faculties of vision or a neglect of using 
them, see not that sun, it diminishes not the conviction and 
its consequences that I possess and enjoy. 

9. Testimony or probable evidence, Dr. Reid divides as fol- 
lows : 1. Human Testimony. 2. The authority of those 
who are good judges of the point in question. 3. That 
whereby we recognize the identity of things and persons. 
4. That which we have of men's future actions and con- 
duct from the general principle of action in man, or from our 
knowledge of the individuals. 5. That by which we collect 
men's character and designs from their actions and conversa- 
tions. 6. The probability of chances. 7. That by which the 
known laws of nature have been discovered, and the eifects 
which have been produced by them, in former ages, or which 
may be expected in time to come. 

10. Human Testimony is that from which the greatest part 
of knowledge is derived. The faith of history is built upon it 
as well as the decisions of solemn tribunals. " When several 
independent original witnesses, with equal advantages for 
knowing the fact, and without any previous concert, agree in 
their report, they mutually strengthen each other's testimony. 
This concurrence of several independent testimonies is itself a 
probability distinct from that, which may be termed the sum of 
the probabilities, resulting from the separate testimonies. The 
circumstances constituting the crefi^i^zV//?/ of a witness are, 1st, 
Sufficient discernment, opportunity and attention^ioohidLin 
a clear knowledge of the fact. 2. Disinterestedness, or the 
absence of all expectations of advantage or detriment, 
arising from the testimony. 3. Integrity, which affords the 
strongest assurance of a true testimony, inasmuch as it is ab- 
solutely inconsistent with any intention to deceive or prevari- 
cate."* 

11. Testimony of this kind is either oral ov written. Oral 
TESTIMONY is either original or transmitted, or what is gene- 
rally termed traditional. It is original when it is derived 
from one who had sensible evidence of the fact asserted ; and 

• Elements of Logic by Levi Hedge, L. L. D. 



ON EVIDENCE. 129 

transmitted or traditiofial, when given by one who obtain- 
ed his knowledge from another or from any original witness. 
" Written testimony is usually esteemed stronger and more 
deserving of confidence than oral ; for the record, being made, 
for the most part, without a knowledge of the uses to which 
it is afterwards applied, may be presumed to have been 
written without any undue bias : Farther, as the record 
of facts is usually made soon after they occur, this testi- 
mony is secure against any defects arising from the imperfec- 
tion of memory. Written testimony is also less liable to have 
its credibility impaired by transmission than oral." If two 
or more written records, relative to the same facts, exist, and 
in all material points agree, the credibility is increased. Mere 
circumstantial variation as to points of minor consequence, not 
affecting what is essential, tends rather to increase than to di- 
minish that credibility ; for this is precisely what in all ordina- 
ry cases, will and must occur, where previous concert and col- 
lusion are excluded. 

(Art. 107.) Evidence is that complete testimony, or con- 
currence of testimonies, which is sufficient to produce certainty 
or conviction in faculties capable and willing to perceive it ; 
and remains sufficient evidence, though not perceived as 
such through a neglect in the exercise of the faculties of 
perception, ^ 

1. For example, Euclid wrote a work containing self-evi- 
dent axioms and demonstrations, on the [subject of intuitive 
and deductive evidence, relative to the magnitude and exten- 
sion of matter. This book has been read not only by the most 
scientific men, but by men of the strongest minds for two 
thousand years, and by them, without a dissentient voice, 
acknowledged to be, on the subject, a volume of evidence. In 
this book then there is evidence as acknowledged by all men 
that have any claim to rationality. But evidence as it is, and 
must remain to be, it conveys no conviction to the clown, to 
the man that prefers ignorance to knowledge, or darkness to 
light, and still less so to him, who through a perversity, not 
less than monstrous, of what once might have been rational, 
denies the veracity of his own senses, or the existence of mat- 
ter, and consequently of magnitude and extension. Notwith- 
standing this, the evidence is to be found in this book, as 
much as a color, a sound, an axiom or a demonstration remain 
a color, a sound, an axiom or a demonstration, although the 
blind, the deaf and the lunatic perceive them not. 



130 ON EVIDENCE. 

2. Three men are sitting with me in this room. We all 
appear to be looking through the window towards the oppo* 
site green. One man has the faculty of vision, but neglects 
to use it; his mind is vacant, and his attention unemployed*, 
Another, through misem ploy ment, weakened this faculty, and 
cannot see distinctly at a distance. The third, though not so 
blind but that he might recover his sight, yet has no desire to 
use the means. I see distinctly a mass of gold on that green. 
The evidence to me is so clear that I am convinced of it: but 
though evidence, it is not evidence to them. The consequence 
is, I have the advantage, and they the loss. This supposition, 
though expressed figuratively, refers to the case of thousands. 
Evidence, light, sufficient as to every necessary truth, actually 
exist, and that too within our reach. And the very existence 
of this light or evidence, whether we use it or not, renders us 
responsible.* 

3. Besides it is only through a proper exercise of the facul- 
ties of perception that the mind acquires power so to perceive 
the evidence of some of the most sublime and interesting truths 
that concern us, that it can become conviction. ^' It is only 
by the means of something antecedent," said Dr. Johnson, 
" that any thing is known." But when all means of acquir- 
ing those antecedent ideas, or of laying the foundation, are 
neglected, how can we ever hope to arrive at the superstruc- 
ture ? Superabundant means of obtaining that evidence are 
before us ; but if we neglect the means of perceiving it, to us 
that evidence can never become such conviction as to lead 
to consequences identical with our happiness. 

(Art. 108.) The faculties of perceiving evidence are 
those, which, in apprehension, enable mind to form an idea 
of ONE term ; in judgment^ to determine the agreement or 
disagreement of two ; and in reasoning to deduce a conclu- 
sion from THREE. 

1. What faculties they are by which we perceive evidence, 
and by which we are ourselves beings capable of assent, be- 
lief, convictian and certainty, it is of importance to inquire. 
Were we to attend to the writers on Mental Philosophy, to 
those that insist on all the distinctions that Metaphysics, not 
Logic, would institute, we should require all the discrimination 
necessary to enable us to vary our terms to express these as 
different cases might require ; as in sensation, perception, 

* AwT» (fi ialn n X4^m, on to <pt3-c iXtiw^iv Us rov kot/u.ov, »«/ >ty!t7nio-etv oi Av^^ceTroi 
ftethKoit TO cr«oT9f, » to <focg, Kv yoL^ Trovag* ccuTm ta teya. John iii. 19.' 



ON EYIDENCE. 131 

consciousness, imagination, conception, attention, associa- 
tion, memory, comparing, abstraction, and analysis ; be- 
sides the powers of thought generally, and the passions. 
The distinctions detailed in this enumeration, and the mode of 
expressing them in general conversation, we shall chiefly leave 
to Metaphysics, and proceed to inquire what three mental acts 
are they with which evidence is concerned, and the names by 
which logicians are agreed, however, modified by circumstan- 
ces, to express them ; but not without briefly first considering 
the subdivisions to which we have just alluded. 

2. By SENSATION is understood the functions performed by 
the five corporeal senses, seeing, hearing, feeling, tasting and 
smelling ; which the mind expresses by saying 1 (the mind) 
see, hear, feel, taste, or smell. This latter, that is the mind's 
act, is called perception, implying the faculty of perceiving an 
idea through sensation, not only whilst the object of sense is 
present but when removed. " The sensations^ which are ex- 
cited in the mind by external objects, and the perceptions of 
material qualities, which follow those sensations, are to be 
distinguished from each other only by long habits of patient 
reflection." (Stewart's Elem. vol. I chap. V. part 2d, sec- 
tion 1st. 

3. It is impossible to mention this faculty, whether called 
sensation or perception, perceiving testimony or evidence, 
without an expression of gratitude that we are thus indulged 
by Him whose gifts are truths with powers of perceiving it, 
and who consequently does not, cannot, give that which is fal- 
lacious. And every man that has the least claim to ration- 
ality would judge that he that was inclined to carry scepticism 
to such a length as to disbelieve the testimony, the evidence, 
of his own senses, was of all men the veriest of fools. Scep- 
ticism by trying to prove or disprove, has proved or disproved 
too much ; since in reason's eye, or in the eye of any thing that 
has sense or reason, it has destroyed itself. It may exist, but 
its fate is sealed. It has existed long enough to give proof to 
the world, to what a length, men, by beginning to doubt the 
most rational evidence, may ultimately go ; into what a mise- 
rable chaos of mental wretchedness they may finally sink. 

4. " The Cartesian Philosophy is to be considered as the 
ground-work of modern scepticism. The source of Locke's 
reasoning against the separate existence of the secondary quali- 
ties of matter ; of Berkeley's reasoning against the existence 
of a material world ; and of Hume's reasoning against the 
existence qf both soul and body ; may be found in the first 



132 ON EVIDENCE. ^ 

part of the Principia of Descartes. Yet nothing seems to 
have been further from the intention of this ingenious philo' 
sopher, than to give countenance to irreligion or Hcentiousness. 
He begins with doubting ; (even the testimony of his own 
senses,) but it is with a view to arrive at conviction : his suc- 
cessors, the further they advance, become more and more scep- 
tical ; and at length the reader is told, to his infinite pleasure 
and emolument, that the understanding, acting alone, does 
entirely subvert itself, and leaves not the lowest degree of 
eMdence in any proposition ! ! The first thing a philosopher 
ought to do, according to Descartes, is to divest himself of all 
prejudices, and all his former opinions ; to reject the evidence 
of sense, of intuition, and of mathematic demonstration ; to 
suppose that there is no God, nor heaven, nor earth ; and that 
man has neither hands, nor feet, nor body ; in a word, he is to 
doubt of every thing of which il is possible to doubt, and to be 
persuaded that every thing is false, which can possibly be con- 
ceived to be doubtful. Descartes begins with universal doubt, 
that in the end he may arrive at conviction : Hume begins 
with hypothesis, and ends with universal douht,^^ Beattie's 
Essay on Truth, part I, chap. H, section 1. 

5. Descartes, Malehranche, Hume and Berkeley, call 
into question the evidences of their own senses. " By Berke- 
ley we are taught, that external objects, (that is, the things 
we take for external objects,) are nothing but ideas in our 
minds : in other words, that they are in every respect different 
from what they appear to be. This candle, it seems, has not 
one of the qualities it appears to have: it is not white, nor lumi- 
nous, nor round, nor divisible, nor extended ; for to an idea of 
the mind, not one of these qualities can possibly belong. How 
then shall I know what it really is ? From what it seems to 
be I can conclude nothing ; no more than a blind man by 
handling a bit of black wax, can judge of the color of snow, 
or the visible appearance of the starry heavens. The can- 
dle may be an Egyptian pyramid, the king of Prussia, a mad- 
dog, or nothing at all: it may be the island of Madagascar, 
Saturn's ring, or one of the Pleiades, for any thing I know, or 
can ever know to the contrary." 

Descartes, Locke and Berkeley, suppose, that what we 
call a body is nothing but a colleclion of qualities ; and these 
they divide into primary and secondary. Of the former 
kind are magnitude, extension, solidity, &c., which Locke 
and the Cartesians allow to belong to bodies at all times, 
whether perceived or not. Of the latter kind are the heat 



ON EVIDENCE. 133 

of fire, the smell of a rose, or the taHe of sugar, &c., and 
these by the same authors, and by Berkeley, are qualities 
which are said to exist not in the bodies themselves, but only 
in the mind that perceives them : an error into which they 
are led by supposing, that the words heat, taste, smell, &,c. 
signify nothing but a perception ; whereas we have formerly 
shewn, that they also signify external things. Berkeley, fol- 
lowing the hints which he found in Descartes, Malebranche 
and Locke, has applied the same mode of reasoning to prove, 
that primary as well as secondary qualities, have no external 
existence, and consequently that body, (which consists of these 
two classes of quality and nothing else) exists only as an idea 
in the mind that perceives it, and exists no longer than it 
is perceived /" — Beat tie. 

6. Here then by the wonderful sagacity of a Dr. Berkeley 
it is discovered, that there is no such thing as matter, and as 
for the senses, they are the organs of lies and deception; 
therefore all testimony or evidence is now, and for ever, out 
of the question. But all the ingenuity, if such it be, of Des- 
cartes, Malebranche, Hume and Berkeley, has never yet per- 
suaded any man to run his head against a post, or to prefer 
stepping into a coal-pit rather than believing his own senses. 
Men generally choose to leave this sort of experiment to Dr. 
Berkeley, or to any disposed to believe him ; to lay their hand 
on a red hot coal, if they like, and then to say, whether they 
view the red hot coal, their burnt fingers, or writhe with the 
agony of pain, " I cannot tell what that is, it. may be a pine- 
apple, a strawberry, a lump of ice, the North Pole itself, the 
Great Mogul, the Cham of Tartary, or one of Jupiter's moons, 
for aught I know, or ever can know to the contrary." 

7. Oh, the beauty of scepticism ! What have we? Glories 
yet undiscovered ; the excellency of not believing our own 
senses; of denying evidence of every kind! Thus by the 
admirable aid of a Dr. Berkeley we discover that there is no 
stick thing as matter, and by the philosophic powers of a Dr. 
Priestley,* we learn that there is no such thing as soul or 
spirit! ! Consequently the grand discovery is, that there is 
NOTHING ; neither body nor soul ; neither matter nor spirit ; 
and that all that is, is nothing ; except a parcel of lying 
senses, that serve no other purpose than to testify that 
nothing is something. Here is the glory of scepticism ! 1 ! 
O ye men, that have from the foundation of the world, be- 

* See answer to Dr. Priestley on Materialism, by Rev. J. Benson. 
M 



1S4 ' ON EVIDENCE. 

lieved that there is such a thing as a sun that shines, a moon 
that gives light; that there are such things as grassy meads, 
or verdant lawns, or meandering rills, for near six thousand 
years have ye been in error, but never believe such things 
again, but reject them as non-entities in common with those 
of poetic fiction, or the legendary tales of the Arabian Nights ; 
but to know ani/ thing' or somethings whether all is nothing 
or not, go to the sceptics, for wisdom only dwells with them 5 
and when they are gone, there will be, of course, nothing at 
all. 

S. Whether this digression, occasioned by a consideration 
of the possibility of deranged minds disbelieving the testimony 
of the most simple and plain faculties of perceiving evidence, 
those which even an infant, and the common sense of children 
believe, be excusable or not, we leave to others, according to 
their inclination, to decide. The apology we offer is by re- 
suming the subject of this article, or by proceeding to say, that 
consciousness is defined to be, that faculty by which we 
notice the various operations of our own mind, or of its modes 
of existence. Consequently, consciousness is immedfately con- 
cerned with internal objects, or operations purely mental; or 
that by which we know, or are conscious that we think, form an 
idea of any one thing, material or immaterial, compare two, 
or reason from three, or feel the emotions of desire, aversion, 
fear, hatred, love, joy, &c., therefore consciousness is analo- 
gous to perception; by the latter we know that we see, 
taste, feel, &c. ; and by the former, we know that we 
think, form an idea of an object, judge, reason, remember, 
desire, fear, love, &c. Dr. Reid says, " Reflection ought to 
be distinguished from consciousness, with which it is too often 
confounded, even by Mr. Locke. All men are conscious of 
the operations of their own minds, but there are few who re- 
flect on them, or make them the object of their thought. 
Though the mind is conscious of its operations, it does not 
attend to them ; its attention is turned solely to the external 
objects, about which those operations are employed. Atten- 
tion to things external is properly called observation, and 
attention to the subjects of our consciousness, rejieciionP As 
reflection is defined by Dr. Reid, to be " attention to the sub- 
jects of our consciousness," Dr. Hedge considers these terms, 
reflection and consciousness, but different names for the same 
thing, without denying that reflection is used to express a 
more voluntary and intense attention to the subjects of con- 
sciousness, or to the phenomena of mind. 

9. Conception is that power which enables us to form an 



ox EVIDENCE. 135 

idea of an absent object. Shakspeare calls this power the 
mind^s eye ; as, 

ffamlet. My father ! Methinks I see my father ! 

Horatio. Where, my lord 1 

Hamlet. In mi/ mincVs eye, Horatio. 

Imagination is distinguished from conception as a whole 
from a part By variously modifying our conceptions, or by 
combining the parts of different conceptions together, we can 
form new wholes of our own creative fancy. Imagination, 
therefore, is the power that gives birth to the productions of 
the poet and the painter. 

" The poet's eye, in a fine phrenzy rolling, 
Glances from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven, 
And as imaginatiost bodies forth 
The forms of things unseen, gives to airy nothing 
A local habitation and a name." — Shakspeare. 

It is not uncommon to use the word imagination and its 
verb to imagine, somewhat extensively : thus we may say, 
that we imagine that we see a whole scene, containing many 
objects ; as the beautiful vale of Tempe : we imagine that 
we hear the melody of the softest strain, or the harmony of 
the full choir : that we are feeling the cooling zephyrs of the 
favonian breeze : we may imagine that we are tasting the 
sweetness of the grape : that we smell the aromatic fragrance 
of the " citron grove:" we may imagine, with Thompson, that 
we are quenching our thirst with the " cocoa's milky bowl ;" 
that we are satisfying our hunger with the " ambrosial 
fruit of the spicy Anana :" or that we enjoy the whole at 
once, on some favored spot of Eutopia, a country we never 
knew, or where we never experienced sensations of any kind. 

10. Attention is the faculty which detains for our exami- 
nation ideas or perceptions in the mind, and exclude other 
objects that solicit its notice. The distinctness of our ideas, 
the accuracy of our judgments, and consequently of our rea- 
soning, and the retentiveness of our memory, very much de- 
pend on the exertion of our attention. The reason why we 
commit things to memory more easily at one time than 
another, is that we command our attention more perfectly. 
Dr. Reid observes, " that if there be any thing that can be 
called genius, in matters of mere judgment and reasoning, it 
seems to consist chiefly in being able to give that attention to 
the subject which keeps it steadily in mind, till we can survey 
it accurately on all sides. There is a talent of imagination 
which bounds from heaven to earth, and from earth to heaven 
in a moment. This may be favorable to wit and imagery ; 



136 ON EVIDENCE. 

but the powers of judging and reasoning depend chiefly on 
keeping the mind to a clear and steady view of the subject." 

1 1. By the association of ideas, is understood that tendency 
which one thought, affection, or even rennembrance, has to in- 
troduce another. That one thought is often suggested by 
another ; and that the sight of an external object often recalls 
former occurrences, places or persons, and revives former feel- 
ings, are facts known to all. " The view of the spot where 
we passed the first years of life will, after a long absence, re- 
call many interesting events of childhood. The first notes of 
a familiar tune being sounded, will cause the remaining ones 
to pass through the mind in regular order. No principle of 
our nature is productive of more important effects than this ; 
which establishes a connection between our ideas, feelings, and 
mental operations. It is, too, the source of numerous errors 
and prejudices. It is the foundation of all our local attach- 
ments, and most of our prepossessions in behalf of the govern- 
ment, and the institutions of our country. It is to the 
principle of association that we are to attribute our predilec- 
tions for the modes of dress, habits, and behaviour of those 
whom we esteem and respect." — Hedge. 

12. Memory is the faculty by which the mind has a knowl- 
edge of what it had formerly perceived, felt or thought. The 
object of memory being something that hpast, and the object 
of perception or consciousness something which is present; 
what now is, cannot be an object of memory ; neither can 
that which is past and gone be an object of perception or 
consciousness. "Memory is always accompanied with the 
BELIEF of what we remember, as perception is accompanied 
with the BELIEF of that which we perceive, sind consciousness 
with the BELIEF of that whereof we are conscious. This be- 
lief which we have from distinct memory, we account real 
knowledge, no less certain than if it were grounded on de- 
monstration ; no man in his senses calls it in question, nor will 
he hear any argument against it. We are so constituted as 
to admit it of itself, immediately and incontestibly. The tes- 
timony of witnesses, in causes of life and death, depends upon 
it, and all the knowledge mankind have of past events is built 
on this foundation. 

13. Comparing refers to that act by which we derive 
evidence, as to the equality, similarity, agreement, suitable- 
ness, &c. of any two ideas or terms ; thus, that road is short- 
er than this; this polyanthus is unlike that ; one point in 
the circumference of a circle cannot be further distant 

from the centre than another; that hook is suitable for 



ON EVIDENCE. 137 

John ; are propositions which express this act, which logical- 
ly is called judgment. By it too, we compare a subject with 
existence or non-existence, or with its attribute mode or quali- 
ty ; or an agent with its act ; or a being with what is acted 
on it; as a centaur does not exist — Troy was^ hut Troy is 
not ; Croesus was rich — Caesar crossed the Rubicon — The 
Augean stables were swept by Hercules. In this sense each 
of such relative words or terms, as the following, imply a 
whole proposition ; as father, cousin, master, servant, Vir- 
ginian, largeness, smallness, superiority, &c. ; and if expand- 
ed would amount to such propositions as Ji is the father of B ; 
Jane is cousin to Mary ; C is master to D ; that man is 
a Virginian; the spices of Arabia are superior ; i. e. such 
terms as largeness, smallness, superiority, &c. imply a compari- 
son with some other thing. 

14. Abstraction is a process of the mind frequently neces- 
sary to obtain evidence, by which we divest an idea either of 
any mistake or prejudice with which it was encumbered, in 
order to obtain a clear and unbiassed view of it. Thus a 
young student in mathematics reading such terms as axiom, 
postulatum, problem, theorem, &c. may be, for a time, in some 
doubt, if the word axiom is ever taken for a postulatum, pro- 
blem, &c. or vice versa ; by investigation he abstracts from 
his idea of axiom, every thing belonging to postulatum, pro- 
blem, &c. which he had through mistake attached to it, and 
thus obtains the clear idea, that an axiom is a self-evident 
truth, and that it should be understood for nothing less or more, 
whether maxim, precept, or any thing else. And if all men 
by abstraction, could, with equal facility divest themselves of 
all mistaken views or prejudices, relative to adventitious cir- 
cumstances not essential, they would obtain a clear and just 
idea of the being or character, without which evidence is out 
of the question, and their judgment must remain incorrect. 

But there is another process of abstraction, by which we 
either classify or arrange, the individuals of being, whether 
belonging to the vegetable, animal or mineral kingdoms ; or 
to the varied products of mind, of Literature and of the arts; 
whether considered in books of all kinds, and on all subjects ; 
in manuscripts, paintings, statues, busts, cabinets, coins or nu- 
mismatics, models and patents ; or to being generally, 
whether visible or invisible, material or immaterial, (as in the 
science of Ontology,) into orders, tribes, genera, species, 
VARIETIES, not only for the purpose of establishing univer- 
sal terms affording ideas of a universal nature, distinct 

m2 



138 



ON EVIDENCE. 



from any other universal nature, but in each depart- 
ment, in each kingdom, to form one system, which is one 
SCIENCE, and therefore important for the purpose of acquir- 
ing a7id retaining evidence, since science and evidence are 
correlative terms ; or we may consider, by abstraction, a 
TRIBE and the properties common to it, as distinct from its 
ORDER ; a GENUS distinct from its tribe ; a species from its 
genus; a variety from its species; or an individual from its 
variety; but ail further division after this, becomes analysis. 

Generalization, effected by abstraction, affords systems, and 
each is not only a system of truth, but a system of general 
terms, with their definitions ; and it is not only a great help to 
the memory, but facilitates very much the definition of the 
order, tribe, genus, species, or variety, i. e. of predicable terms 
or of a term that maybe predicated of any tribe that fallsunder 
the order,of genus that falls under the tribe, of species under the 
genus, of variety under its species, or of individual under its va- 
riety. The effect of such a systematical arrangement of the 
productions of nature, is seen in our various systems of Natu- 
ral History, as of Zoology,* Ornithology ,1 Ichthyology ,J Ento- 
mology, § Conchology,|| Botany,^ Mineralogy,** and Geolo- 
gy ;-ft and also of Chemistry, Pharmacy ,Jt Nosology,§§ The- 
rapeutics,|||| and Bibliography;^^ in which a species is accu- 
rately defined in a line or two, which without this systemati- 
cal arragement, could scarcely be defined in a page. 

By some, generalization seems to be considered as a distinct 
process from abstraction ; but the fact is, that whether we 
reduce a genus to a species, or generalize a species into its 
genus, both are done by abstraction, i. e. in either case by 
taking off properties to admit the one to be the other. As there 
has been some misunderstanding on this topic, it will be proper 
here to give the following illustration. Let it be required, in 
the first place^ to generalize the species, bird, into its genus, 
animal. 



Comprehension. 



Life, 

Sense, 

Motion, 

fhaving 
J Wings, 
"^ Feather 

^Oviparc 



I 

J 



Exten- 
sion. 



Ostrich, 
Eagle, 
Swan, 
Raven, 
Parrot, 
Linnet, 
Sparrow, 
&c. 



All birds are animals. 



ipreht 



Life, 

Sense, 

Motion, 



Exten- 
sion. 



Man, 

Beast, 

Bird, 

Fish, 

Insect. 



* The science which treats of living creatures ; f of birds ; ± of fishes; § of 
insects ; || of shells ; ^ of plants ; ** of minerals ; ff oi the earth and its com- 



ON EVIDENCE. 



139 



To generalize the species, bird, into its genus,aninnal, it is only 
necessary, as appears by the above example, to take off, by ab- 
straction, the properties constituting its essential difference^ 
found under brackets in the column of comprehension on the 
left of the species birds. 

Then let it be required, to reduce the generic term animal 
to the special one, bird. 



Comprehen- 


Extension. 


sion. 




Life, 


Ostrich, 


Sense, 
Motion, 


Eagle, 
Swan, 


having 


Raven, 


wings, 
feathers, 


Parrot, 
Linnet, 


Oviparous, 


Sparrow, 
&c. 



Comprehen- 
sion. 



All birds are animals. 



Life, 

Sense, 

Motion, 



Extension. 



Man, 7 
Beast, 5 

Bird, 



^Fish, ^ 
\ Insect. > 



And to specialize, or reduce the genus animal to its species 
bird, it is only necessary, as appears by the above example, 
to take off again, by abstraction, such parts of its extension, 
found under brackets in the right hand column, as do not 
agree with bird ; i. e. neither man, nor beast, nor fish, nor 
insect is a bird; the rest of animal is a bird. 

Therefore, to generalize a species into its genus, you take 
off, by abstraction, that part of its comprehension that con- 
stitutes its essential difference, but no part of its extension, 
since they are all animals. 

And to reduce a genus to a species, you take off, by ab- 
straction, such parts of its extension as do not agree with the 
species, but no part of its comprehension which is common to 
all. 

But how in chemistry would abstraction or generahzation 
differ from analysis? Take for example the proposition, 

A nitrate is a neutral salt. 

The comprehension of a nitrate, is 1st, composed of an acid 
and a base, and 2d, its essential difference, composed of the 
nitric acid and a base; its extension is, the nitrate of potassa, 
the nitrate of soda, the nitrate of ammonia, nitrate of lime, 
nitrate of silver, &c. 

The comprehension of neutral salt, the predicate is, having 

ponent parts ; \^ the art of preparing medicines ; §§ the classification of dis- 
eases ; nil the art of healing; *[[f see excellent plans for the arrangement of 
books and of large libraries in the supplemental volume of Dr. A. Clarke's Bib- 
liography, 8 vol. 8vo. 



140 ON EVIDENCE. 

properties distinct from either of its component parts: its ex- 
tension is, nitrates, sulphates, chlorates, acetates, &c. 

Now the species, a nitrate, is generalized into its genus, a 
neutral salt, by taking off, or abstracting its essential differ- 
ence, a part of its comprehension, viz. composed of the nitric 
acid and a base : this taken away, we have its generic cha- 
racter, ** a neutral salt." 

Or to reduce a '* neutral salt" to its species, '^nitrate," we 
take off, or abstract such parts of its extension, viz. sulphates, 
chlorates, acetates, &c., as do not agree with the species, 
" nitrate." 

But still, here is no analysis. To effect this, therefore, we 
must have some individual nitrate, say the nitrate of ammonia, 
and decompose it into its two component parts, viz. the nitric 
acid and ammonia, which process is not implied by either 
abstraction or generalization. 

13. Analysis is another important process by which evi- 
dence is obtained. It is that by which the whole of any indi- 
vidual of a species is taken to pieces, in order to view some 
particular part considered separately, or to have a more cor- 
rect perception relative to the composition of the whole. It 
is by this that a mineral or an ore is examined, to determine 
if it contain any metal or other valuable substance, by divest- 
ing the compound of its unnecessary parts. Thus morphia is 
found to be the narcotic principle in the larger mass opium ; 
and consequently that more of the energy of this drug may be 
exhibited in less volume. In the same way, quinine is found 
to be the active part of cinchona, or the Peruvian bark. 
By this mode of obtaining evidence, some of the most lu- 
minous and useful discoveries have been made in the sciences. 
Thus it is found that the base of every tree, of every vege- 
table, is a metal !* that there is metal in every piece of soap; 
and that fire may be lighted with water !! 

* A whole tree may be thus analyzed ; not as the botanist would do to suit 
his purpose. The whole tree, roots, leaves and all, may be burnt to ashes ; the 
ashes may be washed, and the washings when drained off are a weak solution 
of the carbonate of potassa. The unnecessary quantity of water is driven off 
by rapid evaporation, or boiling, (a part of the analysis) until what remains is 
stronor enough to crystallize, when the carbonate of potassa appears, a white 
salt, commonly called potash, as found in the shops. It is now requisite to 
divest this of the carbonic acid, which constitutes a carbonate. Lime has a 
stronger affinity for that acid than potassa in combination with it. Quick lime, 
i.e. lime deprived of its own carbonic acid, is therefore mixed with a heated 
solution of the carbonate of potassa. The lime seizes the carbonic acid of po- 
tassa, and therefore potassa being set free, is precipitated to the bottom of the 
vessel, and obtained in its solid state, potassa, by evaporation, Potassa is a 



ON EVIDENCE. 141 

By this faculty of obtaining evidence, a whole subject or 
book may be analyzed ; its several parts distinctly contem- 
plated, their mutual coherency perceived, and the relevancy 
or irrelevancy of its parts to the chief point, evinced or ex- 
posed, as the case may require. Thus an argument, whether 
it occupy an hour or two,-nr three in the delivery, or whether 
expanded over a page, a chapter or a volume, may be taken 
to pieces, and it may be shown, if the parts are such as to ad- 
mit of ever being put together again ; or whether sound has 
not been substituted for sense ; wit, plausibility and rhetoric 
for argumentation, and as a counterfeit passed oiF amongst the 
unthinking. This process, in such case, would constitute 
sound criticism, to which all its canons relative to taste, fancy 
and imagination would be, comparatively, of inferior and 
secondary importance. 

The contemplation of character, frequently is a matter of 
no small importance to our moral conduct and happiness. But 
character is often a complex consideration, that requires be- 
ing divested of every thing which is temporary or casual in its 
duration, accidental as to circumstances, and not a native or 
essential feature in the delineation. Thus the recollection 
that it was the solicitude of Martha to make in a proper man- 
ner the requisite preparations, that encumbered her with 
care at a very interesting moment, is sufficient to intimate that 
she was by no means destitute of respect and love for the 
guest she entertained. 

14 It does not appear to be generally thought that the pas- 
sions have any thing to do with perceiving any evidence we 
receive. Neither is it supposed that perception is any organ 
of sensation ; consciousness the act itself of thinking, remem- 
bering or reasoning ; nor mem.ory or reflection, the idea itself 

strong oxide of potassium, and requires a strong agent, as the galvanic battery, 
to drive off the oxygen which renders the metal yet an oxide. The oxygen, 
now flies off at the positive pole, and the pure metal, potassium, is obtained at 
the negative pole of the battery. Here is a metal obtained by analysis out of 
a tree, and thus we have the evidence of the convertibility of vegetable matter 
into metal. We view it as a simple, incomplex idea, a simple body, incapable 
by any art known of further decomposition ; almost giving presumptive proof 
that all matter originally was metallic, and that even our nine earths are me- 
tallic oxides, since several of them already have been reduced to their primitive 
metals. When tired of viewing the metal we have obtained, we throw it into 
a saucer of cold water. In a moment there is a fire ! The metal, size and 
shape of a pea, is running, whilst on fire, all over the water, as if greedy of the 
oxygen the water contains to reconvert itself into an oxide, or potassa, as it 
was before it became potassium. Here, by analysis, we have evidence that 
the base of vegetable matter is metallic, and that -water can light afirt I 



142 ON EVIDENCE. 

to which by that reflex act we refer. When we perceive, are 
conscious, remember or reflect, it is on an idea or emotion pre- 
sented by sensation, thought, reasoning, &c. either at the same 
time or before, as the case may be ; and according to the great- 
er or less energy in that perception, consciousness, remem- 
brance or reflection do we retain that idea, or that evidence, 
for a greater or a less time. Thus it appears that perception, 
consciousness, remembrance and reflection are merely powers 
that are acting according to ideas given by other powers either 
before or at the same time ; and therefore before they act, or 
at the same time they act, there exists furniture in the mind 
given by other means. This, at all events, brings the passions 
very near to an identity with other powers already specified. 
Without undertaking to decide this, however, but leaving it 
at present problematical, we shall merely proceed to inquire, 
what is a passion, or what must exist in the'mind at the time 
when the energy implied by that passion is in operation? A 
slight reflection on the subject will convince us, that two ideas, 
at least, or the ideas of two terms, simple or complex, by 
whatever means obtained, must exist in the mind, whenever a 
passion is felt. There is the object of that passion, whether 
money, wealth, pleasure or pain, accommodation or annoy- 
ance, which becomes the subject of the mental proposition. 
The other idea is the predicate of that proposition, which, 
however ordinarily expressed by the epithets, *' desirable," 
** beautiful," " lovely," or by " ugly," " unpleasant," " odious," 
** wretched," "dreadful," &c. may be comprised in two 
words, viz: suitableness ov unsuitableness ; i. e. suitable to 
me, to you, or to another ; or unsuitable to me, to you or to 
some one contemplated, as the case may be ; " suitable to me" 
or " unsuitable to me" is the predicate, which is considered one 
term ; the propositions then stand thus. 

1 2 

That object is suitable to me. 

1 2 " 

That object is unsuitable to me. 

Now if these two ideas, viz : the object which is perceived 
suitable to me, is not in possession, it is desired ; if its ul- 
timate attainment be a matter of probabiHty, I hope for it ; 
if it be possessed, its worth and value, duly appreciated, I re- 
joice in it. 

But if we take the other propositions, viz: 

1 2 

That object is unsuitable to me. 



ox EVIDENCE. 143 

and if the object which is perceived to be unsuitable to me, 
beat a distance,! am averse to it ; if likely to occur, I fear 
it ; if inflicted, I grieve ; if on another, I am sorry ; if in- 
flicted injuriously by another on me, the object of the passion 
is transferred to another, the offender, and I am angry. 

These remarks are made merely to show that there cannot 
be less than two ideas or one proposition, in the mind, when- 
ever a passion is exerted. But the modifications of both the 
subject, as at a distance, probable or expected, in possession 
or suffered; and of the predicate, how or for what particular 
reasons, or on how many accounts suitable or unsuitable, im- 
ply that although not less than two ideas or one proposition 
can constitute the basis of a passion, yet on it many more pro- 
positions and consequently ideas may be built, not only on ac- 
count of the modifications just specified, but on account of the 
usual great activity of the thoughts during such emotions, 
when propositions, ideas and relative views may pass in the 
mind with inconceivable rapidity. 

Though it is not contended that the passions imply the ori- 
ginal powers by which we receive evidence, yet they often 
prove powerful means not only of enabling us to obtain a 
stronger view of the evidence given by other instruments, but 
of retaining it, in consequence of that strength, longer in the 
mind than we otherwise should have done. 

We are well aware that many are prepared to say, that if 
the passions can be considered either as means of receiving 
evidence, or as the channel through which it should, for a mo- 
ment, be permitted to flow, that at all events, they are often 
very dangerous powers in connection with evidence, or that any 
evidence, which may have been unfortunate enough to get into 
such bad company, can at best be, only an object of suspicion. 
We cannot see it, however, any more necessary, that because 
any part of a man has been in a diseased state, it should re- 
main always so, or not made equally sound with any other 
part, when healthy and correct action will be the necessary 
consequence, any more than we can see it necessary that a 
living man should always be chained to a dead man. We do 
not see any valid reason why we should stand aloof, or in a 
state of alarm, at any of the faculties an unerring Creator 
hath given us; especially since their restoration to healthy ac- 
tion is a declared possibility. If however we doubt this, or 
prefer, by habit, or wrong objects to keep the passions pervert- 
ed, we only fall under that rule, which applies generally to 



144 ON' EVIDENCE. 

every power, " If the light that is in thee be darkness, how 
great is that darkness!"* 

We are not contending for the use of a blind eye, a deaf 
ear, or of a perverted passion, but for the healing of all, or of 
any of them, if they be diseased ; and can it be supposed, that 
they will not act, if they be healed, or that the action of any 
of them, in that state, will be worthless ? The passions when 
healed are noble endowments; paint an idea, in colors of 
clearest evidence, according to the dimensions of the full 
length portrait ; constitute the bond and amenities of social 
life, and are parents of all the acts that make man amiable 
to man. 

It is only for the passions in their healthy or correct state 
that we contend, not as being the original powers by which 
evidence is received, but as the most vivid energies by which it 
is impressed and retained. Where is there a stronger passion 
than the love of God? which we are told by testimony, and it 
has been proved by experience, that nothing except sin can 
conquer, not even death itself, and in it is evidence of the 
strongest character: for can a man love what he does not 
know ! ! And within this genus, and in no other, is comprised 
the species, the power of " loving our neighbor as ourselves :" 
therefore, without these^ two, mere civilization, ethics, &c. 
however excellent when in possession of consistent and vital 
energies, are nothing but the picture of a fire that cannot 
warm ; or are things that exist merely to contradict themselves. 

15. We have now reviewed the several powers enumerated 
by writers on Mental Philosophy, that are, more or less, or in 
one way or the other, the means through which we receive 
evidence^ or retain that which we possess. But how are w^e 
allovt^ed by them, would we speak according to the common 
dialect of ordinary conversation, to express these faculties, as 
they are in combination with the varied circumstances of life? 
since an idea may be of an object that h present, distant, or 
fancied, external or internal, past, abstract, something 

immaterial yet known to exist, or what is charged on us 
as worthy of observation ? 

16. For example, I am told, that the moon will rise this 
evening at 9 o'clock, eclipsed ; i. e. a7i object not now appa- 
rent to sense; I conceive an idea of it: so of a distant or 
fancied object, as an Egyptian pyramid, a centaur, or a flying 
horse. I am allowed to say, I conceive an idea of such 
things ; as, I can conceive an idea of old Troy that now no 

* Matt. vi. 23. 



ON EVIDENCE. 145 

one sees; of Briareus with his hundred hands; of Argus with 
his hundred eyes ; or of Polyphemus with only one, yet large 
as a Grecian shield, and whose head touched the clouds. But 
9 o'clock has come ; this moment the moon rises eclipsed. I 
perceive it ; before, of course, I conceived it, or an idea of it. 
Or, I am told of something that did occur, the comet for ex- 
ample, of 1811 ; I remember it : it is true, once, 1 perceived 
it. But I have occasion to observe not what is external, but 
something within, it may be a thought, what I fancy or im- 
agine, some emotion of the mind, as desire, hope, love, joy, 
&c.; I am conscious of it; or, it may be purely abstract, 
what I never saw, yet I know it exists ; it. may be virtue, 
justice, or mercy, space, motion, extension, spirit, duration, 
&;c.; here I am allowed to say I form an idea of it, or I am 
conscious that I am thinking of it — (thus far the ignorance of 
certain metaphysicians would go;) — or an object, it may be a 
continued subject, is charged on me as something worthy of 
observation; 1 attend to it. Perhaps we are going too fast, for 
we may have two ideas instead of one ; then we are compar- 
ing them ; which logicians call judgment, without making 
any concessions to metaphysicians, or varying their general 
terms to suit the purposes of common conversation, any more 
than chemists can alter the jnomenclature of Lavoisier and 
Fourcroy, to suit those who will never study chemistry. But 
we are not engaged, perhaps, with any thing within the 
reach of intuitive evidence. We may be reflecting on nature, 
and wonder v/hat it is. On investigation, we discover that its 
acts are regular, and properly directed to some wise and 
good end, with no deviations except what are referrible to 
principles comprehended within what is consistent with itself, 
as if the whole were one system of unique rules uniformly 
tending to some apparently beneficent purpose. We are 
conscious that this either is law, or we never had an idea 
what law is. And as for law without mind, something intelli- 
gent to form and direct that law, especially when directed to 
wise and salutary purposes, we immediately perceive to be 
absurd, the admission of which is utterly incompatible with 
rationality; we therefore arrive at the conviction that law is 
the expression of mind ; and as we before had discovered 
that nature is law, we are then prepared to reason thus — 

Law is the expression of mind. 

Nature is law ; therefore 

Nature is the expression of mind. 



146 ON EVIDENCE. 

This is the act of reasoning, or the expression of it; and by 
it we obtain deductive evidence, viz. that '^ nature is the ex* 
pression ofmind.^^ We may now use this principle, obtain- 
ed by reasoning, and estabhsh it as a principle of deductive 
evidence, to find, to search after some other truth, viz. nature 
is the expression of mind! What mind? Where is that 
mind ; or rather where is it not ? since nature, its expression, 
is, in its operations, beheld here, there, every where — to-day, 
yesterday, one hundred, as well as a thousand years ago, 
working, proceeding by uniform laws productive of wise and 
beneficent design : in vegetables, in animals, in minerals, in 
matter, as well as in the animated man ; on the surface, be- 
neath it, on the dry land, in the waters, the mighty oceans, 
in the skies, the heavens ; all move by regular laws, towards 
consistent c design, as if guided by some ineflfable, matchless 
wisdom, power and goodness ; i. e. mind ! But where is that 
mind ? It is working here, there, elsewhere and every where 
to-day and yesterday, the same ; then that mind is here ! is 
there ! is every where ! And what impedes my faculties of 
perceiving evidence, that I have not become acquainted with 
that mind !! It made me ; not for a vain, a temporary, or an 
unworthy purpose, but for something consistent with infinite 
beneficence, in the consummation of which is the very fruition 
of my being!! Have [ then fully appreciated that? or do I 
recollect that I, a free agent, not a machine impelled by ne- 
cessity, may thwart that, by rules mine, not his? These 
though enthymemes expressed interrogatively, are reducible 
to syllogisms, from each of which, when proved, we should de- 
rive some new deductive evidence which again might be 
taken as a premiss, the minor or the major of another, as far 
as necessary. 

17. It is, indeed, sufficiently clear that the several faculties 
of perceiving evidence, whether intuitive or deductive, how- 
ever modified by circumstances, are reducible to what logi- 
cians have agreed to express by apprehension, judgment, 
and argumentation. Whether we conceive, imagine^ per- 
ceive, remember, or are conscious of an idea, or attend to it, 
we, in logical language, apprehend it ; if we are engaged in 
the comparison of two, we are, in the logical sense, engaged 
in that act of judgment, which forms a proposition : or if we 
are engaged with three ideas, as in the preceding example, 
nature, law, mind, we are engaged with reasoning, more cor- 
rectly termed argumentation. All sciences have their tech- 
nicalities, without which, indeed, no science would be intelli- 



ON EVIDENCE. 147 

gible; and apprehension, judgment, and argumentation 
are the names logicians have agreed to employ to express the 
faculties of perceiving evidence, whether intuitive or deduc- 
tive ; i. e. APPREHENSION, the power of apprehending one idea 
or term, whether it be of an object external, present, distant, 
fancied, past, or internal ; judgment, the faculty of perceiving 
evidence from the mental juxta-position or comparison of two 
ideas or terms ; and argumentation, the power of deriving 
deductive evidence by reasoning from three ideas or terms. 
These three expressions are sufficient, without regarding dis- 
tinctions which belong to metaphysics and common conversa- 
tion. A certain salt of a slight green colour, in ordinary lan- 
guage, is called copperas. The chemist calls it the sulphate 
of iron, knowing that not one particle of copper is in the mass. 
Thus the dialect of common discourse is often one thing, whilst 
that of science is, and must remain, another. 

(Art. 109.) AssENT'is a persuasion of the probability of tes- 
timony, and is more or less strong, according as that testimo- 
ny rises to evidence, when assent amounts to conviction. 

(Art. 110.) Conviction is the conscious perception of evi- 
dence, by faculties capable and willing to receive it. 

1. The following remarks, with slight alteration, are ex- 
tracted from Mr. Wesley's Logic ; q. v. 

2. That is an evident proposition, which extorts convic- 
tion, as soon as it is understood : as, the whole is greater 
than its part. That is a doubtful one, in which we know 
not how to determine ; as, the stars influence men. 

3. If any thing occur, whereby the mind inclines to either 
side, that which was doubtful before, becomes probable. Such 
an assent is termed opinion. 

4. Opinion, therefore, respects a barely probable proposi- 
tion, and implies no certainty at all. Yet there are several 
degrees, whereby it approaches towards certainty ; and the 
highest degree of probability, is not far distant from it. 

5. Certainty is two-fold, 1st. that of the object, the thing 
to be perceived ; and 2d, that of the subject, the understand- 
ing which perceives it ; and both have their degrees. That is 
more certain, in the former sense, to which there is the less 
objection; that in the latter sense, to which the less objec- 
tion appears. 

6. We might enumerate many kinds of evidence. But it 



148 ON EVIDENCE. 

may suffice to observe, it rs either, 1. that of a self-evident 
axiom ; (i. e. intuitive evidence ;) or 2. that of a conclusion 
regularly deduced from propositions of intuitive or deductive 
evidence. This logicians term science ; which accordingly 
they define — " A conviction of certain and evident conclu- 
sions, regularly deduced from certain and evident premises." 
The certainty and evidence here implied are that both of the 
object and of the subject. For by the former, science is dis- 
tinguished from error; by the latter from opinion. Without 
the evidence of the subject, there can be no science : and this 
without the other, is as the existence of positive light in the 
presence of the blind. 

7. We need not prove that there is such a thing as certain- 
ty : seeing all reasonable men allow it. We freely assent to 
what is affirmed by a wise man : and more freely, if he con- 
firm it by reason. Some things we are taught by nature it- 
self; and some by Divine revelation, and of all these we have 
sufficient certainty. 

8. To assent to testimony is the same as to believe ; and 
such an assent is termed faith ; I)ivine faith depends on the 
testimony of God ; Human faith on the testimony of man. 
What nature dictates we may be said to perceive, what rea- 
son teaches us, to know. 

9. God can neither deceive, nor be deceived ; men are often 
deceived, and often deceive. Reason and nature lowers. No- 
thing, therefore, is more firm than Divine faith : nothing less 
so, than human. In what v^e perceive or know, there is often 
no fear, always some danger of being deceived. Hence, 
there is the highest rest for the mind in divine faith ; the low- 
est of all in human. In what we know or perceive, there 
are various degress of rest according to the degree of testimo- 
ny or evidence ; probability or certainty. 

10. If, therefore, we were to make a sort of scale of assent 
and conviction, it might consist of the following steps. 

, . 5 ^' H^^^-*^^ FAITH ; an assent to a doubtful proposition. 

^ 2. Opiifiojf ; an assent to a probable proposition. 

1. Assurance ; or conviction of the truth of a certain 
proposition . 

2. SciEs-cE ; or conviction of the truth of a certain and 
evident conclusion. 

2. CoifTiCTioif. -^ 3. Intelligence, or conviction of the necessary truth 
I of a self-evident axiom. 

I 4. Divine faith ; or conviction of the truth of Divine 
I Revelation, or of the necessary veracity of truth testifying^ 
\j)f itself. 



ON EVIDENGE. 149 

1 ] . To each of these there belong certain principles, which 
are peculiarly proper to produce it. The principles of Di- 
vine Faith are those, and those only, which are contained in 
the Scriptures. Of intelligence, those which are properly 
termed axioms ; of science the conclusions regularly deduced 
from them. 

12. An AXIOM is a proposition which needs not, and cannot 
be proved. This is a subject of intuitive evidence. Such 
are the following. 

From NATURAL DIVINITY. 1. God cannot deceive^ nor he 
deceived. Whence flow these certain and evident conclu- 
sions : 2. Absolute faith is due to the testimony of God : 
o. Revelation never contradicts either sense or reason. It 
may indeed transce-nb both. But it cannot possibly con- 
tradict either, rightly employed about its proper object. 

From MATHEMATICS. The whole is greater than each of its 
parts ; equal to them all. All right angles are equal to one 
another. Things which are equal to the same thing are equal 
to one another. 

From METAPHYSICS. It is impossible for the same thing, 
at the same time, to be and not to be. Some affirm this to 
be the only axiom in the world. Whoever affirmed this, had 
a miserably narrow and perverted mind. 

From LOGIC. Terms which agree in one and the same 
third, agree with one another. 

13. Some suppose, that there are no axioms to be found in 
the other arts and sciences. But such principles at least, are 
found therein, as produce assurance, if not science. Such are 
these. Nothing, which is not a thing, cannot spring from 
itself, since that is not a thing. Nothing, which is not a thing, 
can be the cause of itself, since that self is not a thing. That 
which is not a thing, cannot have any attribute, since an at- 
tribute without a subject is impossible and inconceivable. 
That which is not an agent, (as nothing) cannot act. That 
which cannot act cannot produce any thing. What you would 
not have another to do to you, you ought not to do to aoother. 

14. The principles that serve to produce opinion, are usual- 
ly styled maxims. They commonly hold, but not always. To 
this class those properly belong, which are, as it were, in the 
middle way, between doubtful and certain. 

15. The uncertainty of human faith arises hence. In order to 
procure a firm assent of this kind, a competent witness must 
know what he says, and say what he knows ; and both be ap- 
parent to him that believes it. But this is rarely the case. 



150 ON EVIDENCE. 

Wherefore we have always reason to suspect what we have 
no other proof of, than human testimony, even when there 
appears no more reason to doubt thereof, than of a mathemati- 
cal demonstration. 

16. According to these six degrees of assent and conviction, 
propositions might have been divided with regard to their mat- 
ter, into infallible, self-evident, scientific, certain, probable 
and doubtful. But as the four first of these produce science, 
and any assent short of this, is indefinitely speaking, termed 
opinion, they are usually divided only into two classes. 1. 
That which produces science ; and this is called scientific or 
demonstrative, and often demonstration, 2. That which 
produces opinion; (any assent short of science) and is termed, 
assumptive ; i. e. arguing probably, or on assumed grounds. 

17. There are two species of demonstration. The first de- 
monstrates that a thing is ; proving either directly that it 
is so, {and this is called direct demonstration) or that if it 
be not so, some absurdity must inevitably follow. This is 
called demonstratio ad absurdum. We may properly term it 
oblique. 

18. We demonstrate directly, either 1, by proving a thing 
from its effect, as the sun gives no light ; therefore it is eclipsed. 
Or 2, by proving it from its remote cause, as the moon is dia- 
metrically opposite to the sun ; therefore it is eclipsed. But 
we prove this from the earth's being interposed between 
them ; this is 

19. The second sort of demonstration, which demonstrates, 
why a thing is, by assigning its proximate and immediate 
cause. 

20. But there may be a proximate, which is not the prime 
cause, that is self-evident, and indemonstrable, whose evidence 
is therefore prefered before all others, as needing no other 
light than its own. The stars are not necessary to show the 
sun. 

21. There are then four degrees of demonstration: the 
oblique demonstration is good ; but the direct is preferable to 
it. Demonstration by the proximate cause is better still ; but 
ihQ prime cause, best of all. 

(Art. 111.) The consequences of conviction are the prac- 
tical and moral effects it should produce on rational free- 
agency. 

1. Testimony, evidence, conviction, and even logic itself, 
are subjects eminently concerned with man. It is impossible 



ON EVIDENCE. 151 

to consider man (exceptions there may be to all general rules) 
either as inert matter, or as an irrational being. But the de- 
grees within the precincts of rationality are indefinitely great 
and numerous ; and a wide difference exists between mere 
rationality, or rationality not in action, that is, the mere pas- 
sive capacity of understanding, and rationality vigorously ex- 
erted towards the end for which so high a talent is given. 
Had all men the mind either of Milton, the creative poet, or 
of Milton's Adam, when he found himself surrounded by testi- 
fiers more numerous than drops of evening dew on the spires 
of grass, they would perceive that testifiers do not exist with- 
out testimony, and that these several testimonies compose 
evidences as countless as the pages in nature's endless volumes ; 
and the conviction of this would be, that not an inch of 
space, nor a moment of time existed, without ample proof 
not only of their own original, but of the moral consequences of 
their rational existence, and the pleasing privileges to which 
they, as free agents, were invited. 

2. Is it possible for a man, a man of active intelligence, to 
be placed in this, or in any similar condition, with all the con- 
viction that it is his privilege to enjoy, and conceive that any- 
thing is indifferent, or can he be indifferent to them ; whilst 
all these testimonies, this evidence, the countless pages of na- 
ture, the pages of life, the pages of experience, of revelation, 
of the volumes of science, all testifiers ; nay, of the volumes, the 
bibliothecas of Asia, Europe and America, lay expanded be- 
fore him ? Man, all sense, all intelligence, both active and 
passive, an agent and a patient, surrounded with evidence co- 
extensive with space, and co-existent with duration, and yet 
if not inactive, not active in a right way, is a paradox of the 
highest order ; giving a proof that it would require volumes 
to unfold, of the high value of conviction, and that convic- 
tion, of a right kind, is all that is wanting to breathe an at- 
mosphere of beneficence around the world. 

3. As testimony, evidence and conviction minister to the 
happiness of man, so do doubt, uncertainty and scepticism not 
only to his own individual wretchedness, but tend so far as 
their influence goes, to the entire demolition of all society and 
government, and to the destruction of all the more kind and 
noble feelings, not only between man and his Maker, but be- 
tween one man and another. Their origin is darkness, their 
work destruction, and their end chaos. However unhappy it 
has been to those who have lived only to advocate such a 
cause, and to disserve mankind, yet in another sense it is for- 



152 ON EVIDENCE, 

tunate ; since a standing proof is before the world to what 
length men may go who, by first rejecting all the sources of 
evidence, at last can disbelieve their own senses, and deny 
that they have any testimony or evidence that the snow is 
white, the grass green ; that ice is cold, or the fire hot; and 
believe, the only thing they must believe, that their own 
senses, not only of the mind, but of the body, exist only for the 
purposes of deception. 

4. We are not informed of any earlier instance of sceptic 
lunacy similar to this, than that of Pyrrho, the founder of the 
Grecian sect of sceptics. According to the testimony of Dio- 
genes Laertius, " Pyrrho, professed to disbelieve his senses, 
and to be under no apprehension from any of the objects that 
affected them. The appearance of a precipice or of a wild 
beast was nothing to Pyrrho ; at least he said so ; he would 
not avoid them ; he knew they were nothing at all, or at 
least that they were not what they seemed to be/' We do 
not see that this sect was likely to make many converts, 
whilst the pleasures and pains of the body are connected with 
the senses, and men generally are disposed to accept the for- 
mer and avoid the latter, if they can, whether they acknow- 
ledge that they do this through believing that they have senses 
or not. Men generally, by this one circumstance, have con- 
tinued to give proof to the world that they believed their 
senses, including even such rare specimens of insanity as 
were found in Descartes, M'alebranche, Hume, and Berke- 
ley. 

5. This comparatively modern scepticism called into success- 
ful exercise the pens of Father Buffier, Reid, Butler, Beattie, 
Campbell, Paley, and Stewart. Father Buffier appears to 
have been the first that successfully taught the important 
science of Jirst truths in opposition to the career of that 
scepticism. He finds two great sources from which he derives 
his first principles; viz: 1. The consciousness we have of our 
own thoughts. 2. Commonsense, or the faculty, as he explains 
himself, by which men form judgments on the ordinary ob- 
jects of their experience, which are not proper subjects of 
consciousness. The principles of common sense, as given by 
Buffier, may be thus detailed, ^'l. There are other beings, 
and other men in the world besides myself." (The statement 
of this appears to have been necessary, since Descartes refus- 
ed, until he had first proved, to believe it ; i. e. he could not, 
as to this matter, trust the intuitive evidence of his own senses.) 
2. There is in them something that is called truth, wisdom. 



ON EVIDENCE. 153 

and prudence; and this something is not merely arbitrary. 
3. There is in me something that I call intelligence or mind ; 
and something which is not that intelligence or mind and which 
is named body ; so that each possesses properties distinct from 
the other. 4. What is generally said and taught by men in 
all ages and countries of the world is true. 5. tdll men have 
not combined to deceive and impose on me. (An axiom cer- 
tainly, and applicable to a good purpose.) 6. What is not 
intelligence or mind, cannot produce all the effects of intelli- 
gence or mind manifestly existing ; neither can a fortuitous 
jumble of particles of matter form a work of such order, and 
of such regular motion as a watch, tie likewise mentions 
three tests by w^hich first truths, or axioms of common sense, 
maybe distinguished from all others, viz: 

1. They are so clear, that they cannot be proved by any 
thing clearer.* 

2. That they have been admitted in all countries, and at 
all times, with exceedingly few exceptions. 

3. They are so strongly imprinted on our minds, that we 
regulate our conduct by them, in spite of all the speculative 
refinements of that (pseudo) philosophy, which denies them.f 

6. On this subject, Beattie's " Essay on the nature and im- 
mutability of truth in opposition to sophistry and scepticism," 
is worthy of the most attentive perusal. His enumeration of 
the sources of evidence are as follows: 

1. Mathematical evidence. 

2. The evidence of external sense. 

3. The evidence of consciousness. 

4. The evidence of memory. 

5. The evidence w^hich we have, when from effects, we 
infer causes. 

6. Probable evidence. 

7. The evidence of testimony. 

The sixth class Dr. Beattie divides into 1st, the evidence by 
which we judge of future events by our past experience from 
similar events ; and 2d, the evidence of analogy. 

7. Intuitive evidence, according to Dr. Campbell, is that 
which is admitted immediately on a bare attention to the 

* Aristotle admits, " as true whatever is self-evident, (as well as Euclid,) 
without seeking to prove it ; nay he affirms that those men who attempt to prove 
self-evident principles, or who think that such principles may be proved, are 
ignorant of the nature of proof." — Aristot. Metaphys. lib. 4, cap. 4. 

t " Traite des premiers Verites, et de la Source des nos Jugemens," par M. 
Buffier. 



154 



ON EVIDENCE. 



ideas under review ; and Deductive, that which is adnriitted 
mediately, by a comparison with other ideas ; as, 



1. 

Iiituitive 
Evidence. 



INTUITIVE EVIDENCE. 

Mathematical Evidence, which is the result 

of pure intellection. 
Consciousness ; and 
3. Common Sense, or 
evidence of 



I' 



C 1. cense, 
^a. Memory. 

Deductive evidence founded on the intuitive, is either 



^1. 'Whz.i is founded on the axioms of pure intellection. 

f 1. The knowledge we derive from 
experience. 

2. That from analogy. 

3. That from testimony. 



2. fVfho.iis founded on 

Deductive J I the dictates of con- 
Evidence. I 2.-^ sciousness and com-< 
II mon sense; or moral 
i^or probable evidence j 4. From chances- 

112.) Evidence is of two kinds 



/ partly probable, 



partly certain. 



(Art. 
Deductive. 



1, Intuitive, and 2, 



INTERROGATORY EXAMINATION 

ON 

Chap. VI. 



Q. 1. What has evidence to do with the matter of a proposition ? page 121, 
note 1. 

Q. 2. What are the particulars involved in the consideration of evidence 1 
page 123, note 3. 

Q. 3. If evidence first proceeds from that which testifies, who, or what are 
they which testify 1 Art. 105. 

Q. 4. Explain what you mean by testimony. 106. 

Q. 5. Does testimony always amount to evidence 1 See examples under art. 
106 ; as example 4. 

Q. 6. On page 123, we read '* A killed B, according to the testimony of C ;" 
is the truth of that proposition proved by evidence ? 

Q, 7. What is evidence 1 107. 

Q. 8. Does the book written by Euclid on geometry contain evidence 1 1 07, 
note 1 . 

Q. 9. Is it evidence to those who never read it 1 107, note 1. 



ON EVIDENCE. 155 

Q. 10. Is there less of evidence in that book in consequence of its not being 
read by any one 1 107, note 1. 

Q. 11.* Does Paley's work on Natural Theology contain evidence relative 
to NATURAL iiEiiGioif ; and does it contain less evidence on account of its 
not being read by any one 1 

Q. 12.* Does the book, called the Bible, contain evidence relative to re- 
vealed RELiGioif ; and does it contain less evidence on account of its not 
being read by any one 1 

Q. 13. What may be said to be the faculties of perceiving evidence 1 108. 

Q. 14. By what faculty is it that you form an idea, or the evidence result- 
ing from one term 1 108. 

Q. 15. By what faculty do you perceive the evidence resulting from two 
terms? 108. 

Q. 16. By what faculty do you deduce the evidence resulting- from three 
terms? 108. 

Q. 17. Do apprehension, judgment, and reasoning express the three facul- 
ties by which we perceive evidence ] 108. 

Q. 18. What is assent? 109. 

Q. 19. What is conviction ? 1 10- 

Q. 20. State what are the consequences that should result from convic- 
tion] 111. 

Q. 21. How many kinds of evidence are there 1 113. 



CHAP. VII. 

On hituitive Evidence. 

(Art. 113.) Intuitive evidence is that which is sufficient 
to produce immediate conviction or certainty, without the 
necessity of reasoning. 

1. Intuitive evidence is of four kinds ; viz : 

1. That of sensation, or perception, 

2. That of consciousness, 

3. That of memory, 

4. That of axioms, or of self-evident truths. 

2. Intuitive evidence is that which we have of any truth, 

* These questions may be omitted to any, if such there can be, who have not 
read these books. 



156 ON INTUITIVE EVIDENCE* 

or fact, which appears at once, through sensation, perception, 
consciousness, memory, or axioms, so self-evident, that it can- 
not be made more clear, nor can require demonstration ; and 
its own light and clearness evinces the want of understand- 
ing in any one attempting to make plainer that which can- 
not be 7nade more plain. 

3. For example : " 1 see the sun ;" now how is the mathe- 
matician to demonstrate this, or how am I to demonstrate it 
mathematically, or by any species of reasoning whatever. If 
there be such a thing as truth, or truth can speak by me, I 
can express my conviction of that evidence, by a sentence of 
affirmation or negation, without any act of comparing or 
reasoning, or without any need of Euclid or Algebra. 

4. Yet mathematicians (so called,) exist, who say, that they 
will believe nothing they cannot demonstrate, as if the light- 
ning that glances now out of the corner of that cloud, cannot 
without demonstration, be allowed to exist, either in itself, or 
its image in my eye. Mathematicians, that talk in this, or 
in any similar way, however mathematically sane they may be^ 
are certainly, if not intellectually and morally 2W5a?2e, at least 
troubled with a monomania. 

5. " I will believe nothing," said a young sceptic riding with 
a gentleman in a coach in England, ^' that I cannot demon- 
strate." " Do I understand you rightly, sir," said his compa- 
nion, " that you will believe nothing that you cannot under- 
stand and demonstrate ?' "Yes." "Now, sir, will you tell 
me what is that V^ " A cow.^^ " What has it on its back ?" 
« Hair." " Of what color." " Red." " And what is that ?" 
"A sheep." "With what is it covered?" " Wool.'^ "Of 
what color ?" " White." " Do you believe so." " Yes.'' 
" But do you understand why that cow is covered with hair, 
and the sheep with wool ; or why the one is red and the other 
white ?" " No." " But did you not tell me that you would 
believe nothing that you could not understand ?" He was si- 
lent. 

6. All over the world is the truth of that scripture verified, 
it is *' THE FOOL," emphatically the fool, •* that hath said in 
his heart, there is no God ;" the fool that will not believe his 
own senses ; the fool that talks about demonstration, or the 
need of it, to make that plainer which cannot he made more 
plain ; or craving after dead Euclid to prove the living Bible 
or moral truth. If such a thing as the very quintessence of 
folly can exist, it certainly is in him who is emphatically this 

FOOL. 



Oiy INTUITIVE EVIDENCE. 157 

7. Some speak of intuitive evidence as if there necessarily 
existed in it a sort of comparison, or ^' a comparison of ideas." 
So said Hume. " All certainty," says he, " arises from the 
comparison of ideas, and from the discovery of such relations 
as are unalterable so long as the ideas continue the same ; but 
the only relations of this kind are resemblance, proportion 
in quantity and number, degrees of any quahty, and contra- 
riety J^ On which subject Dr. Beattie observes, ** there are, 
according to Mr. Hume, seven^ different kinds of relation, to 
wit, resemblance, identity, relations of time and place, joro- 
portion in quantity or number, degrees in any common quality, 
contrariety, and causation. And by the word relation, he 
here means that particular circumstance in which we may 
think proper to compare ideas." 

8. It is to be regretted that any more modern writer should 
have copied any thing from this into his view of intuitive evi- 
dence. We read in a work on logic recently printed in this 
country, as follows : " The relation between these objects is 
sometimes discovered by barely contemplating them with- 
out reference to any thing else; and sometimes by com- 
paring them with other objects, to which they have a known 
relation. The former is simple comparison ; the latter is an 
act of reasoning." Now, according to this, the " barely con- 
templating objects without reference to any thing else," is 
comparison. Again, "that which determines the mind in 
simple comparison, is called intuitive evidence.^^ Now here 
we are not told that any thing else is intuitive evidence, but 
what determines the mind in simple comparison ; yet barely 
contemplating objects is intuitive evidence : that is, 

All intuitive evidence is simple comparison. 

Bare contemplation is intuitive evidence ; therefore, 
Bare contemplation is simple comparison. 

This conclusion must certainly follow, provided that the pre- 
mises are correct. The major proposition, however, requires 
examination, for if it can be proved that all intuitive evi- 
dence is simple comparison, and something more or different 
from simple comparison, it is of the same character with the 
false proposition, 

" All animals are birds," 

And, therefore, it cannot, from a false premiss, follow that 
bare contemplation is comparison. 

* Therefore Hume, in this, is not consistent, speaking of only four relation- 
ships in one place, and of seven in another. 

O 



158 ON INTUITIVE EVIDENCE. 

9. Dr. Beattie, refering to the affirmation of Hume, that 
" all certainty arises from a comparison of ideas," says, " I 
cannot admit that all certainty arises from a comparison of 
ideas. I am certain of the existence of myself, and of the 
other things that affect my senses: I am certain, that * what- 
ever is, is ;' and yet I cannot conceive that any comparison 
of ideas is necessary to produce these convictions in my mind. 
Perhaps I cannot speak of them without using words expres- 
sive of relation ; but the simple act or perception of the under- 
standing by which I am conscious of them, implies not any 
comparison that I can discover. If it did, then the simplest 
intuitive truth requires proof, or illustration, at least, before it 
can be acknowledged as truth by the mind; which I presume 
will not be found warranted by experience. Whether others 
are conscious of making such a comparison, before they yield 
assent to the simplest intuitive truth, I know not ; but this I 
know, that my mind is often conscious of certainty, where no 
such comparison has been made by me. I acknowledge, in- 
deed, that no certain truth can become an object of science, 
till it be expressed in words ; that, if expressed in words, it 
must assume the form of a proposition, being either affirmative 
or negative, and imply a comparison of the thing or subject 
with that quality or circumstance which is affirmed or denied 
to belong to, or agree with it : and, therefore, I acknowledge 
that in science all certainty may be said to arise from a com- 
parison of ideas. But the generality of mankind believe many 
things as certain, which they never thought of expressing in 
words. An ordinary man believes, that himself, his family, 
his horse, and cattle exist ; but in order to produce this belief 
in his mind, is it necessary that he compare those objects 
with the general idea of existence, or non-existence, so as to 
discern their agreement with the one, or disagreement with 
the other ? I cannot think it ; at least, if he has ever made 
such a comparison, it must have been without his knowledge ; 
for I am convinced that, if we were to ask him the question, 
he would not understand us. I apprehend that our author 
has not enumerated all the relations which, when discovered, 
give rise to certainty. I am certain that I am the same per- 
son to-day, I was yesterday. This, indeed, our author (Hume) 
denies. I cannot help it ; I am certain, notwithstanding ; and 
I flatter myself there are not many persons in the world who 
would think this sentiment of mine a paradox. I say, then, 
I am certain, that I am the same person to-day I was yester- 
day. Now the relation expressed in this proposition is not 



ON INTUITIVE EVIDENCE. 159 

resemblance, nor proportion in quantity and number ; nor de- 
grees of any common quality ; nor contrariety ; it is a rela- 
tion different from all these ; it is identity or sameness." (But 
where, it may be added, is comparison here 1 How can a 
thing or being be compared with itself? The same thing 
with the same thing ?) " That London is contiguous to the 
Thames, is a proposition which many of the most sensible peo- 
ple in Europe hold to be certainly true ; and yet the relation 
expressed in it is none of these four, which our author sup- 
poses to be the sole proprietors of certainty, ^^ 

10. Should I, by intuitive evidence, be conscious of my own 
existence, and express that consciousness, by the proposition 
"1 exist y^^ or "/am existent, ^^ it is to be acknowledged that 
this consciousness, when expressed, affords two terms, or two 
ideas, viz : " I" and " existent. " But do I proceed to obtain an 
adequate idea of each of these terms respectively, and then 
to institute a comparison, or discover some relationship be- 
tween them, before I affirm, "I exist?" Certainly not, the 
conviction is instantaneous, without time for, or need of, any 
other act. It is pure mental affirmation, and nothing more. No- 
thing exceeds in motion the celerity of light, and^nothing is 
conveyed more rapidly than intuitive truth. When either of 
them comes there is no need of going to Euclid, to compari- 
sons, or to Hume's seven different relationships. The captain 
in the cabin of a ship at sea, desirous of taking a lunar ob- 
servation, says to his mate, " go on deck, and tell me if you 
seethe moon." The mate, as soon as he gets on deck, ex- 
claims, " I see the moon." The captain, somewhat sceptical, 
must have previous demonstration that his mate saw the moon, 
and, therefore, instead of taking up his quadrant to take the 
observation, calls his mate down for previous examination. 
"Now tell me," says he, "if you are a man of sincerity, the 
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth ; I want to 
know the whole, not a part, of what you perceived, or were 
conscious of, when you said, */ see the moon^ together with all 
your thoughts, whether of comparison or relationship at the 
same time ?" The mate can only reply, by saying, " I told you 
the whole, when I said, * I see the moon.' " But were you 
conscious of nothing else, or did you compare or refer to all or 
to any of the seven relationships % whether of resemblance, 
identity, relation of time and place, proportion, degrees, con- 
trariety or causation, before you were convinced that you saw 
the moon?" We might suppose that this mate in common 
with every man of sense, would reply, *'I told you the whole 



160 OS INTUITIVE EVIDENCE. 

of what I in any way perceived, or of what I was conscious, 
when I said, I see the moon ; neither had I time to make any 
comparison, whether to compare myself to the moon^ or my 
faculty of sight to the moon, or to refer to any of the seven 
blue lights, you mention, taken out of Hume's dark lantern." 

11. When a man expresses to another, the whole, not a part 
of all and every thing that takes place in his mind, when in- 
tuitive evidence, as to any single object, is perceived by any of 
the faculties, that expression is a proposition of simple affir- 
ination or negation, without any comparison whatever. 
The proposition is neither interrogative nor imperative, but 
indicative, simply affirming or denying. It is as if truth itself 
then had a tongue, declaring in the simplest manner possible, 
*' it is" or " it is not ; *< I see" or "I see not," " I remember," or 
*'I remember not" — and that declaration expresses the whole, 
and every thing, act, or consciousness, simply connected with 
that truth, of which the testifier, at the time, was sensible ; 
and the only cases wherein intuitive evidence is concerned 
with comparison, is either in that afibrded by axioms referring 
to two ideas, or to two ideas where an axiom is not concerned. 
But the general nature expressed by intuitive, is intimated by 
this epithet, which is derived from the Latin verb, intueor, 
that signifies simply, to look at, an act more of contempla- 
tion than com,parison; therefore, it is not true that '^all 
intuitive evidence is simple comparison" 

(Art. 114.) The first kind of intuitive evidence, is the evi- 
dence of SENSATION. 

1. Fortunate is it for the welfare of man, and for that of 
the world at large, that few men exist, have existed, or ever 
will exist, but that believe the testimony of their own senses, 
or that of sensation. So far indeed from being not disposed to 
believe it, they are generally more inclined to trust to its tes- 
timony than to that of any other. The five senses, and the 
faculty of perceiving their testimony, have existed in the 
world now, for near six thousand years; had they all this 
time been deceivers and their testimony false, how many 
egregious blunders must have been the inevitable consequence ! 
It is strange in this case, that amongst the many myriads that 
have existed in this and every preceding age, that have either 
inhabited houses, cultivated farms, planted vineyards, watched 
their flocks, fought in battles, travelled by land, sailed by sea, 
or navigated the world around, that none have made the 
brilliant discoveries that it was the peculiar fortune of Berke- 



ON INTUITIVE EVIDENCE. 161 

ley and his compeers to do ; that the five senses a man has, 
and that all men have had, from the foundation of the world 
to the present time, have been in each, and in all cases, a 
conspiracy of five, in the noble and worthy system of lies 
and deception, practised now, without detection, except by 
Berkeley and a few more, for near six thousand years. And 
whether men are disposed to believe their senses now or not, 
may be easily tested. Let us go with all the dialect and 
suasive powers of Berkeley to that man parched with burning 
thirst, and going to quench it with that glass of cool water ; 
and say, " My dear sir, let that alone, for aught you know, or 
ever can know to the contrary, it is nothing but hydrogen 
gas, sulphuric acid, or part of the moon's atmosphere." If he 
will not believe, we have another chance of making a con- 
vert — it is of that man nearly famished with hunger. Now 
let us say when he is just sitting down, with eyes sparkling 
over that roast beef and plumb-pudding, " My dear fellow, 
let all that alone, put it away, it is nothing, for aught you 
know, but an alligator, or an Egyptian mummy, an ourang 
outang, or the tail of the sea serpent." Failing of success 
here, we repair to that avaricious old gentleman about to 
take up that silver dollar or golden eagle that glistens on the 
table, and say, " My good sir, take my advice, let that alone, 
for aught you know, or ever can know to the contrary, it is 
nothing but a red hot coal, a boiling kettle, a Chinese Man-, 
darin, or Munchausen himself." With how many men, 
placed in similar situations, out of as many as the Chinese 
empire contains, should we prevail ? 

(Art. 115.) The second kind of intuitive evidence is the 

evidence of consciousness. 

1. Nothing more suitable on this subject can be offered than 
what has been said by Dr. Beattie. " By attending to what 
passes in my mind, / knowy not only that it exists, but also 
that it exerts certain powers of action and perception ; which, 
on account either of a diversity in their objects, or of a dif- 
ference in their manner of operating, I consider as distinct 
faculties ;• and which I find it expedient to distinguish by dif- 
ferent names, that I may be able to speak of them so as to be 
understood." (see art. 108, note 1 and seq.) Thus I am con- 
scious that at one time I exert memory, at another time ima- 
gination : sometimes I believe, sometimes I doubt : the per- 
formance of certain actions, and the indulgence of cer- 
tain affections, arc attended with an agreeable feeling of a 

o3 



162 ON INTUITIVE EVIDENCE. 

peculiar kind which 1 call moral approbation ; different ac- 
tions and affections excite the opposite feeding, of moral 
disapprobation : to relieve distress, I feel to be meretorious 
and praiseworthy ; to pick a pocket, I know to be blameable, 
and worthy of punishment: I am conscious that some actions 
are in my power, and that others are not; and that when I 
neglect to do what I ought to do, and can do, I deserve to be 
punished ; of all these sentiments I am as conscious, and as 
certain, as of my own existence. / cannot prove that I feel 
them, neither to myself, nor others ; but that I do really feel 
them, is as evident to me as demonstration could make it. 
I cannot prove in regard to my moral feelings, that they are 
conformable to any extrinsic and eternal relations of things; 
but I know that my constitution necessaril)^ determines me to 
believe them just and genuine, even as it determines me to be- 
lieve that I myself exist, and that things are as my external 
senses represent them. An expert sophister might puzzle me 
with words, and propose difficulties I could not solve ; but he 
might as well attempt to convince me that I do not exist, as 
that I do not feel what I am conscious I do feel. And if he 
could induce me to suspect that I may be mistaken, what 
standard of truth could he propose to me, more evident, and 
of higher authority in these matters, than my own feelings? 
Shall I believe his testimony, and disbelieve my own sensa- , 
tions ? Shall I admit his reasons, because I cannot confute 
them, although common sense tells me they are false? Shall 
I suffer the ambiguities of artifical language to prevail against 
the clear, the intelligible, the irresistible voice of nature ?" 

2. "Let it not be thought, that these objects and faculties 
of internal sensation are things too evanescent to be attended 
to, or that their evidence is too weak to produce a steady and 
well-grounded conviction. They are more necessary to our 
happiness than even the objects of external sense ; yea, they 
are no less necessary to our existence. What can be of great- 
er consequence to man than his moral sentiments, his reason, 
his memory ? What more interesting, than to know, whether 
his notions of duty and of truth be the dictates of his nature, 
that is, the voice of God ? What is it to which a wise man 
will pay more attention, than to his reason and conscience, 
those divine monitors, whereby he is to judge even of religion 
itself? The generality of mankind, however, ignorant of the 
distinctions and explanations of their internal powers, do yet 
by their conduct declare, that they feel their influence, and 
acknowledge their authenticity. Every instance of their 



ON INTUITIVE EVIDENCE. 163 

being governed by a principle of moral obligation is a proof of 
this. They believe an action to be lawful in the sight of God, 
when they are conscious of a sentiment of lawfulness attend- 
ing the performance of it : they believe a certain mode of 
conduct to be incumbent on them in certain circumstances, be- 
cause a notion of duty arises in their mind, when they con- 
template that conduct in relation to those circumstances. ' I 
ought to be greatful for a favor received,' — why ? * because 
my conscience tells me so.' ' How do you know that you ought 
to do that of which your conscience enjoins the performance V 
^ lean give no further reason for it; but Ifeel, that such is my 
duty.' Here the investigation must stop, or, if carried a little 
further it must return to this point: "I know that I ought to 
do what my conscience enjoins, because God is the author of 
my constitution; and I obey his will, when I act according to 
the principles of my conscience. Why do you obey the will 
of God 1 Because it is my duty. How do you know that ? 
because my conscience tells me so," &c. Here, as Dr. Beattie 
observes, the investigation must stop, i. e. so far as natural reli- 
gion goes, without the higher evidence of revealed precept. 

(Art. 116.) The third kind of intuitive evidence, is the evi- 
dence of MEMORY. 

1. Suppose we had no memory, no such source of intuitive 
evidence as this, what would be the consequence ? Then all 
that I had done or seen, or experienced yesterday, or for 
months or years before, would be clean swept off the tablet of 
record, into the oblivious resjions of an everlasting Lethe. Nay, 
all that I had learned yesterday, or for months or years before, 
by intuitive or deductive evidence, by demonstration, by Eu- 
clid, or by Algebra, would be clean gone, no one knows whi- 
ther. I was composing a book last night, and had twenty ideas 
before me, but twelve o'clock struck, and I was compelled to 
go to bed, hoping that the said twenty ideas, which I thought 
I had well caged, would be forthcoming in the morning ; but 
how am I mistaken ! I have lost my memory. The twenty 
birds have flown: the cage is searched, but nothing is there! 
And with all my seeking, and care and sorrow, nothing is to 
be found ; I have all to do over again ; but the said twenty I 
shall never cage again ; and thus I must go on until another 
twelve o'clock comes, rising morning after morning a mere va- 
cant blank. 

2. Ah ! but memory lives I And its testimony, its serious 
testimony, is evidence, and needs no demonstration. Even a 



164 ON INTUITIVE EVIDENCE. 

child knows this. Tell that boy that was whipt yesterday, 
and remembers it yet, that he must not believe this, for me- 
mory is fallacious, and nothing is to be believed without de- 
monstration*. What would even the understanding of a child 
think of your sagacity ? Yes, memory lives ; and its testimo- 
ny is accredited, as it testifies to me, to you, to all. Without 
it laws would be useless ; testimony or witnesses before a court 
not to be had ; juries would have nothing to do ; and the senr 
tence of a judge a nonentity. 

3. If memory lives, it lives in conscience. And what 
does conscience say? Let conscience tell the tale, and 
that by memory's voice. What says the memory, the con- 
science of the man, that knowingly, designedly injured his 
neighbour, his property, his wife, his daughter, his servant, or 
any thing that was his? and is aware that the circum- 
stances of the injured man have been declining ever since, and 
he in consequence fast sinking into poverty ? Ah ! but what 
says the evidence of meinory in him, who pursued with " mur- 
d'rous thought,"him, once his friend, to that secret place where 
he thought no eye saw ! Reviembers he not, how his victim, 
when in his power, first begged for life, were it only for his 
wife and family's sake ? Does he not remember by whose 
hand it was by which first the fatal blow was struck ? Do not 
his very ears yet hear his piercing cry ; his eyes yet see his 
quivering limbs, his death's last struggle ? Staid he not by the 
corpse disfigured with crimson streams till the glass of death 
glazed its eyes; till he who was in health and peace an hour 
ago " was minish'd from the sons of men ?" Has he not since 
and many a day after passed the cottage of the widow, and 
seen her sinking into poverty and despair ? Heard he not 
the children's cry, " My father, my father, would to God that 
I had died in thy stead !" What then is m^emory in that man 
in whom its evidence is as a burning fire, and is aware that 
he must feel its quenchless agony for ever ; so long as his own 
identity shall last? Needs he demonstration when that is for 
ever too late ? Talk to him about it, and the voice of intui- 
tive evidence within him, louder than thunder, would laugh 
your impertinence to scorn. 

" O treach'rous conscience ! while she seems to sleep 
On rose and myrtle, lull'd with syren song, 
While she seems nodding o'er her chaige to drop, 
On headlong appetite the slacken'd rein, 
And give us up to license, unrecall'd, 
Unmark'd, see from behind her secret stand, 
The sly informer minutes every fault ; 



ON INTUITIVE EVIDENCE. 165 

And her dread diary with horror fills. 

Not the gross act alone employs her pen ; 

She reconnoitres Fancy's airy band, 

A watchful foe I the formidable spy 

List'ning, o'erhears the whispers of our camp, 

And steals our embryos of iniquity. 

Thus with indulgence most severe, she treats 

Us spendthrifts of inestimable time ; 

Unnoted ; notes each moment misapplied ; 

On leaves more durable than brass, 

Writes our whole history, which Death shall read 

In ev'ry pale delinquent's private ear. — Young. 

(Art. 117.) The fourth kind of intuitive evidence, is that of 

AXIOMS or SELF-EVIDENT TRUTHS. 

1. An axiom is a sentence expressing a self-evident truth* 
Though an axiom is, in itself, a self-evident truth, yet even 
this, self-evident as it is, may not be such until the terms 
which compose it are understood ; but when they are, their 
agreement is so plain, that not only the conviction of the truth 
they express, is, in every rational mind, inevitable, but also so . 
clear, that any attempt at demonstration, were it possible, 
would be unnecessary ; for this attempt itself refers to the 
axiom, "It is impossible to make plainer, that which cannot 
be made more plain^^ 

2. In this sense, an axiom is analogous to what we have said 
of evidence. An axiom or evidence may be an axiom or evi- 
dence to A, B, and C ; why? because they are able and willing 
to understand it ; but not to D, because either he does not 
understand the terms, and therefore cannot perceive the 
agreement, or his faculties have not been in healthy and 
efficient exercise to enable him to comprehend either terms, 
their agreement, or any thing about it. But that is no reason 
that it should not be an axiom or evidence. It will remain 
unchangeably and eternally what it is, an axiom or evidence, 
notwithstanding D's unbelief or want of comprehension to 
understand the terms. For these are the glorious and corre- 
lative attributes of truth. For what is truth now, ever 
has, and ever will be, immutably, eternally truth, not- 
withstanding all the fogs of ignorance, the mists of unbelief, 
the clouds of scepticism, and the miasma of dissipation, to the 
contrary. 

3. Though the terms of an axiom may sometimes require 
explanation, yet their agreement requires no proof, for as this 
is intuitively evident, it admits no medium more clear or 
certain than itself. If it admit of proof clearer than itself, let 



166 ON INTUITIVE EVIDENCE. 

US try, and take for trial, the following axiom, *' the whole 
(W) is equal to all its parts," (A, B, C. ) 

AH the parts are equal to W, 

A, B, C, are all the parts, 
A, B, C, are equal to W. 

Of course this is a proof of a proof, and another proof be- 
sides, that it is impossible to make plainer that which can- 
not be made more plain. The folly of attempting any such 
thing was known as far back, at least, as Aristotle, yet that 
honest heathen, Aristotle, ignorantly as he has been censured 
by those that never understood him, had not only more honesty 
but more sense, than many of the modern apes of what they 
call, forsooth, philosophy. 

4. Some have had the hope that the happy day would come 
when axioms could be made more plain, and that all and 
everyone of them might be reduced to identical propositions! 
Now, what are identical propositions? They are such as 
these; " sugar is sugar *^ ''salt is salt,^^ *^ the same thing is 
the sam>e thing^^ Blessed philosophy this! The sceptics 
millenium of identical propositions I So then we must wait 
before we admit one particle of truth, until so much sunshine 
shall come as to enable us to make the grand discovery, that 
the same thing is the same thing ! ! But still even this would 
not be sufficient, for the glory of the Pyrrhonists was, that 
only one thing was certain ! What was that 1 " That every 
proposition, axiom or identical, was uncertain^^ consequently, 
with them only one thing was certain, which was, that it was 
uncertain, that A was A, or B was B. But they contradicted 
the declaration by their own practice, since they would neither 
run into fire nor water, though they professed ignorance that 
the one would burn, and the other would drown them. 

5. " We are convinced by a demonstration," says Dr. Beat- 
tie, '^because our constitution is such that we must be con- 
vinced by it, and we believe a self-evident axiom, (for the 
same reason) because our constitution is such that we must 
believe it. You ask, why I believe what is self-evident ? I 
may as well ask why you believe what is demonstrated ? Nei- 
ther question admits of an answer ; or rather, to both ques- 
tions the answer is the same, namely, because I must believe 
it." See Beattie, part 1, chap. 2. An axiom, therefore, is a 
complete proof as well as a demonstration ; and to attempt to 
demonstrate an axiom, or to prove a proof, is as ridiculous as 
to wait to see a second sun rise to enable us to see if the first 



ON INTUITIVE EVIDENCE. 167 

shines in the heavens ; or to call the maid to bring the second 
candle to help you to see if the first is shining on your table. 
But this is the depth of foolery into which mathematical scep- 
ticism has already sunk, in talking about proving moral, or all 
truth, by mathematical demonstration ; the light of a candle to 
see if the sun is shining P' 

6. In the mind's contemplation of an axiom there is some- 
thing analogous to the properties of the eye. Though, of a 
landscape, the eye can take in, more or less distinctly, a large 
extent, yet there is only one point, that the eye sees distinct- 
ly at the same time. Standing on the top of a hill, my friend 
says, ** are those two creatures in that distant field, the sanye 
kind of animal ?' I look at the one, and then at the other, 
and find them to be different. Now here are two objects, 
and two movements of the eye. So in an axiom there are 
two ideas, with which the mind acts to produce assent or dis- 
sent. This is comparison ; and the evidence of axioms is a case 
wherein, in intuitive evidence, comparison is necessary. The 
intuitive evidence of sensation, consciousness and memory, and 
the whole of every mental act and thing felt or implied there- 
in, may be fully expressed by a proposition of simple affirma- 
tion or negation ; as, I see, I am conscious that I know or re- 
member A ; or I do not see, am not conscious that I know or 
remember A. But the evidence of axioms implies two ideas 
and comparison, as in 

1 2 

The whole is equal to the sum of all its parts. 

1 2 

rvA-^ f. ^ ^ 

The whole is greater than any of its parts. 

1 2 



r ' % 

iN'on-existence agrees not with existence of the same thing at the same time. 



INTERROGATORY EXAMINATION, 

ON 

Chap. VII. 

Q. 1. What is intuitive evidence 1 Art. 113. 

Q. 2. How many kinds of intuitive evidence are there 1 113. I, 



168 ON INTUITIVE EVIDENCE. 

Q. 3. What do you mean by the evidence of sensation 1 1 14. 

Q. 4. What may be understood by the evidence of consciousness ? 115. 

Q. 5. Is the evidence of memory one of the kinds of intuitive evidence ? 1 16. 

Q. 6. Explain the evidence of axioms. 117. 

Q. 7. What is an axiom 7 117. L 

Q. 8. Can an axiom be made plainer than it is, or demonstrated 1 117. 3. 



CHAP. VIII. 
Deductive Evidence. 

(Art. 118.) Deductive Evidence is that which is express- 
ed in a conclusion correctly deduced from premises known or 
admitted to be true. 

1. We have already observed that evidence may be ex- 
pressed by an affirmative or negative proposition ; but before 
we pronounce that proposition, we have evidence, without which 
propositions are useless. A single proposition may be the ex- 
pression of either intuitive or deductive evidence. If the latter, 
it is deduced from others preceding it ; and in this sense a de- 
ductive proposition, which is a conclusion, might be considered 
to be rather the property of syllogism : but as a syllogism ex- 
ists not without the materials which compose it, and single pro- 
positions are those materials, we shall not defer seeking after 
the materials until after the house is built 

2. Deductive evidence, reasoning or demonstration, is found- 
ed on intuitive evidence. Reasoning, by which deductive evi- 
dence is obtained, begins with two ideas expressed by an intui- 
tive proposition, or by one previously established or demonstrat- 
ed, which were originally intuitive, until we obtain the third 
Almost all the propositions of science, most of those of the arts 
and of business, and those propositions by which the mind re- 
ceives conviction, by the exercise of its faculties, are of this 



3. It is affirmed to me that the monument A is higher than 
the monument B. I doubt this ; I have seen them both, i. e. 
I have had intuitive evidence that they both exist, but I have 
not intuitive evidence that the altitude of the one is greater 



ON DEDUCTIVE EVIDENCE. 169 

than that of the other, or that they both are equal. The one 
is ten miles from the other, and I cannot carry the monument 
A to the monument B, to compare the two ideas, which their 
juxta-posltion would afford. In this difficulty, I remember 
the axiom, " Things equal to the same third thing are equal 
to one another." I therefore take this '^ third thing," the 
measure C, or make it precisely equal to the height of B. I 
then take the "third thing," C, to A ; and find C and A per- 
fectly equal ; consequently, I can reason or say, 

C is equal to A, 

Bis equal to C ; therefore 

B is equal to A. 

This is deductive evidence ; or evidence deduced from three 
intuitive acts, viz: 1. Things equal to the same third thing 
are equal to one another. 2d. The intuitive conviction that 
A is equal to the third thing C ; 3d. The intuitive conviction 
that B is equal to the same third, or C ; therefore the deduc- 
tive evidence is that B is equal to A. 

4. Deductive evidence involves a field as unlimited as the 
subjects which can be comprehended by the understanding. A 
conclusion derived by it forms a premiss, a second may be ob- 
tained the same way, or from an axiom of intuitive evidence ; 
these two may constitute the premises of another act of 
reasoning, giving another conclusion of deductive evidence, 
and thus the process may be continued, on indubitable pre- 
mises, through a series of indefinite extent, filling a volume, 
as Paley's Evidences of Christianity, or composing a whole 
treatise on science. Thus let it be granted to me that '^ all 
thinking beings are spirits;" that "spirits have not the pro- 
perties of matter, as extension ;" here are two postulata grant- 
ed. I may from these two derive Jive conclusions of deductive 
evidence; thus, 

1. 

All thinking beings are spirits. 

The mind is a thinking being ; therefore 
The mind is a spirit, 

^ 2. 
Spirits have no extension. 

The mind is a spirit ; therefore 
The mind has no extension. 



170 



ON DEDUCTIVE EVIDENCE. 
3. 



Things having no extension are indivisible. 

The mind has no extension ; therefore 
The mind is indivisible. 

Thmgs indivisible are indissoluble. 



The mind is indivisible; therefore 
The mind is indissoluble. 

Things indissoluble are immortal. 



The mind is indissoluble ; therefore 

The mind is immortal. 

The mind is immortal, or shall exist for ever ! 



5. Thus the process by which an ultimate conclusion of de- 
ductive evidence is obtained, may sometimes involve an ex- 
tensive series, or several acts of reasoning. The w^hole of this 
may sometimes rapidly pass in the mind from one conclusion 
to another, without the necessity, on every occasion, of formally 
stating every premiss. Nevertheless, when legitimately con- 
ducted, the ultimate conclusion will be correct. A gentleman 
in Yorkshire was disposed to doubt of the existence of his own 
soul, simply because he could not see it. In the course of 
his evening's walk, he came to the lock of a canal, and stood 
to contemplate the gate by which it was enclosed, and with- 
stood the pressure of a considerable mass of water. He 
viewed the machinery by which the two parts of the ponder- 
ous gate were opened or shut ; the peculiar position of these 
parts when closed, not at right angles with the direction of the 
canal, but at an angle or position towards the point of pres- 
sure, such that the greater the pressure the more firmly were 
they closed. He inquired who had done this? Mr. L. the en- 
gineer. But who is Mr. L.? is he body? But body cannot 
study mechanics, hydraulics, or hydrostatics. And here is a 
VISIBLE proof that whatever has done this must have under- 
stood the principles which these sciences involve. These 
gates which / see are an expression of science, and body can- 
not study science ; and if not body, it must be mind ; but 
where is that mind ? I do not see Mr. L. or his mind here ; 
nevertheless he has left here a proof of the existence of mind ; 
that proof 1 can see, feel, and even hear the roaring, the dash- 
ing of water against the gates, which, notwithstanding, during 
every hour of the day and night, they withstand. Mr. L. is 
therefore mind, though neither Mr. L. nor his mind can I now 



ON DEDUCTIVE EVIDENCE. 171 

see. But let me continue this thought. What was that statue 
I saw in the cathedral last week 1 Was it not the expression 
of mind? What but mind, something that understood the 
form, the figure of a man, the position of the muscles accord- 
ing to the attitude assumed, could have produced it ? What 
produced that painting, which is acknowledged to be the 
chef-d'oeuvre of the art? Was it merely the hand of the 
painter, the pencil or the paint ? That is only body, and bo- 
dies are common to all men ; but not one man in a thousand, 
nor all the bodies in the world could produce this, any more 
than all the bodies in the world could make a watch. Thus 
that mansion, exhibiting such architectural design, such ele- 
gancy of taste, every accommodation and convenience, in 
situation or arrangement, suited to foresee?! wants or plea- 
sures, is an expression of mind. If so, then all that I see in the 
city or the town, its buildings, churches, mansions, cathedrals, 
temples, are the proceeds of art, and art is the production of 
mind, of previous thought and design. And though that mind 
is not seen here or there, yet here are they which testify by 
visible, audible and tangible testimony that mind exists in 
them, in me, in all capable of thought or design. I overcome 
my doubt, and perceive that ultimately truth and victory 
will be SYNONYMOUS terms, and all that oppose it will sink into 
everlasting contempt. I now write down the sum deduced 
from my evening reflections in this short compass. 

Whatever designs is mind. 



I design ; therefore, 
I am mind. 



6. By a similar process, we may obtain the deductive evi^ 
dence, the synopsis of which is expressed in the following short 
compass. 

Vl^hat acts necessarily is not an agent, but an instrument controlled by another. 

Necessity acts necessarily ; therefore 

Necessity is not an agent, but an instrument controlled by another. 



Whatever acts from another necessitating it to act, implies something antece- 



dent to itself. 
Necessity acts from another necessitating it to act ; therefore 
Necessity implies something antecedent to itself. 

Whatever acts by regular and consistent laws, implies an intelligent agent 

enacting those laws. 
Nature acts by regular and consistent laws ; therefore 
Nature implies an intelligent agent enacting those laws. 



1'72 ON DEDUCTIVE EVIDENCE. 

That which never formed an orga nized being, never was a creator. 
Chemical affinity never formed an organized being ; therefore 
Chemical affinity never was a creator. 

Whatever never produced one new plant or animal, never was a creator. 

Perpetual appetency* never produced one new plant or animal ; therefore 
Perpetual appetency never was a creator. 

An hypothesis countenanced by no known facts in nature, has no claims to 

rationality. 
Atheism is countenanced by no known facts in nature ; therefore 
Atheism has no claims to rationality. 

All things that are now what they always have been, deny the existence of 

casual formations. 
Men, animals and plants are now what they always have been ; therefore 
Men, animals and plants deny the existence of casual formation. 

Whatever cannot show an example of the first rudiments of organization, or 



spontaneous generation, cannot disprove the pre-existenee of an intelli- 
gent first cause. 

Atheism cannot show an example of the first rudiments of organization, or 
spontaneous generation ; therefore 

Atheism cannot disprove the pre-existence of an intelligent first cause. 

That an unthinking, undesigning being should produce intelligent and design- 



ing beings, is an absurdity. 



Chance is an unthinking, undesigning being ; therefore that 

Chance should produce intelligent and designing beings is an absurdity. 

What cannot produce that which requires less energy, never could produce 

what requires greater. 
Chance never built a cottage, which requires less energy ; therefore 
Chance never could produce (the world) what requires greater energy. 



What could not draw a portrait, never could make a man. 



Chance never could draw a portrait ; therefore 
Chance never could make a man. 



- * By this, the atheist means what he calls " the eternal effort," comprising 
the following three absurdities, viz. 1, the power of nothing to create some- 
thing- ; 2, of an imperfect thing to create a perfect thing ; 3, of a senseless 
thing an intelligent thing. 



ON DEDUCTIVE EVIDENCE. 173 

The structure of achromatic telescopes proves the pre-existent knowledge of the 

laws of light, in the inventor. 
The structure of the eye is the structure of an achromatic telescope ; therefore 
The structure of the eye proves the pre-existent knowledge of the laws of light 

in the inventor : (i. e. God.) 

Whatever combines inimitable complication of machinery, could not, in millions 

of ages, have been produced by any fortuitous combinations of 
matter, but must have had a designing cause. 
The eye combines inimitable complication of machinery ; therefore 
The eye could not, in millions of ages, have been produced by any fortuitous 
combination of matter, but must have had a designing cause. 

(Art. 119.) Deductive Evidence is of two kinds, Mathe- 
matical and MORAL. 

(Art. 120.) Mathematical Evidence is that which is de- 
duced from axioms or self-evident truths relative to number 
or quantity. ' 

1. Mathematical evidence is of two kinds, intuitive and 
deductive. Mathematical Evidence is intuitive, as in the case 
of axioms, (see Art. 117,) when from the YHTy nature of the 
ideas they contain, it appears, at first view, that they must 
necessarily agree or disagree. Mathematical evidence is 
deductive, when the conclusions established are deduced from 
axioms, from postulata, (or truth, generally as clear as axioms, 
the granting of which is demanded,) or from some other con- 
clusion or conclusions, previously demonstrated and admitted 
to be true. This species of mathematical evidence again is 
divisible into two kinds, the direct and the indirect. When 
a conclusion is infered from principles which render it neces- 
sarily true, the demonstration is direct. When by supposing 
a given proposition false, we are necessarily led into an absur- 
dity, its contradictory is infered to be true, which is called in- 
direct. 

2. " All mathematical proof is founded on axioms or propo- 
sitions, the co?itraries of which are inconceivable. And this 
sort of proof seems to be peculiar to the sciences that treat of 
quantity and number ; and therefore, in no other science is 
the mathematical method of proof to be expected. For, in 
the other sciences, in most of them at least, truth and its 
contrary are equally conceivable.^'' So says Mr. Andrews ; 
does he mean, that in every case, that which is contrary to 

p2 



174 ON DEDUCTIVE EVIDENCE. 

truth is conceivable to be true 7 We know that an eye may 
be so diseased that a man may fancy that the grass is yellow, 
that a horse is green, or that a tall thistle nodding by moon- 
light, is a ghost : such an eye requires the oculist. Mr. An- 
drews proceeds to say, "that Julius Caesar died a natural 
death is easy to be conceived." Maniacs, certainly, believe 
many strange things, as well as the man that believed he was 
made of glass. But whoever was determined to disbelieve 
that testimony to which the world assents that Caesar died by 
assassination in the Senate House. Ifcannot be proved mathe- 
matically it is true, and it would be ridiculous to attempt it ; 
yet, for reasons no better than this some talk as if there was a 
superiority in mathematical reasoning. There is certainty in 
it, it is true ; but is there certainty in nothing else ? *' We 
may conceive," says he, " that the sun, after setting to-night 
will nev^er appear again, or that any particular man will never 
die," (as Paracelsus did ;) " and yet we consider death as what 
must inevitably happen to every man, and the rising of the 
sun to-morrow so certain, that no rational being can doubt of 
it. Though therefore the mathematical method of proof is to 
be found in the mathematical sciences only, yet satisfactory 
proof may be found in any other science : and is actually 
found in every part of knowledge that deserves the name of 
science." 

3. Mathematical reasoning is " a successive comparison of 
every pair of ideas, from the first to the last, or from the idea 
w^hich forms the subject of the proposition to the predicate ; 
and in demonstration every comparison is intuitively certain. 
When these ideas are found to agree the demonstration is 
finished. 

For example, in the 47th proposition (a conclusion,) of the first book of 
Euclid, the truth to be established is, that in a right angled triangle, the 
square of the side opposite to the right angle is equal in quantity to the sum 
of the squares of the other txuo sides. The square opposite to the right angle 
is the subject, the sum of the two other squares is the predicate, and the idea 
of the extent of the first square is to be compared with the idea of the sum of 
the other two squares. 

Argument I. The first step is to prove that G A C* is one straight line, and 
H A B another, in order to lay a foundation for demonstrating that the triangle 
F B C is equal to half the square F A, and the triangle A B D equal to half 
the parallelogram B L. 

II . The next step is to prove the triangle A B 1) equal to the triangle 
F BC. 

III. The third step is to prove the triangle A B D equal to half the parallel- 
ogram B L and the triangle F B C equal to half the square F A, and hence to 
infer the equality of the square F A to the parallelogram B L. 

* See the figure in Euclid's Elements. . 



ON DEDUCTIVE EVIDENCE. 175 

IV. Three similar steps are necessary to find the square A K equal to the 
parallelogram C L : and hence to infer the equality of the whole square B E, 
to the two squares F A and A K, which establishes the agreement of ihe sub- 
ject and predicate of the proposition." 

In this process there are no less than six capital steps, each including subor- 
dinate steps, or twelve subordinate steps in all, which with the former are equal 
to eighteen intermediate ideas. 

(Art. 121.) Moral evidence is that which is deduced from 
axioms or self-evident truths, and conclusions established on 
correct premises relative to facts and conduct. 

1. Moral evidence in the whole extent in which some take 
it, has been made to include probable testimon)^; that is, the 
day has been made to be the night, or the night the day. 

2. The valuable remarks of Dr. Beattie on this subject, 
claim attention. *' That my body exists, and is endued with 
a thinking, active and permanent principle, which I call the 
soul ; — that the material world hath an existence ; — that the 
men, beasts, houses, and mountains, we see and feel around 
us, are not imaginary, but real and material beings, and such 
in respect of shape and tangible magnitude, as they appear 
to our senses ; I am not only conscious that I believe, but also 
certain, that such is the nature of these things ; and that thus 
far at least, in regard to the nature of these things, an omnis- 
cient and infallible being cannot think me mistaken. Of these 
truths I am so certain, that I scruple not to pronounce every 
being in an error who is of a contrary sentiment concerning 
them. For suppose an intelligent creature, an angel for in- 
stance, to believe that there are not in the universe any such 
things as this solar system, this earth, these mountains, houses, 
animals, this being whom I call myself; could I, by any effort, 
bring myself to believe that his opinion is a true one '\ It is 
impossible and inconceivable. My understanding intimates, 
that such an opinion would as certainly be false, as that two 
and two are equal to ten, or that things equal to one and the same 
third are unequal to one another. So long as this solar sys- 
tem remains unannihilated, and my intellect undepraved, 
there is not a geometrical axiom more true, or more evi- 
dent to me, than that this solar system, and all the objects 
above mentioned, do exist ; there is not a geometrical axi- 
om that has any better title to be accounted a principle of 
huw^an knowledge ; there is not a geometrical axiom 
against which it is more absurd, more unreasonable^ more 
unphilosophical, to argue. 



176 ON DEDUCTIVE EVIDENCE. 

3. ^' That snow is white, fire hot, gold yellow, and sugar 
sweet," (how are these to be mathematically demonstrated?) 
*' we believe to be certainly true. These bodies affect our 
eyes, touch, and palate, in a peculiar manner; and we have 
no reason to think that they affect the organs of different 
men in a different way ; on the contrary, we believe with full 
assurance, founded on sufficient reason, that they affect the 
senses of all men in the same manner. 

4. " Of moral truth, we cannot bring ourselves to think 
that the Deity's notions (pardon the expression) are contrary 
to ours. If we believe him omniscient and infallible, can we 
also believe that, in his sight, cruelty, injustice, and ingrati- 
tude, are worthy of reward and praise, and the opposite vir- 
tues of blame and punishment ? It is absolutely impossible. 
The one belief destroys the other. Common sense declares 
that a being possessed of perfect knowledge can no more en- 
tertain such a sentiment, than I, with my eyes open, can just 
now avoid seeing the light. If a created being were to think 
that virtue which we think vice, and that vice which we 
think virtue, what would be our notions of his intelligence ? 
Should we not, without hesitation, pronounce him irrational, 
and his opinion an absurdity ? That any being should think 
in this manner, and yet not think wrong, is to us as perfectly 
inconceivable as that the same thing should, at the same time, 
be both true and false. 

5. " Those who will not allow any truth to be self-evident, 
except what has all the characteristics of a geometrical axiom, 
are much mistaken. It would be easy to reduce intuitive 
certainties into classes, but this is not necessary on the present 
occasion. We are here treating of the nature and immuta- 
bility of truth, as perceived by human faculties. Whatever 
intuitive proposition man, by the law of his nature, must be- 
lieve as certain, or as probable, is, in regard to him, certain 
or probable truth; and must constitute a part of human 
knowledge, and remain unalterably the same, as long as the 
human constitution remains unaltered. And we must often 
repeat, that he who attempts to disprove such intuitive truth, 
or to make men sceptical in regard to it, atts a part as in- 
consistent with sound reasoning, and as effectually subversive 
of human knowledge, as if he attempted to disprove truths 
which he knew to be agreeable to the eternal and necessary 
relations of things." 

6. Thus thought Dr. Beattie, and so thinks every man 
whose mind is not fractional, but, at least, a.n integral qua-n- 



ON DEDUCTIVE EVIDENCE. 177 

titj. Some, however, give the precedency to mathematical 
demonstration ; but that is, for no better reason than some 
such as the following. Mr. X plus Y says, " I intend to in- 
struct my son in the principles of mathematics, mechanics, 
&c. ; but as he is only eight years of age, and, of course, a 
little boi/, and cannot, therefore, form adequate ideas af ab- 
stract quantities, I shall supply him with visible, tangible 
symbols of ^e«/ squares, triangles, circles, solid cubes, cylin- 
ders, cones and their sections ; now these he can see, feel, by 
bodily sense, whether his mind be integral or not ; he can 
turn them over, place and arrange them in every visible, tan- 
gible way, for he is but a boy^ Very well, let all boys, 
then, whether of eight or ^//y years of age, begin with things, 
which if not visible and tangible, at least refer to things which 
are visible and tangible, and continue to imagine that 
all moral truth is beyond their comprehension, merely because 
it is not visible and tangible ; and that, therefore, they can 
form no ideas of virtue, vice, justice, cruelty, mercy, nor of 
any relations betw^een them, nor appreciate Him, who is the 
unclouded sun of eternal truth. Pulmonary consumptions are 
serious enough, but for the mind to wane into such a narrow 
contracted state as this, implies a condition of mental 
wretchedness extremely unenviable. Owls, however, natu- 
rally shun the light, but of unfeathered owls, as yet, we have 
met with no adequate definition. 

7. Men exist, even in this city, if beings with the under- 
standing of men they can be, who talk about the necessity of 
proving every thing mathematically, before it can be admitted 
to be truth ! Had such mathematicians been born, as many 
are, in mines, where no sun is to be seen, how by mathemati- 
cal demonstration, could they have proved either the existence 
or nature of light, its divisibility into the prismatic colors^ 
or its properties, of reflection, refraction, or polarization ? 
yet they know that these are facts or existing laws and 
properties, without the aid either of them or their de- 
monstrations. Do these things either not exist, or is no man 
authorized to believe them without the warrant of these gen- 
tlemen of the itaque, ergo, and idcirco genus 1 

8. Now is there no such light as moral light ; or is that 
which is called moral truth, some imaginary thing, without 
either hght or heat ? Is there no intellectual sun that can 
shine on minds not as wilfully blind as theirs, without the need 
of their demonstrations, their EucHd, their algebra ; or need 
we their *^ Pons asinorum,^^ their " ass^s bridge," to get over 
all difficulties, in order to see such light ? Is that moral truth 



178 , ON DEDUCTIVE EVIDENCE. 

either not allowed to exist, or must he that sees its light, and 
feels its warmth and energy, wait until some demonstration 
can be hit upon to make all plain? Shall the blind teach 
those that have sight ; the cfea/ those ih'di can hear ; the 
callous stone those that can feel? Shall Euclid, Simpson, 
Euler, Emmerson, Bernoulli, dead men all, cooled down to 
we know not how many degrees below Zero, teach us that 
there is neither moral light or felicity ? Can it be that such 
small-eyed gentlemen exist that expect that the advocates of 
moral truth are to wait until the dead can teach the living ? 
If there be such a thing as truth, and living truth too, a sun 
that wants no candle, cannot that which is essentially truth 
declare more concerning itself than ever blind guides can do? 
9. By the generality of writers, probable evidence is made 
co-extensive with moral evidence ; that is, in their view, " all 
moral evidence is probable evidence !"* And by way of apolo- 
gy they tell us, that the word probable is ambiguous, having a 
philosophic as well as a common acceptation ; in the former 
implying every thing not mathematical. But what kind of 
consolation is this to the reader who never heard of this dis- 
tinction, and by the word probable understands any thing con- 
tingent or not certain, especially when in addition to all this, 
he is told that there is no certainty^ but what will submit to 
the test of mathematical demonstration, that all the rest is 
probable? Thus then have we a probable sun, a probable 
moon, a probable fire, and not only so, but a probable burn- 
ing, 3.Yid probable scalding, probable pleasures, and proba- 
ble pains ; and that too, even if the pains should be of the 
unmathematical genus, that they SLve pains that can be felt, 
whether of the gout or tooth ache, yet are they probable, be- 
cause not mathematical. Thus the man that comes into the 
parlor, nearly frozen with cold, and is told, that there is a fire 
in the kitchen, whether he first believes this on testimony, or 
when he sees it on entering the kitchen, or when he is cheer- 
ed by its warmth, still from beginning to end it is ?l\\ probable 
because not mathematical. Water and the thirsty, and beef 
and the hungry are excellent juxta-positions, and by them, the 
thirsty and the hungry have the probable evidence that the 
necessities of nature are satisfied ; but the hungry and thirsty 

* To the honor of mathematics generally, and of mathematicians too, not of 
the class to which we allude, who with all their boasted powers, probably never 
read, much less understood, the Principia of the " facile Princeps" of mathe- 
matics, Sir Isaac Newton, these were not his views. Sir Isaac was not 
only mathematically, but morally great ; and his dying words evinced that 
the light of moral truth was shining on his soul. 



ON DEDUCTIVE EVIDENCE. 179 

say that their evidence is better than the mathematical. It 
is true that what may be moral certainty and conviction to 
me may not be such to you, any more than what is mathema- 
tical certainty and conviction to you, may not be such to him 
who never read Euclid. But this, in either case, alters not the 
fact, which is, that evidence exists in both cases, whatever 
may be tht faculties of perceiving it in either, and they two 
will remain eternally distinct without the necessity of the one 
proving the existence of the other, any more than it is ne- 
cessary that the light of the sun should prove the light of 
the candle, or the light of the candle prove the light of the 
sun. But the licentious and unwarrantable latitude of this 
philosophic sense of the word probable is an insult to common 
sense ; and an indignity to the Fountain of Truth himself, and 
Parent of the very sun that shines in the heavens. It goes so 
far that it proves too much ; for the demonstration of the ma- 
thematician is certainty, whilst the existence of the thinking 
power of him that produced it, rests on probable evidence. 
Here probability produces certainty, the less the greater ; 
or in other words the less is greater than the greater ! ! 
which comes to one of a mathematician's " third things,^^ 
which he commonly calls " quod absurdum est.^^ Here then 
is mathematical monomania, that involves, in some Cartesian 
vortex of probable evidence, the word, the testimony, the evi- 
dence, the certainty of Him who is essential and immutable 
veracity, the Original and Eternal Fountain not only of the 
Moral Sun, but of all the suns that ever did and ever will 
shine ; and goes, at least next door to giving even Him the lie, 
merely because He is either not mathematical, or because 
either He himself, or his testimony is not now, nor ever will or 
can be comprehended within the narrow limits of three or four 
hundred pages of Euclid's Elements. And thus the sons 
of truth are to be told, whether they first merely believe this 
testimony, and afterwards, as in the case of the man at the 
fire, begin to see it, and then to feel and enjoy its renovating 
warmth, whether they have tested, through all the severest vicis- 
situdes of human life, for one or forty years, the veracity of that 
which has been proved changeless from the days of mar tyro- 
logy to the present ; yet it is all something probable because 
not mathematical ! I But the day is coming when that mo- 
ral truth will be found on a rock, that will stand firm when all 
else shall shake, and the Sons of Truth, in its noon-tide glory, 
shall wave the trophies of eternal victory in cloudless splen- 
dor, when all things else, including mathematical diagrams, 
shall be dark. It is time then that this word probable, as 



180 ON DEDUCTIVE EVIDENCE. 

applied to moral truth, should be swept from the pages of 
every book that has the least regard to truth, v^^ith a broom 
dipt in nitric acid keen enough to sever eternally the limb 
of the dead from the soul of the living, 

10. Moral evidence involves all that portion of human tes- 
timony v^'hich a large number of the most intelligent part of 
mankind have, in all ages, after due examination, found to 
produce certainty in every rational mind. But in a work 
first printed at Boston, in the year 1821, the following exam- 
ple, in order to show certain differences between mathemati- 
cal and moral reasoning, is given, viz: " The assertion, that 
Carthage was never taken by the Romans, though false, is 
not absurd; for there was a time when it was true." This 
sentence if it mean any thing to the purpose, must signify as 
follows. The assertion, now, in the year 1821, that Carthage 
was never taken by the Romans, is not absurd ; that is, it is 
not absurd to contradict that concurrent history and testi- 
'mony which all rational and competent men have, in all ages 
since, admitted to be evidence, and that for this good reason, 
that a time was, when Carthage was not so taken, and con- 
sequently then, no such fact was to be contradicted ! Theem- 
dence that " the Romans once possessed Great Britain," is 
made up of the following accumulative testimonies ; imme- 
morial tradition ; original manuscripts ; early biographical 
records; the testimony of historians; the ruins of Roman 
buildings, camps and walls ; Roman coins, urns, vessels, and 
inscriptions; the several vestiges from the first, discovered 
almost every year, and the universal belief and assent of all 
men to this fact ; but for any man having the opportunity to 
be informed, to say that this accumulative testimony is not 
evidence, or evidence in any rational mind to command con- 
viction, would certainly be absurd. 

(Art. 122.) Probable testimony is that which does not 
amount to evidence, and is deduced from declarations or in- 
ferences not amounting to certainty. 

1. Thus then, for the first time, the bold step is taken, to 
deny the existence of any such thing as probable evidence; 
which implies a contradiction. " Evidence," as already de- 
fined, and contradistinguished from testimony, (Art. 106 and 
107,) "is that complete testimony or concurrence of testimo- 
nies, which is sufficient to produce certainty or conviction, in 
faculties capable and willing to perceive it." Evidence? 
therefore, if not certainty to those who will not perceive it, is 



ON DEDUCTIVE EVIDENCE^ 181 

sufficient in all minds of rational conduct, of producing cer- 
tainty. To those that perceive it, evidence and certainty, 
though not identical, are yet as near as cause and effect. 
To talk of probable certainty would be certainly ridiculous, 
and probability producing certainty is not much better. We 
therefore deny the existence of any such thing as probable 
evidence, a term that has been productive of confusion in the 
minds of thousands; though we fully admit the existence of 
probable testimony, since the whole of testimony until it 
amounts to evidence is probable. (Art. 106.) We cease to 
attach the terms of probable testimony or probable evidence 
either to moral evidence or moral truth. That which has 
been established, tested, tried in all ages, by every kind of 
proof, not excepting visible, audible, tangible, external, iii" 
ternal, individual, social, and in every other way that 
rationality can possibly require, we cannot, we will not, call 
probable evidence, oy probable testimony; but on the contra- 
ry, what we have known and seen, we, according to unalte- 
rably^ conviction, testify, that the sun needs no candle. Stars 
give probable testimony to the doubtful traveller, but when 
the sun rises, these scintillations vanish. 

2. When human testimony rests on the attestation either 
of a single individual, or of more, not of known character or 
veracity ; or when the witness is not competent to know what 
he says, or was not at the time in circumstances requisite to 
enable him to know the fact to which his testimony refers ; 
or when, from motives or inducements favorable to his tempo- 
rary interest, he is suspected not to say what he knows, it is a 
case that falls within the limits only of probable testimony. 

3. Probable testimony is also frequently derived from 
common experience, or such experimental facts which either 
have not been often repeated, or if repeated, not attended 
with results sufficiently uniform to establish any thing more 
than a presumptive conclusion. The success of a medicine, 
salutary in seven cases out of ten, and apparently injurious 
in three, is a question only of probability. " An equal num- 
ber of favorable and unfavorable instances leave the mind in 
a state of suspense, without exciting the smallest degree of as- 
surance on either side. When the favorable instances exceed 
the unfavorable in number, we begin to think the future event 
in some degree probable, and more or less so, according to the 
surplus of favorable instances. A few favorable cases, with- 
out any mixture of unfavorable ones, render an event proba- 
ble in a high degree; but the favorable experience must be 



182 ON DEDUCTIVE EVIDENCE. 

both extensive and uniform, before it can produce moral evi- 
dence." 

4. Analogy is also a source of probable evidence. Thus a 
gentleman knowing that acidity is extremely injurious in the 
gout, to which he is subject, and also that three grains* of 
magnesia will neutrahze the acidity in one wine glass of Sherry, 
judges, by analogy, (for the case appears similar) that the 
same quantity will produce the same effect in a glass of Port 
wine. This analogy, though it brings him near the truth, yet 
not exactly, since Port wine is different from Sherry^ the 
acidity of which, on experiment, he finds to absorb three and 
a half grains, instead of three. 

4. The calculation of chances has also been reckoned as a 
source of probable testimony. The doctrine of chances is that 
which teaches the degree of probability or improbability of 
any one of a given number of events, considered as equally 
possible. It is a mathematical, not strictly a logical subject, 
for which Demoivre's doctrine of chances may be consulted. 



INTERROGATORY EXAMINATION 

o» 

Chap. VIII. 

Q. 1. What is deductive evidence 1 Art. 118. 

Q. 2. Wherein does deductive differ from intuitive evidence 1 

Q. 3. How many kinds are there of deductive evidence ? 119. 

Q. 4. Give me a definition of mathematical evidence. 120, 

Q. 5. Describe moral evidence. 121. 

Q. 6. What is probable testimony 1 122. 

* The rule may be, for one wine glass full, or two ounces of Sherry, three 
grains of magnesia ; three and a half grains for Port wine ; five grains for Vi- 
donia ; five grains for Porter, and two and a half grains for Beer. 



PART III. 

ON ARGUMENTATION. 
On Induction and Analogy. 

CHAP. I. 

Section I. 

INDUCTION. 

(Art 123.) In DVCTioNf in a general sense, is that process, 
by which we examine the properties of individuals, or of 
species without or with reference to those properties being 
common to the whole species or genus ; and is of two kinds ; 
the former is discursive, the latter argumentative. 

(Art. 124.) Discursive induction is that process, by which 
we examine the properties of individuals or of species, with- 
out reference to those properties being common to the whole 
species or genus. 

1. This may be, and is often done, by all persons of observation 
or reflection, whether accidentally, or intentionally, though not 
in the first case with any view to obtain the premises to consti- 
tute an argument. Thus a person in early Hfe may remember 
that he observed that an individual, suppose a, (it may be an 
animal, a man, a vegetable, a mineral, &c. , as the case may 
be,) has a property, which call x ; afterwards he may per- 
ceive that the individual, b, has the same property x ; and as 
he advances in life or in experience, or travels by land or sea, 
whether these observations be accidental or intentional, he 
notices, that other individuals, as c, d, e, and/, have each re- 
spectively, the property x. This begins to make some im- 
pression on his mind ; though at first his observation seemed 
casual, yet the accumulated instances lead him to presume 
that there exists some general law, of which at first he had 
fio conception. (It may be a case iiktheology, natural history, 



1S4 ON INDUCTION. 

philosophy, trade, law, or even phrenology, &:c.) The numer- 
ous facts lead him now to read or converse on the subject, by 
which means he learns, that the individuals, a, b, c, d, e,yj all 
belong to one species, viz : to the species A ; but that there is 
another individual of that species, g, which he has not ob- 
served ; neither can any man or book give him information as 
to g : and where to find g, he knows not ; nevertheless, as he 
has six cases established out of the seven, he has strong pre- 
sumptive or probable testimony of the existence of a general 
law, which he can now express, by saying, '•'' JlllindividuaU 
of the class «/5, have the property xP Though argumenta- 
tion originally was not his intention, yet he is now in possession 
of the major premiss of an argument, which, until ^ can be 
examined, is at least presumptive ; but he may from a ^re- 
su7nptive premiss diQdi\xcQ at least, 3. presumptive conclusion 
of strong probability; viz. 

All individuals of the specie? A, have the property x. 

g belongs to the class A ; therefore 
g has the property x. 

2. In the course of time, he meets with g, and finds it has 
the property x. Now he can express the general law, from a 
certain premiss, and prove that the major of the former syl- 
logism, at first presumptive, is a conclusion of certainty from 
premises experimentally tested and found also to be certain- 
ties ; viz. 

a, bf Cy d, e,f,g, are all the individuals of the class A. 

This he learned from books or conversation. 

The property x is common to a, b, c, d, e, f, g. 

This he learned experimentally. 
The property x is common to all the individuals of the class A. 
The fact established as a principle of science. 

3. These observations at first, or as to a, b, c, &c. were 
merely casual, without reference to, or even the knowledge 
of, any general law or property, when the induction is merely 
discursive, or the collection of facts known and observed by 
experience, or even by experiment casually noticed, or inten- 
tionally instituted ; but still if intentionally, not with reference 
to any law as yet, of course, unsuspected. 

4. But as the instances are increased, through the succes- 
sive steps, d, e,f, a presumption in proportion arises, that 
such a law, at first unsuspected, would be, could all the cases 
be examined, found to be general, as to some class as yet ua- 



ON INDUCTION. 185 

defined, and not known to be the class A. Here the induction 
ceases to be purely discursive, or wandering, but is in search 
of some class, and the individuals composing it. An indistinct 
view of some object or principle of science arises, as yet like 
twilight, on the mind, excites inquiry, which is answered by 
the further information that the several individuals, «, 6, c, d^ 
e, f, g, compose a class or species, called A, and that g only 
remains to be examined. A probable conclusion as to the 
actual existence of a general law at first suspected, and co- 
extensive with the whole class A, now takes place, and 
induction becomes argumentative; as yet from assumed 
premises, until g, the only remaining individual of the class, is 
examined, when the induction is completed by forming a syl- 
logism on certain premises, which, when regular, declares a 
principle of science no longer a matter of doubt or contro- 
versy. 

(Art. 125.) Argumentative induction is that process, by 
which we examine some property of particulars until we ar- 
rive at their universal, on the presumption that the property 
observed, is common to the universal ; in order to establish 
the requisite premises for argumentation. 

1. Thus Mr. Bakewell, the celebrated cattle breeder, (a 
case mentioned by Dr. Whately,) '* observed, in a great num- 
ber of individual beasts, a tendency to fatten readily, and in 
a great number of others, the absence of this constitution. In 
every individual of the former description, he observed a cer- 
tain peculiar m,ake, though they differed widely in size, color, 
&c. Those of the latter description differed no less in various 
points, but agreed in being of a different make from the others. 
These facts were his data ; from which combining them with 
the general principle, that nature is steady and uniform in 
her proceedings, he logically drew the conclusion that beasts 
of the specified make have universally a peculiar tendency to 
fatten : but then his principal merit consisted in making the 
observations, and in so combining them, as to abstract from 
each of a multitude of cases, differing widely in many respects, 
the circumstances in which they all agreed, and also in con- 
jecturing skilfully how far those circumstances were likely to 
be found in the whole class : the making of such observations, 
and still more the combination, abstraction, and judgment 
employed, are what men commonly mean when they speak 
of induction." 

q2 



186 ON INDUCTION. 

2. Up to this point, Dr. Whately does not consider induc- 
tion argHmentative, nor does he admit it to be such until all 
the premises are discovered, and stated in argumentative form. 
On this point, almost trivial, we beg leave to differ from Dr. 
Whately. Induction, so long as it is merely discursive, as ob- 
serving facts in the common way, and collecting them, but not 
to any specific purpose, nor to prove a property at that time 
not suspected to exist, is certainly not argumentative or logi- 
cal. But the moment induction advances beyond this, though 
only on the presumption of the existence of a law, which may 
be predicated of the whole of any class, and is directed in such 
a way as to obtain all the premises of an argument, it is of 
the argumentative character, conducted on the persuasion 
that such an argument may be completed. The first obser- 
vation of Mr. Bakewell, for example, in the first cases might 
be casual, wherein nothing either of the incipient or complete 
argument could exist. But when these cases began to multi- . 
ply and arrest his notice, it led to the presumption, 1st, that 
there was a distinct species of cattle easily fattened ; 2dly, that 
such and such marks distinguished that species. Consequently 
with these two premises, though then presumptive, Mr. Bake- 
well appears to have proceeded, and that with the view to 
establish these two facts, that the argument might be then 
conclusive in his own mind ; that is, he proceeded argumenta- 
tively, and with a view to establish an argument, from which 
point his induction was of the argumentative character, though 
no argument was yet completed, as much as an embryo is a 
being, before it is a being of the same kind at maturity. And 
Mr. Bakewell's induction from that point was the embryo of 
the following syllogism. 

There is a distinct species of cattle easily fattened. 
Such and such marks distinguish that species. 
Those having those marks are easily fattened. 

3. If of a young student in c4iemistry it were inquired, 
" have all neutral salts qualities different from those o{ either 
of the simples composing them .^" he would, if deprived of 
all other means of knowing this to be a fact, proceed first by 
induction. After he obtained from the examination of a few, 
presumptive testimony, to establish complete evidence, he 
would probably proceed. 

First, with the nitrates ; and having obtained the several 
individuals of this species, as the nitrate of potassa, the nitrate 
of soda, the nitrate of ammonia, the nitrate of silver, &c., and 
finding by induction that each and every one had qualities 



ON INDUCTION. 187 

distinct from either of the simples composing them, he could 
then predicate, by syllogistic reasoning, this property of this 
species of the genus, neutral salt. 

Secondly. He would then proceed to the sulphates ; as to 
the sulphate of potassa, of soda, lime, magnesia, iron, &c., 
and his induction being completed, he could then predicate by 
syllogism of this species of the genus neutral salt. 

Thirdly. To complete his induction, and to arrive ulti- 
mately, through the several species, to their genus, a neutral 
salt, as originally proposed, he must now^ proceed consecu- 
tively with the remaining species, viz. with the chlorates, 
carbonates, acetates, fluates, phosphates, prussiates, oxa- 
lates, chromates, borates, &c., and the results by induction 
being the same, he may sum up the whole, by a syllogistic 
conclusion, predicating that neutral salts have qualities dis- 
tinct from either of the simples composing them. 

4. From this view of the subject it appears, First, that in- 
duction is the reverse of syllogism. Induction proceeds from 
particulars to a universal, or to a universal of any kind con- 
taining particulars composing and completing it ; as from in- 
dividuals to a variety ; from varieties, or class, to a species ; 
from SPECIES to a genus; from gejjera to a tribe; from 
tribes to an order. On the contrary, syllogism proceeds from 
universals of any kind to particulars, as from an order to a 
tribe, from a tribe to a genus ; from a genus to a species, 
from a species to a variety, or from a variety, or any other 
universal, to an individual, provided that those particulars 
are contained within what is predicated of their universal. 

Secondly. It appears that induction and syllogism together, 
make up a complete system of argumentation. We cannot 
always proceed by syllogism, that is, when the universal is 
not known, nor what may be predicated of it, but the know- 
ledge of this may be obtained by induction, by examining its 
particulars. But when this is known, induction is unnecessa- 
ry, we proceed by syllogism; or syllogism sums up, concisely 
and argumentatively expresses in three lines, a volume of the 
labors of induction. Induction is, therefore, the pioneer for 
syllogism. Syllogism relieves induction of its toil. 

Thirdly. The rank of priority is doubtless due to induc- 
tion ; that of completion and certainty to syllogism. In early 
ages, before universal natures were known, men would arrive 
at them by the patient investigation of particulars by induc- 
tion. The process would begin with presumption, or with a 
presumptive conclusion as to a supposed or real universal 



188 ON INDUCTIOJT. 

founded on partial testimony, and probably at a lower grade 
still, with discursive until it advanced to argumentative in- 
duction. The latter would proceed through various degrees 
of probable testimony, gradually approximating to complete 
evidence ; and throughout the whole of this some degree of 
uncertainty would attach to the process. But the moment it 
attains the point of certainty, induction has discharged its 
honorable office. Syllogism itself is indebted to it for the in- 
formation it has afforded, and even for its own material. 
The universal is now known, and what may be predicated of 
it, and every premiss necessary to the construction of an ar- 
gument, is no longer presumptive. Syllogism memorializes 
the whole, and in a synoptic form, in the miniature compass 
of three lines, and by a conclusion deduced from premises no 
longer presumptive, forces conviction on one not capable of 
tracing such connexion through the several steps of a long 
induction. 

Fourthly. Thus it may be perceived, that throughout the 
whole of the period of the allowable existence of induction, it 
is a presumptive conclusion from probable testimony as to the 
universal. But syllogism need not be employed except to 
deduce a conclusion from premises of certainty. That is, 
induction is an argumentative process within the limits of 
probable testimony; syllogism is an argument expressive of 
certainty from complete evidence. On this account, partly, 
Dr. Whately denies that induction is an argument until it can 
be expressed syllogistically, or when the universal and its 
predicate are known ; but at this point precisely it is unneces- 
sary as an argument, would be inconvenient, and properly 
ceases to be one. We do not contend that induction is an 
argument, but a process conducted on an assumption that ar- 
gumentative principles exist, and therefore is within the pre- 
cincts of what is argumentati\^e, as much as twilight is within 
the precincts of the morning. 

Fifthly. Truths, by Dr. Whately, very properly have been 
divided into truths of information, and truths of instruc- 
tion. It is the office of induction to affi)rd the former, that 
of syllogism to communicate the latter. Induction seeks a 
science, syllogism expresses it. Information supplies the ma- 
terial of instruction, instruction cannot exist without informa- 
tion. Induction and information, and syllogism and instruction 
are therefore correlatives. In short, induction and syllogism 
are the two luminaries during the night and the day of science. 
5. Induction is the organon of Bacon, which he recommend- 



ON INDUCTION. 189 

ed as the means of acquiring truths of information, though 
many have erroneously imagined that he proposed to substi- 
tute it in place of the dictum, of Aristotle, on which syllogism 
is founded. This is another testimony of the possibility of even 
successive generations, when misled by misrepresentation, ex- 
isting even for centuries under a popular error. The functions 
of induction and syllogism are quite distinct, and it is impossi- 
ble, with propriety, to substitute the one for the other. We 
agree with Dr. Whately that syllogism includes, or is, all rea- 
soning, and consequently in this sense includes induction. It 
does so in the view we have taken ; induction is the incipient 
syllogism, syllogism expresses the complete induction. Induc- 
tion begins with assumed premises syllogistically conducted 
till probable testimony amounts to evidence, and induction at 
maturity arrives at syllogism. 

6. From the following example will be perceived what pre- 
miss is commonly suppressed in the inductive process, and like- 
wise the comparative length, when the cases are only seven be- 
tween it and the syllogistic expression. 

Cloven feet belong to the ox, a horned animal, 
Cloven feet belong to the sheep, a horned animal. 
Cloven feet belong to the deer, a horned animal. 
Cloven feet belong to the goat, a horned animal, 
Cloven feet belong to the antelope, a horned animal, 
Cloven feet belong to the elk, a horned animal, 
Cloven feet belong to the ibex, a horned animal. 

If this completes the inductive process we arrive at the 
major premiss, until this suppressed and doubtful, viz : 

" A property which belongs to the ox, sheep, deer, goat, an- 
telope, elk, ibex, &c. belongs to all horned animals." 

Having obtained this major, the syllogism may be completed, 
thus — 

A property belonging to the ox, sheep, deer, goat, antelope, elk, ibex, &c. be- 
longs to all horned animals. 
Cloven feet is a property belonging to these ; therefore 
Cloven feet is a property belonging to all horned animals. 

7. Induction, is derived from the Latin word, induco, to 
bring in, and therefore induction properly signifies a bringing 
in, one by one, all the particulars pf the universal, as in this 
case, the ox, the sheep, the deer, &c. in order to ascertain, if 
what is predicated of one, may of the whole species or genus. 



190 on analogy. 

Section 2. 
ON ANALOGY. 

(Art. 126.) Analogy is a presumptive inference from the re- 
semblance of a particular or universal of one kind more known, 
to the particular or universal of another less known, that a pro- 
perty existing in the former exists in the latter. 

1. Analogy is seldom employed except in the absence of 
more certain premises for reasoning. It proceeds on the pre- 
sumption that in consequence of a similarity, in the mode, con- 
stitution or circumstances of an individual, or individuals, of 
one class, with which we are more acquainted, to those of ano- 
ther class, with which we are less acquainted, that some pro- 
perty known to belong to the former, may also belong to the 
individuals or class less known. It is, therefore, a process of 
deriving a presumptive conclusion from presumptive premises 
in the absence of anything more certain. Analogy, however, 
may by various degrees approximate towards a conclusion of 
strong probability. This may be illustrated in the following 
manner. 

2. A has a property, which call x ; but this property may 
depend on its constitution or circumstances which consist of the 
parts, «, 5, c, without the addition of any other. B's consti- 
tution consists of the parts a and 6, wanting c, without that 
defect, however, being known ; C's constitution is composed of 
h, c, wanting «, but , with the addition of e ; D's constitution 
is «, b, c, d ; and £'s is precisely A's, viz : «, 6, c, without that 
identity being known, and they stand thus : 



d, 



And the argument from presumed or partially known prC' 
mises, will stand thus : 

All beings of A's constitution, have A's property, which is x, 
B, C, D, E are of A's constitution : therefore 
B, C, D, E have the property of A, which is x. 



/A is «, 


b, 


c. 


1 B is a, 


b. 




<; Cis 


b, 


c, 


D is a, 


h 


c, 


E is a, 


h, 


c. 



ON ANALOGY. 191 

The major is not denied, the minor is, it is presumed, not 
known, and when examined turns out to be true only as to a 
part of it, i. e. as to E whose case is that of A ; and the above 
on presumed premises may be reduced to the following, where 
nothing is denied and the conclusion certain : 

All beings of A's constitution have the property x, 
E has A's constitution ; therefore 
E has the property x. 

The property x, however, may be more or less found in B, 
C, and D, though not in the same degree, or with the same 
modifications as in A or E, according to something either de- 
fective or redundant in their natures not applying to the case 
of A. 

2. But how does this apply in medicine. The physician 
applies a remedy to A and to E, and in both cases succeeds ; 
and likewise to B, C and D, who apparently/ are persons of 
the same structure and organization ; yet there is either some- 
thing defective in the one or redundant in the other, of which 
the physician, not being omniscient, knew not; his best efforts, 
therefore, reasoning by analogy from the case of A and E, are 
more or less opposed, according as the difference, whatever it 
be, more or less agrees with the medicine exhibited. 

3. What we now call comparative anatomy, seems to have 
been the first process, at least amongst certain nations, by which 
we have arrived at our present knowledge of the structure 
of man. It was the process of analogy, and conclusions more 
or less perfect were obtained from it, which ultimately led to 
those of greater precision and certainty. To analogy, though 
we trust to it as little as possible, we owe many obligations, 
without being thankful for past favors. We would hope that 
there is always something in man averse to cutting up other 
men even when dead, and much more to injuring the living 
subject to explore the mysteries of the vital machine. Com- 
parative anatomy, therefore, was a more agreeable process at 
least to delicate feelings. Here is an animal, an organized 
being once capable of life and motion, which by dissection we 
find to have these parts, thus and thus situated. Man is such 
a being ; therefore man has these parts thus situated. Thus 
was their analogy producing a conclusion, partly right, and 
partly wrong. The middle term, animal, is improper in the 
sense to which it is applied. The animal dissected was pro- 
bably a quadruped, a bird or a fish ; but man is neither ; and 
therefore, since the minor is not contained in the middle, no 
conclusion of certainty follows. 



192 ON ANALOGY. 

4. But 

ABC and D have all tried the business x, and have succeeded. 
I intend to try the business x ; therefore 
I shall succeed. 

I try, and fail ! why ? was the fau!t in the syllogism ? Cer- 
tainly ; for first the little important I is neither A nor B nor 
C nor D, and therefore no part of the middle term ; for one 
had more capital, another more skill, and I perhaps less man- 
agement; and I find that I derived my conclusion from an 
analogy of a very remote character, since I was not even 
any part of the middle term. 

5. But the law says 

All that commit the crime x, with the aggravations a, b, c, shall die. 
Z has committed the crime x, with the aggravations a and b ; therefore 
Z, shall die. 

Not so ; for Z is not in the middle term. It is true that 
there is a similarity in the crime defined, and that Z commit- 
ted ; but the want of the circumstance, c, in the latter, will 
save his life. The want of c throws him out of the middle 
term, that thunders, "thou shalt die." 

6. But the law also declares that the punishment for the 
crime Y is imprisonment for life ; and Z is charged before the 
court for the commission of Y. But the definition of Y in the , 
statutes is ambiguous, or such as to admit of more meanings 
than one ; and the questions become, 1, what is Y? 2, did Z 
commit Y? 

No similar case having been decided in this country, the 
only mode practicable is analogy, or reasoning from the defi- 
nition of Y in another country, w^hose circumstances are simi- 
lar to ours ; or if that definition, as in our case, be defective 
in the statute book, the reasoning must be from the way in 
which it is understood in the courts of that country. Thus in 
the case of L, the court in that country decided that the three 
circumstances, a, b, c, were necessary to Y as contemplated 
by the law. fn the case of B, the essentials were decided to 
be a b. So also in the case of F. Two cases, therefore, against 
one, contend that the two circumstances only, a, b, constitute 
the crime Y ; Z did these, and therefore committed Y, whose 
definition is determined by analogy to be a, b. 

7. Reasoning from analogy is not always considered as ar- 
gument, but implies motive and illustration involving argu- 
ment from premises whose force is often sooner felt than un- 
derstood. It may be termed reasoning, not argumentation. 
Analogy on many occasions is improper, but many are the 



ON ANALOGY. 193 

cases wherein it is proper and useful. It is inference from 
resemblance. If that resemblance be slight or remote, or the 
circumstances in whatever is essential to the inference not 
parallel, analogy is improper ; as, for example, the mind in 
suspense has been compared to a balance in a state of equi- 
Hbrium. The analogy here is improper, for what determines 
the balance is mechanical ; but what determines the mind is 
intellectual. 

8. Analogy is frequently employed for a didactive purpose, 
especially as to children and minds not familiar with abstract 
truth. It employs visible symbols, allegories, metaphors, allu- 
sions easily understood, to teach and illustrate what is less 
known from some resemblance between them. It contains an 
implied argument whose force is readily perceived. The great- 
est Teacher employed this method. '^ Behold the fowls of the 
air, for they sow not, neither do they reap, nor gather into 
barns ; yet your heavenly Father feedeth them. Are ye not 
much better than they ? Consider the lillies of the field," &c. 
Here is an argument from analogy. Will a farmer take care 
of that part of his stock which is of Httle value, and will he 
not take care of that which is of greater ? If men, if common 
sense act thus, will not Providence 1 The minds of most to 
whom his discourses were addressed, were in a state not other- 
wise equally capable of understanding and appreciating the 
truth and spirituality of his doctrines. He chose this method, 
and this evinced his intimate acquaintance with human na- 
ture. " If I have told you earthly things and ye believe not, 
how shall ye believe if I tell you of heavenly things ?" Ana- 
logy begins, therefore, with earthly things, the A, B, C of 
Christianity, and then ascends to the mysteries into which 
" angels desire to look ;" " what eye hath not seen, what ear 
hath not heard, and what hath not entered into the heart of 
man to conceive" — " the heavenly things" — prepared for those 
that " love Him." 

9. Analogy is also employed after argumentation, not be- 
cause the latter is insufficient, but because there are some 
that are disposed to understand and believe the former, when 
they are not the latter. Hence Butler wrote his Analogy of 
Natural and Revealed Religion, not because the direct evi- 
dence of Revealed Religion was not more than sufficient to 
produce conviction in all rational minds willing to read, in- 
vestigate and understand, but because many are disposed to 
begin first, if ever they begin at all, with the volumes of 
Natural Religion, And the things analogous in Nature and 



194 ON ANALOGr. 

experience lead us to the same conclusions more immediately 
and directly declared by revelation. 

10. By analogy, the naturalist or philosopher is enabled to 
continue his travels to the utmost bounds of reasonable infer- 
ence, or of what an elegant writer terms verisimilitude, but 
where sense cannot follow; whilst in the animal kingdom, 
Cambray, Nieuwentyt, Derham, Bonnet, Buffon, and 
Swammerdam ; in the vegetable, Tournefort and Linne; 
in the mineral, Theophrastus, Werner^ Klaproth, Cron- 
stedt, Morveau, Reaumur, Kirwan, St a hi, Lavoisier, Four- 
croy and Davy ; and in the motions of the heavenly bodies, 
Copernicus, Kepler, Newton, Halley and Herschell, have 
observed that nature acts with uniform and consistent laws, 
and that those laws always point to nature's God; he, in com- 
mon with them, by analogy from the things that are seen, 
infers that in the fields of ether yet unmeasured by Herschell's 
telescope, this law, this uniformity, this testimony and evi- 
dence prevail. 

11. No great mind exists without occasional excursions to 
regions so sublime. We are yet within the precincts of analo- 
gy, or of reasonable inference from known and visible 
resemblance, and are unwilling therefore to yield the whole 
of this to the creative fancy of the poet, but within the 
limits of inference almost irresistible, with Dr. Reid exclaim, 
" We observe a great similitude between this earth which 
we inhabit, and the other planets of this system. They all 
revolve round the sun, as the earth does, though at different 
distances, and in different periods. They borrow all their 
light from the sun, as we do. Several of them are known to 
revolve round their axis, like the earth, and by that means 
must have a like succession of day and night. Some of them 
have moons, that serve to give them light in the absence of 
the sun, as the moon does to us. From all this similitude, it 
is not unreasonable to think, that those planets may, like our 
earth, be the habitation of various orders of living creatures." 

12. We need not, however, stop here. This is but one 
solar system, and however great to us, who are finite, to the 
universe, which is infinite, nay to that galaxy of which we 
are a part, it is but a point. We cease, therefore, to con- 
template single systems, and with Herschell, view galaxies, 
aggregates of systems, probably each like our '^via lactea," 
or milky way, a grand celestial chain of systems that no finite 
mind can grasp, but whose myriad suns have, doubtlesss, each 
like ours, their own systems, with planets revolving around 



ON ANALOGY. 195 

them. Herschell considers our galaxy but one of the many, 
the countless aggregates of systems that compose the universe. 
He directs our attention to one, to another, and to many dis- 
tant beds of light ; and by his telescope, they appear each a 
congregation of suns. We are yet within the limits of mortal 
vision, and by analogy infer, if this be the case so far as our 
own view can reach, why not throughout the universe. A 
universe composed of aggregates, an aggregate composed of 
systems, a system composed of planets, a planet peopled by 
intelligence. No one attempts to prove it by direct argu- 
ment; it is infered by analogy, from known resemblance, 
confirmed, so far as it can go, by observation, and compatible 
with the views we would form of infinity. A finite agent 
produces a finite work, but an infinite agent an infinite work; 
above, below, on this side, on that, one vast unbounded uni- 
verse of being and created intelligence, of which no finite 
mind can form an idea, but is comprehended by Him who 
comprehends all, Himself comprehended by none. He has a 
name that no man can spell, and whilst He is the creator of 
suns, is, himself, the sun of suns, the fountain of every thing 
excellent, and therefore so comprises within himself, all ex- 
cellencies, and every thing amiable, that not any word, nor 
all the words, in any, nor in all languages, can express. And 
is not He, therefore, who comprises all excellencies, and every 
thing amiable within himself, and consequently every thing 
excellent or that can be loved at all, the proper object of 
reverence, adoration and love, to you, to me, to all ? Life is 
too short to do any thing else than to love Him who com- 
prises all excellencies in One, and without whom nothing is 
excellent. " To whom," therefore, " shall we go. Thou alone 
hast the words," (the excellencies) " of eternal life." 



INTERROGATORY EXAMINATION, 

ON 

Chap. I. 

Q. 1. What is your definition of induction? Art. 123. 
Q. 2. How many kinds of induction are there *? 123. 
Q. 3. What is discursive induction 1 124. 



196 ON ANALOGY. 

Q. 4. What is argumentative induction'.' 125. 

Q. 5. How does induction differ from syllogism 1 125, note 4. 

Q. 6. When you are in search of some new truth, or truths of infobma- 
Tioir, in the investigation do you employ induction or syllogism "i 125, notes. 

Q. 7. To what truths of information, or truths of instruction, is 
the syllogism adapted] notes. 

Q. 8. When from premises, the truth of which is known, you deduce a 
truth of instruction, contained in them, though not perceived, but yet infer^d 
from them, dp you employ induction or syllogism 1 125, notes. 

Q. 9. What is analogy 1 126. 

Q. 10. In what cases is analogy employed 1 126, note. 



SECTION in. 

ON ARGUMENTS. 
CHAP. I. 

On the Nature, Parts and Rules of Syllogism. 

(Art. 127.) A PREMISS is a proposition employed in argu- 
ment or syllogism : every syllogism contains two, of which the 
first* is the major premiss, the second the minor premiss ; 
these two are the premises by which the last proposition of 
the syllogism, or conclusion, is proved ; as 

JMajor premiss. An effect without a cause is an absurdity. 



Minor premiss . Chance, in the sense of the atheist, is an effect without a 

cause. 
Conclusion. Chance, in the sense of the atheist, is an absurdity, 

(Art. 128.) An argument is that expression by which from 
premises granted or proved to be true, a conclusion results as 
their necessary consequence. 

1. In this sense an argument is an expression of that por- 
tion or quantity of reasoning generally as may be comprised 
and expressed within three propositions ; and it is that expres- 
sion to which every thing that is reasoning may be reduced. 
Every thing that is not reasoning, however it may appear as 
such, when reduced to this, is reduced only to be exposed. If 
there be any thing more of reasoning than can be thus ex- 
pressed in three propositions, it implies more acts of reasoning 
than one. An argument expresses one act of reasoning and 
no more. In common language it is sometimes taken for ar- 
gumentative discourse which may occupy a whole volume ; as 
when we speak of " Warburton's Argument to prove the di- 
vine legation of Moses." 

2. '' Reason" is that faculty by which the reasoning process 
is conducted. Reasoning is the act of reason. In common 

* i. e. when the syllogism is regularly stated. 
r2 



198 ON THE NATURE, &C. OF SYLLOGISM. 

language, the word " reason" is sometimes used to signify 
reasoning. (Whately's Logic, p. 279.) Reasoning is some- 
times employed to mean, not only its own direct act or opera- 
tion, but also all those mental processes necessary to that act ; 
thus the mathematician not only has to demonstrate, but 
to exercise his skill in the judicious selection of the proper 
materials for his argument ; in like manner, the naturalist or 
philosopher, before he establishes the principle or science it 
is his object to prove, has frequently to employ, as in induc- 
tion, assumed premises, select and combine facts, and by 
abstraction separate or take off that unsuitable to his pur- 
pose, that he may contemplate that, and that only, which is 
suitable to his selection, and the mode of proof he intends to 
pursue. The whole of this, and whatever other mental pro- 
cess is necessary, as well as the direct act, is frequently in- 
cluded in the general and somewhat vague word reasoning. 
In contradistinction to this, argumentation is employed in this 
work to signify the direct act of reasoning only. (See Art. 4.) 

(Art. 129.) In every complete argument, Mere «7'e three 
and only three terms : two in the conclusion called the ex- 
tremes ; and these can neither be proved to agree nor differ, 
without one and only one third term. 

1. For the meaning of a term, see Art. 8. 

Third term or middle term. 

All enslaved by appetite are not freemen. 
The sensualist is enslaved by appetite. 

1 2 

The sensualist is not a freeman. 

(Art. 130.) The minor term is the subject, and the major 
TERM the predicate of the conclusion ; and the middle term 
is that with which each of them is separately compared. 

1 Middle term. 



A religion attested by miracles is from God. * 

The Christian religion is attested by miracles. 
Minor term. Major term. 

The Christian religion is from God. ' 

2. The predicate of a conclusion is called the m,ajor term, 
because it is commonly m,ore comprehensive than the middle 
term : it is so in the above example, for not only a religion at- 



ON THE NATURE, &C. OF SYLLOGISM. 199 

tested by miracles, but also animate and inanimate creatures 
are from God. 

3. The minor term is so called because it is commonly less 
comprehensive than ihe'middle term: it is so in the above 
case ; for not only the Christian religion, but that typifying its 
future existence under the Mosaic economy, was attested by 
miracles: therefore the middle term, (*'a religion attested by 
miracles") is more comprehensive than the minor, 

(Art. 131.) The middle term must be such a universal term 
as to include the whole of the minor term. 

1. In every syllogism regularly constructed, the middle 
term should be found in the major premiss. Syllogisms having 
the middle term distributed in the minor premiss should be 
reduced to regular form. 

2. Consequently since the middle term should be a univer- 
sal term, and in the major proposition, the major proposition 
should be universal : at least all syllogisms may and should be 
reduced to this form. Every middle term must represent some 
entire order, tribe, genus, species or class of persons or things, 
or else some attribute that may be predicated of the whole of 
such universal ; and this entire class or universal must include 
the whole of the minor term. It is the only business of the 
minor proposition to assert this : if the minor proposition does 
not assert this, or it cannot be proved, the minor proposition is 
useless. 

(Art. 132.) The minor term must be included in the middle 
term, not excluded from it. 



All that understand Euclid are mathematicians. 



A Creole understands not Euclid ; therefore 
A Creole is not a mathematician. 

This is very plausible ; and nothing is denied relative to the 
truth of each proposition, for propositions they only are, 
and no argument at all ; since the minor term {a Creole^) is 
not included in the middle term, [all that understand Euclid^) 
but excluded from it, viz : " a Creole understands not Euclid." 
The most essential connection is, therefore, broken, and the 
apparent argument falls to the ground as useless. But bring 
the minor term, (a Creole) to his own class, or middle term, 
(all that understand not Euclid,) and the three disconnected 
propositions become an argument. 



200 OPT THE NATURE, &C. OP SYLLOGISM. 

All that understand not Euclid, are not mathematicians, 
A Creole understands not Euclid ; therefore 
A Creole is not a mathematician. 

(Art. 133.) An argument contains only three proposi- 
tions ; TWO premises in which the middle term is compared 
withthe extremes; and the conclusion, in which the extremes 
stand together. 

(Art. 134.) The major premiss compares the middle term 
with the major ; the minor premiss the middle term with the 
minor ; and the conclusion, the minor with the major. 

1. As, 

JWd. term. Major term. 

i ^— ^ r ^ N 

Major premiss. Every effect is the result of an adeq;uate cause. 

Min. term. Mid. term. 

Minor premiss. The world is an effect ; therefore 

Min. term. Major term. 



Conclusion. The world is the result of an adequate cause. 

(Art. 135.) Whatever is predicated of a distributed mid- 
dle, may be predicated in hke manner of every thing contain- 
ed in it. 

1. By *^ predicated" here we are to understand " affirmed 
or denied," of the middle term, distributed. The distribution 
of the middle term is a subject we have already explained : 
first in the Analytical Introduction, (see page 36 to 42) and 
also in the Synthetic G^mpendium, (See Chap. IV. of proposi- 
tions, page 96 ;) but the whole doctrine of distribution is ex- 
pressed in the rule already mentioned, viz : 

A distributes the subject, O the predicate, I neither, and E 
both. 

2, This rule necessarily implies the following consequence, 

(Art. 136.) Whatever is denied of a whole class excludes from 
that class every thing denied. 

(Art. 137.) A perfect syllogism is an argument so expressed 
that the major term of the conclusion must be predicated of its 
minor, in consequence of that minor being contained in a 
distributed middle of which the same major is predicated. 



ON THE NATURE, &C. OF SYLLOGISM. 201 

J\Iid. term. 



1. Every wicked man is miserable. 

Every tyrant is a wicked man; therefore 
Min. term. Maj. term. 
Conclusion. Every tyrant is miserable. 

To the above example, how does the above definition ap- 
ply? The major term of the conclusion, (miserable) must be 
predicated of its minor, (every tyrant) in consequence of that 
minor term, (every tyrant) being contained, as the minor pro- 
position asserts, in the middle term, (every vs^icked man,) 
distributed, (for A distributes the subject as marked,) of which 
the same major, (miserable) is predicated. This is the spirit 
of the syllogism, and nothing can be more simple than the 
principle it implies. 

2. But of the following proposition, which is the predicate, 

No wicked man is a happy man, 
the term "wicked man" is the subject; the copula is al- 
ways, " is" or "is not" or their equivalents, and the proposi- 
tion is reducible to 

" A wicked man is not a happy man." 
The whole predicate therefore, ''happy man," is predicat- 
ed, i. e. here denied (by no or not) of the subject " wicked 
man." 



No discontented man is a happy man. 
Every wicked man is discontented ; therefore 
No wicked man is a happy man. 

The definition equally applies, therefore, in the case of ne- 
gative propositions ; for here, the major term, of the conclu- 
sion, " happy man," must be predicated, i. e. here denied, of 
its minor, "wicked man," in consequence of that minor, 
" wicked man," being contained in, as the minor premiss affirms, 
the middle term, " discontented man," distributed ; for " E dis- 
tributes both ;" of which the same major " happy man," is 
predicated, i. e. here denied. 

3. The definition strictly applies to all syllogisms of a per- 
fect character ; all of the first figure, which is agreeable to Aris- 
totle's general law, (Art. 135.) It applies also to the third 
figure. But since all syllogisms are reducible to the four 
moods of the first figure, which are called perfect moods, this 
is offered as a definition of a perfect syllogism only, the rest 
fall under the general definition of an argument, synonymous 
with a syllogism generally ; (Art. 133.) 



202 ON THE NATURE, &C. OF SYLLOGISM. 

(Art. 138.) If two terms agree with one and the same 
middle term, they agree with each other. 

(Ar(. 139.) If one term agrees, and another disagrees with 
one and the same middle term, these two disagree with each 
other. 

1 . On the former of these Canons rests the validity of af- 
firmative conclusions ; on the latter, of negative, for no abso- 
lute syllogism can be faulty which does not violate these 
canons, none correct which does. Hence, on these two are 
built the rules or cautions which are to be observed with 
respect to syllogisms. 

2. We therefore make use of some third term, in order to 
find whether the subject and predicate of a question agree. 
" It appears that every act of reasoning necessarily includes 
three distinct judgments ; two, wherein the ideas, whose rela- 
tion we want to discover, are severally compared with the 
middle idea; and a third, wherein they are themselves con- 
nected or disjoined, according to the result of that comparison. 
Now, as our judgments, when put into words, are called propo- 
'sitions, so our acts of reasoning, when expressed by words, are 
termed syllogisms. And hence it follows that as every act of 
reasoning implies three several judgments, so every syllogism 
must include three distinct propositions, and when an act of 
reasoning is thus put into words, and appears in the form of a 
syllogism, the intermediate idea made use of to discover the 
agreement or disagreement which we seek to investigate, is 
called the middle term, and the two ideas themselves, with 
which this third is compared, are called the extremes." 

3. " To illustrate this by an example, suppose that we have 
set ourselves to inquire, ' whether men are accountable for 
their actions,'' As the relation between the ideas of man 
and account ableness comes not within the immediate view 
of the mind, our first care must be to find out some third idea 
that will enable us to discover and trace it. A very small 
measure of reflection is sufficient to inform us that no creature 
can be accountable for his actions, unless we suppose him 
capable of distinguishing right from wrong, i. e. unless we 
suppose him possessed of reason. Nor is this alone sufficient ; 
for what would this capability of distinction avail him, if he 
had no freedom of choice, and could neither avoid the one 
nor pursue the other ? Hence it becomes necessary to take 
both these considerations in the present case. It is at the 



ON THE NATURE, &C. OF A SYLLOGISM. 203 

same time equally evident, that wherever there is this ability 
of discrimination and of choice, there also a creature is ac- 
countable. We have then got a third idea or middle term, 
with which accountableness is inseparably connected, viz. 
the ideaof « creature possessed of reason and liberty, ^^ 

4. "Let us now take this third or middle idea, and compare 
it with the other term in question, namely man, and we all 
know by experience that it may be affirmed of him, viz. that 
he is a creature possessed of reason and liberty. Having 
thus, by means of the intermediate idea, formed two several 
judgments — that man is possessed of reason and liberty, and 
that reason and liberty imply accountableness, a third obvi- 
ously and necessarily follows, that man is accountable for his 
actions. If now we put this reasoning into due form, it ex- 
hibits what logicians call a syllogism ; thus 

Every creature possessed of reason and liberty, is accountable for his actions. 
Man is a creature possessed of reason and liberty ; therefore 
Man is accountable for his actions. " — Duncan. 



THE RULES FOR SYLLOGISMS. 

(Art. 140.) Rule I. Particular propositions are contained 
in universals, and may be infered from them ; but universale 
are not contained in particulars, nor can be inferred from 
them. 

1. Consequently the middle term should be one of the terms 
of a universal proposition, and the minor should be contained 
in it. Mr. Hedge observes, " the major proposition must 
always be universal, but may be either affirmative or negative 
and the minor proposition must always be affirmative, but may 
be either universal or particular. The conclusion may be 
either a universal affirmative, or universal negative, a particu- 
lar affirmative, or a particular negative. In every regular 
syllogism the major proposition is placed first, the minor next, 
and the conclusion last." Again, the middle term is so called 
"because its extension is less than that of the major, and 
greater than that of the minor term. This circumstance 
proves the natural situation of the middle term to be that of 
subject in the major premiss, and of predicate in the minor; 
since the predicate of a proposition is never less, but usually 
more general than the subject." 

2. The predicate of a universal proposition is taken in no 



204 ON THE NATURE, &C. OP SYLLOGISM. 

greater extension than its subject, and the predicate of a ne- 
gative is always taken universally, for in its ivhole exten^ 
sion it is denied of the subject ; for if we say no stone is a 
vegetable, we deny all sort of vegetation concerning stones. 
The example given on page 99 note 14, illustrates the former 
case, and the proposition, " no bird is a quadruped," the latter ; 
for the term quadruped throughout its whole extension, whe- 
ther elephant, camel, horse, or any thing else having four feet, 
essential to the character of quadruped, is denied of the sub- 
ject bird. 

3. Mr. Hedge's remarks quoted in note 1, apply to all syllo- 
gisms regularly constructed. We shall meet, however, with 
others differently formed ; they are, however, irregular, and 
should be reduced to the formula of a perfect syllogjism, as de- 
fined in Art. 136. 

(Art. 141.) Rule II. An equivocal middle term proves 
nothing. For this is not one and the same third. 

1. An equivocal term is such as, a foot, which may signify 
either the foot of an animal, or a measure ; so the word light 
either signifies that which emanates from a luminous body, as 
the light of the sun ; or (light the adjective) not heavy ; the 
effect of such an equivocal term, may be thus exemplified, 

" Light is contrary to darkness. 
Feathers are light ; therefore 
Feathers are contrary to daikness." 

The term light is ambiguous or equivocal, and is either a 
noun or an adjective. It is employed, in the above example, 
as a noun in the major proposition, as an adjective in the mi- 
nor, i. e. two middle terms, or not one and the same third, 
contrary to Art. 137 ; and the syllogism has four terms, con- 
trary to Art. 129. 

(Art. 142.) Rule III. An undistributed middle is equivo- 
cal ; therefore the middle term must be distributed in one of 
the premises. 

1. If the middle term be taken for two different parts or 
kinds of the same common term, which would be equal to two 
middle terms, then the extremes in the conclusion, (i. e. the 
minor and major terms) not having been compared to the same 
THIRD, could not, in the conclusion, be compared to each other. 
Therefore, the middle term must not be taken twice par- 
ticularly, but once at least universally. If not there will 



ON THE NATURE, (fcc. OF SYLLOGISM. 205 

be two extremes and two middle terms, four in all, contrary 
to the canon. Should we say, " some men are pious," and 
*' some men are robbers," we can never from this infer that 
" some robbers are pious." The premises of this example are 
particular affirmatives, or I, and " 1 distributes nothing ;" the 
middle term, therefore, "some men," is not distributed in 
either of the premises ; but on the contrary is taken twice 
particularly ; so that the term '* some men" does not mean 
the same men in the one as it does in the other premiss : hence 
here are two middle terms, not one and the same third. 
Aristotle's general law has nothing to do with any thing of 
this kind. 

2. Syllogistic reasoning, as Dr. Whately very properly 
observes, " is all reasoning ;" that is, every thing appearing 
to be reasoning, not reducible to the form of the syllogism, 
nor standing the test of its rules, is not reasoning. To under- 
stand those rules, therefore, especially those relative to the 
distribution of the middle term, is important. Tf the middle 
term be undistributed, such conclusions as the following may 
be the consequence. 

A. White is a color. 

A. Black is a color ; therefore 
A. Black is white. 



Gross as this untruth is, yet many exist whose chief busi- 
ness it is to persuade both themselves and others that black is 
white, and white is black, founded on premises no better than 
these. Here color is the middle term, and being the predi- 
cate of a universal, (all white) is undistributed ; for A distri- 
butes the subject, of course not the predicate. Color being 
undistributed, is taken twice particularly, no where univer- 
sally, meaning a part of one property in one premiss, another 
part in the next, consequently two middle terms ; thus an un- 
distributed middle, a common case in specious reasoning, may 
prove that " black is white." 

I, Some animals are beasts. 



I. Some animals are birds ; therefore 
I. Some birds are beasts. 

This false conclusion is also the result of an undistributed 
middle. The middle term here is " animals.*' All the propo- 
sitions are I ; and " I distributes neither," subject nor predi- 
cate ; one part is taken in the major premiss, and another in 
the minor ; with the same consequence, two middle terms : of 



206 ON THE NATURE, &C. OF SYLLOGISM. 

course nothing is proved, except the necessity of distributing 
the middle, which if not done, an error, frequently undis- 
covered, may run through a volume. 

3. The rule says, " the middle term must be distributed in 
one of the premises;'' i. e. by being the subject of a univer- 
sal, or the predicate of a negative. This is always determined 
by considering whether the premiss is A, O, I or E, since ac- 
cording to the rule which must be kept in mind, <' •/! distri- 
butes the subject, O the predicate, I neither, and E both.''^ 
If the middle term be distributed in one of the premises it is 
enough, since if one extreme has been compared to a part of 
the middle term, and another to the whole of it, they must 
have been both compared to the same third. 

4. It is therefore not sufficient for a middle term to occur 
in a universal proposition; for if that proposition be an affirma- 
tive, (" A distributes the subject,") and the middle term the 
predicate of it, it will not be distributed : (see the first ex- 
ample quoted in note 2.) If, however, one of the premises be 
negative, E or O, the middle term may be made the predicate 
of that, and will be according to the above rule distributed ; 
as, 

E. No ruminant animals are predacious. 

A. The lion is predacious ; therefore 
A. The lion is not ruminant. 

(Art. 142.) Rule IV. No term must be distributed in the con- 
clusion which was not distributed in one of the premises. 

1. The contrary to this rule, or employing the whole of a 
term in the conclusion, of which only a part had been em- 
ployed in the premises, is equivalent to the introduction 
of four terms, though with only one middle term, and this is 
called an illicit process either of the major or minor term ; 
as 



A. All quadrupeds are animals. 

E. No bird is a quadruped ; therefore 

E. No bird is an animal. Illicit process of the major. 

2. We here find in the conclusion, 1st. the minor term 
" bird," distributed, as well as the major term '^ animal," for 
«' E distributes both." But *' bird" is distributed in the minor 
premiss, which is E, by the same rule. 2d. The major term 
animal distributed, in the conclusion which is not distributed 



ON THE NATURE, &C. OF SYLLOGISM. 207 

in any premiss; certainly not in the major premiss, where it 
is the predicate, for A distributes only the subject. It is 
therefore the illicit process of the major, distributed in the 
conclusion, and not distributed in any preceding premiss. 
There is however another irregularity in the above example, 
since the minor term, *'bird,'^ is not included in, but exclud- 
ed from the middle term '^quadruped," (art. 132.) rendering 
the whole not a perfect syllogism (art. 136.) 

(Art. 143.) Rule V. Two negative or two particular pre- 
mises, prove nothing. 

1. " For in them the middle is pronounced to disagree with 
both extremes ; not to agree with both ; or to agree with one, 
and disagree with the other ; therefore, they cannot be com- 
pared; as, 

A fish is not a quadruped. 

A bird is not a quadruped ; proves Nothing." 

Therefore, in this case a third is brought, from which both 
terms differ. 

^ 2. So also in the case of two particular premises, where 
either the middle term will be distributed, or there will be an 
illicit process ; as 

I. 8ome animals are sagacious. 

O. Some beasts are not sagacious. 
O. Some beasts are not animals. 



The middle term, *^ sagacious," is undistributed, " I distrib- 
utes neither," and the minor term " beast" is excluded from, 
not included in the middle term ; and the major term " ani- 
mals" is distributed in the conclusion, since ** O distributes the 
predicate," which was not distributed in the premises; it is 
likewise, therefore, an illicit process of the major term. 

(Art. 144.) Rule VI. If either premiss be particular or 
negative ; so is also the conclusion. 

1. That is, if either premiss be particular, the conclusion 
is particular ; if either premiss be negative, the conclusion ii 
negative. "If the premiss be negative, the middle term is 
pronounced to disagree with one of the extremes, and in the 
other premiss, which is affirmative, to agree with the other 
extreme, therefore the extremes disagreeing with each other, 
the conclusion is negative. Consequently to prove a negative 
conclusion, one of the premises must be a negative." 



208 ON THE NATURE, &,C. OF SYLLOGISM. 

2. And if either premiss be particular, so must the conclu- 
sion; as, 

All the students that have passed the examination, will receive a diploma. 

Some students have passed the examination. 

From this it can only be infered, that some students, (not 
all,) will receive a diploma. For to infer in such case a uni- 
versal conclusion, would be an illicit process of the minor. 

3. Neither is it in every case possible to infer a universal 
conclusion from even universal premises ; as, 

All gold is precious. 

All gold is a mineral ; therefore 
Some mineral is precious. 

3. But even when we can infer a universal, we are at 
liberty to infer a particular; since what is predicated of all, 
may always be predicated of some of the same class. 

4. According to the preceding definitions and rules, let the 
following syllogisms be examined : 

A. Whatever is an enemy to truth is an enemy to man. 

A. Scepticism is an enemy to truth ; therefore 
A. Scepticism is an enemy to man. 

First, By the definition. Art. 136, the a^ove is a perfect 
syllogism, for the major term, (an enemy to man,) must be 
predicated of the minor term, (scepticism,) consequent on the 
minor term being contained in the middle term, (whatever is 
an enemy to truth,) of which the same major term (an 
enemy to man) is predicated. 

Secondly. The middle term, (whatever is an enemy to 
man,) is distributed according to Rule III., since it is the sub- 
ject of the proposition A, and "A distributes the subject." 

Thirdly. The only term distributed in the conclusion, is 
the subject, "scepticism," of the proposition A, which is dis- 
tributed, according to the Rule, "A distributes the subject;" 
and this term is distributed in the minor premiss, according to • 
the same Rule ; it is therefore distributed in one of^the premi- 
ses, according to Rule IV. 

Fourthly. It contains not either two negative nor two par- 
ticular premises, according to Rule V. and its conclusion is 
universal and afiirmative, for neither of its premises is par- 
ticular or negative, according to Rule VI. 

5. This may serve as an example of logical analysis, to 
show that it would be considerably more easy to introduce 
and practice logical parsing in schools, than the parsing of 



ON THE NATURE, &C. OP SYLLOGISM. 209 

Greek, Latin, or English, according to the grammars of those 
languages, since all the necessary rules are few, easily learned 
and retained in memory; whereas, grammar rules relative to 
etymology, syntax and prosody, are numerous, and^ as gram- 
mars are commonly written, prolix and verbose, and are not, 
without much practice, easily retained. 

6. The learner may exercise his knowledge of the rules 
by the analysis with the following example : 
A. All who wish to propagate error, dislike logic 
A. « Children of the mist " wish to propagate error ; therefore 
A. " Children of the mist " dislike logic. 



INTERROGATORY EXAMINATION 

ON 

CHAP. I. 

Q. 1. What is a premiss 1 Art. 127. 

Q. 2. What is the first premiss contained in an argument called? 127. 
Q. 3. What is the second premiss called 1 127. 
Q. 4. What are the two called 1 127. 
Q. 5. What are premises 1 127. 
Q. 6. What is the conclusion ? 127. 
Q. 7. What is an argument? 128. 

Q. 8. How many terms does a complete argument contain ? 129. 
Q. 9. What is the minor term 1 129. 
Q. 10. What is the major term 1 129. 
Q. 11. What is the middle term? 129. 

Q.. 12. What should be the character of the middle term ? 131. 
Q. 13. Should the minor term be included in, or excluded from the middle 
term? 132. 
Q. 14. How many propositions does an argument contain ? 133. 
Q. 15. What is the major premiss? 134. 
Q. 16. What is the minor premiss ? 134. 

Q. 17. What terms are compared together in the major premiss? 134. 
Q. 18. What terms are compared together in the minor premiss? 134. 
Q. 19. What terms are compared together in the conclusion ?* 134. 

* This, or the third proposition of the syllogism, is sometimes called, before 
it is proved, the question, afterwards the conclusion. 

s2 



210 ON THE MATURE, &C. OF SYLLOGISM. 

Q. 30. Repeat the general law of syllogism, commonly called " Aristotle's 
dictum." 135. 

Q. 21. What is the definition of a perfect syllogism ]* 136. 

Q. 22. If two terms agree with the same middle term, what is your infer- 
ence? 137. 

Q. 23. If one term agrees, and another disagrees with one and the same 
middle term, what is your inference 1 138. 

Q. 24. What are called the extremes of a syllogism 1 

Q. 25. In what proposition do the extremes stand together 1 

Q. 26. What is the first rule relative to the correct construction of a syllo- 
gism 1 139. 

Q. 27. What is the second rule 1 140. 

Q, 28. What is the third rule 1 141. 

Q. 29. What is the fourth rule 1 142. 

Q. 30. What is the fifth rule ] 143. 

Q. 31. What is the sixth rule 1 144. 

Q. 32. Prove that you remember what A distributes. 

Q. 33. What does E distribute 1 

Q. 34. What does I distribute 1 

Q. 35. What does O distribute 1 

Q. 36. Prove your knowledge of this by analyzing or parsing the syllogism 
given under Art. 144, note 6, and show whether it is true or false, according 
to the rules. 



CHAP. II. 

On the Moods and Figures of Syllogisms. 

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. 

1. It will be impossible correctly to understand and practise 
the subject of this chapter, without the recollection of a rule 
already given, (Art. 69, 2) relative to the signification of the 
four symbols, which logicians invariably employ to designate 
the character, as to quality and quantity, (Art. 94, Rule 5, 
note 3, and Rule 6, 7, 8, 9,) of the four principal propositions 
to which all are reducible : viz : ^ always signifies a uni- 
versal affirmative^ E a universal negative, I a particular 

* From luxKoxtviJ.0?, reasoning ; which is from ^vkKoytgo/uai, to reason ; from 
2yv, together, and Aiywy to say, select, count, infer. 



ON THE MOODS, &C. OF SYLLOGISMS. 211 

affirmative, and O a particular negative. Which is easily 
remembered by the aid of the mnemonic lines given, (Art. 70) 
viz: 

Universally, A affirms, and E denies. 

Particularly, I affirms, and O denies. 

2. It has already been intimated that all syllogisms either 
are or may be reduced to the four moods of the first figure, 
which is in strict conformity with the Aristotelian precept, 
" Whatever is predicated of a whole class, (a distributed mid- 
dle,) may be predicated of anything contained in that class,'* 
when the four moods will be expressed by the four following 
associations, — 

A. A. A. E. A. E. A.I.I, and E. I. O. 

For example, 

A. Every flower fades. 

A. Every tulip is a flower ; therefore 

A.' Every tulip fades.* 

E. No flower is always in bloom. 
A. Every rose is a flower ; therefore 
E. No rose is always in bloom. 

A. All flowers are beautiful. 

I. Some things deciduous are flowers ; therefore 

I. Some things deciduous are beautiful. 

E. No star is dark. 

I. Some unseen are stars ; therefore 

O. Some stars unseen are not dark. 

3. According to one of these four moods, viz: A. A. A. ; 
E. A. E. ; A. I. I. ; E. I. O. ; we may always construct our own 
syllogisms. In short they appear to be consistent with the 
usual order of thought, and doubtless are, with the definitions 
of a perfect syllogism, (Art. 136.) *' A perfect syllogism is an 

* Let it not be supposed, in consequence of syllogism being frequently se- 
lected, in logical treatises, of a short and simple character, that they often ex- 
press only an obvious truth. Syllogisms are universal in their application, com- 
prehending all subjects, whether of Divinity, science, of the arts, political eco- 
nomy, or of the general and common business of hfe ; in short, a syllogism 
exists, expressed or implied, wherever such illative words, as therefore, ivhere- 
fore, consequently, &c. rationally exists. But were selections, on every occa- 
sion made from the sciences, &c. they would not be so generally understood ; 
whilst one of a short compass, expressed in a few words, though it contain an 
obvious truth, is not selected on that account, but that it might briefly express 
in a miniature compass, a general form, or be the fac simile to which all others 
of the same mood and figure, and on any subject, obvious or not, may be reduced. 



212 



ON THE MOODS, &C. OF SYLLOGISMS. 



argument so expressed that the major term must be pre- 
dicated of the minor, consequent on that m,inor being con- 
tained in a middle term of which the same m,ajor is pre- 
dicated. 

4. Nothing can be more simple and obvious than this gene- 
ral and infallible law of reasoning : its simplicity is such that 
it may be even ocularly elucidated by a geometrical figure : 
e.g. 

Predicates of the containing square. 



The Major, 



What it predicates of~ 
the square contained in | 
it. 





Middle 






Z 

Minor. 


—I 




Term. 



Predicates of the containing square. 

That is, 
All squares are four-sided figures, having all their sides equal, and their angles 

right angles. 
The figure z is a square ; therefore 
The figure z is a four-sided figure, having all its sides equal, and its angles right 

angles. 

5. We may at least reduce all our reasoning to this sim- 
ple and obvious character, the propriety and necessary con- 
sequence of which is evident to the understanding, and thus 
evident to the eye. We shall, however, meet with syllogisms 
of a dilBTerent form, whether constructed such designedly or 
not ; and the first process w^e should, in such case adopt, would 
we be successful opponents of an adversary, is to convert them 
into one of the four moods of the first figure in which a fallacy 
will be more clearly exposed. Hence the necessity of this 
chapter on the moods and figures of syllogisms, and of the next, 
containing the rules necessary for their reduction. 

(Art. 145.) The mood of a syllogism is that order in which 
the characters of the propositions composing it succeed each 
other. 

1. The character of a proposition is always denoted by 



ON THE MOODS, &C. OP SYLLOGISMS. 213 

either A, E, I, or O. These are sufficiently expressive, and 
indicate all that it is necessary to attend to in this respect. 

2. Since the major premiss may be either A, E, I, or 0, and 
the minor be likewise either, or four times four, the variety 
in the premises may be sixteen ; and since the conclusion is 
also capable of four variations, four times sixteen, or sixty- 

JbuTf is the number of different ways in which A, E, I and O 
can combine in three propositions. 

3. This, however, is a mere arithmetical calculation, with- 
out any regard to those logical rules, which reject fifty-three 
out of the sixty-four, leaving but eleven combinations, viz: — 
AAA, AAI, AEE, AEO, All, AOO, EAE, EAO, ElO, lAI, 
OAO.* 

(Art. 146.) The figure of a syllogism is that position which 

the middle term assumes with respect to the extremes, 

1. The extremes of a syllogism are always the minor and 
^ major terms, which become the extremes of the conclusion. 

(Art. 147.) The middle term being the subject of the ma- 
jor, and predicate of the minor premiss, is the first figure. 

1. This figure is the most natural and clear of all; it is to 
this that Aristotle's dictum applies, and it is the peculiar ex- 
cellency of this figure, that all questions may be proved by it, 
universal or particular, affirmative or negative ; consequently 
to this all other figures may be reduced. 

* The arithmetical combinations are AAA, AAE, AAI, AAO : AE A, AEE, 
AEI, AEO: AIA, AIE, All, AIO: AOA, AOE, AOI, AOO: EAA, EAE, 
EAI, EAO: EEA, EEE, EEI, EEO: EIA, EIE, EII, EIO: EOA, EOE, 
EOI, EOO: lAA, lAE, lAl, lAO : IE A, lEE, lEI, lEO: IIA, HE, III, IIO: 
IOA,IOE, 101,100: OAA, OAE, OAI, OAO: OEA, OEE, OEI, OEO: 
OIA, OIE, on, 010 : OOA, OOE, 001, 000. 

But sixteen of these are excluded by the fifth Rule (Art. 143,) because their 
premises are negative, viz. EEA, EEE, EEF, EEO : EOA, EOE, EOI, EOO: 
OEA, OEE, OEf, OEO: OOA, OOE, 001, 000. Twelve by the same 
Rule, (Art. 143,) because their premises are particular, viz. IIA, IIE, III, IIO: 
lOA, lOE, lOI, 100 : OIA, OIE, Oil, 010. Twelve by the sixth Rule, 
(Art. 144,) because one of the premises is negative and not the conclusion, viz. 
AEA, AEI: AOA, AOI: EAA, EAI: EIA, EII: lEA, lEI: OAA, OAI. 
Eight by the same Rule, (Art. 144,) because one of the premises is particular 
and not the conclusion, viz. AIA, AIE : AOE : EIE : lAA, lAE : lEE : OAE. 
Four, because the conclusion is negative, but neither of the premises : AAE, 
AAO : AIO : lAO. To which must be added I, E, 0, for an illicit process 
of the major in every figure. 

Therefore fifty-three moods are excluded, many of which offend against seve- 
ral rules. There consequently remain eleven, which only are useful in syllo- 
gism, which are already quoted above. 



214 ON THE MOODS, &C. OF SYLLOGISMS. 

(Art. 148. ) The middle term being the predicate of both pre- 
mises, is the SECOND, and the subject of both is the third figure. 

(Art. 149.) The middle term being the predicate of the 
major, and subject of the minor premiss, is the fourth figure. 

1. This figure, in every respect, is the reverse of the first ; 
and as that is the best, this is the v^orst, and most awkward ; 
and merits stating only that it may be, as shall be hereafter 
shown, reduced to the first. 

2. The proper order of a syllogism is to place the major 
premiss, or that which compares the middle term with the 
major first, and the minor premiss, or that which compares 
the middle term with the minor next. 

3. If, in the following examples, each middle term is marked 
as usual with a double line, they will show that varied posi- 
tion of the middle term which constitutes, according to the 
preceding rules, the four figures of syllogism. 

1st Figure. 
All flowers are beautiful. 



Some things deciduous are flowers. 
Some things deciduous are beautiful. 

2d Figure. 
Every flower is deciduous. 

No evergreen is deciduous. 



No evergreen is a flower. 

3d Figure. 
All flowers are beautiful. 



Some flowers are deciduous. 



Some deciduous are beautiful. 

4th Figure. 
Every flower is deciduous. 



Nothing deciduous is an evergreen. 



No evergreen is a flower. 
4. This varied position of the middle term is frequently re- 
presented symbolically, by letters. Only let Y, wherever 
found, signify the middle term, Z the minor, and X the major, 
and the four figures can be thus exhibited. 

First Figure. Second Figure. Third Figure. Fourth Figure. 
YX XY YX XY 

ZY ZY YZ YZ 

ZX ZX ZX ZX 



ON THE MOODS, &.C. OP SYLLOGISMS. 215 

^* Between Y an X we may place either a negative or af- 
firmative copula ; and we may prefix either a universal or 
particular sign to Y. By applying the moods thus to each 
figure, it will be found that each figure will admit six moods 
only, without violating the rules |igainst undistributed middle, 
a.nd against illicit process; and of the moods so admitted, 
several, though valid, are useless, as having a particular con- 
clusion, when a universal might have been drawn;" as 

A. Every wicked man is miserable. 

A. All cruel men are wicked men ; therefore 

I. Some cruel men are wicked men. 

Which admits of a universal, therefore, in the first figure, A, 
A, I, is useless, and for the same reason E, A, O. 

(Art. 151.) The mnemonic line for the four figures, is sub- 

pre, twicepi^e, twicesub, presub. 

1. The above four mnemonic words should be carefully 
committed to memory. They are easily understood, and refer, 
of course, to the premises, and not to the conclusion of a syl- 
logism. The first subpre intimates that the middle term is first 
the subject, then the predicate ; and as the same term cannot 
be both subject and predicate of the same proposition, it will 
be first the subject of the major, and then the predicate of the 
minor premiss. Twicepre intimates that, in the second figure, 
the middle term is first the predicate of the major, and then 
the predicate of the minor premiss. As a similar explanation 
applies to the other two words, their meaning is sufliciently 
evident ; they will be easily remembered, and found to contain 
" multum in parvo." 

2. " Each of the allowable moods mentioned above, (Art. 
145, 3) will not be allowable in every figure; since it may 
violate some of the foregoing rules in one figure, though not in 
another: e.g. I A I, is an allowable mood in the third figure, 
but in the first it would have an undistributed middle. So 
AEE, would in the first figure have an illicit process of the 
major, but is allowable in the second; and AAA, which in 
the first figure is allowable, would in the third have all illicit 
process of the minor, 

o. Because of an undistributed middle, the first figure 
excludes two moods, TAX; and A : the second four, AAA; 
AAI; All; I A I: and the fourth two, A II, and A O. 

Because of the illicit process of the major term, the first 
figure excludes four moods, AEE; AEO; AOO; lEO; 



216 ON THE MOODS, &C. OP SYLLOGISMS. 

the second twoIEO: OAO; the third four AEE; AEO; 
AOO,andIEO; and the fourth two, I E O ; andOAO. 

Because of the illicit process of the minor term, the third 
excludes two AAA; E A E ; and the fourth two, AAA 
and EAR 

The following are also rejected as useless, because of a par- 
ticular conclusion when a universal might be drawn ; viz: 
the first figure, on this account, rejects A A I ; and E A O ; 
the second E A O; and AEO; and the fourth, AEO. 

4. There remain then nineteen moods ; four in the first 
figure ; four in the second ; six in the third; and five in 
the fourth. 

5. This statement of the several causes on account of which 
the above are rejected will be useful, for as they are possible, 
though not allowable combinations, we shall by reference to 
this enumeration, whenever they occur, be enabled by it, as 
well as by the rules, to say on what account they are impro- 
per or inconclusive, i. e. whether on account of, 1. *dn un- 
distributed middle ; 2. The illicit process of the major ; 
3. The illicit process of the minor, or 4. On account of re- 
sulting in a particular conclusion, where a universal 
might be drawn. 

(Art. 151.) The four figures comprise nineteen regular 
moods. 

(Art. 152.) The mnemonic lines of the nineteen moods 

are. 

Figure 1. Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio. 
Figure 2. Cesare, Camestres, Feslino, Baroko. 
Figure 3. Darapti, Disamis, Datisi, Felapton, Bokardo, 
Feliso. 

Figure 4. Bramantip, Camenes, Dimaris, Fesapo, Fresison. 

1. These mnemonic lines will be found, in practice very 
convenient ; since in a few words, easily retained in memory, 
they not only comprise the nineteen moods, and indicate in 
what figure each allowable mood is found, but by their initial 
consonants, BCD F, (and no other initial consonant is found,) 
show to what mood in the first figure, as will be explained in 
the chapter on reduction, any of the remaining fifteen moods, 
may be reduced. Again, no other vowel but A E I O is em- 
ployed, which also signify the character of the three proposi- 
tions composing each mood. ThusBarbara,or bArbArA is ex- 
pressive of the first mood in the first figure, whose three pro- 



ON THE MOODS, &C. OF SYLLOGISMS. 217 

positions AAA are three universal affirmatives. Camestres 
in the second figure, whose three propositions are A E E, and 
is reducible, as its initial consonant C declares to Celarent in 
the first figure : the use of the other letters composing these 
mnemonic words, and their several significations, will be shewn 
in the chapter on reduction. These lines should he carefully 
committed to memory. 

2. By a careful inspection of them, it will be perceived, 
that the proposition A, can only be proved by the first figure; 
in which also conclusions E I O may be proved ; that the 
second figure proves only negative conclusions ; the third only 
particulars : that the first figure requires the major premiss 
to be universal, and the minor affirmative, &c. 

3. It is somewhat amusing to observe, in what manner some, 
writers on Logic too, have been displeased with these lines : 
" Barbarous !" says one ; " barbarous Latin /" says another. 
To suppose that they ever were intended for Latin, when very 
few words of the whole catalogue have that character, is cer- 
tainly ingenious. A third contrives to keep them out of his 
book until the last sheet, when finding his mistake, he allows 
them to pass with a little abuse, but without any explanation 
of their service in reduction. " But cannot they be mended V 
says a fourth ; not knowing that as they stand, unmended, they 
are an excellent string of keys, so formed as to fit every ward, 
every varied sinuosity that fallacy, under the disguise of ob- 
scure mood and figure, has devised ; and to reduce the whole 
to the condition of a perfect syllogism, where truth must be 
seen and error exposed. They are mnemonic terms. And 
mnemonics have been highly appreciated by all acquainted 
with the value of the art, at least from the time of Crassus, 
Seneca and Cicero. Of words similar to these we shall find 
abundance in the treatises on mnemonics either by Feneigle, 
Grey or Murden. But who on looking into these works, jingles 
the peals of his own misconceptions by exclaiming " barbar- 
ous," ^' barbarous Latin," " Hexameters," &c. ; knowing that 
there is a utility in such artificial expressions, and that the 
greater in proportion to the more that for the memory can be 
expressed in a short compass. 

4. Relative to the figures Dr. Whately makes the follow- 
ing remarks : " With respect to the use of the first three 
figures, (for the fourth is never employed but by an accidental 
awkwardness of expression,) it may be observed, that the first 
is that into which an argument will be found to fall the most 
naturally except in the following cases : — First, when we have 

T 



218 ON THE MOODS, &C. OF SYLLOGISMS. 

to disprove something that has been maintained, or is likely to 
be believed, our arguments will usually be found to take most 
conveniently the form of the second figure ; viz : we prove 
that the thing that we are speaking of cannot belong to such 
a class, either because it wants what belongs to the whole of 
that class, (Cesare) or becanse it has something of which that 
class is destitute, (Camestres) ; e. g. "No impostor could 
have warned his followers, as Jesus did, of the persecu- 
tions they would have to submit to;" and again, "an enthu- 
siast would have expatiated, which Jesus and his followers did 
not, on the particulars of a future state." The same observa- 
tions will apply, mictatis mutandis, when a particular con- 
clusion is sought, as in Festino and Baroko. The arguments 
used in the process " Abscissio Infiniti,"* will in general be 
the most easily referred to this figure. The third figure is, of 
course, the one employed when the middle term is singular 
since a singular term can only be a subject. This is also the 
form into which most arguments will naturally fall that are 
used to establish an objection, (Enstasis of Aristotle) to an op- 
ponent's premiss, when his argument is such as to require that 
premiss to be universal. It might be called, therefore, the 
enstatic figure, e.g. if any one contend that "this or that 
doctrine ought not to be admitted because it cannot be ex- 
plained or comprehended ;" his suppressed major premiss may 
be refuted by the argument, that '^ the connexion of the body 
and soul cannot be explained or comprehended, &c. A great 
part of the reasoning of Butler's Analogy may be exhibited 
in this form.'' 

Unless we understand the precise meaning of Aristotle's 
general law, viz. " whatever is predicated of a whole class, 
may be predicated of any thing contained in that class," we 
may, on inspecting some of the following moods and figures, 
suppose them to be violations of this principle. But we have 
to recollect that by the whole class, the middle term is to be 
understood. The rule expressed with greater precision is, 
" Whatever may he predicated of a distributed middle, 
may be predicated of any thing contained in it ;" which 
of course implies, whatever is denied of a distributed mid- 
dle excludes from it all particulars in the whole class de- 
nied. But we are not at liberty to affirm any thing of a par- 
ticular not contained in a middle term, whether that be af- 
firmed of that middle or not ; except to affirm that the par- 

* See Art. 18, note 1. 



ON THE MOODS, &C. OF SYLLOGISMS. 219 

ticular is no part of the middle when the minor term excludes 
itself. To determine these points, the middle term must al- 
ways be known. (See page 35 and seq.) The three cases to 
which we allude may be thus illustrated. 

No part of an eagle is iron. 



All half eagles are parts of an eagle; therefore 
No half eagle is iron. 



No money is iron. 

These tokens are iron ; therefore 
Not one of these tokens is money. 

Here it is not tokens that are thrown out of the class " iron," 
but money ; there is then excluded from the class iron, all 
particulars of the whole class (money) so excluded, whether 
eagles, dollars, cents, sovereigns, &c. 

Whoever has read Persius in Latin, and Homer in Greek, is a classic. 

Sancho read (not Persius in Latin, nor Homer in Greek ;) therefore 
Sancho was not a classic. 

Very true ; but we cannot prove it from a class to which 
poor Sancho never belonged. Bring. Sancho then to his pro- 
per class, and we shall have a proof; viz. 

Whoever has not read Persius in Latin, nor Homer in Greek, is not a classic. 

Sancho read not Persius in Latin, nor Homer in Greek ; therefore 
Sancho was not a classic. 



The First Figure. 



bAr. Every flower is deciduous. 



bA. Every tulip is a flower; therefore 

rA. Every tulip is deciduous. 

cE. No flower is an evergreen. 

lA. Every tulip is a flower ; therefore 

rEnt. No tulip is an evergreen. 



dA. All flowers are beautiful. 



rL Some deciduous plants are flowers ; therefore 

L Some deciduous plants are beautiful. 



^^^ Oi\ THE MOODS, &C. OF SYLLOGISMS. 

f E. No f alling bo dy is a star. 

rl. Some luminous bodies are falling bodies ; therefore 

^ • Some luminous bodies are not stars. 

The Second Figure. 
cEs. No planet is fixed. 

A. Every star is fixed ; therefore 
rE. No star is a planet! 

cAm. Every ^ is fixed.* 

Es. No planet is fixed ; therefore 
trEs. No planet is a star. 

fEs. No planet is a sun. 

tl. Some luminous bodies are suns ; therefore 
nO. Some luminous bodies are not planets. 

bAr. Every star is fixed. 

Ok. Some luminous bodies are not fixed ; therefore 
0. Some luminous bodies are not stars. 

The Third Figure. 

d Ar. All flowers are beautiful. 

Ap. All flowers are deciduous ; therefore 
tl. Some deciduous are beautiful. 

dis. Some flowers are deciduous, 

Am. All flowers are beautiful ; therefore 
Is. Some beautiful are deciduous. 

dAt. All flowers are beautiful. 



Is. Some flowers are decidous ; therefore 
I Some deciduous are beautiful. 

fEl. No star is dark. 
A p. All stars are distant bodies ; 
tOn. Some distant bodies are not dark. 

* Comparatively, not absolutely so. 



ON THE MOODS, &C. OF SYLLOGISMS. 221 



bOk. Some called Christians are not true believers 



Ar. All called Christians profess faith ; therefore 



dO. Some who profess faith are not true believers. 



f Er. No star is dark ; 
Is. Some stars are unseen ; therefore 
On. Some unseen are not dark. 



The Fourth Figure. 
brAm. Every precious stone is a gem ; 

An. Every gem is brilliant ; therefore 

tip. Some things brilliant are precious stones. 

cAm. Every star is a fixed body; 



En. No fixed body is a planet ; therefore 
Es. No planet is a star. 

dim. Some luminous bodies are comets. 

Ar. All comets are wandering planets ; therefore 
Is. Some wandering planets are luminous bodies. 



fEs. No falling body is a star. 

Ap. All stars are luminous ; therefore 

O. Some luminous bodies are not falling bodies. 



frEs. No fixed body is a comet. 
Is. Some comets are luminous ; therefore 



On. Some luminous bodies are not fixed bodies. 



INTERROGATORY EXAMINATION 

ON 

Chap. II. 

Q. 1. What do you understand by the mood of a syllogism 1 Art. 145, 
Q. 2. What is the figure of a syllogism ] 146. 

t2 



222 ON THE MOODS, &C. OF SYLLOGISMS. 

Q. 3. When the middle term is the su'jject of the major and predicate 
the minor premiss, what is the figure 1 147. 

Q. 4. When the middle term is the predicate of both premises, what is the 
figure? 141. 

Q. 5. When the middle term is the subject of both premises, what is the 
figure] 148. 

Q. 6. When the middle term is the predicate of the major and subject of 
the minor premiss, what is the figure 1 149. 

Q. 7. Can you express all this by one mnemonic line ] 150. 

Q. 8. How many moods do the four figures contain ] 151. 

Q. 9. Can you repeat the mnemonic lines relative to these moods 1 153. 

Q. 10. What do the initial consonants of these mnemonic words signify ] 
152, note. 

Q. 11. What do the vowels denote? 152, note. 



CHAP. III. 

On the Reduction of Syllogisms. 

(Art. 153.) The REDucTiojv of a syllogism is that process 
bj which an imperfect mood is changed into a perfect one of 
the first figure. 

1. We are not to understand by the reduction of a syllo- 
gism, that we are at liberty to introduce any new term or pro- 
position. But syllogisms may at all times be reduced from the 
second, third or fourth figures to the first, declaring from the 
same premises the same conclusion, by inferential conversion 
(Art. 100 and 101) whether simple (Art. 102) or particular 
conversion (Art. 103,) and by the transposition of their pre- 
mises as occasion requires, as taught by the mnemonic lines, 
(Art. 152.) 



ON THE REDUCTION OF SYLLOGISMS. 223 

(Art. 154.) Reduction is either ostensive, which shows 
that the conclusion is as it affirms ; or ad impossible, that it 
cannot be otherwise ; or if false, the reverse. 

1. The method of reduction is taught by the mnemonic sym- 
bols (art. 152.) 

First. The initial consonants B C D F, (no others are em- 
ployed,) show to what mood {Barbara, Celarent, Darii, or 
Ferio) of the first figure, the reduction is to be made. 

Secondly. The vowels A E I (no others being used) in- 
dicate the character of the propositions, according to the well 
known signification of these symbols. 

Thirdly. M signifies that the premises are to be transpos- 
ed. S. P. denote that the proposition which the preceding 
vowel stands for, is to be converted, either S simply (art. 102) 
or V particularly (art. 103) and P in the mood Bramantip, 
intimates that the premises warrant a universal conclusion 
instead of a particular. 

Lastly. K is the mark of reduction ad impossible ; i. e. the 
proposition denoted by the vowel immediately before it must 
be left out, and the contradictory of the conclusion substituted ; 
which being done, we shall have in the first figure, a conclu- 
sion, either the same with that premiss, one convertible into 
it, or its contradictory, other letters are not used. 

2. It will be proper here to remember according to art. 95, 
and art. 104 ; that 

A and O or £ and I are contradictories ; and 
By simple conversion E is converted into E, and T into I ; by 
particular conversion A into I ; and E into 0. 

(Art. 155.) For S P convert the proposition, either s simply, 
or p, particularly ; for M transpose the premises; and for K 
reduce ad impossible, by substituting instead of the premiss 
the contradictory of the conclusion, as A for 0, and E for I, 
and vice versa. 



224 



ON THE REDUCTION OF SYLLOGISMS. 



EXAMPLES OF OSTENSIVE REDUCTION. 
The reduction to the first figure of each of the following 
examples, will be found opposite to itself on the next page. 

The Second Figure. 

Convert the whole 

to the mood. 

®Es No planet is fixed — convert simply '\ 



A Every star is fixed — as it is 
rE No star is a planet — as it is 



cAm Every star is fixed 



Es No planet is fixed : 
trEs No planet is a star 



fixed: ") ^^ 
fixed: J "" 



'^anspose the premises, f 
and simply convert E, 

convert simply, 



f Es No planet is a sun : 
tl Some luminous bodies are suns : 



convert simply 
as it is 



Celarent. 



Celarent. 



Ferio. 



nO Some luminous bodies are not planets: as it is 



The Third Figure. 

dAr All flowers are beautiful: as it is 

C convert 
t particularly 
as it is 



Ap All flowers are deciduous : 
tl Some deciduous are beautiful 



dis 



Some flowers are deciduous : "^ 



transpose and 



Am All fl^^;^ are beautiful : * 5 ''""-^^^ ^"""'"''^ ^' 
Is Some beautiful are deciduous : convert simply 



dAt All flowers are beautiful : 



Is Some flowers are plants : 
I Some plants are beautiful : 



as it is 

convert simply 
as it is 



Darii. 



Darii. 



Darii. 



f El No star is dark : 



as it IS 



Ap All stars are distant: convert particularly Q Eerio. 

tOn Some distant bodies are not dark : as it is j 



f Er No star is dark : as it is 

Is Some stars are unseen : convert simply 

On Some unseen are not dark : as it is 



Ferio. 



* Plants omitted for the sake of shortness ; easily understood, 
f By transposing the premises, understand, placing the minor premises in- 
stead of the major, and the major instead of the minor. 



ON THE REDUCTION OF SYLLOGISMS. 225 



The examples opposite on the preceding page, reduced to 

The First Figure. 



cE No fixed body is a planet. 



I A Every star is fixed ; therefore 
rEnt No star is a planet. 



cE No fixed body is a planet. 
lA Every star is fixed ; therefore 



rE;nt No star is a planet. 

f E No sun is a planet. 

rl Some luminous bodies are suns ; therefore 

O Some luminous bodies are not planets. 



dA All flov^ers are beautiful. 



rl Some deciduous plants are flowers ; therefore 
I Some deciduous plants are beautiful. 



dA All flovs^ers are beautiful. 



rl 

I 


Some plants are flowers ; therefore 
Some plants are beautiful. 


fE 


No star is dark. 


rl 


Some distant bodies are stars ; therefore 





Some distant bodies are not dark. 


fE 


No star is dark. 


rl 


Some unseen are stars ; therefore 


O 


Some unseen are not dark. 



226 ON THE SEDUCTION OF SYLLOGISMS. 

The fourth figure. 

brAm Every precious stone is a Z^^.^^^.p^,^ the 1 

. _ . u -ii- * 1 premises. C Barbara. 

An Every gem is brilliant : J T 

tip Some brilliant stones are precious, change to universal. ^ 

c Am Every star is a fixedbodyj ^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^ "^ 

En No fixed body is a ^aliit: 5 ^''^"'''''' ^Celarent. 

Es No ^I^l^is altiT convert simph J 

dim Some luminous bodies are comets : ^ "^ 

i- transpose. ^ ^ .. 

Ar AH comets are irregular planets : J ^ ' 

Is Some irregular planets are luminous bodies, con. simply. ) 



fEs No falling body is a star : convert simply. "^ 

Ap All stars are luminous : convert particularly. ? Ferio. 

O Some luminous bodies are not falling bodies. as it is. \ 



frEs No fixed body is a comet : convert simply. J 

Is Some comets are luminous : convert simply. ^ ^^^' 

O Some lunimous bodies are not fixed. as it is. J 



ON THE REDUCTION OF SYLLOGISMS. 227 

bAr Every gem is brilliant. 



bA Every precious stone is a gem. 
rA All precious stones are brilliant. 



cE No fixed body is a planet. 

lA Every star is a fixed body. 
rEnt No star is a planet. 



d A All comets are irregular planets. 

r I. Some luminous bodies are comets. 
I. Some luminous bodies are irregular planets. 



fE No star is a falling body. 
rl Some luminous bodies are stars. 



O Some luminous bodies are not falling bodies. 



fE No comet is a fixed body. 

rl Some luminous bodies are comets. 



O Some luminous bodies are not fixed bodies. 



228 ON THE REDUCTION OF SYLLOGISMS. 

REDUCTION AD IMPOSSIBLE. 

(Art. 157.) "Reduction ad impossible proves, in the first 

figure, not directly that the original conclusion is true, but that 

it cannot be false, or that an absurdity would follow from the 

supposition of its being false." 

1. This kind of reduction is chiefly employed for Baroko 
and Bokardo ; for example 

bAr. Every star is fixed. 

Ok. Some luminous bodies are not fixed. 
0. Some luminous bodies are not stars. 



If this conclusion be not true, its contradictory must be true : 
let this then be tried, by substituting as K implies (Art. 154, 
n. 1) instead of the " proposition denoted by the vowel imme- 
diately before K, the contradictory of the conclusion.'^ If this 
lead to a true consequence, the above conclusion is false, oth- 
erwise true ; as 

bAr. Every star is fixed. 

bA. All luminous bodies are stars. 

r A. The false consequence to which this would lead, viz. all 
luminous bodies are fixed, proves that the original is true. 

bAr. All true patriots are friends to religion. 



Ok. Some great statesmen are not friends to religion. 
0. Some great statesmen are not true patriots. 

The minor of this syllogism is false, and therefore leads to a 
false conclusion. But how is this to be proved ? It may be 
proved by the substitution of the contradictory of the conclu- 
sion, viz. "all great statesmen are true patriots," instead of 
the proposition of K : we shall then have both premises uni- 
versal, in the mood Barbara, and shall be warranted in draw- 
ing a universal conclusion; as, 

All true patriots are friends to religion. 



All great statesmen are true patriots. 

All great statesmen are fri ends to religion. 

This true conclusion proves the original one false from a 
false minor. Be this then the character of a great statesman, 
for such and such only are great. 



ON THE REDUCTION OP SYLLOGISMS. 229 

INTERROGATORY EXAMINATION 

ON 

Chap. HI. 

Q. 1. Explain what is meant by the reduction of a syllogism. Art. 153. 

Q. 2. Into what figure is all reduction effected 1 154. 

Q. 3. What is ostensive reduction 1 154. 

Q. 4. What is reduction ad impossible ] 154. 

Q. 5. What do the initial consonants of the mnemonic lines, beginning with 
" Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio," signify 1 154, notes. 

Q. 6. What do the vowels of those words denote 1 1 54, notes. 

Q. 7. When a mnemonic word begins with B, as Bramantip, into what 
mood of the first figure would you reduce 1 154, notes. 

Q. 8. When a mnemonic word begins with C, as Cesare, Camestres or Ca- 
menes, into what mood of the first figure would you reduce 1 154, notes. 

Q. 9. When a mnemonic word begins with D, as Darapti, Disamis, Datisi, 
Dimaris, into what mood of the first figure would you reduce 1 154, notes. 

Q. 10. When a mnemonic word begins with F, as Festino, Felapton, Fre- 
sison, into what mood of the first figure would you reduce ? 154n tes. 

Q. 11. What do the other consonants of these words, or consonants not 
initial, indicate 1 154, notes. 

Q. 12. Repeat the mnemonical lines, showing the meaning of these conso- 
nants. 155. 

Q. 13. What does S signify ] 155. 

Q. 14. What does P signify 1 155. 

Q. 15. What does M signify 1 155. 

Q. 16. What does K signify ■? 155. 

Q. 17. How would you reduce the mood Cesare 1 

Q. 18. How would you reduce the mood Festino] 

Q. 19. How would you reduce the mood Darapti 1 

Here further examples for exercise may be taken from the Appendix. 

U 



CHAP. IV. 
On Hypothetical Syllogisms. 

(Art. 157.) A hypothetical syllogism is that in which one or 
more of its propositions are conditional or disjunctive. 

1. Example ; 

If there is a God, the v/orld is governed by providence. 

But there is a God ; therefore 

The world is governed by providence. 

2. For the definition of a conditional proposition see Art. 81 ; 
of a disjunctive, Art. 80. 

3. These syllogisms admit of two sorts of true argumenta- 
tion, whether the major is conditional or not. 

First, when the antecedent is asserted in the minor, that 
the consequent may be asserted in the conclusion ; as in the 
preceding: example. This is called arguing from the posi- 
tion of the antecedent to the position of the consequent. 

Secondly, when the consequent is contradicted in the minor 
proposition, that the antecedent may be contradicted in the 
conclusion; as, 

If Atheists are in the right, then the world exists without a cause. 
But the world does not exist without a cause ; therefore 
Atheists are not in the right. 

This is called arguing from removing of the consequent 
to the removing of the antecedent. 

4. " When a hypothetical conclusion is inferred from a hy- 
pothetical premiss, so that the force of the reasoning does not 
turn on the hypothesis, then the hypothesis must be consider- 
ed as part of one of the terms, so that the reasoning will be 
in effect absolute ; as 

Predicate. 



Every conqueror is either a hero or a villain. 
Caesar was a conqueror ; therefore 

, ^ > 

Caesar was either a hero or a villain. 

5. "But when the reasoning itself rests on a hypothesis, in 
which an absolute conclusion may be drawn from a hypotheti- 
cal premiss, this is what properly is called a hypothetical syl- 



ON HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISMS. 231 

logism, and rules have been devised for ascertaining the vali- 
dity of such arguments at once without bringing them into the 
form of simple syllogisms. In these syllogisms the hypotheti- 
cal premiss is the major, and the absolute one the minor." 
For the general construction of a hypothetical syllogism is, 
that the first proposition is hypothetical, and the minor and 
conclusion absolute. 

(Art. 1 58.) A hypothetical proposition is either conditional; 
as, if he is w^ise, he is happy ; or disjunctive ; as, either it is 
true or it is false. 

(Art. 159.) A conditional syllogism is that vi^hose major pre- 
miss is conditional. * 

(Art. 160.) In a conditional proposition, the clause contain- 
ing the condition, is called the antecedent ; that containing 
the assertion, the consequent ; the connexion between them, 
the consequence. 

1. The natural order is that the antecedent precede the 
consequent ; though this is frequently reversed ; as " The hus- 
bandman is well off, if he know his own advantages." — Virg. 

(Art. 161.) The rules of conditional propositions are three. 

Rule I. If the antecedent be granted, so is the consequent. 

Rule II. If the consequent be taken away, so is the ante- 
cedent. 

Rule III. Nothing can be inferred either from taking away 
the antecedent, or granting the consequent. 

1. The truth or falsity of a conditional proposition depends 
entirely on the consequence ; as, if mineralogy be useless, it 
deserves to be neglected ; here both the antecedent and con- 
sequent are false ; yet the whole proposition is true ; i. e. it is 
true that the consequent follows from the antecedent. 

If men be fallible free agents, they need the restraints of gov ernment. 
But men are fallible free agents ; therefore 
Men need the restraints of government. 

2. It is evident on the inspection of this example, 1st, that 

* Syllogisms are sometimes divided into 1st. Absolute, i. e. consisting of 
propositions which absolutely affirm or deny ; and 2dly. Hypothetical, or those 
which contain at least one proposition of a conditional character. 



232 ON HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISMS. 

the major proposition is conditional, and the minor and con- 
clusion absolute. This then constitutes a hypothetical syllo- 
gism. 2. That the same major consists of two entire propo- 
sitions, which together make an enthymeme ; which enthy- 
meme, if absolutely expressed, would be, men are fallible 
free agents, therefore they need the restraints of govern- 
ment. But before we can make it absolute, the condition- 
ality of the major premiss, expressed by " if," must be de- 
stroyed. The minor premiss effects this, and by affirming ab- 
solutely, " men are fallible free agents," destroys if, and we 
have our enthymeme extricated from its difficulty, speaking 
unconditional language, " meii are faUible free agents, there- 
fore they need the restraints of government:" it is now, there- 
fore, reducible to the syllogistic form, viz: 

All fallible fr ee agents need the restraints of government. 

Men are fallible free agents ; therefore 
Men need the restraints of government. 

3. Every conditional syllogism is either equivalent to an 
absolute syllogism, or wholly to be rejected. For in every 
conclusive conditional there is an absolute implied, in which 
the same argument would prove the same conclusion. 

4. For in all hypothetical syllogisms the major proposition, 
consisting of two absolute propositions, (i. e. on the removal of 
the connective if) the minor is either one of these, or the con- 
tradictory to it, in order to infer, either the other, or its contra- 
dictory. In either case an enthymeme will be proposed, whose 
force lies in the conditional proposition, and which is not con- 
clusive unless from that proposition there can be drawn a com- 
pletory, that is, the premiss which is wanting in an enthymeme 
to complete the syllogism. 

5. Now as an enthymeme is only one premiss with the con- 
clusion of a syllogism, it has three, and only three terms. 
Suppose two of them are D and a, and c the third term. The 
other premiss, whose terms are D, and a is wanting; hence 
it follows, that according to the various dispositions of the terms, 
there are four forms of enthymeme, each of which will admit 
of a twofold completory ; as in the following scheme. 

The Enthymeme. | The Completory Da | aD 



CD. 


therefore Ca. 


The Major. 


in Fig. 1. 


in Fig. II. 


DC. 






in Fig. in. 


in Fig. IV. 


CD. 


therefore aC. 


The Minor. 


in Fig. IV. 


in Fig. II. 


DC. 






in Fig. III. 


in Fig. I. 



6. Wherefore, as there are nineteen moods of absolute syl- 
logism, and as each figure may be applied twice, to complete 



ON HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISMS. 233 

an enthymeme, there will be thirty-eight ways, in which a 
man may argue with a syllogism, whose major is conditional. 

(Art. 162.) There are two kinds of conditional syllogism, 
the constructive, answering to direct reasoning, and the de- 
structive, answering to indirect reasoning. 

1. The destructive *'is in fact a mode of throwing the 
indirect form of reasoning into the direct" ; as, " if C be not 
the centre of the circle, some other point must be ; which is 
impossible : therefore, C is the centre." Euclid, B. III. Pr. 1. 

(Art. 163.) The constructive is when, by granting the an- 
tecedent, you admit the consequent ; 1, as. 

Major prop. If this man has a fever, he is sick. 
Minor prop. This man has a fever ; therefore 
Conclusion. This man is sick. 

Major prop. If the crops are not bad, corn must be cheap. 
Minor prop. But the crops are not bad ; therefore 
Conclusion. Corn must be cheap. 

(Art. 163.) The destructive is when, by denying the con- 
sequent, you infer the contradictory of the antecedent. 

Major prop. If this man has a fever, he is sick. 

Minor prop. This man is not sick ; therefore ^ 

Conclusion. This man has not a fever. 

Major prop. If the crops are not bad, corn must be cheap. 
Minor prop. Corn is not cheap ; therefore 
Conclusion. The crops are bad. 

2. But if you affirm the consequent^ or deny the antecedent^ 
you can infer nothing, (126) for the same consequence may 
follow from other antecedents ; as, in the case above, a man 
may be sick from other disorders besides a fever; therefore it 
does not follow from his being sick that he has a fever ; or, 
for the same reason, from his not having a fever, that he is 
not sick. It is evident, therefore, that there can only be two 
kinds of conditional syllogism; viz. 1, the constructive ; as if 
CD, then ka; but CD, therefore Ka; and the destructive; as 
if CD, then Ka; but not Ka, therefore not CD. 

(Art 165.) A disjunctive syllogism is that whose major pre- 
miss is disjunctive. 

The earth moves in a circle or an ellipse ; but 
The earth does not move in a circle ; therefore 
The earth moves in an ellipse. 

U3 



234 ON HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISMS. 

1. For the definition of a disjunctive proposition, see Art. 80. 

2. A disjunctive syllogisnn naay, as the propositions of which 
it is composed, have many parts, i. e. subjects or predicates ; as 

It is either spring, summer, autumn or winter ; but 
It is not summer, autumn or winter ; therefore 
It is spring. 

(Art. 166.) Since any disjunctive is easily turned into a con- 
ditional, the directions given for the one serve equally for the 
other. 

1. For example; 

It is either true or false. 
But it is true ; therefore it is not false. 
But it is false ; therefore it is not true. 
It is not true ; therefore it is not false. 
It is not false ; therefore it is not true. 

Instead of this, it is easy to say, 

If it is true, then it is not false. 
If it is false, then it is not true. 
If it is not true, then it is false. 
It is not false, then it is true, 

2. " A Disjunctive may consist of any number of absolute 
propositions; and of these, some one at least must be true, or 
the whole proposition will be false : if, therefore, one or more 
of these absolute propositions be denied, you may infer that 
the remaining one, or (if several) some one of the remaining 
ones is true ; as, " either the earth is eternal, or the work of 
chance, or the work of an intelligent Being ;" it is not eternal 
nor the work of chance ; therefore it is the work of an intelli- 
gent Being. 

3. In examples similar to these it is implied not only that 
one of the members must be true, but that only one can be 
true ; so that in such cases, if one or more be affirmed, the rest 
may be denied. But this is by no means universally the case; 
as, virtue tends to procure us either the esteem of mankind or 
the favor of God ; here both members are true, and conse- 
quently by affirming one we are not authorised to deny the 
other. 

(Art. 167.) A dilemma is a conditional syllogism with two 

or more antecedents in the major, and a disjunctive minor. 

Major. '• If ^schines joined in the public rejoicings, he is inconsistent ; if 

he did not he is unpatriotic. 
Minor. But ^schines either joined or did not; 
Conclus. ^schines is either inconsistent or unpatriotic." 

[Demosth. fok the crowk. 



ON HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISMS. 235 

3. This kind of reasoning, is very connmon with Euclid ; 
when about to demonstrate the equality of two figures, he 
frequently assumes that if the one is not equal to the other, it is 
either greater or less : and having destroyed both these sup- 
positions on which the assertion of their inequality can rest, 
he thence infers, by this indirect reasoning, the equality of the 
figures, and the absurdity of its contradiction. 

3. The two conditionals that constitute the major premiss 
may sometimes be omitted in one proposition by means of the 
word, whether ; as, " if the blest in heaven have no desires, 
they will be perfectly content ; so they will be if their desires 
are fully gratified;" may be reduced to" whether the blest, 
&c. have no desires, or have them gratified they will be con- 
tent.'' 

4. If the several antecedents have each a different con- 
sequent, then the antecedents being disjunctively granted, you 
can only disjunctively infer the consequent as in the first ex- 
ample. This case is that of the constructive dilemma. 

5. '* In the destructive form if you deny the whole of the 
consequent or consequents, you may deny the whole of the 
antecedents ; as " if the world were eternal, the most useful 
arts, (such as printing, &c.) would be of unknown antiquity :" 
and on the same supposition there would be records long prior 
to the Mosaic ; and likewise the sea and land, in all parts of 
the globe might be expected to maintain the same relative 
situations now as formerly ; but none of these is the fact, there- 
fore the world is not eternal. 

6. Or, 

Major. If the world existed from eternity there would be records prior to the 
Mosaic : and if it were produced by chance it would not bear 
marks of design. 
Minor. But there are no records prior to the Mosaic ; and the world does 
bear marks of design ; therefore 
Conclas. The world neither existed from eternity, nor is it the work of 
chance. 

7. " These, though commonly called dilemmas, hardly differ 
from conditional syllogisms, two or more being expressed to- 
gether. Nor is the case different, if you have one antecedent 
with several consequents, which consequents you disjunctively 
deny ; for that comes to the same thing as wholly denying 
them ; since if they be not all true, the one antecedent must 
equally fall to the ground ; and the syllogism will be equally 
simple. 

8. That is more properly called a destructive dilemma 
which has a disjunctive minor premiss ; i. e. when you have 



236 ON hy'pothetical syllogisms. 

several antecedents with each a different consequent ; which 
consequents, instead of wholly denying them, you disjunctive- 
ly deny; and thence, in the conclusion, deny disjunctively the 
antecedents; as, 

Major. If this man were wise, he would not speak irreverently of Scripture 

in jest ; and if he were good, he would not do so in earnest ; 
JSiinor. But he does it either in jest or in earnest; therefore 
Conclus. This man is either not wise, or he is not good. 

9. '^ Every dilemma may be reduced into two or more sim- 
ple, absolute syllogisms : as, the first example, * If ^schines 
joined, &c. he is inconsistent ; he did join, &c. therefore he is 
inconsistent;' and again, 'If ^Eschines did not join, &c. he is 
unpatriotic ; he did not, &c. therefore he is unpatriotic' Now 
an opponent has his choice to deny either, of the minor pre- 
mises, but he cannot deny both, and therefore he must ad- 
mit one or other of the conclusions : for when a dilemma is 
employed, it is supposed that some one of the antecedents is 
true ; or, in the destructive kind, some one of the consequents 
false, but that we cannot tell which of them is so, and this is 
the reason why the argument is stated in the form of a dilem- 
ma."— Z?r. Whately. 

10. A dilemma is of no force, unless, 1. One or the other 
part must be accepted. 2. Either one or the other prove the 
point. And 3. It cannot be retorted. For example Bias tells 
you, " If you marry a beautiful woman, she will be vain ; if an 
ugly one, despised ; therefore marry none." Now had Bias 
observed the three conditions specified he would have perceived 
that his argument fails in every particular ; for, 1. A wife may 
neither be beautiful nor ugly ; therefore neither part of the 
dilemma need be accepted. 2. Neither is every beautiful wo- 
man vain, nor every ugly one despised. Therefore neither 
part of it proves the point. 3. It may be retorted thus, If I 
marry the one at least she will not be vain ; if the other, she 
will not be despised. 

11. To exemplify the dilemma further, and the mode of re- 
torting it, the following case is quoted. Euathlus promised Pro- 
tagoras a reward when he had taught him the art of plead- 
ing and it was to be paid on the first day that he gained any 
cause in the court. After some time Protagoras goes to law 
with Euathlus for the reward, and uses this dilemma. 

Either the cause will go on my side, or on yours ; 

If the cause go on ray side, you must pay ms according to the sentence of the 
judge. 

If the cause go on your side, you must pay me according to your bargain ; there- 
fore 

Whether the cause go for me or against me, you must pay me the reward. 



ON HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISMS. 137 

But Euathlus retorted this dilemma thus ; 

Either I shall gain the cause or lose it ; 

If I gain the cause then nothing will be due to you, according to the sentence 

of the judge ; 
But if I lose the cause nothing will be due to you, according to my bargain ; 

therefore 
Whether I lose or gain the cause, nothing will be due to you. 

(Art. 168.) Hypothetical syllogisms may be reduced to the 
absolute form by considering every conditional proposition a 
universal affirmative, of which the terms are entire propositions, 
viz: the antecedent the subject, and the consequent the pre- 
dicate; as, 

If the stoics are right, then pain is no evil ; 
But pain is an evil ; therefore 
The stoics are not right. 

Reduced thus : 

The case of the stoics being right, is the case of pain being no evil ; 
The present case is not the case of pain being no evil ; therefore 
The present case is not the case of the stoics being right. 

This is Camestres, Vvhich is easily reduced to Celarent ; or 
all conditional syllogisms may be reduced to Barbara, by con- 
sidering them as constructive. 

2. The reduction of Hypotheticals may be always effected 
either in the manner stated, or by unfolding the argument into 
two syllogisms ; or we may, when requisite, subject any argu- 
ment io the test of Aristotle's dictum, in order to show that 
all reasoning turns upon one simple principle. 

3. Certain writers on the subject of Logic have specified 
other kinds of what they conceive to be syllogism ; some of 
which, however, are not even argument, but propositions, 
each expressing its own truth, placed the one after the other, in 
consecutive, or grammatical, but not in argumentative connec- 
tion. These, whatever writers on Logic may do, Logic itself 
does not recognize, until they are reduced, as all, not exclud- 
ing hypotheticals, may, to the one only form it proposes as a 
universal test, by which to try not one or fifty modes, but the 
whole of all argumentation, and of every thing having the 
least claim to that character ; to which if any thing assum- 
ing the appearance of reasoning does not conform, nor bear 
the rigor of its examination, it certainly is to be rejected, as 
that which classes with fallacy and not with either truth or 
argument. 



238 ON HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISMS. 



INTERROGATORY EXAMINATION 

ON 

Chap. IV. 

Q. 1. What is meant by a hypothetical syllogism'? Art. 157. 

Q. 2. How many kinds of hypothetical syllogisms do you enumerate 1 158. 

Q. 3. What are the parts of a conditional proposition'? 160. 

Q. 4. Repeat the rules of hypothetical syllogisms. 161. 

Q. 5. If you grant the antecedent what is the result 1 161. 

Q. 6, If you deny the consequent what is the result 1 161. 

Q. 7. What is a disjunctive syllogism '? 165. 

Q. 8. What is a dilemma? 167. 



CHAP. V. 

On the Enthymeme^ Sorites, Induction, S^c. 

There are certain other forms of argument, whose ordinary 
form, though not in regular syllogistic order, may be easily 
reduced to it, or to the test of the general law of reasoning. 
These either are syllogisms with a suppressed premiss, a series 
of abridged syllogisms, or one or more expanded ; such as the 
enthymeme, the sorites, the epichirema, &c. 

(Art. 169.) The enthymeme is a syllogism with one premiss 

suppressed. 

1. As, '< he is a good man ; therefore, he is happy.'' Here 
the major premiss " all good men arc happy," is suppressed. 
" Every man is mortal ; therefore every king is mortal ;" here 
the minor, " every king is a man," is the suppressed premiss. 

2. Sometimes the whole argument is abridged into one sen- 
tence ; as, " being mortal, do not bear immortal hatred ;" but 
as all the terms v^ill be found in the expressed premiss and con- 
clusion, it will be easy to fill up the syllogism by supplying the 
premiss that is wanting. 

3. This is the ordinary form of speaking or writing. It is 
evident that the enthymeme may be filled up hypothetically. 



ON THE ENTHYMEME, SORITES, INDUCTION, &C. 2^ 

The premiss of an enthymeme is sometimes called the ante- 
cedent, the conclusion, the inference, and the suppressed pre- 
miss, the completory. 

4. The moment an enthymeme is contested, it will be ne- 
cessary to add the completory, and to prove the whole by the 
stricter rules that apply exclusively to the syllogistic form. 

(Art. 170.) A sorites is a series of abridged syllogisms, so 
arranged that the conclusion only of each is made the pre- 
miss of the next ; and \h^ predicate of every preceding pro- 
position is made the subject of the next, until the predicate of 
the last is predicated of the subject of ihe first. 

1. As, 

There can be no enjoyment of property without government. 
No government without laws enforced. 
No laws enforced without a magistrate. 
No magistrate without obedience. 

And no obedience where every one acts as he pleases ; therefore 
There can be no enjoyment of property, where every one acts as he pleases, 

2. A sorites has as many middle terms as there are inter- 
mediate propositions between the first and the last ; and con- 
sequently it may be drawn out into as many separate syllo- 
gisms. This kind of argument, therefore, as it serves to unite 
several syllogisms into one, must stand upon the same founda- 
tion with the syllogisms of which it consists ; and is, indeed, 
properly speaking, no other than a compendious way of rea- 
soning syllogistically, and can be tried only by the same test. 

4. A series of hypothetical syllogisms, may, in a similar 
manner, be abridged into a sorites ; as 

If the Scriptures are the word of God, it is important that they should be 
well explained. 

If it is important that they should be well explained, they deserve to be di- 
ligently studied. 

If they deserve to be diligently studied, an order of men should be set aside 
for that purpose, 

But the Scriptures are the word of God ; therefore, an order of men should 
be set aside for that purpose. 

(Art. 171.) The Epichirema is a syllogism in which the 
major and minor are proved before the conclusion ; as. 

Major. Parties that aim at universal supremacy are not eligible to the exercise 
of the legislative function. 



240 ON THE ENTHYMEME, SORITES, INDUCTIOX, &C. 

Because all their legislative acts would be biassed by an 
aim incompatible with the general welfare, and with the 
established principles of a free state. 

Minor. The party x — y aims at universal supremacy, 

> ■ 

This is proved, 1st, by their principles written and declared 
in authentic and acknowledged documents. 2dly, By their 
acts approved or not censured by their polity. 3dly, By the 
injurious means adopted to disseminate or enforce those prin- 
ciples, and sanction those acts; therefore 

Conclus. The party x — y is not eligible to the exercise of the legislative 
function. 

Example 2d. 

Major. A religion attested by miracles is from God. 

Because an infinitely wise, benevolent Being, that ordains 
and preserves the laws of nature, would not allow them to be 
suspended or controlled, except for purposes congenial to his 
own nature, and promotive .of his wise and benevolent designs. 

Minor. The Christian Religion was attested by miracles. 

This is attested 1st, By those who could have no worldly 
prospect in view consequent on such testimony, but, on the 
contrary, had to contemplate, as the inevitable consequence, 
every secular privation and affliction, and even loss of proper- 
ty and life, by all the cruelties that persecution and the 
opposers of Christianity could inflict. 

2. By the testimony of the very enemies and opposers of 
Christianity themselves, as appears from the evidence of many 
profane writers; and " fas est doceri ab hoste." 

3. By the benign and happy effects on the moralization 
and reform of mankind, consequent on an efficient embracing 
of that Christianity in all its consequences, which is attested 
by miracles. 

Conclusion, therefore, The Christian Religion is from God. 

3. The epichirema is simply an expanded syllogism. 
It may frequently be employed in writing, in orations, and in 
treatises. Each part of the argument involving a series of 
inferential and conclusive enthymemes or syllogisms, as dis- 
tinct parts of the original premiss, though not formally 
expressed as such, comprises its own proof. Thus, the origi- 
nal major and minor premiss of the involving syllogism is 
distinctly proved, as the argumentative^ process moves to the 
conclusion. 



ON THE ENTHYMEME, SORITES, &C. 241 

4. We are not to infer from the terms usually employed to 
denote the different subjects or objects of reasoning, as, a prio- 
ri, a posteriori, a fortiori, direct or indirect demonstration, 
argumentum ad hominem, ad verecundiam, ad ignoran- 
tiam, ad populam, or ad judicium, that these or any of 
them express any different kind o( argument as to form; 
they merely differ according to the nature of the middle term 
selected, or the object in view, and are either enthematic or 
reducible, in common with every process of reasoning, to the 
general form, in which alone they may be subject to the tests 
pecuHar to the syllogism. 

5. Reasoning a priori, is that which infers an effect from 
its necessary cause, as when we prove that the sun will be 
eclipsed when the moon intervenes between us and him. 
Reasoning a posteriori, is that which infers the cause from 
its effect, as when we infer that the earth is spherical, from 
its shadow on the moon, or the possibihty of its being circum- 
navigated. Reasoning a fortiort,* consists in deducing a 
proposition as true, from a less to a more obvious proposition, 
involved by the same principle. Thus, if the felon, who robs 
on the highway, deserves the punishment of death, this retribu- 
tion is due to the stronger case, to the wretch guilty of parricide. 

6. Reasoning is direct, when the proofs are so selected as 
to show immediately the agreement or disagreement between 
the subject and predicate of the conclusion. It is indirect, 
when the predicate of the conclusion admits an alternative, 
the one the contradictory of the other, so that, if one is true, 
the other must be false or absurd, and there is no medium 
but to accept of this absurdity, or to admit the only conclusion 
that can, in such case, be true. Thus Euclid proves by an 
indirect course, that "if two circles touch each other inter- 
nally, they cannot have the same centre." He first supposes 
the contrary to be true, namely, that the two circles have the 
same centre, and no third supposition can be made, for they 
must either both have the same centre or not. He then 
demonstrates the impossibility of the case assumed, and then 
infers the truth of the proposition which he first asserted. 
Thus it is proved that the moon is either opaque or transpa- 
rent; as, it is not transparent, because, if it were, it would 
transmit the rays of the sun through it when it comes between 
the sun and the earth, and no eclipse of the sun could happen 

* A fortiori can only mean,/row: a stronger case, to one less so, but in the sense 
in which it is commonly interpreted, it should be ad fortiorera, to a stronger, &c. 

X 



242 ON THE ENTHYMEME, SORITES, &C. 

from the intervention of it between the sun and the earth* 
But this conclusion is contrary to truth, for such eclipses do 
happen. The alternative, therefore, that the moon is a trans- 
parent body must be false, and consequently the original 
predicate must be true, viz. that the moon is an opaque 
body. The refutation of the alternative is always pursued 
till it terminate in some contradiction or absurdity, and on 
this account, indirect reasoning is generally termed '^reductio 
ad ahsurdumP 

7. Argumentum ad hominem, literally an argument, not to a 
man, but to the man, that particular character with whom 
you are engaged ; or even though a singular itself, in the plu- 
ral sense, to the men, according to the peculiarity of their 
principles, opinions or prejudices. It is frequently employed 
for a good purpose, and occasionally, for such sometimes is 
either the narrow-mindedness or obstinacy of men, necessarily 
so. '<It is in this way that our .Lord, frequently silenced the 
cavils of the Jews; as, in the vindication of healing on the 
sabbath, which is paralleled" by their own allowed practice 
of drawing out a beast on that day, that had fallen into the, 
pit ; a practice which evinced their own general principle to 
be, that to do good on the Sabbath was lawful, in their case, 
to a beast, and therefore, much more in the nobler act 
to a man. This kind of reasoning, in such cases as this, ap- 
plicable to a good purpose, nevertheless, in common with all 
other good or useful things, is capable of being abused by its 
application to a bad one. It is however, as well as all reason- 
ing, reducible to the syllogistic form, in which, itself, its pre- 
mises, and their connection, may be subjected to the same test, 
as well as any other mode of reasoning. 

8. Argumentum ad verecundiam is that w^hich derives its 
middle term or premises, however expressed or put together, 
from the sentiments, or opinions of some wise, great or good 
men, whose authority we reverence, and scarcely can pre- 
sume to oppose; i. e. an address to ourmodesty. 

9. Argumentum ad ignorantiam, improperly termed argu- 
ment, bears on the very face of it intended deception, a fal- 
lacy practised on the ignorant, a device, alas ! too common, 
and wickedly employed by the children of him who is the 
father of lies, for the interest of self pocket oy party. Ar- 
gumentum ad POPULUM, or argument addressed to the people, 
or to the passions of human nature, as well as argumentum 
AD captandum, argument to catch, are the two big guns of 
the demagogue, which he employs instead of either argumen- 



ON THE ENTHYMEME, SORITES, &C. 243 

TUM AD REM, argument to the point, or argumentum ad ju- 
dicium argument to the understanding or judgment, or to the 
cool and deliberate considerations of men, who without his 
political fanaticism would be calm, and adopt measures more 
conducive to the public welfare than the inflammatory com- 
bustibles to which he invites their torch. 



INTERROGATORY EXAMINATION 

ON 

Chap. V. 

■Q. l.'Whatkind of argument is an enthymeme 1 Art. 169. 

Q. 2. Give an example of an enthymeme. 169. 

Q. 3. What kind of an argument is the sorites 1 170. 

Q. 4. Can you give an example of the sorites 1 170. 

Q. 5. What is an epichirema 1 171. 



CHAP. VI. 

General Remarks on Arguments, S^c. 

1. The several kinds of argument enumerated in the pre- 
ceding chapter, especially the common enthymeme, are so 
many distinct modes of modern as wellas of «7?C2e7Z^ reason- 
ing; and they are all, whenever necessary, reducible to one 
form. Induction and analogy are syllogistic ; an enthymeme 
is a part of a syllogism, and with its completory constitutes a 
whole one. A sorites is a series of the parts of several syllo- 
gisms, the completories being implied, and necessary if con- 
tested. The epichirema is an expanded syllogism, or a syllo- 
gism involving the parts or the whole of many others. Ma- 
thematical demonstration itself implies one or more syllo- 
gisms. All the rest are parts, or syllogisms out of order; in 
which state they may frequently, and that reasonably, be 
satisfactory to some or to many, as they stand, and may be 



244 GENERAL REMARKS ON ARGUMENTS. 

explained to more, but can h^ demonstrated to none, except 
by the one, the only known law, (i. e. the genus whatever 
species may be adopted) of demonstrative argumentation, 
which alone has strict rules, such that if truth be only in the 
premises, those rules are sufficient, when the whole of what 
is to be argued is in the syllogistic order, to demonstrate in a 
moment whether the conclusion be true or false. 

2. That is, we can say, the moment any thing having, by 
right or sufferance, the name of argument, is thrown into the 
syllogistic form, and the several rules made to bear upon it in 
that form, whether it is true or false as an argument. If we 
are not aware of the truth of the premises, that is another 
thing. Logic does not pretend to prove the truth of all pro- 
positions, any more than it pretends to prove who lives in the 
moon ; or any more than Euclid ever pretended to prove the 
properties of squares, circles and triangles, until he had pre- 
viously established, by antecedent data, such propositions as 
were necessary to constitute the premises of the argument 
with which he was engaged. We, to demonstrate that " this 
is," or " it is not," must do likewise. If we have not premises, 
neither axioms, nor truth acknowledged or proved by antece- 
dent demonstration, we must obtain such, or one datum at 
least, undeniably involving our minor term, of which we may 
predicate the same major. Having this datum, the way is 
perfectly clear; that is, to predicate the major of the minor 
contained in a distributed middle of which the same major 
is predicated, provided that no term is distributed in the con- 
clusion, which was not distributed in the premises, and that 
those premises are not both either particular or negative. 

3. We have said " that the way is clear," and not only the 
way, but the result is often so clear, that when the premises, 
before at a distance, and the conclusion, are placed in juxta- 
position, they express an obvious truth : and we say, the more 
obvious truth is the better. Yet for this very obviousness, this 
clearness, syllogism has been censured by those who scarcely 
understood the nature of their ow^n remarks. This bottle, con- 
taining the medicine you are going to take, has corrosive sub- 
limate held in solution, so disguised that you know nothing 
about it. Fortunately, you take it to the chemist, who ana- 
lyzes it, precipitates the sublimate, reduces it to its usual form, 
and shows it to you; and you exclaim, "0, this is corrosive 
sublimate, this is poison, of course, every one knows thatP 
True ; but did you know it in the bottle ? Do you thank the 
chemist for the service he has rendered you ? 



GENERAL REMARKS ON ARGUMENTS. 245 

4. Here is a book of two hundred pages; its principal parts 
are only three terms, but so put together, or the nnode of con- 
nection so artfully concealed, that it is highly calculated to 
deceive. Here the poison is held in solution, and that so 
colored by plausibility and eloquence that it imposes on a mul- 
titude, and disseminates its pestilence through a nation. You 
have read it ; it has disturbed your mind ; but you cannot say 
why or wherefore. You hand it to the analyst ; he finds the 
three terms, places them together in juxta-position, exposes 
the fallacy, and exhibits the poison ; and you exclaim, " this 
is too plain, every one knows this." Be on your guard ; you 
are mistaking the point; you knew it not when in the bottle 
or the book ; you have thrown away both the bottle and the 
book, but you have neither thanked the chemist nor the syl- 
logism. If it is plain, so much the better. Men love, when 
in a diluted state, even the works of the devil; but if they 
could bring his pretty face to the looking glass, they would 
Jove neither him nor his works any longer. Plainness, obvi- 
ousness is the very thing at which we aim ; and the nearer to 
this daylight all conclusions can be brought, so much the bet- 
ter. The syllogism does this, or nothing does. 

5. "No," say you, "mathematical demonstration does this." 
Another "ignoratio elenchi," mistake of the question, since 
all mathematical reasoning is syllogistic, conducted on syllo- 
gistic principles, and reducible to that form. Mathematical 
reasoning throughout is deducing some particular from a uni- 
versal, some consequent from an antecedent involving it, 
something unknown from something known, something un- 
measured from a known measure that measures it. If syllo- 
gistic principles did not exist, neither could mathematical 
reasoning ; therefore we repeat again, that syllogism alone 
does this, is itself all reasoning, and we challenge the world, 
including great names, to show a better way, not only one 
more direct to the point, more general in its application, but 
also one in which fallacy is more immediately detected. 

6. *'But," say you, "are we not allowed to reason, except 
we use your syllogism ? Must we lay aside our ratiocinative 
faculties on the dusty shelf, till we throw every thing into 
mood and figure ?" Truly, if you think so, we pity you, for 
your fancy has conjured up, not one, but many ghosts, which 
lie, thick as bees,* concealed under every illative particle, such 
as for, because, therefore, wherefore, &c. and now your 
ratiocinative powers are fairly matched against a host! 
Mercury complained to his mamma, one morning, that he had 

x2 



246 GENERAL REMARKS ON ARGUMENTS. 

more business to do than any body else in heaven ; Hercules 
made the same complaint as to his concerns on earth ; but 
now you have more to do than either. 

7. No man demands a demonstration of an axiom, of a self- 
evident truth, an object of intuitive evidence, nor of you, nor 
of another, on every occasion, when either of you introduce a 
clause, by an illative, an inferential particle, since he per- 
ceives its truth, is convinced of it, as well as you, and demands 
a reason no otherwise expressed than as j^ou have done ; that 
is sufficient to convince him. Nor even of a deductive truth, 
if it be acknowledged, even should you saj, these two vertical 
or opposite angles are equal, because the straight lines 
enclosing them cut one another. You have not demonstrat- 
ed this. Your inference, (introduced by the illative, because^ 
you knew, and he knew, was just, and that, in such case, is 
sufficient. But what if he should demand a proof; what are 
you to do ? Then you will want Euclid, and if you have 
Euclid, you have syllogism, for he that has the species, must 
know something of the properties of the genus. 

8. Should I say, " the act Y is illegal," I pronounce only 
one proposition, expressing one act of judgment, without as- 
signing any reason on which that judgment is founded. If you 
demand that reason, I may reply, *' the act Y is illegal, be- 
cause all acts prohibited by government are illegal ;" and now 
that which was at first only one proposition becomes the 
common enthymeme. I employ this enthymeme, because / 
am aware that Y is one of the acts prohibited by government, 
therefore the word because, and the clause it introduces, con- 
vey a sufficient reason to me, but not to you, who are not 
aware that Y is one of those acts. On your pressing me fur- 
ther on the subject, I discover that I had offered an argument 
sufficient for one man, but not for two, consequent on the dif- 
ferent degree of previous information possessed by each of us ; 
and therefore give you the only remaining enthymeme that 
the subject admits of, viz: " the act Y is illegal, because Y is 
an act prohibited by government ;" and the two enthymemes 
stand thus : 

The act Y is illegal, because all acts prohibited by government are illegal. 
The act Y is illegal, because Y is an act prohibited by government. 

Of the above enthymeme it is evident that the completory 
of the first is the minor, and of the second the major proposi- 
tion of the complete syllogism : and that neither the first nor 
the second enthymeme is a complete argument. And for the 



GENERAL REMARKS ON ARGUMENTS. 247 

want of this completion, the first enthymeme, though sufficient 
for me, was not to you, not knowing that Y was one of the 
acts prohibited ; and the second enthymeme does not affirm 
that acts prohibited by government are illegal. But the two 
are reducible to one complete argument, expressing both 
these, viz : 



All acts prohibited by government are illegal. 



The act Y is an act prohibited by government ; therefore 
The act Y is illegal. 



9. Having now the complete argument before us, if you 
are my opponent, 1 see at once the precise limits in which 
you must meet me ; and ask, do you intend to deny the minor ? 
Then you must prove that Y is not an act prohibited by go- 
vernment. I appeal to the proper authorities ; 1st, to the defi- 
nition of Y, and that being found to correspond, I prove to you 
by the statutes, &c. that Y is an act expressly prohibited by 
government. If you cannot oppose me in the minor, you must 
in the major, in which case you will immediately differ from 
me in politics, and have the boldness to deny that " all acts 
prohibited by government are illegal." 

10. If the ^' onus probandi,^' or task of proving, is then 
still to devolve on me, I must change the field of argument, 
and meet you on another, viz. For all fallible free agents, 
that, without restraint, would exist merely to destroy 
themselves, and one anothers^ property, the laws of gov- 
ernment necessarily determine what is illegal ; m,en are 
fallible free agents, that, without restraint, would exist 

'merely to destroy themselves and one anot her s^ property ; 
therefore, for m,en the laws of Government necessarily de- 
termine ivhat is illegal. As no man of sense will deny either 
the minor or the major of this argument, and no man ever did 
but what was shunned by all rational society, and his senti- 
ments recorded only in the annals of infamy, it is, therefore, 
supposed that the validity of what was first introduced by the 
inferential particle, because, is now granted, though it was not 
at first perceived. Thus syllogism or argument is only neces- 
sary when formal proof is required ; on all ordinary occasions, 
the common enthymeme is accepted. 

11. On the subject of argument, a very important question 
presents itself, viz : was it, or was it not, intended by the au- 
thor of our existence, that we, as rational beings, should be 
capable of arriving at the whole of all truth that concerns us, 



248 GENERAL REMARKS ON ARGUMENTS. 

by intuitive evidence only, and consequently, without the ne- 
cessity of argument'? To this question, an answer is immedi- 
ately afforded by the common experience of all men, to whom 
every day, month, ami year, testify by renewed examples, the 
necessity not only of the reasoning faculty itself, but of its con- 
stant exercise. It may be infered, therefore, not only that 
we should have minds capable of perceiving, but capable of 
reasoning : and that very properly so. The mind is the no- 
blest part of man, yet it can only grow and expand by exer- 
cise; which exercise is the reach after new truth, by which 
very act, and by that alone, can its capacity be enlarged to 
receive that truth. The acquisition of the one and the exer- 
cise of the other are collaterally inseparable ; and if the one 
is omitted, the other is lost. It is by this, and this alone, that 
the vigor of its own powers is increased, in discriminating, 
in judging, in perceiving things that differ, in comparing one 
with the other, in deducing the nature of a particular from a 
general law, and ultimately in rejecting things indifferent and 
unprofitable, and choosing that which is serviceable and good. 
Again, the benefit is always greater, when the mind, by the 
exercise of its own powers, makes its own discoveries, secures 
its own acquisitions, can trace its own difficulties, and the sev- 
eral steps by which it was tinally led to victory, a victory its 
own, and not that of another, than it would be, had it been 
possible that another, whilst it remained passive and not equal- 
ly concerned, should communicate the same science or the 
same truth. The very difficulty you encountered on a road 
and overcame, is to you a good memorialist ; with Archimedes 
you can exclaim sy^')^^, iv^nnA* and with Caesar, *' veni, vidi, 
vici ;"t but all this to you, this vivid perception, this lasting 
remembrance, this victory, yours not mine, would have been 
lost, had the difficulty been overcome for you by another.J 

12. Difficulties are absolutely to be reckoned amongst the 
number of our blessings. They are powerful preachers, and 

* " I have found it ! I have found it !" 

•}■ " I came, I saw, I conquered." 

4: " I met wiih one day," said a student at Oxford, " a mathematical difficul- 
ty. It cost me a fortnight's hard anxious study. At last I overcame it, and 
the effect it had on me was such, that I began skipping and jumping all over 
my room." Now had all this been demonstrated to Dr. C. as he sat quietly in 
his chair, the several difficulties wouki have been anticipated, one by one, with- 
out his perceiving them to be such, and his mind comparatively passive, 
exclaiming ; " very true," " of course," *' this is as might have been ex- 
pected," and of course no victory at all. As it was, the enthusiasm of Archi- 
medes was all his own. 



GENERAL REMARKS ON ARGUMENTS. 249 

often strike home, and awaken faculties otherwise dormant. 
If the attention is excited, and caused to drop concerns com- 
paratively unimportant, that cannot edify, and to fix intently, 
and with solicitude, the mind's eye on what alone can enlarge 
and enlighten its field of view, from that moment, and not 
until then, that mind begins to grow. It does not, and can- 
not, were all truth or any part of valuable truth offered to it, 
when not in a state in which it is possible to receive it. But 
it grows and improves, because the mind by this act places 
itself in an attitude, in a state and condition of receiving ; and 
in proportion as this act is continued, and to the greater ener- 
gy with which it is exerted, that mind continues to enlarge, 
not only by its increased susceptibility of receiving, but also 
by the continued attainment of all that antecedent conviction, 
light and truth, which are the pre-requisites for every subse- 
quent acquisition, and the whole the necessary consequence of 
that attention duly directed. 

13. If the commander of a naval fleet could, on the day of 
battle, exclaim to his men, "This day England expects every 
man to do his duty," is it to be expected that the Giver of 
mind does not virtually say to all to whom he has given it, 
" This day, the day of your probation, He that gave you mind, 
expects that mind to do its duty." For if your mind does not 
do this for itself, no other either can, nor ever will do it for 
you, and the case is lost. And that duty is alone discharged 
in this exercise, in the diligent pursuit and acquisition of 
truth. 

14. We have, in the second chapter of Proverbs, a beauti- 
ful picture of mind in the attitude of this exercise, this seeking 
and pursuit after truth, drawn with all the elegance and ex- 
pressiveness of oriental metaphor, "My son, if thou wilt 
receive my words, and hide my commandments with thee, so 
that thou incline thine ear unto wisdom, and apply thine 
heart to understanding; yea, if thou cry est after knowledge, 
and liftest up thy voice for understanding; if thou seekest 
her as silver, and sear chest for her as for hid treasures, then 
shalt thou understand the fear of the Lord, and find the 
knowledge of God. For the Lord giveth wisdom ; out of 
his mouth cometh knowledge and understanding." Now 
we have only to conceive of ourselves in this very attitude, in 
this mental state and exercise, searching with all the solici- 
tude and love of truth, here so happily described, after a trea- 
sure of infinite value, transcending in excellency all we had 
ever found before; and we have the idea at once. And the 



250 GENERAL REMARKS ON ARGUMENTS. 

only reason that either can now, or ever can be given, why 
there are so many men, so many minds that do not grow, are 
no nearer truth now than they were twenty or forty years 
ago, is, that this is not their state, nor the condition of their 
minds. Consequently, each one knows just about as much as 
his neighbor; it is opinion or conjecture all, without convic- 
tion or victory to any. 

15. Pilate once said to Jesus Christ, " what is truth V but 
he was not answered, and that for the wisest and best of rea- 
sons. He who could best answer, did not choose to answer, 
or to unveil at once the universe of truth to a mind then ut- 
terly incapable of receiving it, and not at all engaged in the 
act of pursuing it. How is it possible to communicate to a 
babe in intellect the knowledge of a mind that has acquired 
capacity by exercise ? Truth itself can only be acquired by 
successive gradations. It is true that some men can receive 
more at once than another ; and thus to Sir Isaac Newton it 
was not necessary to read Euclid in the common way. But 
this alters not the case ; even Sir Isaac himself did not, could 
not, receive the whole at once ; the mind even of a Newton 
stood in need of reasoning, of argumentation, and knew that 
every consequent truth was dependant on some antecedent one 
of previous acquisition ; and had not even his mind been a 
mind of solicitude in action, in reasoning, in argumentation, 
Sir Isaac never would have been great. The general fact 
then remains ; it is only by successive gradations, successive 
acquisitions and victories, each implying some antecedent one, 
some distinct mental act, exercise and reasoning, that we can 
receive truth : a glorious structure itself, but admitting of as- 
cent by successive steps ; but no man complains that he is not 
at the top of the staircase whilst he will not place his own 
foot on the first step. 

16. Enough perhaps, has been said to intimate that it was 
intended that the constitution of our minds and moral existence 
should be such as to require these successive acts of reasoning 
or argumentation. If so, then are we beings capable of rea- 
soning ; and as " nature acts by uniform and consistent laws," 
and "truth," according to Bishop Horsley, "is single and in- 
divisible, and the constitution of all minds, as to every thing 
general and essential, the same, there must exist some gene- 
ral law, not many, of reasoning.''^ Variations may and do ex- 
ist, as to different subjects, but all these are distinctions as to 
application, or modifications according to special occasion, not 
affecting a general principle in itself uniform and unique. If 



GENERAL REMARKS ON ARGUMENTS. 251 

truth, then, is single and indivisible, and the source of that 
truth the same, though every where diffused throughout the 
universe ; if He is the only Creator of mind, and that origi- 
nally, whatever it is now, in the image of Him, that is one not 
many, though communicating to all, we see only one princi- 
ple, one law, and as to its generic, not special nature, one and 
only one consistent mode of reasoning. If the Author of our 
being, has made it to us a privilege to seek after truth, and a 
privilege it certainly is, is it to be supposed that He w^ould give 
to different minds, when minds as to general constitution are the 
same, different m.odes of finding the same thing? If truth, to 
use a figure, be on one point of a circumference, and we at 
the centre, we all know that from that centre to that point, 
there is one, and only one line, and that line is a straight line.^ 
Whatever that line is, that is the general law and principle of 
reasoning given to me, to you, to all, and to every thing ration- 
al in our circumstances. We therefore may presume, that 
there cannot be any other than one general principle of rea- 
soning in all human minds, only one right mode of finding one 
thing, and a general principle applicable to all things. The 
mind is not coniplex, nor the mind of one man, as to general 
constitution, different from that of another, nor consequently 
its process, which is rational, an(^if rational, it is according to 
truth, and truth is one, though comprehending many particu- 
lars ; but these particulars are again referible to one ; one 
law, one principle and one general nature ; and, therefore, 
though there may be as many arguments as subjects, and may, 
according to circumstances, appear to assume diverse com- 
plexions, suited to occasion, yet doubtless the general princi- 
ple is the same in all, some single and direct line of investiga- 
tion existing in all human minds. As we all have the same 
power of thinking, of judgment, will, memory and imagina- 
tion, though each of us may think, judge, will, remember, and 
imagine different things, yet the power and mode of doing 
these is the same in all, and how then can it be rationally sup- 
posed, that if the power and mode of performing these seve- 
ral mental acts is the same in all, that the general mode and 
principle of reasoning is not the same in all ; and consequent- 
ly there is one law, one principle, one right line existing in all 
to effect the same thing. 

17. Though we have not, nor wish to have the temerity to 

* For this idea, and many others, the author is indebted to the respectable 
publisher of this work. 



252 GENERAL REMARKS ON ARGUMENTS. 

pronounce what that line is, yet as the inquiry is important, 
we are inclined to come as near to that line as possible. 
Could we, with Norris, enter into what he calls the " ideal 
world," and with him inspect the secrets of many minds at 
once, we should perhaps find the mind of one man inferingthe 
nature of a particular from that of the universal to which it 
belongs ; another, the nature of a consequent from that of an 
antecedent comprising li \ a third, the nature of something 
unknown from what is known involving it ; or something un- 
measured from another which measures ; or rather the mea- 
sure of two from a third which measures both — or, once more, 
in the case of alternation admitting only of two cases, whereof 
one is impossible or absurd, infering that which is not impos- 
sible or absurd, which comes to the same thing. Reason ad- 
mits not here, in possible cases, absurdities : it is the abscissio 
infiniti, cutting off all things impossible or absurd, until it 
comes, in possible cases, to what is not impossible or absurd, 
and that is the only class or universal in this respect to which 
the possible case of this alternation can rationally belong. In 
every one of these varied cases, the general law is the same, 
the generic principle is unique. Call it by what name you 
please, still it is infering a particular, a consequent, an un- 
known, an unmeasured nature from a universal, antecedent, 
known, and limited nature, involving, implying and measuring 
it. The common principle in minds that know nothing of 
learning, of logic or of mathematics, is '^ experience, matter 
of fact, common sense, taught me that such and such 
things are so, or true, and I always found what these taught 
me to be true." This is a case of that kind, and therefore this 
is true ; or in other words, truth taught me this of a universal 
nature ; I am sure that this particular belongs to that uni- 
versal nature ; it therefore has the properties of that universal 
nature. 

18. Had a certain writer on Logic, whom in future, and 
out of regard to his feelings, who, for aught we know, may be 
yet, though in another country, a living author, we shall dis- 
tinguish by the name of Mr. X. deferred his Treatise, until 
he bad seen the very able w^ork of Dr. Whateley, he certainly 
would not have committed himself so completely on the sub- 
ject of syllogism. That Mr. X. has had certain distinguished 
authorities to copy, is, for him an apology, but at the same 
time a proof that a general misconception, involving great 
names, has prevailed on this subject, promoted chiefly by 
those who undertook to write on what they themselves did 



GENERAL REMARKS ON ARGUMENTS. 253 

not understand. Mr. X. is certainly at complete issue with 
Dr. Whately, who, for sixteen years at least, out of the five 
and twenty during which he was resident at Oxford, was 
Professor of Logic at that University, and now, if we mistake 
not, Archbishop of Dublin. Dr. Whately repeatedly says, 
'^Syllogism includes, or is, all reasoning.^^ Mr. X. has not 
made this discovery, nor does he seem exactly to know what 
Logicians mean by such terms as universal, genus, species, &c. 
without refering himself to some genus or species in natural 
history, whether of beast, bird, fish, plant, &c. as if the only 
idea we can form of a universal nature, must be confined to 
this department of human knowledge. But we ask, can we 
form no idea, first, of one aggregate universality, one law or 
source of nature and property, from which, secondly, all gen- 
eral, special, and particular natures emanate, each having its 
own essential difference, and each comprising its individuals, 
refering back all their properties, natures, and principles, to 
their own class; the particular to its species, the species to its 
genus, the genus to its universal, and the universal to One 
that gives laws, natures, and properties, that govern as well 
as distinguish all, though diverse in their divisions, yet con- 
sistent in their universality ? One sun shines in the heavens, 
and all the rays of light proceed only from one sun, yet they 
fall on ten thousand objects, comprising many genera, many 
species, many individuals, above, below, all round ; and from 
thence, by refraction and reflection, proceed to the eye, giving 
to that eye, from one object, the idea of substance ; from an- 
other, of figure ; from a third, of color ; and from a fourth, of 
magnitude; which again each divide, for example, that of 
color, according to the property of refraction ; here the idea 
of red, there of blue, and yonder of green, &c. generalized 
into reds, blues, and greens, each of a distinct kind, expressive 
of a special or general law, and each comprising all its par- 
ticulars, from which special or general nature, that of all its 
particulars are rationally infered. 

18. In this general law — this one grand principle of uni- 
versality, co-extensive with the universe, implying one con- 
sistency co-extensive with itself; by its comprehension* ex- 
pressing the nature of all it comprises ; in its extension^ ad- 
mitting of division ; each division, precisely in the same man- 
ner, by its comprehension declaring the principle of all it in- 
cludes; and in its extension, allowing of subdivision ; and thus 

* See page 97. 
Y 



254 GENERAL REMARKS ON ARGUMENTS. 

on, from the all including one to its orders, from the orders 
to their tribes, from the tribes to their genera, from the genera 
to their species, from the species to their individuals ; or from 
the /UNIVERSE itself to the smallest particle of matter ; is to 
be found, the one, the only one general principle of reason- 
ing ; many objects seen by one e^e, and that judges or rea- 
sons by one light ; proceeding from Him who is one, one na- 
ture giving all natures; one infinite extending to all fi^- 
NiTES ; ONE infinity OF SPACE extending to all magnitudes; 
ONE infinite duration extending to all times. 

19. Then whether we are infering the nature of a parti- 
cular from a universal, a consequent from its antecedent, what 
is unknown from what is known, or things unmeasured from 
what measures them ; the latter, in each case, comprising all 
the properties infered as to any individual it includes, are we 
not acting by one, and only one, general principle of reason- 
ing, proceeding from one faculty, reason, acting by one law 
consistent with itself? However diversified the manner, and 
by whatever name it may be called, demonstration, syllogism, 
enthymene, or sorites, yet one principle runs through, guides 
and governs all, showing that there is only one straight line 
from darkness to light, one line from error to truth. By what- 
ever name we distinguish that which affirms or denies, a na- 
ture as to all it includes or to which it is adapted, whether 
universal, antecedent, or something known, yet the general 
idea of universality is implied, or an idea of what includes all 
whose nature or properties it can affirm ; and by whatever 
term we call that which is included or adapted to another, 
particular, consequent, unknown, or unmeasured, yet are its 
properties infered from what is competent to comprehend and 
affirm the nature of all it includes. 

20. " There is no method of teaching," said Dr. Johnson, 
" that of which any one is ignorant, but by means of some- 
thing already known." Here then are the antecedent and 
the consequent. But by the antecedent, in grammar, might 
be understood the relative, or by the antecedent and conse- 
quent, might be understood correlative particles, the one ne- 
cessarily following the other in one clause ; and by antecedent 
and consequent, the philosopher might understand cause and 
effect ; yet the logician, by the term antecedent, does not re- 
fer to any one act effected by one cause, but to the general 
law of all its acts to which he can refer any effect produced 
by that cause. Neither does the mathematician, when he 
compares lines, surfaces and solids with other lines, surfaces 



GENERAL REMARKS ON ARGUMENTS. 255 

and solids, always say, because this body is, in point of figure, 
the same with that, therefore in ntagnitude they are equal. 
Mere magnitude is not always his only object, but also the 
property of similar bodies. A thousand triangles may exist, 
all having the same angles, but the sides and area of each 
very different in magnitude, yet as to the former, the smallest 
is referible to the class of the larger, which in this sense is its 
universal. Again, as to magnitude, how do I know that A is 
equal to B'? I cannot bring them together, they are distant, 
until I have the mathematician's third thing, the measure C, 
and finding it equal to both, it is all the universal I want; it 
comprises both cases, and I pronounce them equal to one 
another. 

21. If only two things are brought together and compared, 
and found equal or unequal, like or unlike, it is not reasoning, 
it is judgment; but if a third thing is wanted, and compared 
first with one and then with another, and the one comparison 
infered from the other, it is reasoning ; here are three terms, 
and three terms are always necessary to one syllogism, to one 
act of reasoning. And this is the one line or process by which 
all reasoning must proceed ; it is injerence jrom two com- 
parisons^ or two judgments of affirmation or negation. In 
all this we see only one line, one consistent law of procedure, 
whether it be infering a particular from a universal, a conse- 
quent from an antecedent, an unknown from a knowm, two 
things unmeasured from what measures both ; or in alterna- 
tion, the reductio ad absurdum, it is simply the rejection of 
the case from the impossible to the possible alternative, the 
only universal that includes it. 

22. We repeat, then, finally, if truth, as before observed, 
" is single and indivisible," and its Author the same ; if minds, 
as to their general constitution are so likewise, it is impossible 
to suppose there can be any other than one general principle 
in all human minds of finding the same thing. Whether this 
be called one law, one principle, or one line, it intimates the 
same thing ; and if a line, that line is straight, not bent, not- 
withstanding to some it may appear such, any more than the 
straight rod can be bent, though by refraction it may appear, 
such, when its image is transmitted through the denser me- 
dium of water. If we still view it under the figure of a line, 
since all reasoning beings have been now reasoning for near 
six thousand years, it follows that though that straight line 
has not been, by men, uniformly turned in a right direction, 
yet it has been turned towards some object ; and it is this line 



256 GENERAL REMARKS ON ARGUMENTS. 

that all, in one way or the other, endeavor to use ; whether 
they see the whole line at once or not, or consequent on the 
medium through which they view it, it should appear bent to 
some, though strt^ight to others, still is it only one line, that 
line straight, and always capable of being turned in that way 
which it is the prerogative of a free agent to direct, and for 
the right use of which he is responsible. 

23. It seems to be one of the great privileges of rational 
nature, that we have come into the world on purpose to rea- 
son ; by reasoning to grow ; and to acquire, by reasoning, a 
rich variety of mental furniture, as so many gems of infinite 
variety in transparency and color, yet ready and in order, that 
when the beams of moral truth shine on a mind so furnished, 
they shine on diamonds not on lumber, and declare by evidence, 
clearer than deductive, the great and noble fruition of intel- 
lectual existence. Had the whole been intuitive evidence at 
once, it would have been an atmosphere, so to speak, in which 
free agency, or any thing short of necessity, could not exist. 
No victory would have been ours, the eternal triumph un- 
known, no motive but that of necessity ; and impulse, com- 
mon to machines, our saviour. We came into the world then 
for the purpose to go to reason's school, and all our life to be 
in one train of education, every step of which may if we will 
be successful, at the school of reasoning ; and that reasoning 
within our limits, always points to v/hat is revealed. Rea- 
soning then is our business, our trade, if you please ; a trade 
not of the store nor of the pocket, but of the mind, that shall 
exist when neither store nor pocket can. Reason then we 
must, and an effective mind, one of the most active things in 
the universe, cannot help it, nor desires to avoid, nor to omit 
that which by experience it finds to be one uninterrupted ca- 
reer of success, without any impediment in the way, to the 
aitainm.ent of every truth essential to happiness. As the main 
spring is to the watch, so is reasoning to the mind ; and we 
reason from the first day that watch is wound up, to the last 
of deductive evidence, when the deductive shall be " swallow- 
ed up" by the intuitive, which shall be eternal, one cloudless 
day of everlasting light. The deductive preceding the other as 
the A, B, C of the spelling book, the highest volume of science ; 
or the chilling twilight of the frozen zone, the " high eternal 
noon," where night and darkness shall be for ever unknown ; 
or the faith of the feeble believer, the fruition of things hoped 
for ; or his hopes, the substantial realities of eternal enjoy- 
ment when all things else shall be shadow. 



GENERAL REMARKS ON ARGUMENTS. 257 

24. If reasoning, then, is a necessary consequence of ra- 
tional humanity; and mind in all, as to its general constitution, 
the same, it not only follows that a process, but that the same 
process, partial or complete, is going on in all that is mind, 
learned or unlearned, whether acquainted with mathematics, 
metaphysics, or the plough. The line is the same, whether 
the professor reasons or the clown, the doctor or the mechan- 
ic, the king or his subject. The former, it is true, may be 
able to take two steps, to the latter taking one ; or more ready 
to separate what is specious from what is conclusive. Yet it 
is the same principle, attempted by all and accomplished by 
some. Whether this remark appi}'" to ancient or modern 
times, the case is unaltered ; for if mind was and is the same, 
its process is so likewise. The child reasons not otherwise 
than the father ; but the latter can express the complete ar- 
gument, whilst the former is not aware of the necessity of any 
more than its part ; the logician can demonstrate to both 
where the fallacy is, if any exist ; or, if not, the reason why 
the argument is conclusive ; neither of which, either the child 
or its father, has skill competent to effect. 

25. The child, the father and the logician, then, intimate 
three stages on the same line ; and we have at once the in- 
complete argument, the argument, and that which is demon- 
strated to be or not to be an argument. For example, though 
B knows that Z committed Y, yet he is not aware that the 
law says, that " all committing the crime Y must be impris- 
oned for life;" and C, though aware of this, knows not that Z 
committed the crime Y. You say to B, " Z must be im- 
prisoned for life^ because he has committed the crime K" 
Here is a complete enthymeme, which would be a complete 
argument to C, because he is aware that such is the law; but 
it is not to B, who has no knowledge of any such law. You 
then say to C, " Z 'must be imprisoned for life, because the 
law says that all committing the crime Y shall be so im- 
prisoned.''^ Here is another enthymeme ; it would have been 
an argument to B, but not to C, who knows not that Z has done 
this. Now your two enthymemes, each of which you thought 
to be a complete argument, spoken to two persons, of whom 
the one knew not the major, nor the other the minor of the 
complete argument, proves to be no argument at all ; and to 
convince both you must say. 

All committing the crime Y must be imprisoned for life. 
Z committed the crime Y ; therefore 
Z must be imprisoned for life. 

y2 



258 GEPfERAL REMARKS ON ARGUMENTS. 

If both B and C hear this together, they are convinced, be- 
cause it is no longer a partial, but a complete argument, ex- 
pressing the whole case, of which neither, unless he can dis- 
prove one or the other premiss, can doubt. No further ex- 
ample is necessary to show that whilst the enthymeme is only 
the half, the syllogism alone is the whole argument. 

26. An enthymene, therefore, though commonly employed, 
is evidently an incomplete argument, or always defective, in 
consequence of the want of one or the other of two comple- 
tories, one of which may be necessary to convince me, ano- 
ther to convince you. Besides this defect, either of the en- 
thymenes composing an argument, may contain a fallacy, which 
is best detected by supplying the completory, to compose the 
entire syllogism, where, having regular rules, you are imme- 
diately enabled to apply them, to show whether the whole is 
an argument or a perfect syllogism, (Art. 137) or to expose a 
fallacy should it exist ; either in consequence of one of the 
premises being false, an undistributed or equivocal middle, 
(Rules II and III page 204) illicit proces?, (Rule IV page 206) 
For an apparent argument and a perfect syllogism are dis- 
tinct. For example, in reference to a cause to come on before 
the Supreme Court, information may be given to the police, 
that, "t^// the criminals are of the party F." Now it is 
well known that you belong to that party ; you are, there- 
fore, arrested, and look somewhat blue when you see the case 
stands thus. 

All the criminals belong to the party Y. 
You are of the party Y ; 
You are a criminal. 

On inspection of the general indictment, however, you per- 
ceive that the middle term, " the party Y," is undistributed. 
Consequently the whole is not a perfect syllogism, according 
to the definition in Art. 137. The middle term being the pre- 
dicate of a universal affirmative cannot be distributed, " for 
A distributes the subject,'^ not the predicate. You, therefore, 
convert the major premiss, when the middle term becomes the 
subject and the case stands thus. 

All of the party Y are criminals. 

You are of the party Y ; 
You are a criminal. 

Here the middle term is distributed, and the whole stands 



GENERAL REMARKS ON ARGUMENTS. 259 

in a regular state to be tried. But since the major proposi- 
tion, " All of the party Y, {not some) are criminals," cannot 
be proved, the premiss cannot be supported, the conclusion 
does not follow, and the charge against you falls to the ground. 
You may, therefore, on getting out of " durance vile," tell the 
officer to his face, that the indictment, or argument on the 
strength of which he arrested you, is no better than the follow- 
ing— 

You are an animal. 
A goose is an animal ; 
You are a goose. 

27. It is not the mere, arrangement of three propositions 
into one series, that constitutes an argument, nor what is com- 
petent to declare what is, or is not true. It is not only neces- 
sary that each premiss should express the truth, but that there 
should be no equivocal or ambiguous word, nor undistributed 
middle, either of which is extremely convenient for the pur- 
pose of deception. A fallacy may exist in either premiss. 
This is easily detected, when the premises are in juxta-posi- 
tion, and subjected to the test of the rules. But a false syllo- 
gism may be expanded into a volume, where the one premiss 
may be a hundred pages distant from the other. The author, 
in this case, has a hundred pages to disguise each, by plausi- 
bility, by specious or eloquent language. The deception is 
artfully concealed, the poison diluted and unperceived ; it 
composes one draught, and injures the morals and happiness 
of a multitude, or of a nation. And though a few may after- 
wards be able to detect the villainy, yet by that time the 
suasiveness of the compound, sweetened to the palate of sense 
or interest, has had time to operate, to fascinate and allure. 
Or should you even attempt to convince, your effort as to the 
many may be in vain ; the passions of the animal are getting 
better of the faculties of the man ; and moral, civil, and even 
national death may be the final consequence. It is a melan- 
choly fact, that thousands exist, whose principles, if developed, 
could have no other tendency than to disturb society, destroy 
nations, and even involve themselves in the general catas- 
trophe. 

28. Or you, yourself, may be engaged : you may advance 
an argument, or you may be attacked by an adversary. It may 
be a case that touches your pocket, your head or your heart; 
your family and all of consequence to you may be concerned. 
A sophistry, perhaps, undetected by any, is concealed, and 
calamitous consequences are the result. That this is no un- 



260 GENERAL REMARKS ON ARGUMENTS. 

common case, the records of sorrow, imprinted deeper by the 
widow's tears, and the children's destitution, too often testify. 
In such a case, then, or in any other, is the faciUty of detect- 
ing a fallacy of no consequence to you, whether the subject 
refer to yourself, your family or friends, or to the society to 
which you belong ? What can be your objection to the ac- 
quisition? Works, we know, have been published on the art 
of logic, to no other purpose than to represent that to be com- 
plex and mystified, which is easy and simple in itself. Logic 
is no scare-crow, though scare-crows exist. And it is these 
scare-crows themselves that have been dressing up logic in an 
old suit of their own clothes, that never could frighlen any 
thing but crows. We declare on the very title page of 'this 
work, " the art of.reasoning simplijied^^ and therefore mean 
to scare none. Read Logic through once attentively, and re- 
fer to the more essential parts of it when occasion requires. 
Afterwards, we intend to give a proof, by the Synopsis that 
shall appear in this work, that all the most important rules 
necessary for every practical purpose, can be, for the memo- 
ry, compressed into one or two pages. And he that cannot 
overcome this, can overcome nothing. 

29. That ordinary reasoning or argumentation may be 
improved by art, we have already had abundant opportunity to 
exemplify. No adage is more common, than that we should 
not judge by appearances. Every thing is by no means an 
argument that assumes the appearance of one. There is not a 
fallacy or deception practised on earth, but what has been 
able at one time or other, to shuffle itself into a specious garb 
resembling argument; and Logic is simply the art of taking 
off the mask, and exhibiting the thing in its native deformity. 
The banker keeps his scales, the chemist his tesis, and the 
logician his rules, more important than either, to enable him, 
when occasion serves, to say, '^ thou art weighed in the ba- 
lance, and found wanting." Men, too generally, have not only 
neglected these rules, but other means, to enable them to ral- 
ly and coalesce at the point of truth, to shame and put down 
error and deception out of the world. Could such noxious 
weeds, this multiplied delusion, have existed, had this not been 
the case. This language is not too strong : only examine it 
seriously, or deny that truth is out of our reach, and affirm 
that we are necessitated to be the victims of error. And is 
not the cause of truth, and our own cause identical? But if 
truth be attainable, and attainable it is, as sure as we are 
rational, where is our zeal ? If we have little or none, or if 



GENERAL REMARKS ON ARGUMENTS. 261 

we are idle, supine or poltroons in its cause, can we wonder that 
thousands are at work, and that on every day, in disseminat- 
ing every species of fallacy calculated to undermine, and ul- 
timately overthrow every department in which our interests 
and human welfare are at stake ? We must be aware of this, 
if our eyes are open ; a thousand facts daily testify, and meet 
us wherever we go. A public spirit, armed with proper 
means, and engaged in a noble cause, is an excellence, whose 
benefit shall extend beyond the limits of our own fire-side to 
bless the world.* 

30. What is the whole of one process of law, from the 
legislative body that enacts a law, to the judge that pronoun- 
ces a sentence agreeable to it, but one syllogism. Here surely 
is reasoning, and one entire act of this reasoning is precisely 
one syllogism. And it is a confirmation of what we have 
said, that all reasoning, when complete, is only one line, one 
principle. And if the highest authorities in the land, for sure- 
ly they not only know what reasoning, but what one act of 
reasoning is, have naturally fallen into that line, and by that 
line only, regulate all their judicial acts, it is a proof to the 
world, that all reasoning, when complete, is one and the same 
line ; and one act of reasoning is the whole of that line, which 
must be used again for another act, a part for common occa- 
sions, but the whole of it, or the whole of the same thing in 
all formal acts, as in law, is required ; so that in law, we see 
what that whole is. One act or process of law demands the 
whole line ; the common enthymeme, only a part of that line, 
is not sufficient here ; the law requires not a part, but the 
whole. The legislature enacts the major proposition, or first 
part of that line, and no more; for example, it enacts, ^^All 
committing the crime T, are to be imprisoned for life^'' — 
and this part contains the middle term or universal, "«// 
committing the crime F;" the advocates and witnesses are 
concerned only to make it clear to the jury that the minor 
(Z) is contained in the middle term ; that is, if Z did, or did 
not, commit the crime Y ; and the jury, when certain of the 
fact, that Z is included in the middle term, proclaim the 
second part of the line, or minor proposition, by saying, " Z 
committed the crime F." Thus two parts of one line are 
passed over, and the judge has only to complete the same line, 
by saying, " Z is to be imprisoned for life/' and the whole 

* Judges, V. 23. " Non nobis solum nati sumus." Cic. 



262 GENERAL REMARKS ON ARGUMENTS. 

of one process of reasoning, or of one line, or of one law, stands 
thus : 

Legislature, All committing the crime Y, are to be imprisoned for life. 
Jury. 7a, committed the crime Y. 

Judge. Z. is to be imprisoned for life.* 

31. But Mr. X. to whom we have already adverted, blames 
the syllogism, because it expresses an obvious truth ; which 
diifers very little from censuring it for rendering truth too 
evident. The conclusion of the preceding syllogism is, " Z is 
to be imprisoned for life?^ Now, how came this to be ob- 
vious ? Of course from the premises. Are the premises then 
not allowed to express their own consequence, lest truth 
should become too obvious ? Or does he mean that we could 
dispense with the whole formality of the syllogism, by being 
content with the common enthymeme? Which of the two 
enthymemes? Is it, *-All committing the crime Y, are to be 
imprisoned for life; therefore Z is to be imprisoned," &c.? 

But this cannot convince him who knows not that Z has 
committed Y. Or is it the following ? 

Z committed Y ; therefore Z is to be imprisoned for life. 

Neither does this express any reason to him who knows not 
that such is the law. Consequently neither is complete. The 
enthymeme certainly may serve for common occasions, but the 
question refers here not to an incomplete, but to a complete 
argument, and by rejecting the syllogism we cannot be sup- 
plied by any other complete form. " All demonstrations in 
mathematics," says Mr. Hedge, *^ proceed on the principle of 
the syllogism, that whatever may he affirmed of any genus, 
may be affirmed of all the species included under it,^'' And 
when one of the completories in mathematical reasoning is 
omitted, it is what has been proved before, is refered to, and 
the reader supplies it. But the syllogism presents the whole. 
To produce a complete argument, then, does Mr. X. propose 
to substitute the two enthymemes taken together, instead of 
one syllogism ? With what advantage? The two contain 
four propositions ; the syllogism only three. Nor would the 
facility of detecting a fallacy be thus promoted. A syllogism 
is a form already provided with rules. When the premises 
are known to be true, and that form stands the examination 
of the rules, it is impossible that a fallacy can remain unde- 
tected. 

32. But because, in the dark ages, the syllogism was abuseiJ 
to the unimportant purposes of wrangling, therefore, says h% 

* Another proof is, that all regular indictments are syllogisms. 



GENERAL REMARKS ON ARGUMENTS. 263 

it ought to be rejected. There is not a single good thing with- 
in the reach of man, but what has been abused ; on the same 
principle, then, according to the logic of Mr. X. we must re- 
ject all good things. Dr. Whately, however, somewhere ob- 
serves, that instead of syllogism being a means of promoting 
wrangling, it is, when rightly understood, the shortest way of 
putting an end to all wrangling. Neither are all men, as he 
evidently supposes, if they admit the syllogism, compelled to 
use it for every ordinary purpose where the common enthy- 
meme may serve. But his chief difficulty is in not being able 
to perceive that all reasoning is infering a particular from 
a universal. That is, because he understands not what is 
the logical idea of universality, or one whole distinguished 
by an essential difference, not an accident, peculiar to all 
the individuals it involves. The very examples he quotes 
are, however, unfortunate to his own position. " A mathe- 
matical demonstration," says he, " consists of the comparison 
of quantities of the same species^ Mere comparison, how- 
ever, implies only judgment, not reasoning; in the latter, three 
terms are necessary. But it is the comparison of quantities 
of the same species. This is the very point for which we 
contend. Mr. X's species is the same thing as our universal, 
or any thing from which the properties of all quantities hav- 
ing the same essential difference on which those properties de- 
pend, are infered. For example, a triangle is a figure bounded 
by three right lines containing three angles. Now, '* a figure" 
expresses the genus ; " bounded by three right lines contain- 
ing three angles," expresses the essential difference ; and the 
two together, denote the species of figure we have in contem- 
plation, from which all the properties of triangles are infered, 
not from their accidents^ which may refer to a thousand dif- 
ferent sizes^ material^ color, &c. Here the object is the 
species of figure, not magnitude, and consequently the com- 
mon properties inseparable from that figure common to all it 
comprises. This, then, is the universal comprising all its par- 
ticulars, an infinite number, without reference to any magni- 
tude, or to what in the present case is accident, not a proper- 
ty depending on essential difference. (See Art. 33, 34 and 
35.) All things corresponding to this figure, thus distinguish- 
ed by its essential difference from all others, are triangles, or 
particulars of this only one universal, comprising all adapted 
to this general character, and possessing properties, not acci- 
dent, common to all. But, continues M r. X, " figures are 
compared with figures, angles wdth angles, and lines with 



264 GENERAL REMARKS ON ARGUMENTS. 

lines." Another example of his confounding judgment with 
reasoning. Judgment needs only two ideas, reasoning 
three. Here is a rod, there is another, one is silver, the other 
wood; one is white, the other is painted green ; but I want 
to know if they are equal ; consequently magnitude now be- 
comes the essential difference I have in view, not an accident, 
whether material or color. I compare them together, and 
find them to be equal in length ; the material or color in this 
case not altering my judgment. Reasoning, as yet, has not 
begun, for I can express the whole of this mental act by one 
proposition, viz : " the rod A is equal to the rod B." But 
yonder is a stone column at the east corner of my estate, 
which call X ; and there is another brick column, Z, at the 
west corner. I want to know if they are equal in height ; i. e. 
magnitude. Magnitude now is the property I contemplate, 
not material whether stone, brick or wood. What am I to 
do? I cannot carry X to Z, that one actof judgment, or sim- 
ple comparison may suffice ; I must reason, and I cannot rea- 
son without a third idea or term. Give me then a rod, call 
it Y ; I mind not in this case whether it is of silver or whether 
it is of wood, or whether it is white or painted green ; magni^ 
tude is my object, and if in this it correspond to the height of 
both X and Z, it is my middle term, my universal, something 
that in the property I aim at comprises both cases, and all 
other cases that will correspond to the same universal, and I 
can with this universal, or with these three terms, reason and 
say, 

Y is eqnal to X, 

Z is equal to Y ; therefore 

Z is equal, to X. 

Now the Y I choose, my middle term, is a universal in mag- 
nitude ; it precisely corresponds to the same magnitude of all 
other things in the universe, whether made of wood, stone, 
metal, or of any other thing; and, as to magnitude, is the 
only universal I need for all similar purposes. The yard-wand 
of a dry goods store, is the store-keeper's middle term, his uni- 
versal, as to magnitude, without minding its material or co- 
lor. Should that piece of woollen cloth be found, by it though 
made of wood, to contain ten times its length, and that piece 
of silk the same, he knows from this middle term, that the 
length of the woollen cloth is equal to that of the silk ; his re- 
ference here being not to the accident, woollen^ wood or silk, 
but to the property he contemplated, magnitude, decided by 
his middle term the yard-wand, made of wood. Should he, 



GENERAL REMARKS ON ARGUMENTS. 265 

however, contemplate material not magnitude, he will then 
refer to another universal, where that is the essential differ- 
ence or property, when magnitude becomes an accident, as it 
was where the general property of all triangles, not their size, 
was the property or subject of reasoning. 

33. He adds, **an inquiry concerning justice or charity, 
compares these virtues with the principles of reason, equity, 
the laws of the community and the situation of persons." 
The same thing precisely ; that is, " the principle of reason, 
equity, the laws of the community, and the situation of per- 
sons," collectively combine to constitute two precepts of moral 
action, iysouniversals, (middle terms) from which I infer that 
such an act, (the minor term,) or such another (the minor of 
the second universal) would be to A, an act of justice, to B 
an act of charity. But " a process in the arts refers to the 
theory of the arts, and to the example of the most reputable 
and successful practitioners." That is, the theory of an art, 
as established by the investigation and practice of the most 
reputable practitioners, is the universal, (or middle term, 
which call Y) of which its known effect, (or major term, X) 
must be predicated. The process I am going to employ, Z, 
the m^inor term,, is according to that theory ; therefore, the 
process Z will be attended with the effect described by that 
theory, or of which the same major, X, may be predicated; 
this comes to the same thing, the same unaltered law of uni- 
versal reasoning; for 

All processes under the theory Y will be attended with the effect X. 
The process Z is a process under the theory Y ; therefore 
The process Z will be attended with the effect X. 

34. There can be no difficulty whatever in selecting a uni- 
versal, whose character comprises the properties of a minor to 
which the same predicate must apply. Its essential differ- 
ence, (art. 33.) is what contradistinguishes it from every other 
universal; and of which essential difference the properties 
(art. 34.) of it and all its particulars having the same essential 
difference, are the inseparable attributes or consequences. 
An accident, (art. 35.) in such case, is out of the question ; 
it is what may or may not belong to any individual of that 
universal without altering its essential character, or altering 
what unites it with its own general nature. Yet Mr. X. seems 
unable to form any such general idea, or to make any such 
distinction, except he refer himself to some department of 
natural history, where he can contemplate beings, some hav- 
ing two feet, others four, one covered with hair and another 



266 GENERAL REMARKS ON ARGUMENTS. 

with feathers, whether bird, or animal. Here he is quite at 
home. Some animals there are that are nine days old be* 
fore they get their eyes open ; and we hope that Mr. X's. nine 
days were over before the publication of Dr. Whately's work ; 
after which we trust he would no longer wink as an owl in the 
light of the sun. 



CHAP. VH. 
On Fallacies. 

(Art. 172.) A FALLACY is that incomplete or apparent argu* 
nrient which, in consequence of an ambiguous or undistributed 
middle, of false or improper premises, of irrelevant conclu- 
sion, or of any violation of the rules of syllogism, affirms or de- 
nies contrary to truth. 

1. A fallacy" is either an incomplete or apparent argument; 
i.e. either the enthymeme or the apparent syllogism ; but 
chiefly the former. The enthymeme is the chief atmosphere 
of the fallacy. A mere because, therefore, V)herefore, &c. 
are the principal venders of counterfeits, and dispose of them 
daily by wholesale. Out of a thousand fallacies, it is incur- 
ing no risk to affirm that nine hundred and ninety-nine are 
enthymemes. It is very common to observe, that an enthy- 
meme is a convenient argument ; but it is at the same time 
convenient for other purposes. Whereas, were any suspected 
enthymeme reduced to the form of the syllogism, and subject 
to the test of its rules, it would be impossible, if the truth of 
the premises be known, that a fallacy should remain unde- 
tected. It is true that a fallacy is commonly exhibited and 
exposed by the syllogism, which does not prove that the fallacy 
has any peculiar attachment to the company of the syllogism, 
but what nondescripts the syllogism fishes out of the enthy- 
meme. The enthymeme tolerates their existence, the syllo- 
gism terminates it. If a large part of the world has been de- 
ceived down to the present day, which every sensible man 
admits, it has not been deceived by ihe perfect syllogism, but 
by apparently inferential particles, and coin easily passed off 
by the score, not requiring the trouble of examination. 



ON FALLACIES. 267 

2. If all correct reasoning be one law, one principle, or one 
line, fallacy must be something not on, or what is bent out of 
that line. In short, it is that on which truth never has, nor 
ever will be found. But to change the figure ; fallacy is the 
only enemy we have, and its enmity is assiduous. It waits on 
us in the parlor, attends us to the store, and pursues us to 
the exchange. In short, we have its services at all times and 
in all places, when and where it can keep on the mask ; and 
that life is best spent, and the most conducive to happiness, 
that is so directed as to get rid off with the least delay, the 
last of this only enemy to our moral and intellectual felicity. 

(Art. 173.) As one act of reasoning involves three terms, 

two premises and one conclusion, a fallacy is either in one 

term, the premises, or in their illogical connection with the 

conclusion. 

1. " When a proposition is by means of syllogisms collected 
from others more evident and known, it is said to he proved; 
so that generally the proof of a proposition is a syllogism, or 
series of syllogisms, collecting that proposition from known and 
evident truths. But more particularly, if the syllogisms, of 
which the truth consists, admit of no premises but definitions, 
self-evident truths, and propositions already established, then 
is the argument so constituted called a demonstration ; 
whereby it appears that demonstrations are ultimately found- 
ed on definitions and self-evident propositions.^' 

2. But the evidence of this demonstration may be reduced 
to one simple principle, whence, as a sure and unalterable 
foundation, its certainty may in all cases be derived. All syl- 
logisms whatever are reducible to the first figure. Therefore 
any demonstration may be considered as deduced from a series 
of syllogisms all in the first figure ; where, in a brief compass, 
we may contemplate on what principle the evidence of all 
demonstrations is derived, and by which fallacy may be with 
equal certainty excluded. 

3. Of the first figure, the middle term is the subject of the 
major proposition, and the predicate of the minor. The major 
is always an universal proposition, and the minor always af- 
firmative. The predicate of the major proposition is the same 
as the predicate of the conclusion ; and that predicates of the 
minor which is contained in a distributed middle, what is pre- 
dicated of it in the major proposition. So that the whole of 
this mode of establishing truth and excluding error, or detect^ 
ing fallacy, is founded on obviously correct principles, viz ; 



?5S ON FALLACIES. 

'* Whatever may he affirmed universally of any class or 
distributed middle^ may be affirtned of any individual or 
individuals contained in that class ;" (i. e. having the same 
genus and essential difference ; for if it have these it will have 
the same properties.) And, " whatever may be denied uni- 
versally of any class or middle term distributed, may, in 
like manner, be denied of any individual or individuals 
contained in that class.^'' On these two principles, the whole 
of syllogism is built; and they are themselves no other than 
two self-evident truths or axioms which it is impossible to deny 
without contradiction. To say that all triangles are figures 
bounded by three lines including three angles, but that some 
are not so bounded, is as plain a contradiction as to affirm that 
it is possible for the same thing, in the same place, and at the 
same time, to be and not to be. To deny, therefore, the truth 
of a perfect syllogism, whose terms are free from all ambi- 
guity, or properly Hmited by correct definition, the truth of 
whose premises are known or previously proved, and the con- 
clusion logically deduced, is to deny a principle as universally 
evident as any comprehended by the human understanding. 

4. Consequently a demonstration is a series of syllogisms, 
all whose premises are either definitions, self-evident truths, or 
propositions already established. Definitions are identical 
propositions. We may distinguish the meaning of a word 
from that of any other, by a nominal definition (art. 43) or 
distinguish a term from any other by a logical definition (art. 
48.) On inspection of the argument we have in hand, if any 
term be undefined, or capable of being taken in more senses 
than one, it is necessary that it should, before we proceed, 
be so limited by definition, as to render it impossible that 
that word or term be taken for any other. This alone cuts 
oflf the whole genus of equivocal and ambiguous fallacies, of 
which we shall find man}^ species. 

5. " Self-evident propositions appear true of themselves, and 
leave no doubt or uncertainty in the mind. Propositions be- 
fore established, are no other than conclusions, gained by one 
or more steps from definitions and self-evident principles ; that 
is from true premises, and therefore, must needs be true. 
Whence all the previous propositions of a demonstration being 
manifestly true, the last conclusion, or proposition to be de- 
monstrated, must be so likewise. So that demonstration not 
only leads to certain truth," but if correctly conducted, ex- 
cludes fallacy. " One uniform basis of certainty runs through 
the whole,, and the conclusions are every wh^re built on some 



ON FALLACIES. 269 

one of the two principles, themselves self-evident truths, as the 
foundation of all our reasoning. And thus the certainty of de- 
monstration is reducible to one simple and universal principle, 
which carries its own evidence, and is the foundation of all 
syllogistic reasoning. 

6. "Demonstration, therefore, serving as an infallible guide 
to truth, and standing on so sure and unalterable a basis, it is 
impossible to deny, that the rules of Logic, when duly applied, 
furnish a sufficient criterion to distinguish truth from falsehood. 
A demonstration, therefore, is, in the whole a concatenation of 
syllogisms, all whose preniises are definitions, self-evident truths, 
or propositions previously established. To judge, therefore, 
of the validity of a demonstration^ we must be able to dis- 
tinguish whether the definitions that enter into it are duly 
limited, and descriptive of the ideas they are intended to 
convey ; whether the propositions assumed without proof 
as intuitive truths, have really that self evidence to which 
they lay claim ; whether the syllogisms are drawn up in due 
form, and agreeable to their laws ; and in short, that no de- 
monstrable propositions serve any where as premises, unless 
ihey are conclusions of previous syllogisms. Now it is the bu- 
siness of Logic, in explaining the several operations of the mind, 
fully to instruct us in all these points. It teaches the nature knd 
end of definitions, and lays down the rules by which they ought 
to be formed, (page 68.) It unfolds the several species of pro- 
positions,"'^ and the necessity and nature of distribution (page 
96) and finally it prescribes rules for the syllogism (page 203) 
which being duly applied, each term being limited by defini- 
tion, or distribution, and the truth of the premises being known 
or demonstrated to be relevant to the conclusion desired, the 
establishment of truth and exclusion of fallacy are the neces- 
sary consequences. 

7. Would we guard against the introduction of fallacy, it 
will be necessary. 

First. To see, whenever necessary, that the terms are so 
limited by either nominal or real definition, (art. 48, note 7) 
as to prevent the possibility of any of them being understood 
in more senses than one. And " as the terms in every syllo- 
gism are usually repeated twice, it will be necessary that they 
be taken precisely in the same sense in both places." If a 
term be a number, it should be stated whether it is to be un- 
derstood in the collective or distributive sense. If all impor- 
tant terms entering into contract between one man and 

* Duncan. 
z 2 



270 ON FALLACIES. 

another were limited by definition, it would frequently pre- 
vent much legal litigation and expense. Mathematicians al- 
ways commence their works ^with definitions, and afterwards 
take care to use no term but in the sense already defined. 

Secondly. The whole syllogism, according to the six rules 
already given, (page 203 to 207) should be examined. As to 
the premises, if our object be not only the mere regularity of 
the form of the argument, but also the verity of the conclu- 
sion, we should be aware, 1st, that they are true, either defi- 
nitions, self-evident truths or axioms, or propositions previously 
demonstrated to be true. 2dly, That the premises are not 
unduly assumed, nor irrelevant to the conclusion. 

Thi?'dly. We may easily, by the mnemonic lines, as already 
explained, reduce all syllogisms to the first figure, which is 
most agreeable to the general principle of Aristotle, when we 
shall find, if regular, that the major term of the conclusion 
MUST BE predicated of its minor, in consequence of that minor 
being contained in a distributed middle, of which the same 
major is predicated. This effectually provides for Dr. 
Watts' rules to guard against fallacy, viz : " that the premises 
must contain the conclusion ;" or, in other words, " one of the 
premises must contain the conclusion, and the other must 
show that the conclusion is contained in it." 

8. The six rules to which we have alluded, (pages 203 to 
207) and the mnemonic lines (Art. 152) are all that are deem- 
ed necessary by most writers on logic, to enable us to ascer- 
tain the regularity of any syllogism, and consequently to de- 
tect any fallacy. The mnemonic lines alone «?'e sufficient to 
intimate what are the only admissible moods in each figure. 
Dr. Whately has not deemed any thing further on the subject 
necessary. Some, however, in addition to the six general 
fules, applicable to all moods and figures, and the mnemonic 
lines, which sufficiently point out what are the only allowable 
moods, furnish special rules for each figure, viz : 

Special Rules for the Syllogisms of each Figure. 

FIRST FIGURE. 

(Art. 174.) Rule I. The minor premiss must be affirma- 
tive, and the major universal. 

1. For were the minor proposition negative, the major 
should be affirmative, since both the premises cannot be nega- 
tive, by the fifth general rule (Art. 143.) And if one of the 
premises were negative, so would also, by the sixth general 



ON FALLACIES. 271 

rule, (Art. 144) the conclusion, whose predicate, the major 
term, in that case would be distributed, (for E or O distribute 
the predicate) which would be a term distributed in the con- 
clusion not distributed in the premises, contrary to Rule IV. 
(Art. 142.) 

2. In the minor proposition the middle term is predicated of 
the minor term, and as the minor proposition is affirmative, the 
middle term will of course be there undistributed, and since 
it must be distributed in one of the premises, the major propo- 
sition, having the middle term for its subject, must necessarily 
be universal, for neither I nor O distributes the subject. 

SECOND FIGURE. 

(Art. 175.) Rule II. One premiss and the conclusion 
must be negative ; hut the major universal, 

1. If a premiss be negative, so must the conclusion, accord- 
ing to Rule VI. (art. 144.) In the second figure, the middle term 
is the predicate of both premises. Consequently were they 
both affirmatives the middle term would remain undistributed. 

2. The predicate of a negative conclusion is necessarily dis- 
tributed, which would be an illicit process of the major term 
unless it were distributed in the premises; and that is effected 
by that major term being the subject of a universal in the 
major proposition. 

THIRD FIGURE. 

(Art. 176.) Rule III. The minor premiss must be affirma- 
tive and the conclusion particular. 

1. Two negative premises, as already observed are inadmis- 
sible ; therefore, were the minor negative, the major proposi- 
tion must be affirmative, while its predicate which is the ma- 
jor term would be undistributed, and as the conclusion, in this 
case, would be negative, the same major term in it would be 
distributed ; that is, there would be an illicit process of the 
m,ajor in the conclusion not distributed in the premises. 

2. Because the minor proposition is affirmative, the minor 
term, here its predicate, remains undistributed: but it would 
be distributed in a universal conclusion, which would be an il- 
licit process of the minor. 

fourth figure. 

(Art. 177.) Rule IV. If the major premiss be affirmative, 

the minor must be universal. 



272 ON FALLACIES. 

1. If the major proposition be affirmative, the middle term, 
which in this case is its predicate, is undistributed, and since 
it is necessary that it should be distributed once in the pre- 
mises, the minor proposition, where the middle is the subject, 
must be universal ; since no particular proposition distributes 
the subject. 

(Art. 178.) Rule V. If the minor premiss be affirmative, 

the conclusion must be particular. 

1. The minor term being the predicate of the minor pre- 
miss, if that be affirmative, the minor term remains undistri- 
buted ; there would therefore be an illicit process of the minor 
term in the conclusion of which it is the subject, were that 
conclusion universal. 

(Art. 179.) Rule VI. If either of the premises be negative, 

the major must be universal. 

1. For if any of the premises be negative, the conclusion, 
by the sixth general rule, is negative, where the major term its 
predicate is distributed, which therefore requires the major 
premiss of which it is the subject to be universal. In a par- 
ticular proposition the subject is undistributed. 

2. Dr. Whatley seems to be the first that has attempted 
the classification of fallacies. This is a matter of some diffi- 
culty. For whatever system be adopted, cases are not un- 
common where a fallacy may evidently belong to more than 
one class, and transgress several rules. His division is into the 
logical, and non-logical fallacies. By logical fallacies, he 
means those wherein the conclusion does not follow from the 
premises ; and by the non-logical, those whose conclusion does 
follow but from wrong premises. The logical again, he sub- 
divides, into those which are purely logical^ or where the fal- 
laciousness is apparent from the mere form of expression ; and 
into the semi-logical whose fallacy results from the middle 
term being ambiguous in sense, &c. The annexed table pre- 
sents his entire scheme. 



ON FALLACIES, 



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274 ON FALLACIES. 

2. It will tend to simplify the whole of what is specified on 
the preceding table, to arrange fallacies into three principal 
kinds, in this case necessarily genera, since each will contain 
its species, and a species will occasionally have its varieties. 

(Art. 180.) The genera of fallacies are three: I. Fallacy 

resulting from ambiguity in one term ; 11. Fallacy from a 

term undistributed ; and III. Fallacy from improper pre- 

m,ises. 

CLASSIFICATIOX, &C. OF FALLACIES. 

Genus I. Fallacy from ambiguity in one term. 
(Art. 181.) The first genus of fallacy is that which com- 
prises all cases where that fallacy results from an equivocal 
word, or ambiguity in one term : its species are, 1, the fallacy 
of similar expression ; 2, of interrogation ; 3, of equivocation ; 
4, of division and composition ; and 5, of the accident. 

1. The whole of these can only arise from the want of pre- 
vious definition, and admit therefore of one remedy, i. e. so to 
limit by definition the term as to prevent its being taken in 
more senses than one ; which will generally lead to the dis- 
covery that there were, in sense, four terms in the argument 
instead of three, and that one yet remains agreeing only with 
the sense rejected, which must in consequence be also ex- 
cluded. 

(Art. 182.) The fallacy of similar expression is that which 

arises from words nearly related to one another by etymology, 

or the grammatical structure of the language. 

1. This species is commonly called ^^fallacia figurse dic- 
tionis.'^ Paronymous words, are such as belong to one another, 
as noun, adjective, verb, &c. of the same root ; though they 
vary in sense, yet in sound are so similar, as frequently to pass 
for what are identical. Such are murder, murderer ; pro- 
ject, projector ; presume, presumption ; art, artful ; de- 
sign, designing ; faith, faithful, &c. ; the following are ex- 
amples. 

Murder should be punished with death. 

This man is a murderer. 

This man should be punished with death. 

However just, as in this case, the conclusion is, yet this can- 
not properly be called an argument ; for the term "murder" 
is certainly not a proper middle term to contain the minor. 



ON FALLACIES. 275 

Projectors are unfit to be trusted. 
This man has formed a project. 
This man is unfit to be trusted. 

This is equivalent to four terms. The bad sense commonly 
attached to the word projector, is not impHed in the term 
project. 

(Art. 183.) The fallacy of interrogation is that of asking 
several questions which appear to be but one, in order to ob- 
tain, relative to one term, an answer suited to the design of 
the sophist. 

1. The refutation is, to reply separately to each question, 
to detect the ambiguity. It is not uncommon in reasoning to 
state an equivocal argument in form of a question, so worded 
that there is little doubt which answer will be given ; but if 
there be such a doubt, a designing sophist will not fail to have 
two fallacies ready ; as in the question " whether any thing 
vicious is expedient 1" The term " expedient" is ambiguous, 
and sometimes expresses what is conducive to temporal, at 
another to eternal good. To whichever sense an answer is 
given, the sophist may have a fallacy of equivocation, founded 
on that sense. Should the answer be given in the negative, 
his argument may stand thus : 
What is vicious is not expedient. 

Whatever conduces to the acquisition of wealth is expedient. 
Whatever conduces to the acquisition of wealth cannot be vicious. 

2. But should the answer be given in the affirmative, the 
ground may be changed thus: 

Whatever is expedient is desirable. 
Something vicious is expedient; therefore 
Something vicious is desirable. 

3. All that is requisite in this, and in all similar cases, is to 
expose the ambiguity of the term. Man in argument has to 
do with sense, not sound ; and if a word has more accepta* 
tions than one, (for example, teneo or testudo in Latin) it must 
be by definition, limited to that in which we intend to take it. 

(Art. 184.) The fallacy of intrinsic and incidental equivo- 
cation is that which arises either from what is equivocal in 
the word itself, or is derived from a context, in which it has 
a different sense, or is differently applied to what it is in 
^mother. 

All that believe shall be saved. 
The devils believe ; therefore 
The devils shall be saved. 



276 ON FALLACIES. 

1. This offends against the very first rules of syllogism ; for 
it has four terms. "Believe," in the major premiss, is taken 
to signify *' to believe with the heart unto righteousness," such 
a belief as is attended with a moral and saving influence ; 
whose fruit is " loving obedience," which cannot exist without 
consistent morality of the highest order. But in the minor 
the same term is employed to signify to believe any abstract 
truth, or one in which we have no such interest, as to produce 
" righteousness, peace and joy." Very differently to this do 
the devils believe ; they ^' believe and trembler The Chris- 
tian believes. In whom 1 In Christ. The Mussulman believes. 
In whom ? In Mahomet. But what has the one to do with 
the other? And I believe that two and two make four, or 
that Caesar passed the Rubicon ; but that belief will not save 
m e 

2. Words are capable of more meanings than one, either, 
1. By accident ; as li^ht signifying the contrary to heavy, 
and the contrary to dark : hear, a quadruped, a northern con- 
stellation, or the name of a dog. 2. From its first and sec- 
ond intention ; as, line in the military or naval art, signify- 
ing, a form of drawing up troops or ships; in geography, a cer- 
tain division of the earth ; in mathematics, the shortest dis- 
tance between two points ; in fishing, a string to catch fish ; 
in ethics, a rule of conduct. 3. From resemblance ; thus 
blade, as a blade of grass from its resemblance to the blade of 
a sword ; dove-tail in joinery from its resemblance to the tail 
of a dove. 4. From analogy ; as sweet taste what gratifies the 
palate ; a sweet sound that pleases the ear : so the leg of a 
table, the leg of an animal ; the foot of a mountain, the foot 
of a man. 5. Metaphorically ; as a ^hi^ ploughing the deep. 
6. In various other ways ; as Homer, the poet ; Homer, the 
Iliad and Odyssey. Have you read Pope ? Pope was a man. 
Learning, acquiring knowledge; learning the knowledge 
itself. Post, a pillar ; post, a stage from one pillar to another; 
post, the conveyance that travels this stage ; " my days are 
swifter than a post :" not the former surely. Premises, the 
two first propositions of an argument ; premises, a building. 
A says " Csesar was a great man. B differs from him; be- 
cause they two by the term great, or great man, do not mean 
the same thing. " His meat was locusts." What locusts ? the 
insects, or the fruit or pods of the locust tree? 

(Art. 185.) The fallacy of division or composition is that 
where the middle term is used in one premiss collectively, and 
in the other distributively. 



ON FALLACIES. 277 

1. If the middle term is used collectively in the major, and 
distributively in the minor premiss, it is the fallacy of division; 
the reverse of this is the fallacy of composition ; the fallacy of 
division, is such as in the following example. 

The primary planets are seven. 
Mercury and Venus are primary planets. 
Mercury and Venus are seven. 

After "primary planets" in the major, write collectively, the 
sense implied ; we then have four terms, and the argument 
falls as useless. 

The fallacy of composition is such as, 

Two and three are even and odd. 
Five are two and three. 
Five are even and odd. 

After two and three in the major, write '^distinctly," the sense 
of the major ; and the same consequence follows. 

2. But says the necessarian. 

He who necessarily goes or stays, is not a free agent. 
You must necessarily go or stay ; therefore 
You are not a free agent. 

This is no better than 

He who has the choice of one alternative is not a free agent. 
You have the choice of one alternative ; therefore 
You are not a free agent. 

i. e. a choice, and not a free agent ! 

3. And the devotee of fortune's wheel says, 

The gaining of a high prize is no uncommon occurrence. 

What is no uncommon occurrence, may reasonably be expected ; therefore 

The gaining of a high prize may reasonably be expected. 

" The conclusion when applied to the individual must be 
understood in the sense of * reasonably expected by a certain 
person ;' therefore, for the major premiss to be true, the mid- 
dle term must be understood to mean, ' no uncommon occur- 
rence to some one particular individual;* whereas for the 
minor, (which has been placed first, for illusion,) to be true, 
you must understand it of ' no uncommon occurrence to some 
one or other ;* and thus you have the fallacy of composition." 

4. Dr. Whately says, " there is no fallacy more common, 
or more likely to deceive, than the one now before us ; the 
form in which it is most usually employed, is to establish some 
truth separately, concerning each single member of a certain 
class ; and thence to infer the same of the whole collectively ; 

Aa 



278 ON FALLACIES. 

thus some infidels have labored to prove concerning some one 
of our Lord's miracles, that it might have been the result of 
an accidental conjuncture of natural circumstances ; next, 
they endeavour to prove the same concerning another ; and so 
on ; and thence infer that all of them might have been so. 
They might argue in like manner, that because it is not very 
improbable one may throw sixes in any one out of a hundred 
throws, therefore, it is no more improbable that one may throw 
sixes a hundred times running." 

5. This is also the logic of the spendthrift. 

This, that or the other expense, I am able to afford. 

This, added to that and the other, is this, that and the other expense. 

This, that and the other expense, I am able to afford. 

Stop ! this, added to that and the other, will ruin you. 

6. In this fallacy too, the selfish and the unfaithful, find their 
Gospel. 

Neither to this charity, or duty, nor to that, nor to the other, am I bound to con- 
tribute or perform. 
These charities and duties belong to this, that and the other, &c. 
These charities and duties, I am not bound to perform. 

A universal from a particular, and four terms, as in the for- 
mer case : the practical consequence of the fallacy, is all chari- 
ties and duties may be dispensed with. 

(Art. 186.) The fallacy of accident is that which, com- 
paring an essential with -An accidental difference, infers that 
to be true in one case which is not in the other. 

1. For essential and accidental diflference, see Art. 33 and 
35. This fallacy involves two varieties; 1st, Inference as to 
accident from essence. 2d, Inference as to essence from acci- 
dent.^ Logic countenances neither of these ; but its rules, 
already given, prohibit both. " Truth is single and indivisi- 
ble, but error is various and multiform.'^ No wonder then 
that men have found out more ways of evading truth than 
there were windings in the Cretan labyrinth. 

2. Now, according to the rules of logic, a middle term, that 
is our universal, is defined and limited ; 1st, by its genus; 2dly 
by its essential difference, (not accident) which distinguishes 
it from every other genus or universal : to introduce accident 

* Or divided in the old works on logic into, 1st, " a dicto secundum quid, 
ad dictum simpliciter," and 2dly, " a dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum 
quid." 



ON FALLACIES. 279 

in such case is to introduce confusion, the fool's atmosphere. 
It is true, if we change our universal, what was accident in 
the one case, may become essential in the other. For exam- 
ple, the universal quadruped, its genus is animal ; its essen- 
tial difference, or what distinguishes it from any other uni- 
versal, is having four feet, and the definition limiting it, is an 
animal having four feet ; for all such, no matter what color, 
or what size, with or without horns, cloven feet or not, in this 
case, accident, are quadrupeds. The case however is possi- 
ble, through accidental circumstances, or a circumstance not 
essential to the genus quadruped, that one or more individu- 
als m^y be maimed, or absolutely without one of the four legs 
essential to the genus. And if it be necessary to consider these 
distinctly, or to have a distinct universal including all such 
cases, we limit it by an essential difference involving all the 
cases, as a maimed quadruped, when what was before acci' 
dent is essential to a distinct character or universal. 

3. The cases of this gross fallacy, commonly quoted, are 
such as the following : 

All things bought in the shambles are eaten by man. 
Raw meat is bought in the shambles. 
Raw meat is eaten by man. 

Here that is infered to be true without, which is only true 
with the accident, [cooked or prepared) since most things are 
eaten only some how prepared, by one who has been defined 
to be, '' a cooking anifnal,'^ or the only animal that cooks. 
But the universal, or middle term, from which this is infered, 
(all things bought in the shambles) does not involve this acci- 
dent as its essence. The proper universal in this case would 
be, " all things bought in the sham,bles and prep ared,^^ such 
we might predicate are eaten by man : the accidents then 
would be, roasted, boiled, seasoned, &c. which universal would 
of course exclude raw meat. Again: 

All things that have been injurious or capable of being abusect, should be re- 
jected. 
The medicine A has been injurious, and capable of being abused. 
The medicine A should be rejected. 

The true universal in such case is, " all things that have 
been accidentally injurious, or occasionally capable of being 
abused ;" from which universal men would, therefore, reject 
first the one thing and then the other, as suited their caprice 
or prejudice, on account of what may be true as to the acci- 
dent, or in a few cases ; but not as to what is essential in its 
general effects and character. Of course from a premiss of 



280 ON FALLACIES. 

this nature, since there is not one good thing but what has 
been abused, we must conclude to reject all good things. 

4. Though a fallacy of this nature, when stated with the 
least propriety, is so gross that even a child would reject it, 
yet in the common enthymeme it is so elliptically expressed 
that its absurdity is not perceived ; and it is scarcely possible, 
gross as it is, to mention another limb of deception, as even 
the newspapers of every day evince, that passes more current 
than this. Opium, improperly used, in five cases, has been 
injurious ; but, properly used, useful in a hundred ; therefore 
reject it. Money of the description X has been capable of 
being abused, by beings not men, in ten cases ; but useful to 
trade and to the honest laborer in a thousand ; therefore re- 
ject it. The Bible itself has been abused, in heresies, &c. in 
ten cases, but useful to the sincere in ten thousand ; therefore 
reject it. The institution B is said, in some dark hour, to have 
taken one or two false steps ; nevertheless, meanwhile, to the 
community at large it has been beneficial in a thousand cases, 
so that the balance is abundantly to its credit ; but it falls un- 
der this false rule, therefore reject it. That is, aim not at 
preventing the abuse and preserving the good, but sweep aw^ay 
the good together with the evil, into one m,ad chaos. Falla- 
cies of this kind are too gross to be sufierable ; but what ex- 
poses them as such is so commonly withheld that they are re- 
newed every day, endorsed by the unthinking and paid away 
for good, as though they were specie. 

5. Now Livy's Roman History describes certain prodigies and 
omens ; is therefore the whole of Livy's History to be reject- 
ed, or not any thing which Livy has said to be taken as true. 
If we have no ability to discriminate between the evil and the 
good, nor to separate the one from the other, but are necessi- 
tated, whenever blended, as they often are, to reject the whole ; 
on this principle where must we stop '\ The art of printing, 
accidentally, has occasioned sedition ; the Turks complain, 
that learning <3estroys all their faith ; for a similar reason 
the Chinese burnt all learned books : to proceed consistently 
with this principle of accident, occasion, d:c. we must destroy 
the art of printing, all learning, and all learned books. 

Genus U. Fallacy resulting from a term undistribut- 
ed. 

(Art. 187.) The second genus of fallacies includes two spe- 
cies, 1st. Those resulting from a middle term undistributed,^ 



ON FALLACIES. 281 

and 2d. From a term distributed in the conclusion not distri- 
buted in the premises. 

I. See the general rules of syllogism (Rules III and IV, 
pages 204 and 206.) 

Isf. From an undistributed middle. 

The consequence of an undistributed middle might be such 
as the following. 

All that understand the whole of Euclid understand the first six books of Euclid* 



John understands the first six books of Euclid. 
John understands the whole of Euclid. 



Here the middle term, " understand the first six books of 
Euclid" is undistributed, being the predicate of a universal, 
and refers to two classes. 1st. Those that understand the 
whole of Euclid, and 2d. Those that understand only the first 
six books. The major premiss converted, would be false, a»d 
no conclusion could follow. 

2g^. From, a term distributed in the conclusion, not dis- 
tributed in the premises. 

Illicit process of the Minor. 
A. Every classic is learned. 

A. Every learned man is a mathematician, 



A. Every mathematician is a classic. 

The minor term, mathematician, is distributed in the con- 
clusion, and not in the premises; it is therefore an illicit process 
of the minor, which cannot be obtained without the violation 
of the rules. This not only violates the sixth general rule, 
(page 206,) the mnemonic line for the fourth figure, (Art. 
152,) (which recognizes no such mood in that figure as AAA,) 
and consequently the fifth special rule, (Art. 178:) similar 
transgression will be necessary to obtain an 

Illicit process of the Major. 
A. All apothecaries are chemists, 



E. No apothecary is a druggist, 
E. No druggist is a chemist. 

No such mood in the third figure, as AEE, is acknowledged 
by the memorial lines, in Art. 152. The third special Rule, 
(Art. 176,) is also violated : the consequence is, an illicit pro- 
cess of the major, distributed in the conclusion, but not in the 
premises, and therefore necessarily involving a fallacy. 

aa2 



282 ON TALLACIES. 

Genus III. Fallacy from improper premises, 

(Art. 188.) The third genus of fallacy is that which com- 
prises all cases where that fallacy results from improper 
premises: its species are, 1. Begging the question, ov sup- 
posing to be granted what is not ; 2. Undue assumption ; and 
3. Mistake of the question. 

(Art. 189.) The fallacy of begging the question is that of 
infering a conclusion from a premiss supposed to be granted, 
when it is not ; or from a premiss, which is the same as the 
conclusion. 

1. This is the Petitio Principii. The following varieties 
are enumerated, 1st. When we attempt to 'prove a thing by 
itself; 2d. By a synonymous word; 3d. By something 
equally unknown; 4th. By something more unknown; or 
5th. By arguing in a circle. 

All that say that the doctrine A is equal to x plus y, are heretics. 
You said that the doctrine A is equal to x plus y ; therefore 
You are a heretic. 

2. Now how do you prove that I said either by writing or 
discourse, that A is equal to x plus y. This you take for 
granted, and then come to a conclusion from a premiss, yours, 
not mine : this is a very common case. 

3. But should I have said that A is equal to x minus y, in- 
stead of X plus y, this is something similar in sound, but very 
different in sense ; you assume, nevertheless, your own hypo- 
thesis, attributing all consequence to me. 

4. The latter of these cases is a compound fallacy, mixing a 
mistake of the question, (ignoratio elenchi,) with a begging of 
the question, (petitio principii,) both of which are extremely 
common in polemic or controversial writings. 

All botlies move towards the centre of the universe. 
All bodies move towards the centre of the earth. 
The centre of the earth is the centre of the universe. 

5. This was a fallacy of the peripatetics. In the minor it 
is taken for granted, that " all bodies move towards the cen- 
tre of the earth :" those do within the limits of the earth's at- 



ON FALLACIES. 283 

traction, that is some bodies, not all ; the minor, therefore, is 
not granted, and the conclusion does not follow. 

All things soporific induces sleep. 
Opium is a soporific ; therefore 
Opium induces sleep. 

6. This is the same thing as to attempt to prove a thing by 
itself; a species of circle ; and amounts to this.; opium induces 
sleep, because it induces sleep. 

7. Of the circle, many are the examples ; thus when the 
Mussulmen are asked, " How do you know that Mahomet was 
a prophet ?" Their answer is, " because the Koran says so ;" 
and when asked, " how do you know that the Koran is true 1" 
they answer, '* because Mahomet said so.'^ In a similar way, 
" the necessarians, bring their hypothesis to prore a fact, and 
then allege the fact as proof of their hypothesis. They first 
assume gratuitously, that the mind acts mechanically, like 
the body; and that it never can act, unless the motive, which 
causes the action, be greater than any other then existing in 
the mind. Any particular volition is then declared to be ne- 
cessary, because the motive, which produced it, was the 
strongest then in the mind. But when asked for the proof 
that this motive was the strongest, they simply refer us to the 
volition, which otherwise could not have taken place. That 
is, the volition was necessary, because it was produced by the 
strongest motive ; and the motive must have been the 
strongest because the volition was produced.''^ — Hedge. 

8. Arguing in a circle is capable, by " obliquity of expres- 
sion" in one of the premises, of such disguise, that it is not 
readily perceived that the whole amounts to attempting to 
prove the same thing from the same thing. " Gibbon," says 
Dr. Whately, *' affords the most remarkable instances of this 
kind of style. That which he really means to speak off is 
hardly ever made the subject of his proposition. His way of 
writing reminds one of those persons who never dare look you 
full in the face." 

(Art. 190.) The fallacy of undue assumption, is that of in- 

fering a conclusion from a premiss either not true, or not 

properly connected with the conclusion. 

1. Its varieties <jiTe,\. H\\q assignation of a supposed in- 
stead of the true cause. 2. Substitution of a false instead 
of a true premiss suppressed. 3. Fallacy of partial re- 
ference. 4. Combination with a mistake of the question ; 
and 5. Infering a greater from a less probability. 



284 ON FALLACIES. 

2. The fallacy sometimes termed *' non causa pro causa," 
or the assignation of a false cause^ or more properly the 
assignation of a supposed^ instead of the proper cause, is 
attributing an effect to what is not, or is not known to be its 
cause ; as, 

What cannot be otherwise accounted for than from volcanic impulse, proceeds 

from volcanic impulse. 
Aerolites cannot be otherwise accounted for, &cc. ; therefore 
Aerolites proceed from volcanic impulse. 

But from what volcano did the one weighing more than 
fifty pounds proceed, which fell within ten miles of the writer 
of these lines, on the Wolds in Yorkshire, whose report he 
heard, and the facts are well attested in the philosophical re- 
cords of that time ? The cause commonly assigned is that of 
the volcano ; but no known valcano exists wdthin a thousand 
miles of that place. 

Patients in the disease Y, taking the medicine X, are cured by the medicine X. 
John was such a patient, and took that medicine ; therefore 
John was cured by the medicine X. 

The major requires proof; some may have recovered 
through constitution, and from other causes, or not from the 
medicine X ; if so, John's may have heen such a case. 

3. Fallacy of suppressed py^emiss frequently prevents the 
undue assumption from being perceived ; thus *' Home Tooke 
would prove, by an immense induction, that all particles were 
originally nouns or verbs; and thence concludes that in reality 
they are so still, and that the ordinary division of the parts of 
speech is absurd; keeping out of sight, as self evident, the 
other premiss, which is absolutely false; viz. that the mean- 
ing and force of a word, now and for ever, must be that which 
it or its root originally bore." 

4. Fallacy of partial reference is that of quoting or refer- 
ing to a part instead of the whole passage of an author neces- 
sary to show whether it is or not relevant to your subject, in 
the hope that most readers will not be at the trouble to ex- 
amine the propriety of your quotation, and that a partial pas- 
sage, in all such cases, wall answer your purpose better than 
the w^hole. 

5. The fallacy of undue assumption, as well as that of beg- 
ging the question, is sometimes blended with the ignoratio 
elenchi ; as when the parallelism of two cases is assumed from 
their being in some respects alike, though they should differ 
in the very point essential to the argument. 

6. Of the fallacy of infering a greater from a less proba- 
bility, the following will serve as a general example : 



ON FALLACIES. 285 

The army Y will probably be victorious. 

The troop Z will probably be in the army Y ; therefore 

The troop Z will probably be victorious. 

There is mere probability in the major, and the probability 
expressed in the minor is dependent on the antecedent pro- 
bability, or a probability dependent on a probability ; there- 
fore less than the original. Even if the first probability were 
more than one-half, say f, and the second still greater, or 
f , yet since the product of these is ^\, it is less than the origi- 
nal probability, in the ratio of 2 to 3. In cases of this nature, 
the doctrine of chances must be consulted. 

(Art. 194.) The fallacy of mistaking the question is that 
which proceeds from an ignorance of the exact point to be 
proved; or presuming that something else similar, but not 
precisely the same, is the question, leads to a conclusion ir- 
relevant to the one in debate. 

1. This is commonly called the ignoratio elenchi, or igno- 
rance of the proper argument, or only argument that can re- 
fute ; for ikiyxoi, 01* elenchos, is an argument, rather refuta- 
tion that confutes your adversary. He falls into this fallacy 
who thinks he confutes his opponent without observing the 
rules of contradiction. 

2. To confute an adversary then, without falling into this 
fallacy, an observance of the rules of contradiction are abso- 
lutely necessary, viz. " Four things are required to make a 
contradiction, namely, to speak of the sa7ne thing, 1, in the 
same sense; 2, in the same respect ; 3, with regard to the 
same third thing ; and 4, at the same time. If any of these 
conditions be wanting, is and is not may agree." (Art. 94.) 

3. Again, " A and 0, or E and I are contradictories. (Art. 
95.) Therefore if your opponent take A, you must take O ; 
if he take E, you must take I, and vice versa ; and that with 
reference to the saine thing, in the same sense, and at the 
same time, &c. If you are wide of this mark, you are beat- 
ing the air, and under the fallacy of ignoratio elenchi. 

4. We may translate " ignoratio elenchi" by ignorance of 
the question, ov precise point at issue. For example one op- 
poses you merely because he understands not, through some 
ambiguity, or mode of expression, or through his own want of 
perception, the precise thing you mean. When once he un- 
derstands this, he drops all his opposition, and finds that he has 
neither inclination nor interest to oppose you any longer, since 



286 ON FALLACIES. 

the discovery is, that you mean precisely the same thing that 
he does, and he regrets only that he did not make this discover 
ry sooner. 

5. But it is sometimes worse than a mere ignorance of the 
question. Your adversary finds it impossible to confute you^ 
on the exact line of contradiction, and his only plan is, 1st. 
to get off that line ; 2d. to assume one like it ; and 3d. to con- 
ceal this from you and others. Having succeeded thus far, 
he knows that he may have all the unthinking on his side ; 
all that for want of discrimination know not the difference be- 
tween the line he has taken and that which, fairly to oppose 
you, he ought to have done. Now it is no matter what his 
own finesse be, whether'it excite the smile here, the laugh there, 
or the derision elsewhere, he is advancing on a line, not that 
of truth. And having dressed up his own man of straw, m 
clothes and a likeness, which he calls yours, you are cudgeled 
about in effigy, whilst he, in common with other Q,uixotes, tri-, 
umphs in what he supposes to be valorous deeds. 

6. In some respects there is a similarity between " begging 
the question," and " a mistake of the question." The former 
proceeds on the supposition that some premiss is granted, when 
it is not. That is, it is convenient for me to presume that 
such is your sentiment, that you really said so, or admitted it 
From this premiss of presumption I deduce what I ought, 
on proper premises to have proved, and charge it to your ac- 
count. A mistake of the question proceeds on either a real 
ignorance of what your conclusion exactly is ; or it is again 
convenient to take that to be your conclusion which is simi- 
lar but not the same, and therefore to assume premises rele- 
vant to the false, but the reverse to the one precisely in view, 
and generally so contrived as to throw the consequence or dis- 
credit of the former on the latter to which it does not refer ; 
but aims to establish, by incorrect premises, a point, exactly 
opposite to what you, by the line of propriety and truth had 
intended. In short, " begging the question," assumes a pre- 
miss to be granted, and by it comes to a point that ought to 
have been proved ; but " a mistake of the question," is a 
mistake of the conclusion, or under the limits and conditions, 
in w^hich alone it was contemplated ; and therefore, assumes 
premises, wide of the mark without observing the rules of 
contradiction, to establish what is irrelevant, or foreign to the 
sense in riew ; charging the consequence in either case to the 
opponent. 

7. For example, because Mr. G. has observed that the in* 



ON FALLACIES. 287 

Stitution or the instrument X, without considering any limita- 
tion by condition or circumstances, has been occasionally 
prejudicial, he therefore recommends its entire abolition. On 
the contrary, I observe that the institution or instrument X, 
under the condition Y, and circumstances Z, is of great service 
to society, and therefore advocate it connected v^^ith such con- 
dition and circumstances. He either not knowing what is 
essential to my conclusion, nor why I so conclude, or 7iot 
wishing to know, urges his former argument, as if it were 
refutation, without observing the rules of contradiction, which 
in such cases are necessary. 

8. It is likewise a practice too frequently adopted to mix 
up this fallacy with that of begging the question ; for example, 
*' the sophist proves or disproves, not the proposition which is 
really in question, but one which so implies it as to proceed 
on the supposition that it is already decided, and can admit 
of no doubt ; by this means his assumption of the point in 
question is so indirect and oblique, that it may escape notice ; 
and he thus establishes, practically, his conclusion, at the 
very moment he is withdrawing your attention from it to 
another question." 

8. To this species of fallacy Aristotle refers every thing 
«|a rov Tr^xy/uctTo? out of, i. c. foreign to the affair, or question in 
debate ; and whenever such appeals to the passions, whether 
characterised by such customary epithets as " argument icm 
ad hominem/^ " argumentum ad verecundiam^'' " argu- 
mentum ad populum,'' ^' argumentum ad ignorantiam^^ 
or not, are resorted to for the purposes of deception, whilst 
the " argumentum ad rem" the argument strictly confined 
to the point at issue, or " argumentum ad judicium,,'^ the 
argument addressed to your unbiassed understanding, are kept 
out; these severally are so many varieties of the ignoratio 
elenchi, or fallacy of ignorantly or wilfully mistaking the 
question. 

9. " When the occasion or object in question is not such as 
calls for, or as is likely to excite in particular readers or hear- 
ers the emotions required, it is a common rhetorical artifice to 
turn their attention to some object which will call forth these 
feelings ; and when they are too much excited to be capable 
of judging calmly, it will not be difficult to turn their passions, 
once roused, in the direction required, and to make them view 
the case before them in a very different light. When the metal 
is heated, it may easily be moulded into the desired form. Thus 
vehement indignation against some crime, may be directed 



288 ON FALLACIES. 

against some person who has not been proved guilty of it ; and 
vague declamations against corruption, oppression, &c. or 
against the mischiefs of any particular institution or govern- 
ment; with high-flown panegyrics, either on unqualified lib- 
erty, rights of man, &c. on the one hand ; or on justice, the 
constitution, &c. on the other, will gradually lead the hearers 
to take for granted, without proof, that the measure stated 
will lead to these evils or these advantages ; and it will in con- 
sequence become the object of groundless abhorrence or admi- 
ration. For the very utterance of such words as have a mul- 
titude of what may be called stimulating ideas associated 
with them, will operate like a charm on the minds, especially 
of the ignorant and unthinking, and raise such a tumult of 
feeling as will effectually blind the judgment; so that a string 
of vague abuse or panegyric will often have the effect of a 
train of sound argument."* 

10. The fallacy of shifting ground is a variety referi- 
ble to this species ; as it is avoiding intentionally, either one 
or the other of the premises proper to the restricted conclu- 
sion. The adversary finding it difficult to maintain his posi- 
tion, instead of having the honesty to acknowledge it, as co- 
vertly as possible assumes another, a device to which he may 
again, on the occurrence of renewed difficulty resort, and thus 
on alternately, from premiss to premiss, without waiting for 
the refutation of either. And though the strength of sense, 
judgment and argument be on your side, yet if he possess 
more of volubility, assurance, and pandering to corrupt pas- 
sions than you do, he gains the ascendency not by sense, but 
by sound, not by judgment, but by the want of it, accompani- 
ed by artifice and design. 

11. The fallacy of partial objections is another variety ; 
i. e. showing that there are objections against some plan, theory 
or system, and thence infering that it should be rejected, when 
that which ought to have been proved is, that there are more 
or stronger objections against the receiving than the rejecting 
of it. There, perhaps, never was, nor will be, any plan, 
theory or system proposed, against which strong, and in some 
cases seemingly unanswerable objections may not be urged ; 
so that unless the opposite objections be fairly weighed in the 
balance on the other side we can form no adequate estimate 
of the question proposed. 

12. " This" says Dr. Whately, *' is the main and almost 

. * Rhetoric, Part II. Chap. II. § 6, by Dr. Whately. 



ON FALLACIES. 289 

universal fallacy of infidels, and is that of which men should 
be first and principally warned. They find numerous objec- 
tions against various parts of scripture," and that the more on 
account of the defect in their own powers of perception, to 
some of which, no answer satisfactory to them that cannot 
see and refuse conviction can, on this account, be given. " The 
incautious hearer is apt while his attention is fixed on these, 
to forget that there are infinitely more and stronger objec- 
tions against the supposition that the Christian Religion is of 
human origin ; and that we are bound in reason and candor 
to adopt the hypothesis which labors under the least. That 
the case is, as I have stated, I am authorized to assume, from 
this circumstance, that no complete and consistent account 
has ever been given of the manner in which the Christian 
Religion, supposing it a human contrivance, could have 
arisen, and prevailed as it did. And yet this may be obvi- 
ously demanded with the utmost fairness, of those who deny 
H% Divine origin. The religion exists! this is the phen- 
omenon : those who will not allow it to have come from God, 
are bound to solve this phenomenon on some other hypothesis 
less open to objections. They are indeed not called upon to 
prove that it actually did arise in this way or that ; but to sug- 
gest, (consistently with acknowledged facts,) some probable 
way in which it may have arisen reconcileable with all the 
circumstances of the case. That infidels have never done 
this, though they have had near two thousand years to try, 
amounts to a confession that no such hypothesis can be de- 
vised, which will not be open to greater objections than lie, 
as they think, against Christianity, 

13. The fallacy of unfair representation is to be classed 
under this head. It is very commonly, but improperly em- 
ployed in the estimation of a character, or in the review of a 
book. It consists in exhibiting to view certain failings, mis- 
takes or other imperfections, taking care to merge whatever 
is of an opposite character, and thus to mislead others, and 
draw the balance, however the truth may be, on the opposite 
side. That '' humanum est errare," or it is common to falli- 
ble man to err, is in such case not the point, no more than it 
is to consider whether the beam is in my own eye ; if the mote 
only can be found in yours, or some failing in the author, that 
is enough ; whatever merits may weigh on the opposite side 
are out of the question. A few cases of the former kind are 
to become the only facts thus rendered ostensible ; by these 
only, your character is to be represented, or with these the 

Bb 



290 ON FALLACIES. 

opponent comes forward with his reply to such and such a 
work. But he that read Homer for no other purpose than to 
select what he conceived to be his faults, expecting a reward, 
was, after a sack of grain was set before him, directed to sepa- 
rate the wheat from the chaff, when he received the latter 
for his pains. 

14. Few things are so frequently censured as every species 
of slander^ at least where personality and personal interest 
are concerned, not directly interfering with the community, 
as in that slandered, but never-to-be-mended book, called the 
Bible. It protects you, your interests and your character too, 
but perhaps you thank it not ; and contains a general rule, 
that ought to be written in letters of gold on the circle of the 
sky, for all nations to read, " do unto all as ye would thai 
that they should do unto youP 

15. Dr. Wallis, it appears, ingeniously remarked that 
"jests are fallacies." Though the question " what have jests 
to do with argument?" would be a little startling, yet jests 
have to do with fallacies, and fallacies often depend on them. 
This is so much the case, that most fallacies^ when reduced 
to their proper form, become nothing but something laugh- 
able, mere jests themselves. Whether it is the open or the 
concealed jest, it matters little, so long as, in any way, one 
fool can make another ; by such, it is too true, that many a 
one has been laughed out of his wits ; which of course merely 
proves that he who can be thus deprived of the little property 
he had, never had much to lose ; and therefore lay within 
the reach of miserable buffoonery, which can only act on 
something within a measureable compass of itself. 

SUMMARY OF FALLACIES. 

GENUS I. Fallacy from ambiguity in one term. 
Species 1. The fallacy of similar expression. 
Species 2. The fallacy of interrogation. 
Species 3. The fallacy of equivocation. 
Species 4. The fallacy of division and composition. 

Variety 1. Of division. 

Variety 2. Of composition. 

Species 5. The fallacy of accident. 

Variety 1. Infering accident from essence. 
Variety 2. Infering essence from accident. 

GENUS II. Fallacy from a term undistributed. 
Species 1. Fallacy from an undistributed middle. 
Species 3. Fallacy from an illicit process. 



ON FALLACIES. 291 

GENUS III. Fallact from improper premises. 

Species 1. Fallacy of begging the question. 

Variety 1. Arguing by what is not granted. 
Variety 2. Arguing from a synonimous word. 
Variety 3. From something equally unknown. 
Variety 4. From what is more unknown. 
Variety 5. Arguing in a circle. 

Species. 2. Fallacy of undue assumption. 

Variety 1. Assigning a false cause. 

Variety 2. Substitution of a false premiss. 

Variety 3. Partial reference. 

Variety 4. Combination with mistake of the question. 

Variety 5. False inference as to probability. 

Species 3. Fallacy of mistaking the question. 

Far/e^i/ 1. Ignorance of the question. 

Variety 2. Wilful mistake of the question. 

Variety 3. Combination with begging the question. 

Variety 4. By appeal to the passions. 

Variety 5. Shifting ground. 

Variety 6. Partial objections. 

Variety 7. Unfair representation. 

Mr. Wesley says, " there are as many fallacies as there are 
ways of breaking any of the rules of syllogism. But one who is 
thoroughly acquainted with those rules will easily detect them all." 
This is at once both a curious and important remark. It may- 
be worth while, therefore, to inquire " how many ways there are 
of breaking each rule ?" Under article 145, notes 2 and 3, we find 
that all the possible arithmetical combinations of A, E, I and 0, in 
three propositions, are sixty-four. Consequently these include all 
the correct and incorrect forms in which three propositions of four 
kinds each, can be arranged. Now from these it appears by the 
note at the foot of page 213, that there are twenty-eight ways of 
breaking the fifth rule ; twenty-four ways of breaking the sixth 
rule, which likewise break other rules, and one which violates only 
the fourth rule ; in all fifty-three modes of breaking three rules ; to 
which further add the possibility of breaking rides 2 and 3, ovfifty- 
Jive modes in all. That is, so many possibilities have the sons of 
fallacy in the practice of deception. Have they then any cause to 
complain when they have so many chances against us, whilst we 
have only nineteen^^ and are content with /owr, giving them the 
still further advantage oi fifteen besides ; when they will be arranged 
against us in the apparently formidable ratio of seventy against 

FOUR ?t 

But what then is our Mg\s against this formidable phalanx of 
seventy ? We of the four can say, that better far than the -^gis 
of Pallas is our shield of truth. The shield unbroken, that with 

* Art. 151 and 152. -j- The first figure has only four moods. 



292 ON FALLACIES. 

increased lustre has stood the test of war for near six, and in its 
present combat for near two thousand years. The shield of truth 
defended by its own enemies^ a numerous host, who have un- 
intentionally testified, but for this cause kept out of sight : the 
truth that so many thousands in vain have attempted to over- 
throw, who, after the fair trial of near two thousand years, have 
failed, but without candor to acknowledge it, prefer to practise on 
the green tyros of any succeeding age. Courage too is on our side ; 
we take the four and give you the seventy, and instead of shrink- 
ing are anxious for the combat, singing the Christian paean* as the 
battle draws nigh. 

But so far as logic is concerned, our advice is to the young sol- 
dier — the memorial lines (Art. 152) alone exclude fifty-three falla- 
cies out of the fifty-five, and the rules the rest, however disguised ; 
and this statement alone is suflicient to point out their importance. 
Avoid, by these rules, the fallacies ; give them up gratuitously to 
the enemy, with their mittimus already signed, in II. Thessalo- 
nians, 2d chapter, verses 10th, 11th, 12th. 

* See Xenophon's Analysis, I. 2. 



APPENDIX. 

Section I. 

Synopsis of Logic ; or the Rules most essential to practice com- 
pressed into one page. 

Mnemonic words will, as already observed, be often found, for 
practical purposes, very convenient for the memory. By them, a 
rule which might require a long sentence, or even a paragraph to 
explain, may be compressed into one or two syllables, and thus the 
more essential or practical parts of science may on some occasions 
be contained by a page. When the explanatory parts are read and 
well understood, the mnemonic words are sufficient to intimate to 
the memory certain conditions, laws of succession and other es- 
sential points which would otherwise require many pages to explain. 
The meaning of each is easily understood, and as this has been 
given in each case, we have only here to refer to Art. 69, note 2 ; 
Art. 70; Art. 85 ; Art. 86 ; Art. 87 ; Art. 95 ; Art. 102 ; Art. 103 ; 
Art. 104 ; Art. 135 and note ; Art. 137. Rules for syllogisms 
page 203 to 207 ; Art. 151 and note 1 ; Art. 152. notes 1 and 2 ; 
Art. 154 and notes ; and Art. 155. 

The articles above referred to, and their notes, contain the prin- 
ciples most essential in practice, which by mnemonic expression, 
are comprised on one page ; this again may be copied on a card of 
a size suited to the pocket book. For the adult it will generally 
be sufficient, having previously read the treatise itself, to commit 
the synopsis to memory, and by occasionally, when necessary, 
reviewing it. Logic will become a companion for life. And thus 
the possessor may, if he will, enjoy one of the only titles of real 
nobility, in becoming an advocatefor the truth. Life is but short ; 
when once gone, cannot be recalled ; and therefore requires econ- 
omy : " spend,'''' says the poet," " no moment but in purchase of 
its worth.'^ And that life too, short as it is, must be spent direct- 
ly or indirectly, in word or in practice, in opposing or advocating 
truth : THERE IS no medium ; the choice is ours. 

Bb2 



294 APPENDIX. 

SYNOPSIS. 
Universally, A affirms and E denies ; 
Particularly, I affirms and O denies. 



A distributes the subject ; O the predicate ; I neither, and E both. 



In necessary and impossible matter, an indefinite proposition is 
universal ; in contingent matter particular. A singular proposi- 
tion is generally universal. 

A and O ; or E and I are contradictories. 



By simple conversion E is converted into E, and I into I ; by 
particular conversion, A is converted into I, and E into O. 



Whatever is predicated of a distributed middle, may be predicat- 
ed in like manner of every thing contained in it. 

A perfect syllogism is an argument so expressed, that the major 
term of the conclusion must be predicated of its minor, in conse- 
quence of that minor being contained in a distributed middle of 
which the same major is predicated. 



R. II. An equivocal middle term proves nothing. 

R. III. The middle term must be distributed in one of the pre- 
mises. 

R. IV. No term must be distributed in the conclusion, which 
was not distributed in one of the premises. 

R. V. Two negative or two particular premises prove nothing. 

R. VI. If either premiss be particular or negative, so is also 
the conclusion. 



Figures : subpre, twice-pre, twice-sub, pre-sub. 



F. 1. Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio. 

F. 2. Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroko. 

F. 3. Darapti, Disamis, Datisi, Felapton, Bokardo, Feriso. 

F. 4. Bramantip, Camenes, Dimaris, Fesapo, Fresison. 



For S P convert the proposition, either S simply, or P particu- 
larly ; for M transpose the premises ; and for K reduce ad impos- 
sible, by substituting instead of the premiss, the contradictory of 
the conclusion, as A for ; and E for I ; and vice versa. 



APPENDIX. 295 



SECTION II. 

In treating on whatever generally concerns argumentation, its 
importance throughout has appeared to be such, as to occasion us 
to exceed the limits originally intended. We are, therefore, at pre- 
sent compelled to be, as to topics which compose this appendix, com- 
paratively brief. Should the public patronize this effort to serve a 
cause which involves all that is of consequence to man, future edi- 
tions will afford latitude to enlarge in all cases where brevity is now 
indispensable. 

Remarks on the distinction between Metaphysical^ Moral and Ma- 
thematical Reasoning. 

The attention that has in this work been already devoted to the 
subject of evidence, whether metaphysical, moral, or mathematical, 
and to argumentation generally, precludes the necessity, at present, 
of entering largely on this subject. 

The word Metaphysics is the derivative o^ physics, which is ul- 
timately derived from <^u<n?y nature, constitution, genius, &lc., and 
by it we understand the science that treats generally on the laws of 
nature. Metaphysics in its limited acceptation refers to the exist- 
ence and properties of immaterial beings ; but in its wider sense is 
the same as Ontology, that treats on being generally, material and 
immaterial, and on their modes, essence, properties, attributes, 
laws, accidents, and relations, in which sense it will include the 
whole of moral evidence and argumentation. And, therefore, fur- 
ther distinction between the two is unnecessary. (We refer to Dr. 
Watt's treatise on the science of Ontology.) 

We shall devote a few lines briefly to inquire wherein is the dif- 
ference, that some conceive they have discovered between Moral 
and Mathematical Demonstration ? The whole of one art of rea- 
soning must begin with one term, or with apprehension ; advance 
to two, or to judgment ; and terminate with three, which rightly 
connected is argument, whether moral or mathematical. One term 
therefore, is the first element of all reasoning. This one term again 
refers either to a being material or immaterial, or to its essence, 
property, attributes, laws or accidents ; and of either of these, we 
have either the testimony, evidence or conviction. Consequently 
if moral and mathematical demonstration essentially differ, the dif- 
ference must begin here, in one or the other of these respects, or 
such difference does not exist. If there be any between moral and 
mathematical demonstration, it is, as to reasoning, accidental not 
essential. 

One term, or one being, is either certain, fixed, limited, or un- 
certain, unfixed, not limited, and consequently contingent. But 
moral evidence and demonstration have as much to do with things 
certain, fixed and limited, as mathematical, and apply not the terms 



296 APPENDIX. 

evidence or demonstration to things contingent. Things not cer- 
tain are matters only of probable testimony and probable conclu- 
sion ; the strength of the latter depending on the former, or it in- 
creases until testimony amounts to evidence sufficient to produce 
conviction and certainty. 

Some seem to imagine that because the mathematician refers to 
lines, surfaces, and solids, and to the several kinds which each ad- 
mits, that he has the advantage, because such things often are and 
always may be visible and tangible. But this is not precisely the 
fact ; for when he is demonstrating the properties of triangles, 
squares, or circles, or of cubes, cones, cylinders or spheres, he is 
directly or by induction, refering to one universal that includes all 
such triangles, to one universal that includes all squares, or to ano- 
ther that includes all circles, &c. ; an individual, or many indivi- 
dual figures of each kind, of course, he has seen, but the universal 
to which he refers he never did see ; yet he infers all the properties 
of what is seen from that which is unseen. 

Besides, in mixed mathematics who has more than the mathema- 
tician to do with that which every one thinks he understands, but 
which no one ever saw, called motion. Did the mathematician ever 
see motion, or can he tell us what motion is ? It is true that he has 
seen a body in motion, but that is not motion itself. The question 
is what is that which is in the body when moving, that was not in 
it when in a state of rest. Is it a being, or a mode or affection ? 
But no mode or affection can exist without the being of which it is 
a mode or affection. There are only two alternatives, viz : it is 
either nothing or something. If we say nothing, the consequence 
will be " a reductio ad absurdum." It is, therefore, something. 
But what is that thing ? The greatest men have tried to define it, 
and all have failed. One defines it by its cause, another by its ef- 
fect, and a third by an identical proposition, which informs us, 
when divested of its disguise, that motion is motion. 

But this unseen thing, (its effect is seen but not itself,) the ma- 
thematician proceeds to measure and declare its laws. By what ? 
Two other unseen things, viz : time and space. It is true that one 
or more effects he measures by a time-piece, and by a visible, tan- 
gible line, and having found these effects, under the same circum- 
stances uniform, by the inductive process, he refers them, on lay- 
ing down the general law, to a universal, which universal line in 
space, or universal measure in duration, as well as motion, to which 
they refer he never saw. Yet has he certainty referring to three 
unseen things, and on this kind of certainty all the Principia of Sir 
Isaac Newton is built. And equal certainty has the moralist though 
he refer to things unseen, equally certain, fixed and limited in their 
character. Things of a contingent nature, referible to probable 
testimony, are not the present subject of consideration. But it is 
not a question, it is testified by common experience, by the expe- 



APPENDIX. 297 

rience of the world, that men have as great certainty as to moral 
terms as they can have relative to those that are mathematical. 

If men then can have as much certainty as to one term of a mo- 
ral, as they can have as to another of a mathematical nature, undoubt- 
edly they may as to two terms, and having two terms we may pro- 
ceed to judgment, whether in the moral or mathematical department 
and by one proposition, pronounce them to be equal or unequal, 
like or unlike, suitable or not, &c. as the case may be. And it is 
the same power, the same judgment, the samerationality that judges 
in the one case as in the other ; and if rational, it can only adopt 
one mode of judging, that is the one specially suited to the case : 
still the acts of judging, and the powers that judge are, in all cases, 
homogeneous powers and acts ; and the evidence by which that 
power acts is as certain in the one case as in the other. 

Again, if we may have certainty as to two terms, there is no dif- 
ficulty in conceiving that we may have certainty as to three ; and 
this is all we ask for one act of reasoning, whether in moral or ma- 
thematical demonstration. And if the power of judging is homo- 
geneous, so is that of reasoning, of which the former is an element. 
It is true we may choose different modes of expressing one act of 
reasoning, or may vary that expression according to occasion ; for 
we reason differently with a child to what we do with a man, or 
differently with the swain to what we do with the man of science ; 
therefore we should reason differently with a mathematician to 
what we should do with a chemist, and differently with the latter 
to what we should do in ethics. Yet the whole, however varied 
as to occasion and circumstances, is one principle, one law and one 
line, which may have as much certainty as to one, two and three 
terms, in the one case as in the other ; and therefore all reasoning, 
which includes moral and mathematical reasoning, not only as to 
its essential character, however varied as to mode or accident, but 
as to its certainty, and the immutable relations of things too, is one 
and the same.* 

Mr. Locke seems to have been of the same opinion ; his words 
are, " The precise, real essence of the things, moral words stand 
for, may be perfectly known ; and so the congruity or incongruity 
of the things themselves be perfectly discovered ; in which con- 
sists perfect knowledge. Definition is the only way whereby the 
precise meaning of moral words can be known ; a way without 
leaving room for any contest. The relation of other modes may 
certainly be perceived, as well as those of number and extension, 
and I cannot see why they should not also be capable of demon- 
stration, if due methods were thought on to examine or pursue their 
agreement or disagreement." Professor Scott, alluding to certain 
inaccurate expressions of Dr. Reid, says " Every branch of science 

* As to moral reasoning, see an important extract fi-om Duncan's Logic, 
pages 267, 268 and 369 of this work. 



298 APPENDIX. 

may occasionally assume the demonstrative form. The existence 
of a Deity, the immateriality of the soul, and other moral or meta- 
physical truths, have been as fairly demonstrated as the Pythago- 
rean proposition, or the parabolic motion of projectiles." To this 
it may be added that it is to the general neglect of this definition of 
terms, especially at the commencement of a work, or whenever oc- 
casion requires, and to the want of consecutive and dependent ar- 
gument throughout, that so many vague treatises exist that yield so 
little conviction to the- world. 



SECTION III. 

Rules of Interpretation. 

If it be necessary to guard the sense of the terms we ourselves 
employ in writing or in debate from misinterpretation, which is a 
very frequent source of controversy, it is no less so, on many occa- 
sions, those found in the writings of others ; especially where the 
importance of the subject with which they are connected directly 
concerns either ourselves or others. The neglect of this, or of em- 
ploying the requisite means to determine the meaning of a word, 
or the import of a passage, has been generally the origin of long 
and protracted contests, either in courts of law or in controversial 
writings. On this account rules to guide in interpretation and con- 
troversy have been drawn up, and are worthy of our attention. 
They are so far complete as, fortunately for our present limits, to 
need very few remarks of our own.* 

Rule 1. " The interpreter of a written or printed document 
must have a thorough knowledge of the language in which it is 
written." (As many controversies refer to the writings of antiquity, 
or to the facts which they narrate, the high importance of keeping 
up, in every civilized nation, the knowledge of three ancient lai>- 
guages at least, the Hebrew, Greek and Latin, to which also we 
are every where indebted for the formation of our own, has not been 
as yet duly appreciated.) ^ 

Rule 2. We must possess an intimate acquaintance with the sub- 
ject of the writing. Many words have different significations in 
different sciences and arts ; and the particular meaning they were 
intended to convey, in any instance, must be agreeable to the na- 
ture of the subject on which they were employed. 

Rule 3. The interpretation of a writing often requires a knowl- 
edge of the character of its author. His peculiar bent of mind, his 



* The rules of interpretation and controversy may be found in Kirwan's 
Logic, vol. II. and Hedge's Logic, pages 157 to 167. 



APPENDIX. 299 

temperament, his vocation, and especially his political or religious 
tenets, should be understood. 

Rule 4. If the writing to be interpreted be of ancient date, the 
interpreter should ascertain the genuineness of his text ; whether it 
has descended to him as it came from the author, without any cor- 
ruptions or interpolations from other hands. 

Rule 5. The interpreter should also be well acquainted with the 
history of the country, and of the period in which the author wrote. 
Some words have different meanings in different ages, and writers 
are sometimes influenced by fashion, or circumstances of a local 
and temporary nature. 

Rule 6. The mind of the interpreter should be wholly free from 
all antecedent bias in favor of any system or creed that might influ- 
ence his judgment in the interpretation he is about to make. 

Rule 7. In making the interpretation of a document, the subject 
and predicate of each proposition should be carefully distinguish- 
ed ; the various sentences and clauses should be construed in re- 
ference to each other ; and the resulting sense of all the parts should 
be connected and consistent. 

Rule 8. Words, which admit of different senses, should be taken 
in their most common and obvious meaning, or in such as their con- 
text obviously requires, and consistent with the known intention of 
the writer. 

Rule 9. When any word or expression is ambiguous, and may, 
consistently with the common use then existing, be understood in 
different senses, it must be taken in that sense, which is agreeable 
to the subject, of which the writer was then treating. 

Rule 10. Doubtful words and phrases must always be construed 
in such a sense as will make them produce some effect, in pre- 
ference to one, if such exist, as may render them nugatory. 

Rule 11. Violations of the rules of grammar do not vitiate a 
writing, in which the sense is distinctly expressed. When a pas- 
sage is imperfect, or unintelligible, the interpreter is at liberty to 
supply such words as are manifestly necessary to render its sense 
complete ; taking special care at the same time, to keep without in- 
terpolation what he supplies detached from the text, and strongly 
distinguished as a paraphrase, or as his own interpretation, to which 
he should add his own name, date and place, when and where his 
marginal or other note was annexed or subjoined. But he is not 
allowed in an analogous case to expunge certain words from the 
text in order to give an intelligible meaning to those that remain. 

Rule 12. When there are no special reasons for the contrary, 
words should be construed in their literal rather than in their figura- 
tive sense ; relative words should be refered to the nearest rather 
than to a remote antecedent ; and words which are capable of being 
understood in either, should be taken in their generic rather than in 
their special sense. 

Rule 13. However general may be the words, in which a cove- 



300 APPENDIX. 

nant is expressed, it comprehends those things only, on which it 
appears the parties intended to contract, and not those, which they 
had not in view. But when the object of the covenant is an uni- 
versaUty of things, it comprehends all the particular things which 
compose that universality, even those, of which the parties had no 
knowledge. 

Rule 14. Whatever is obscure or doubtful in a covenant should 
be interpreted by the intention of the parties. If the intention of 
the parties does not appear from the words of the covenant, it should 
be infered from the existing customs and usages of the place in 
which it was made. If the words of a covenant contradict the 
well known intention of the parties, this intention must be regard- 
ed rather than the words. 

Rule 15. When former interpreters are appealed to, in order to 
establish the sense of an ancient writing, those caeteris paribus, 
should be prefered, who were nearest the author in time or place, 
and who had therefore better advantages for knowing his mind, 
than more distant commentators. 



SECTION IV. 

Rules of Controversy. 

Rule I. The terms, to which the question in debate is expressed, 
and the precise point at issue, should be so clearly defined, that 
there could be no misunderstanding respecting them. This alone 
frequently will terminate the controversy at once. The want of it 
is often the sole origin from which controversy and all the unplea- 
santry attending it arises. 

Rule 2. The parties should mutually consider each other as 
standing on a fooling of equality in respect to the subject in debate ; 
and that it is possible that he may be wrong and his adversary in 
the right. (The latter part of this rule, in certain cases, must be 
taken cum grano salis.) 

Rule 3. AH expressions which are unmeaning, and not of direct 
relevancy to the subject in debate, should be avoided. 

Rule 4. Personal reflection, that is where a name or a tJharacter 
is expressly connected with a name, should in no instance be in- 
dulged. 

Rule 5. No one has a right to accuse his adversary of indirect 
motives. 

Rule 6. The consequences of any proposition are not to be 
charged on an adversary, except they are not only injurious to 
morals and society, but also logically deducible from that propo- 
sition. 



APPENDIX. 301 

Rule 7. As truth is the professed object of controversy, whatever 
proofs may be advanced on either side should be examined with 
fairness and candor ; and any attempt to ensnare an adversary by 
the arts of sophistry, or to lessen the force of his reasoning by witj 
cavilling, or ridicule, is a violation of the rules of honorable con- 
troversy. 



SECTION V. 

On Method, 

Method is such a disposition of the parts of any art, science or 
discourse, that the whole may be more easily taught or learned. 

It is two-fold. 1. Method of invention, which finds the rules 
of an ai't or science ; here the inductive process and analogy are 
useful. 2. Method of instruction, which delivers them : and here 
direct or syllogistic argumentation, or what it implies, is proper. 
The former proceeds from sensible and particular things, to intelli- 
gible and universal ; the latter from intelligible and universal things 
to sensible and particular. 

The method of instruction is either perfect or imperfect. The 
former is either 1, universal, by which a whole art or science, or 
2, particular, by which a part of it only is taught. Both are either 
1, synthetical, which is used in the sciences, and beginning with 
the principles of a science, proceeds to the several parts and species^ 
completing the genus : or 2, analytical, which is of use in the 
arts ; iand beginning with the end or design of an art, explains the 
subject of it, and lastly its parts. Analysis is that process by which 
a compound body is reduced to its elementary parts, and the pro^ 
perty of the whole infered from its parts. Synthesis is the reverse, 
and implies the act or method of collecting and putting those parts 
together. 

The general rules of method are these : In delivering an art or 
science, 1. Let nothing be wanting or redundant. 2. Let all the parts 
be consistent with each other. 3. Let nothing be treated of which 
is not homogeneous to the end of the art or subject of the science. 
4. Let the parts be connected by easy transitions. 5. Let that 
precede without which the things that follow cannot be understood, 
but which itself can be understood without them. 

The particular rules are these : 1. The unity of a science de^- 
pends on the unity of its subject ; the unity of an art on the unity 
of its end. 2. Let the more general parts precede the less general. 

The imperfect method is arbitrary and popular ; being no othei' 
than the method of prudence and common sense. 

For a brief view and recommendation of the mathematical method 
see page 72, note 5. 

Ce 



302 APPENDIX. 

ON THE METHOD OF USING LOGIC IN EITHIiR ART OR SCIENCE. 

[Extracted from Bishop Sanderson.] 

1st, On treating on a simple theme. 

We may use the rules of Logic, in treating either on a simple 
theme, or a problem or proposition. 

In treating logically on a simple term, we are to explain both 
the nanie and the thing. And 

I. The name, by 1, Pointing out the ambiguity of the term, (if 
there be any,) recounting its various significations, and fixing on 
that particular meaning in which we at present take it. 2. Show- 
ing its various appellations both in our own and in other tongues. 
S, Observing whence it is derived, with the more remarkable 
words of the same derivation. Not that all this is necessary to be 
done at all times, and on every theme ; but this is the place where 
it should be done, when necessary ; in which there will be need 
of discretion to notice those particulars only which conduce to the 
explication of the thing. 

II. The thing is explained by assigning its attributes, and dis- 
tributing or dividing it into its parts. The attributes are either 
essential or non-essential. By essential we understand, not only 
those which properly constitute its essence, the genus znd essential 
difference ; but also the properties of substances, the subjects and 
objects of accidents, with the efficient and final causes of both. 

The genus should be assigned in the first place, and that the 
nearest which can be found, though premising, if occasion be, those 
which are more remote. The difference comes next : the want of 
which is supplied, and the nature more fully explained by proper- 
ties. And here may be added, the efficient, principal, impulsive 
and instrumental causes, with the remote or proximate ends. Here 
also in treating on an accident, may be subjoined, its proper subject 
and adequate object. But these, more or less, as need shall require ; 
which are to be closed with a complete essential (logical) definition 
of the thing. 

III. The theme is next to be distributed into its several species 
or parts ; just to name which is generally sufiicient. From distri- 
bution we proceed to the non-essential attributes, whether eflfects, 
relative or opposite terms. 

IV. Such effects as are trivial, or commonly known, may either 
be just mentioned or passed over in silence. Those which are of 
consequence and less known, may be ranged under proper heads. 
This is also the place for citing examples. 

Relative words are those which are compared with the theme, as 
agreeing with it : opposite, as differing from it. A theme is ex- 
plained by comparing it with its relatives, when things are mentioned 
which are, in some respects the same or similar, and it is shown 



APPENDIX. 303 

wherein that identity or similarity consists, and also wherein is the 
distinction or dissimilarity between them. 

We, in the last place, compare the theme with its opposites ; for 
even opposites cast light upon each other. There are four species 
of these ; but the contradictory is usually too vague and indefinite 
to be of any service. And the relative opposite has been men- 
tioned before, among the essential attributes. Therefore, the pri- 
vative and contrary opposites only have place here, and very proe. 
perly close the treatise. 

To gi\Q an example of this, suppose the simple theme to be 
treated on be Envy. 

I am^rs^ to consider the name: and here I observe, 

1. It may mean either actively or passively ; as *' He is full of 
envy ;" that is, he envies others. " A rich man is much exposed to 
eaivy ;" that is, to be envied by others. We take it in the former 
sense. 

2. This is in Latin termed Invidia^ a word which has been 
borrowed by many modern languages. The Romans also termed 
it Livor. 

3. The word Invidia is supposed to be derived from two Latin 
words, that imply the " looking much upon another," (rather look- 
ing in, or into another's circumstances) which the envious are apt 
to do : the word livor from the livid complexion which usually at- 
tends the envious temper. 

There are two words of the same derivation, which are frequent- 
ly confounded with each other, namely invidious and envious; and 
yet the signification of the one is widely different from that of the 
other. An envious man, is one who is under the power of envy ; 
an invidious office, one that is apt to raise envy or dislike. 

II. In explaining the thing, 1 observe, y2rs?, the essential attri- 
butes ; as, 

The genus: to premise the more remote; it is a passion, a sort 
of grief; but the nearest genus, is a vicious grief. 

I next observe i\iQ difference, taken 

1. From the subject, which are almost all mankind ; but chiefly 
those who are ignorant of God, and consequently unable to govern 
themselves. 

2. From the object, which is two-fold ; of the thing, or of the 
person. The thing envied, may be good of any kind ; apparent or 
real, useful or pleasant ; of mind, body or fortune. The person 
envied, may be any other man, superior, equal, or inferior; only 
not at a great distance, either of time, of place, or of condition. For 
few envy them that have been long dead, them that live in China 
or Japan ; or those who are above or beneath them beyond ordinary 
degrees of comparison. 

3. From the efficient cause. The principal internal cause in 
him that envies, is pride and inordinate self-love. The impulsive 
external QdiUse may be various, either in him that is envied, if he 



304 APPENDIX. 

be an enemy, a rival, a vain boaster; or in some third person^ as 
contempt, flattery, oblique insinuations ; any of which may stir up 
envy. 

We may, therefore, define envy to be, either more briefly, a vi- 
cious grief at the good of another ; or more fully, an evil sadness of 
mind, whereby a man, from inordinate self-love, is troubled at the 
good which he sees another enjoy, or foresees he will enjoy, as he 
imagines it will lessen or obscure his own happiness. 

III. There are three species of envy, each worse than the pre- 
ceding: the first, when a man is pained at another's enjoying some 
good, (in kind or degree) which he cannot himself attain : the se- 
cond, when a man is pained at another's having what he himself 
has, but wants to have alone : both these are exemplified in Caesar, 
who could bear no superior ; and in Pompey, who could bear no 
equal. The third, is, when a man cannot or will not enjoy his 
own good, lest another should enjoy it with him. It is well known 
how many in the learned world are infected with this disease. 

The effects of envy are three. 1. It torments the mind contin- 
ually, and spreads inquietude through the whole life. 2. It wastes 
even the bodily strength, and exhausts the spirits. A most just 
evil which is at once a sin and a punishment, and not less a scourge 
than it is a vice. 3. It incites a man to all- manner of wickedness, 
detraction, calumny, strife, murder. 

Its most remarkable relatives are, 1 . Hatred, which agrees with 
envy in its subject ; for he who envys another, cannot but hate 
him ; and in its efficient internal cause, which in both is pride 
and blind self-love. 

2. Rejoicing in evil; this also agrees with envy both in its sub- 
ject, (for he that grieves at another's happiness, cannot but rejoice 
in his misery,) and in its efficient cause. 

And yet hatred diflJers from envy, 1. In the thing ha|ed or en- 
vied. For good is only envied ; but either good or evil may 
be hated. 2. In the person. For we envy men only,, not God ; 
and not ourselves, but others ; but we may hate both other men, 
and ourselves ; both other things, and God himself. 

Rejoicing in evil diflfers likewise from envy. 1. In the genus, 
for the genus of the latter is sorrow, of the former joy. 2. In the. 
object, which, in the one is evil, in the other good. 

The grand opposite to envy is benevolence, a tender good-wijl 
to all men, which constrains us to wish well to all, and seriously to 
rejoice in all the good that befalls them. 



2cZ. On treating on a problem. 

k problem is a proposition to be proved. It is sometimes fully 
|)Toposed, whether jwsitively* £^s., 'a Logic is <m cixt^^ which is 



APPENDIX. 305 

©ailed a Thesis ; or interrogatively, as " /s logic an art?'*'* Some- 
times imperfectly, when the subject only is mentioned, the predicate 
being left in question ; as, " on the genus of logic" 

In a regular treatise on a problem, there are three parts, 1. The 
stating the question : 2. Proving the truth ; and 3. Answering ob- 
jections. To which may be premised, the introduction, concerning 
the importance of the question, and the occasion of its being dis 
puted ; and we may add the conclusion, containing a recapitulation 
of the whole with the corollaries arising therefrom. 

I. In the introduction may be shown, that the point in debate is 
not of little or no moment, but either apparently of the high- 
est concern, or if not so important in itself, yet absolutely 
necessary to be understood, in order to comprehend or explain those 
which are confessedly of the highest moment. Next should be 
pointed out the occasion of the doubt and the origin of the error ; 
what gave the first rise to this dispute ; and how the mistake be- 
gan and increased But this must be done nakedly and simply, in 
a logical, not rhetorical manner. 

II. After a short preface, the problem is not immediately to be 
proved,) unless where the terms are quite clear, and the point little 

' controverted, (but first the terms of the question are to be explained, 
both the subject and the predicate. The various senses of these 
should be observed, and the definitions given, particularly of the 
predicate. We then proceed to explain the true state of the con- 
troversy, by shewing what is granted on each side, and what denied. 
For in every controversy there is something wherein both parties 
agree, and something wherein they differ. In reciting the points 
wherein we and our opponents agree, we may add, if need be, a 
short explanation or proof of them ; and then show, wherein the 
proper difflerence, the very point of controversy lies. If this he 
accurately shown, the business is in a manner done ; for it is 
scarcely credible how much light this throws both on the proof of 
the truth, and the answering of objections. 

III. In proving the truth, if it be a plain, simple problem, it may 
suffice briefly to propose our judgment in a simple affirmative or 
negative thesis, and to confirm it by a few well-chosen arguments. 
But if it be more complex, it will be expedient to comprise our de- 
fence of it in several propositions ; beginning with those wherein 
we remove the opinions of others, and then going on to establish our 
own ; after every proposition placing the argument by which it is 
confirmed. But it does not suffice barely to mention these, they 
are also to be strongly pressed and defended, and evasions and 
cavils of all adversaries to be examined and overturned. 

IV. Next follows the answering of objections. These may 
either be subjoined to the several opinions of our opponents, and 
so answered severally, or all placed together, after we have proved 
the point in question, and answered all together. 

In order to do this effectually, we should observe, first is. not 

cc 2 



306 APPENDIX. 

the conclusion advanced against me wide of the mark ? Frequently 
the objection may be allowed, and it does not overturn any conclu- 
sion which we have advanced. Nay, sometimes it may be retort- 
ed, as proving just the contrary of what it was intended for. 

If the conclusion do really contradict any of ours, we are, second- 
ly, to examine the form of the argument, according to the general 
and special rules of syllogism, and to point out that rule against 
which it offends. 

If the form be unexceptionable, it remains, thirdly, to consider 
the matter of the objection from \he premiss. And it will generally 
be found that either one of the premises is false, (or at least not 
sufficiently proved) or that there is a latent ambiguity in the sub- 
ject, the predicate or the middle term. In this case we are to fix 
upon that term and show the ambiguity of it. 

V. We may close the whole by repeating the sum of what has 
been proved ; unless when some useful observations or corollaries, 
either directly or by easy consequence, follow from the conclusions, 
before established. These we are not to prove again ^ but briefly- 
and nakedly to set them^ down as naturally deducible- from., th^se 
propositions which have been- proved before.. 



SECTION VI. 

Logical Parsing. 

h may be- affirmed, without the possibilit;y of contradiction, that* 
there is less difiiculty in Logic, as an art, than there is either in 
Grammar or Arithmetic. Andj consequently, its eligibility and 
claims for introduction into colleges and schools, especially when 
the unlimited range of the subjects it comprises, and its capability 
of service in all departments and to all the interests of society, are 
considered, yield not to those of any other science or art whatever. 
If young persons of the age of fourteen are found capable of study- 
ing Geometry or Euclid, and there is less difficulty in Arithmetic 
than in that, and less in Logic than in either, it follows that there is 
no objection on the account of difficulty. Logic at a distance may 
be contemplated in any form not its own, but when near, it becomes 
as one of those few friends to whom we are more attached, in pro- 
portion to increasing intimacy. To be without what we may so 
easily possess, implies an act of voluntary privation, that may aflect 
interests co-extensive with our existence, and privileges which it is 
impossible either to foresee or appreciate. 

In schools, parsing is always connected with grammar ; and if 
logic is easier than grammar, the parsing of the former is easier than 
that of the latter. Grammar divides the whole of a language into 
eight or nine genera, and each of these into several species, and 



APPENDIX* 307 

contemplates in each, its diff&rencey properties, and accidents, as gen- 
der, number, case, comparison, mood, tense, person^ concord, go- 
vernment, <fec. On the contrary, the parsing of logic may, with pro- 
priety, be confined to that of the proposition and syllogism. And 
as parsing is a process- successful in rendering a pupil familiar with 
grammar, it cannot fail of similar success in its application to logic. 
It only remains to offer the few directions requisite for this purpose. 

All that will be necessary in the parsing of a proposition, will 
be, 1st, to name its extremes, subject and predicate, and what kind 
of term each is. 2diy.. The character of the whole proposition, 
as denoted by its sign (all, every, some, few, &c.) and its copula, 
(is or rs not, &c. ;) which proposition will be either A, E, I or O. 
3dly. What is distributed,, subject, predicate, both, or neither. 

As to the terms, we have to recollect, 1st, that in a proposition 
there are only two terms, and that the only distinction here requi- 
site is, into singular and, universal terms (art. 9 and 10.) 2., That 
the predicate,, beingapredicable term, (Art. 9, 10, and 29) is there- 
fore universaL (Its distribution is another thing.( The predicate 
of no proposition is a singular term,, except the proposition be re- 
ciprocal, or capable of conversion, without change of sense ; as 
" Romulus was the founder of Rome ;" " the founder of Rome was 
Romulus." 3dly. But the subject of a proposition may be either a 
singular or a universal term. 

ds to the proposition, if it be indefinite (Art. 73) or singulaTj 
(Art; 72) it is reducible (Art. 72, note 3, and Art. 73, note 6) to a 
universal or particular, which will be, as before, either A, E, I or 
O. And all hypothetical and' other propositions are reducible, 
when necessary, to one or the other of these four forms, or to the 
only forms necessary for consideration in parsing or in syllogism. 

Example 1. 

All metals are fusible. 

I'st. Of this proposition, "metals," the sw5/ec^,, is a. universal 
term, because it " can be applied to all individuals" of the univer- 
sal, metals, (Art. 10;) fusible, the predicate, is a universal term, 
because all predicable terms are universal. (Art. 29.) 2d. The 
character of the proposition, as its universal sign " all," and its 
affirmative copula " are," declare, is a universal affirmative, (Art. 
66) or A; and therefore,. 3d,, its subject, " metals," is distributed; 
for " A distributes the subject." 

Example^. 
Some animals are not- amphibious. 

1st. Of this proposition, " animals," the subject, is a universal 
term, because it ''' can be applied to all individuals of the universal, 
'''animals;" " amphibious," the predicate, is a universal term, be- 
cause all predicable terms are universal. 2d. The character of the 
proposition, as ]Xs particular sign " some," and its negative copula 



308 APPENDIX. 

" are not," declare, is a particular negative, or ; and therefore, 
3dly, only its predicate, " amphibious," is distributed, for *' dis- 
tributes the predicate." 

Example 3. 
Planets are bodies moving in elliptic orbits. 

1st. Of this proposition, "planets," the subject, is a universal 
term, because it can be applied to all individuals of the universal, 
*' planets ;" ** bodies moving in eUipti^ orbits," the predicate, is a 
universal term, because all predicables are universal. 2d. The 
character of the proposition, as it is, is indefinite, (Art. 73) the mat- 
ter is necessary, (Art. 73, 6) i. e. all planets are such, and the 
whole is equal to 

All planets are bodies moving in elliptic orbits. 

Of which proposition, the character, as its universal sign " all," 
and its affirmative copula " are," declare, is a universal affirma- 
tive, or A ; and therefore^ 3d, its subject is distributed, for. "A dis- 
tributes the subject." 

Example 4. 
Fixed bodies are not falling bodies. 

1st. Of this proposition, "fixed bodies," the subject, is a uni- 
versal term, because it can be applied to all individuals of the uni- 
versal, " fixed bodies j"" " falling bodies," the predicate, is a uni- 
versal term, because all predicables are universal. 2d. The charac- 
ter of the proposition, as it is, is indefinite ; the matter is impossi^ 
ble; (Art. 73) i. e. no fixed bodies can be such ; and the whole is 
equal to 

No fixed body is a falling body. 

Of which proposition the character, as its universal sign " no," and 
its negative copula, equivalent to "is not," declare, is a universal 
negative, or E ; and therefore, 3d, both its subject and predicate 
are distributed, because "E distributes both." 

Example 5. 
Islands are fertile. 

1st. Of this proposition, " islands," the subject is a universal 
term, because it can be applied to all individuals of the universal, 
"island;" "fertile," the predicate, is a universal term, because 
" all predicables are universal. "^ 2d, The character of the proposi- 
tion, as it is, is indefinite ; the matter is contingent, (Art. 73) i. e. 
some are fertile, some are not ; and the whole is equal to 
Some islands are fertile. 

Of which proposition, the character, as its particular sign 
" some," and its affirmative copula " are," declare, is a particular 
affirmative, or I ; and therefore 3, neither subject nor predicate i& 
distributed ; for "I distributes neither." 



APPENDIX 309 

Example 6. 
The Mississippi is a river. 

1. Of this proposition, *' the Mississippi," the subject, is a sin- 
gular term, (Art. 9.) because it expresses one individual, not con- 
sidered as an individual of any class ; "river," the predicate, is a 
universal term, because all predicables are universal. 2. Tlie 
ciiaracter of the proposition, as it is, is singular (Art. 72,) but 
equivalent in sense (Art. 72, 3) to a universal, meaning, '* all the 
Mississippi is a river," of which proposition the character, as its 
universal sign" all," and its affirmative copula *' is," declare, is a 
universal affirmative or A ; and therefore, the subject is distributed, 
or " A distributes the subject." 

When the learner is competent to parse a proposition, he 
may proceed to the syllogism. In parsing the syllogism, 1, al- 
ways begin with the conclusion, and declare which is the minor 
and which the major term, (Art. 130;) and according to directions 
given on pages 35 and 36, find out the middle term.; and if on 
slate or paper, mark the three terms, as there prescribed : the mid- 
dle term for contradistinction always underscored with a double 
line. 2. Now state whether there be any ambiguity or not in the 
middle term, and if both the premises are known to be true. 3. 
Declare which is the major and which the minor proposition, and 
the reason why, (Art. 134) and add the character of each, and mark 
them, as the case may be, with A, E, I or O. 4. Say what terms 
in the premises are distributed, particularly the middle term, the 
reason as to each (Art. 85 ;) marking each distributed term with a 
line drawn over it. 5. See what terms are distributed in the con- 
clusion, and declare if any are there distributed not distributed in 
the conclusion, and consequently an illicit process of either the ma- 
jor or minor term : if there be, or any other defect, the parsing is 
there at an end, and the syllogism is to be rejected. 6. If all be 
i^egular, declare it to be a perfect syllogism, according to definition 
Art. 137. 7. Lastly, describe its figure, (according to Rule page 
^15,) and its mood in that fiigure, according to memorial lines (Art. 
152) or state if it disagree with any mood in that figure ; if it do 
not, it is regular. 

cE No moving body ifi a fixed body. 

lA Every planet is a moving body : therefore 
rEnt. No planet is a fix ed body. 

-^ ' — r ' — ' 

I. The conclusion of this syllogism is, " No planet is a fixed 
body;" its subject " planet," is the minor, and its predicate, *' fix- 
ed body," is the major term of the syllogism ; and the only re- 
maining term in the whole distinct from either is ^' moving body,' 
which is, therefore, the middle term ; and we mark them according- 
ly. There is m ambiguity in the middle term, " moving body," 
and both the premises are known to be true. 3. The major pre- 



310 APPENDIX. 

miss is, " No moving body is a fixed body," because it compares 
the middle term "moving body" with the major term, "fixed 
body :" it is a universal negative which we mark E ; The minor 
premiss is, " every planet is a moving body," because it compares 
the middle term, " moving body," with the minor term, " planet," 
(Art. 134.) It is a universal affirmative, which mark A, 4. The 
major premiss which is E., distributes both subject and predicate, 
because "E distributes both ;" and consequently the middle term 
contained in that premiss. The minor premiss distributes only its 
subject, '* planet," for " A distributes the subject," which we mark 
accordingly. 5. The character of the conclusion is a universal ne- 
gative, or E, which therefore distributes both subject and predicate 
for " E distributes both," which we therefore mark ; but the terms 
distributed in the conclusion we find already distributed in the pre- 
mises as described, and consequently there is no illicit process, or 
crther transgression of rule. 6. It is therefore a perfect syllogism, 
(Art. 137) wherein "the major term must be predicated of its roi^ 
nor, in consequence of that minor being contained in a distributed 
middle of which the same major is predicated. 7. It is of the first 
figure, according to Art. 147, or memorial line page 151 ; and its 
mood in that figure, according to lines Art. 152, is Celarent, and 
therefore does not disagree with the known moods of that figure, and 
consequently is regular. 

fEs No falling body is a star. 
Ap All star* are luminous bodies; therefore 



O Some luminous bodies are not falling bodies. 



1. The conclusion of this syllogism is, " Some luminous bodies 
are not falling bodies ;" its subject, " luminous bodies," is the 
minor, and its predicate, " falling bodies," is the major term of the 
syllogism ; and the only remaining term in the whole distinct from 
either, is " star," which is, therefore, the middle term, and we 
mark them accordingly. 2. There is no ambiguity in the middle 
term " star," and both the premises are known to be true. 3. The 
major premiss is, " no failing body is a star," because it compares 
the middle term "star," with the major term " falling body :" it is 
a universal negative, which we, therefore, mark E. The minor 
premiss is " All stars are luminous," because it compares the 
middle term "star" with the minor term, "luminous bodies." It 
is a universal affirmative, which we mark A. 4. The major pre- 
miss, which is E, distributes both subject and predicate, because 
" E. distributes both ;" and consequently the middle term contained 
in that premiss. The minor premiss distributes only its subject 
" stars," for " A. distributes the subject" which we mark accord- 
ingly. 5. The character of the conclusion is a particular negative, 
or O, which therefore distributes only the predicate, for " O distri- 
butes the predicate, ' which we, therefore, mark ; but the only term 



APPENDIX. 311 

distributed in the conclusion we find already distributed in the pre- 
mises as described ; and consequently there is no illicit process, or 
other transgression of rule. 6. It is, therefore, a perfect syllogism, 
wherein the major term must be predicated of the minor, in conse- 
quence of that minor being contained in a distributed middle, of 
which the same major is predicated. 7. It is of the fourth figure, 
pre-sub, according to the rule page 215, and its mood in that figure, 
according to the memorial lines. Art. 152, is fesapo, and therefore, 
does not disagree with the known moods of that figure, and conse- 
quently is regular. 

For practice in the parsing, both of propositions and syllogisms, 
a variety of examples will be found in every part of this work. 

For propositions see page 102 : every syllogism also contains 
three. A variety of the latter in every mood and figure will be found 
in various parts of this volume, and also in the syllogistic exercises 
of the next section. 



SECTION VL 

Syllogistic Exercises. 

The exercises of this section are of the following kinds, 1 . Ar- 
guments in the form of the syllogism and regular. 2. Arguments 
in that form but irregular. 3. Arguments not in that form. To 
arrange these three classes consecutively or in* any way to distin- 
guish the one from the other would be improper as to the object 
for which they are inserted. To the whole the learner will, of 
course, apply the rules already given, when the distinctions will 
become his own, accompanied with the principles on which those 
distinctions are founded ; and to him, it will be an exercise highly 
useful to reduce what is irregular or not in form to correct mood and 
figure. 

1. No one that is always in fear is happy ; 
Covetous men are always in fear ; therefore 
Covetous men are not happy. 

2. Every effect must have had an adequate cause ; 
The formation of the world is an effect ; therefore 

The formation of the world must have had an adequate cause. 

3. Every attribute is the property of some being ; 
Space and duration are attributes ; therefore 

Space and duration are the properties of some being. 

4. Infinite attributes are the properties of an infinite being ; 
Space and duration are infinite attributes ; therefore 
Space and duration are the properties of an infinite being. 



312 APPENDIX. 

5. •Every natural and just mode of argumeat tends to produce conviction ; 
Analogy is a natural and just mode of argument ; therefore 
Analogy lends to produce conviction. 

6. All similar systems of things are likely to have had the same author and 

cause ; 
The natural and revealed systems of things are similar ; therefore 
The natural and revealed systems of things are likely to have had the same 

author and cause. 

7. Whatever acts with uniformity and consistency is the proceed of intelli- 

gence ; 
Nature acts with uniformity and consistency ; therefore 
Nature is the proceed of intelligence. 

8. All accountable beings are free agents ; 
Men are accountable beings ; therefore 
Men are free agents. 

9. All desires to gain by another's loss, is the violation of the tenth com- 

mandment ; 
Gaming is a desire to gain by another's loss ; therefore 
Gaming is a violation of the tenth commandment. 

10. Sensualists wish to enjoy perpetual gratifications without satiety ; 
To enjoy perpetual gratifications without satiety, is impossible. 

It is impossible for a sensualist to obtain his wish. 

11. Whatever during the experience of many ag6s, men of civilization and 

learning generally are disposed to believe, is worthy of evidence; 

Human testimony wherein witnesses of known integrity agree, is what 
during the experience of many ages, men of civilization and learn- 
ing generally are disposed to believe ; therefore 

Human testimony wherein witnesses of known integrity agree, is worthy 
of credence. 

13. To all who would attain liberty only to destroy it, liberty cannot with safe- 
ty be granted ; 

All aiming at or contending for the occasional suspension of the laws 
would attain liberty only to destroy it ; therefore 

To all aiming at or contending for the occasional suspension of the laws, 
liberty cannot with safety be granted. 

13. Liberty cannot with safety be granted to those who would attain it, only 

to destroy it ; 

All aiming at universal supremacy, would attain liberty only to destroy 
it ; therefore 

Liberty cannot with safety be granted to those aiming at universal supre- 
macy. 

14. What is not a being, since it can have no attribute, can be no agent nor 

act, cannot produce anything ; 
What is called nothing, is not a being, has no attribute, is not an agent, 

nor can it act ; therefore • 

What is called nothing, cannot act or produce anything. 

•This and the next example have reference to Butler's analogy, a work 
which has the highest claims to attention. 



APPENDIX. 313 

15. Not any thing reproductive produces anything unlike itself; 
Chance, by atheists, is said to be reproductive : therefore 

Chance cannot produce any thing unlike itself ; or that which exhibits 
marks of design. 

16. No one admitting that a less work that discovers design, had an intelli- 

gent author, can rationally deny that a work infinitely greater dis- 
covering design had an intelligent author ; 

All admit that the works of Euclid implying infinitely less design than 
the universe, had an intelligent author ; therefore 

None can rationally deny that the universe implying infinitely greater de- 
sign than the works of Euclid, had an intelligent author. 

17. The production of the achromatic telescope implies pre-existing design 

and knowledge of the laws of light, in the minds of its makers (who 
successively were Gregory, Newton, Euler and Dollond.) 
The eye is the production of an achromatic telescope ; therefore 
The production of an eye (without the imitation of which neither Gre- 
gory, Newton, Euler or Dollond would have succeeded,) implies pre- 
existing design and knowledge of the laws of light, in the mind of 
the only maker of an eye. 

18. The production not only of an instrument of inimitable excellence, but 

of one capable of the reproduction of others in unlimited succession 
of undiminished excellence, implies infinitely greater design than 
that of the production of an instrument of excellence incapable of 
such reproduction. 

The eye is the production of an instrument of inimitable excellence con- 
nected with the reproduction of others in unlimited succession of un- 
diminished excellence ; therefore 

The eye implies infinitely greater design than that of the production of 
an instrument of excellence incapable of such reproduction. 

19. Nature either is the author of nature, or the order and constitution of 

things that Supreme Intelligence has established and maintains ; 
Nature cannot be the author of nature, or the author of itself ; therefore 
Nature is the order and constitution of things that Supreme Intelligence 

has established and maintains. 

20. The order and constitution of things established and maintained in the 

universe, is the law of Supreme Intelligence ; 
Nature is the order and constitution of things established and maintained 

in the universe ; therefore 
Nature is the law of Supreme Intelligence. ^ 

21. Law, supposed to exist without an Intelligent Author, is nothing or an 

absurdity ; 
Nature is law; therefore 
Nature, supposed to exist without an Intelligent Author, is nothing, or an 

absurdity. 

22. All theories and systems not only violating sacred belief, but also destruc- 

tive of the order of society and government, are irrational and incom- 
patible with civilized humanity, or with personal and social welfare ; 

Scepticism involves theories and systems not only violating sacred belief, 
but also destructive of the order of society and government; therefore 

Scepticism is irrational and incompatible with civilized humanity or with 
personal and social welfare. 

Dd 



314 APPENDIX. 

23. All terms applied to any individual, or to all individuals of the same class, 

are taken universally ; 

The predicate of a negative is applied to any individual, or to all individu- 
als of the same class ; therefore 

The predicate of a negative is taken universally. 

24. All terms applied to some individuals of a class only, are said to be un- 

distributed ; 

The predicates of all affirmative propositions are applied to some individu- 
als of a class only ; therefore 

The predicates of affirmative propositions are said to be undistributed. 

25. All terms applied to individuals not considered as individuals of any class, 

are called singular terms ; 
Proper names are applied to individuals not considered as individuals of 

any class ; therefore 
Proper names are called singular terms. 

26. Every term applied to an object in reference to another object to v^rhich it 

is related, is called a relative term ; 
The words husband, father, patron, &c. are applied to another object to 

which they are related ; therefore 
The words husband, father, patron, &c. are relative terms. 

27. AH propositions reducible to two or more propositions, are called com- 

pound propositions ; 

All propositions having two or more subjects or predicates, or both, are re- 
ducible to two or more propositions ; therefore 

All propositions having two or more subjects or predicates, or both, are 
compound propositions. 

28. All that are of God, according to the scripture, love Him supremel3f, and 

so hear as to obey his word ; 
X, Y and Z do not so love Him, nor do they so hear as to obey his word ; 

therefore 
X, Y and Z are not, according to the scripture, of God. 

29. All doctrines respecting the moral government of God which involve a 

practical absurdity, are false ; 
The doctrine of fatalism respecting the moral gov£rnment of God involves 

a practical absurdity ; therefore 
The doctrine of fatalism is false. 

.30. No impostors reject, throughout a long life, worldly wealth, distinctio n 
and pleasures, and suiFer poverty, toil, contempt and death, in attes- 
tation of a falsehood ; 

St. Paul and the other apostles thus rejected worldly wealth, &c. and suf- 
fered poverty, toil, contempt and death, in attestation of the truth of 
their doctrine ; therefore 

St. Paul and the other apostles were not impostors. 

31. Whatever contradicts moral principles, restraining men from the commis- 
sion of sin, is destructive to the well-being of society ; 

Atheism, Deism and Universalism contradict moral principles restraining 
men from the commission of sin ; therefore 

Atheism, Deism and Universalism are destructive to the well-being of 
society. 



APPENDIX. 315 

32. All governments admitting of suspense, deliberation, declining one way, 

determining, and at last acting as determined, are free ; 
The moral government of God admits of suspense, deliberation, declining 

one vpay, determining, and at last acting as determined ; therefore 
The moral government of God is free. 

33. Whatever has reflection and volition, has the essential properties of mind ; 
Mankind has reflection and volition ; therefore 

Mankind has the essential properties of mind. 

34. Whatever voluntarily subjects itself to a system of government, exhibits 

intelligence and superior powers ; 
The human mind voluntarily subjects itself to a system of government; 

therefore 
The human mind exhibits intelligence and superior powers. 

35. All solids expand by heat and contract by cold, and are longer or taller in 

summer than in winter ; 
Men are solids expanding by heat and contracting by cold ; therefore 
Men are taller in summer than in winter. 

36. All solids nearer to the moon are specifically lighter than the same solids 

further from the moon. 
A cubic foot of water near the surface of waters influenced by tide, are 

nearer to the moon during spring or high tide, than during neap or 

low^ tide ; therefore 
A cubic foot of such water, is specifically lighter than a cubic foot of water 

further from the moon. 

37. Gravitation to the moon acts on all solids whose cohesion does not wholly 

resist that attraction. 
The brains of some men are such solids, that their cohesion does not 

wholly resist that attraction ; therefore 
Gravitation to the moon acts on the brains of some men, whose solidity 

wants cohesion wholly to resist that attraction. (Luna, the moon, 

lunaticus ; hence, the word lunatic. The same idea exists in Greek.) 

38. All bodies on the earth's surface, further from the earth's centre are lighter 

than the same bodies when nearer to that centre. 

A ship, which together with her cargo on the earth's surface at Peters- 
burgh in Russia, weighed 2000 tons, is further from the earth's 
centre* on crossing the equator; therefore 

The ship and her cargo which at Petersburgh, &c. weighed 2000 tons, 
does fnot weigh 2000 tons on crossing the equator. 

39. Christ came into the world to save sinners, either in this life, or in the 

next, or he did not come to save sinners at all. 

Hs did not come to save them from the consequences of sin in this life, 
(Human laws, magistrates, and bodily suffering, and pain and death, 
testify this.) 

He came to save them from the consequences of sin in the next life ; or 
he came not to save them at all. (So according to the universalist, 
if temporal pain, &c. atone for and purify from sin, the advent of 
Him who is the Christian's hope and glOry, was unnecessary.) 

* The earth is an oblate spheroid, whose equatorial exceeds its polar diame- 
ter in the ratio of 230 to 229. 

■j- Independently of this cause, the increase of the centrifugal force decreases 
the weight of bodies near the equator, or in the proportion of 289 to 288. 



316 APPENDIX. 

40 (According to some) all pain is sanatory ; sin is painful ; therefore sin is 
sanatory ! ! ! 

41. (According to the same,) whatever tends to produce pain, is salutary in 

its tendency ; the violation of any or of all the laws of our physical 
and moral nature, tends to produce pain ; therefore, the violation of 
any or of all the laws of our physical and moral nature is salutary 
in its tendency ! 

42. All men when they die, according to some, go to heaven. 
R. T. was hanged for murder ; therefore 

R. T. according to some, has gone to heaven. 

43. (According to some,) whatever is believed to be true, is true to him, that 

believes it to be true ; 
Simpkins believes that there are no such things as pain, taxes and death ; 

therefore 
To Simpkins there are no such things as pain, taxes and death. 

44. Similar systems with similar claims to divine origin are entitled to similar 

regard ; 
The systems of nature and revelation, are similar systems with similar 

claims to divine origin ; therefore 
The systems of nature and revelation are entitled to our regard. 

45. All natural and just modes of reasoning are satisfactory and conclusive. 
Analogy is a natural and just mode of reasoning ; therefore 

Analogy is a satisfactory and conclusive mode of reasoning. 

46. If virtue is voluntary, vice is voluntary : virtue is voluntary ; therefore, so 

is vice. [Arist. Eth. B. iii.] 

47. Protection from punishment is plainly due to the innocent: therefore, as 

you maintain that this person ought not to be punished, it appears 
that you are convinced of his innocence, 

48. All appointments of nature are invariable: correct principles of justice are 

appointments of nature ; therefore correct principles of justice are in- 
variable. 

49. If every story is not to be believed, of which the reporters give various or 

even contradictory reports ; and the story of the life of Bonaparte be 
of this description, as it is, it follows on this ground that the story of 
the life of Bonaparte is not to be believed. 

50. If the prophecies of the Old Testament had been written without know- 

ledge of the events of the time of Christ, they would not correspond 
with them exactly ; and if they had been forged by Christians, they 
would not have been preserved and acknowledged by Jews ; 

They are preserved and acknowledged by Jews, and they correspond 
exactly with the events of the time of Christ ; therefore 

They were neither written without a knowledge of these events, nor 
were forged by Christisns. 

51. A true prophecy coincides precisely with all the circumstances of an 

event as could not be conjectured by natural reason ; 
This is the case with the prophecies of the Messiah contained in the 

Old Testament ; therefore 
These are true prophecies. 



APPENDIX. 317 

52. If any complete theory could be framed to explain the establishment of 
Christianity by human causes, such a theory wonld have been pro- 
posed before now ; 
But none such ever has been proposed ; therefore 
No such theory can be framed. 



Example of Logical Jlnalysis applied to the first part of Paley^s 

Evidences. 

[Extracted from" Praxis of Logical Analysis/' by Bishop Whately.J 

The ultimate conclusion, that " the Christian Religion came frome God," is 
made to rest (as far as " the direct historical evidence" is concerned) on these 
two premises ; that " a religion attested by miracles, is from God ;" and that 
"the Christian Religion is so attested." 

Of these two premises, it should be remarked, the minor seems to have been 
admitted, while the major was denied, by the unbelievers of old : whereas at 
present^the case is reversed.* 

Paley's argument therefore goes to establish the minor premiss, about which 
alone in these days there is likely to be any question. 

He states with this view two propositions : viz : 

Prop. I. " That there is satisfactory evidence, that many, professing to be 
original witnesses of the Christian miracles, passed their lives in labors, dan- 
gers, and sufferings, voluntarily undergone in attestation of the accounts which 
they delivered, and solely in consequence of their belief of those accounts ; 
and that they also submitted, from the same motives, to new rules of conduct. 

Prop. 11. " That there is kot satisfactory evidence, that persons pretend- 
ing to be original witnesses of any other similar miracles, have acted in the 
same manner, in attestation of the accounts which they delivered, and solely 
in consequence of their belief of the truth of those accounts. 

Of these two propositions, the latter, it will easily be perceived, is the major 
premiss, stated as the converse by negation of a universal affirmative, the for- 
mer proposition is the minor. 

As a syllogism in Barbara therefore, the whole will stand thus. 

" All miracles attested by such and such evidence, are worthy of credit :" 
(by conversion, " none which are not worthy of credit are so attested.") 

"The Christian miracles are attested by such and such evidence:" there- 
fore " they are worthy of credit." 

The minor premiss is first proved by being taken as several distinct ones, 
each of which is separately established. 

I. It is proved that the first propagators of Christianity suffered : by showing 

1st. ^priori, from the nature of the case, that they were likely to suffer: 
(because they were preachers of a religion unexpected and unwelcome : 1, to 
the Jews ; and 2, to the Gentiles.) 

2d. From profane testimony. 

3d. From the testimony of Christian -writings. (And here comes in the 
proof of one of the premises of this last argument ; viz. the proof of the 
credibility, as to this point at least, of the Christian writings.) 

These arguments are cumulative ; i. e. each seperately goes to establish the 
probability of the one common conclusion, that "the first propagators of 
Christianity suffered.'''' 

*The original opponents ^f Christianity admitted that miracles were wrought 
but attributed them to magic. 

Dd2 



318 APPENDIX. 

By similar arguments it is shown that their sufferings were such as they 
voluntarily exposed themselves to. 

II. It is proved that " what they suffered for was a miraculous story ;" by 
1st. The nature of the case ; they could have had nothing but miracles on 

which to rest the claims of the new religion. 

2d. By allusion to miracles, particularly to the resurrection ; both in Chris- 
tian and in profane writers, as the evidence on which the religion rested. 

The same course of argument goes to show that the miracles in attestation 
of which they suffered were such as they professed to have witnessed. 

III. It is proved that " the miracles thus attested are what we call the 
Christian miracles ;" in other words, that the story was, in the main, that 
which we have now in the Christian scriptures ; by 

§ 1st. The nature of the case ; viz, that it is improbable the original story 
should have completely died away, and a substantially new one have occupi- 
ed its place. 

§ 2d. By the incidental allusions of ancient writers, both Christian and pro- 
fane, to accounts agreeing with those of our scriptures, as the ones then re- 
ceived. 

§ 3d. By the credibility of our historical scriptures : This is established by 
several distinct arguments, each separately tendij^g to show that these books 
were, from the earliest ages of Christianity, v^ell known and carefully pre- 
served among Christians : viz. 

§ 1. They were quoted hj ancient Christian writers. 

§ 2. With peculiar respect. 

§ 3. Collected into a distinct volume, and 

§ 4. Distinguished by appropriate names and titles of respect. 

§ 5. Publicly read and expounded, and 

§ 6. Had commentaries, &e. written on them. 

§ 7. Were received by Christians of different sects ; &c. &c. 

The latter part of the first main proposition, branches off into two; viz. Ist. 

That the early Christians submitted to new rules of conduct, 2d, That they 

did so in consequence of their behef in miracles wrought before them. 

Each of these is established in various parts of the above course of argument, 

and by similar premises ; viz. the nature of the case— the accounts of heathen 

writers — and the testimony of the Christian Scriptures, &c. 



The major premiss, that " miracles thus attested are worthy of credit," which 
must be combined with the former, in order to establish the conclusion that 
*' the Christian miracles are worthy of credit," is next to be established. 

Previously to his entering on the second main proposition, (which I have 
stated to be the converse by negation of this major premiss) he draws his con- 
clusion from the minor premiss, in combination with the major, resting that 
major on 

§ 1st. The a priori improbability that a false story should have been thus 
attested: viz. 

" If it be so, the religion must be true. These men could not be deceivers. 
By only not bearing testimony, they might have avoided all these sufferings, 
and have lived quietly. Would men in such circumstances pretend to have 
seen what they never saw ; assert facts which they had no knowledge of; go 
about lying, to teach virtue ; and, though not only convinced of Christ's being 
an impostor, but having seen the success of his imposture in his crucifixion, 
yet persist in carrying it on ; and so persist as to bring upon themselves, for 
nothing, and with a full knowledge of the consequence, enmity and hatred, 
danger and death?" 



APPENDIX. 319 

§ 2d. That no false story of miracles is likely to be so attested, is again 
proved, from the premiss that " no false story of miracles ever has been so 
attested ;" and this premiss again is proved in the form of a proposition 
which includes it ; viz. that " no other miraculous story -whatever is so 
attested." 

§ This assertion again bifurcates ; viz. it is proved respecting the several 
stories that are likely to be, or that have been adduced, as parallel to the 
Christian, that either 

§ 1 . They are not so attested, or 

§ 2. They are not properly miraculous ; i.e. that admitting the veracity of 
the narrator, it does not follow that any miracle took place ; as in cases 
that may be explained by false perceptions, accidents, &c. 



In this way the learner may proceed to analyze the rest of the work, and to 
fill up the details of those parts of the argument which I have but slightly 
touched upon. 

It will be observed, that to avoid unnecessary prolixity, I have in most of 
the above syllogisms suppressed one premiss, which the learner will be able 
easily to supply for himself: e. g. in the early part of this analysis it will easily 
be seen that the first of the series of cumulative arguments to prove that the 
propagators of Christianity did suffer, would at full length stand thus : 

" Whoever propagated a religion unwelcome to the Jews and to the Gen- 
tiles, was likely to suffer ; 

The Apostles did this ; 

Therefore they were likely to suffer," &c. &c. 

It is also to be observed, that the same proposition used in different syllo- 
gisms may require to be differently expressed, by a substitution of some equiva- 
lent, in order to render the argument in edich. formally correct. This of course 
is always allowable, provided the exact meaning be preserved : e. g. if the pro- 
position be, " the persons who attested the Christian miracles underwent suf- 
ferings in attestation of them," I am authorised to state the same assertion in a 
different form, thus, " the Christian miracles are attested by men who suffered 
in attestation of their reality," &c. 

Great care however should be used to avoid being misled by the substitution 
of one proposition for another, when the two are not (though perhaps they 
sound so) really equivalent, so that the one warrants the assumption of the 
other. 





IIVDEX, 




A 




D 






PAGE. 




PAGE. 


Absolute proposition, 


80 


Deductive evidence. 


168 &seq 


Absolute terms, 


55 


Definite terms, 


57 


Abstraction, 


137 


Definition, 


70 


Abstract terms, 


56 


Dilemma, 


234 


Accident, 


64 


Discretive proposition, 


92 


Accidental definition. 


70 


Discursive induction, 


183 


Affirmative proposition, 


81 


Disjunctive proposition, 


92 


Analogy, 


190, & seq. 


Disjunctive syllogisms, 


233 


Analysis, 


140 


Distribution of propositions, 96 


Analytical introduction, 


25 


Division of terms, 


68 


Appendix, 


293 






Apprehension, 


49 


E 




Argument, 197 & seq. 


243 & seq. 






Argumentation, 


50 


Enthymeme, 


238 


Argumentative induction, 


18 


Epichirema, 


239 


Argumentum ad hominem 


, &c. 242 & 


Equivocal vpords, 


57 




243 


Essential definition. 


71 


Assent, 


147, 148 


Essential difference. 


63 


Association, 


136 


Evidence, 


121, 129 


Attention, 


135 


Exercises, 


311 


V Axiom, 


149, 165 


Extension, 


62 






Extremes of proposition. 


77 



c 



Causal proposition, 93 

Certainty, 147, 148 

Circle, fallacy of, 283 

Classification of fallacies, 274 

Comparing, ^ 136 

Complex proposition, 89 

Compound proposition, 90 

Comprehension, 62 

Conception, 134 

Concrete terms, 56 

Conditional propositions, 93 

Conditional syllogism, 231 

Consciousness, 134, 161 

Consequences of conviction, 150 

Consistent terms, 59 

Constructive syllogism, 233 

Contingent matter, 84, 103 

Contrary opposition, 59, 107 

Contradictory opposition, 60, 107 

Conversion of propositions, 114 

Conviction, 147, 148 

Copula of propositions, 78 

Copulative propositions, 92 



Faculties of perception, 130 

Fallacies, ' 266 & seq. 

Fallacy of similar expression, 274 

of interrogation, 

of equivocation, 

of accident, 

of division &c. 

of undistributed middle, 

of illicit process, 

from improper premises, 

of begging the question; 

of petitio principii, 

of the circle, 

of undue assumption, 

of assignation of a false 

cause, 

of suppressed premiss, 

of partial reference, 

of ignoratio elenchi, 

of mistaking the question, 285 

of appeal to the passions, 287 

r of shifting ground, 28S 



275 
275 
278 
27S 
281 
281 
282 
282 
282 
28a 
283 

284 
284 

284 
285 



322 



INDEX. 



PAGE. 

Fallacy of partial objections, 288 

of unfair representation, 289 

Figures of syllogism, 210, 213 &seq. 

G 



PAGE. 

Mnemonic lines for moods, 216 

Modal proposition, 8& 

Moods and figures of syllogisms, 210 
and seq. 
Moral evidence, 1 75 

Moral demonstration, 295 



Generalization, 




61 






Genus, 


63,64 


]V 




H 






Negative terms. 
Negative propositions. 


56 

81 


Hypothetical propositions, 




80 


Necessary matter. 


84 


Hypothetical syllogisms, 230 & 


seq. 


Nominal definition. 


70 


I 




, 


o 




Identical proposition, 




94 


Operations of the mind. 


49 


Illicit process, 




281 


Opinion, 


147 


Ignoratio elenchi, 




285 


Opposite terms. 


59 


Imagination, 




135 


Opposition of terms. 


59 


Impossible matter, 


84 


,103 


Opposition of propositions, 


106 


Indefinite terms, 




57 






Indefinite propositions, 




83 


P 




Indirect reasoning, 




241 






Induction, 183 & 


seq. 


Particular afiirmatives. 


82 


Inferential conversion, 




115 


Particular conversion. 


118 


Intuitive evidence. 




155 


Particular negative. 
Particular propositions, 


82 
81,82 


J 






Passions, 
Perfect syllogism. 


141 

200 


Judgment, 




50 


Positive terms, 
Predicable terms, 


56 
62, 63 


K 






Predicate of a proposition. 
Premiss, 


77 
197 


Kinds of opposition, 




107 


Privative terms, 
Privative opposition. 


56 
59 


L. 






Probable testimony, 
Property, 


180 
64 


Language, 




51 


Proposition, 


76 


Logical definition. 




70 






Logical parsing, 




306 


d 




M 






Quality of a proposition, 
Quantity of a proposition, 


81 
81 


Major premiss, 




197 






Major term, 




198 


R 




Mathematical evidence, 




173 






Mathematical demonstration. 




295 


Real definition. 


70 


Matter of propositions, 79, 


84, 


103 


Reasoning a priori, 


241 


Memory, 136, 


163 


164 


Reasoning a posteriori. 


241 


Metaphysical demonstration, 




295 


Reasoning direct, 


241 


Middle term, 


198 


199 


Reasoning indirect, 


241 


Minor premiss. 




197 


Reciprocal propositions. 


94 


Minor term. 




198 


Reduction of syllogisms, 


222 


Mnemonic line for figures. 




215 


Reduction exemplified. 


224 





INDEX. 


323 




PAGE. 




PAGE. 


Relative terms, 


55 


Special rules of syllogism. 


270 


Relative propositions, 


94 


Subalterns, 


107 


Relative opposition, 


59 


Sub- contrary opposition, 


107 


Rules of definition, 


73 


Subject of a proposition. 


77 


of division, 


68 


Summary Of fallacies, 


290 


of distribution, 


101 


Syllogisms, 


197 & seq. 


of opposition. 


110,111 


Syllogisms ; figures of 


219 & seq. 


of conversion, 


119 


Syllogistic exercises, 


311 


of syllogism, 


203 & seq. 


Symbols of propositions. 


83 


special of ditto. 


270 


Synopsis of logic. 


294 




223 






of conditional syllogism, 231 


T 






298 








300 


Terms, 


54 


of method, 


301 


Testimony, 


124 


S ' 




u 




Sensation, 


131, 160 


Undistributed middle, 


2S1 


Simple proposition. 


88 


Uniformity of reasoning. 


250 & seq. 


Simple conversion. 


117 


Universal affirmative, 


82 


Singular terms, 


54 


Universal proposition. 


81 


Singular propositions. 


83 


Universal negative, 


82 


Sorites, 


239 


Universal terms, 


55 


Species, 


63 


Universal words. 


57 



ERRATA. 
For P. understand page, for L. line from the top, I. instead of, and for R. read. 

P. 16, 1. 23, i. x(ic*T, r. xacrct. 

P. 19, 1. 3, i. or guiding, r. for guiding. 

P. 20, 1. 27, i. a and permanent, r. and a permanent. 

P. 42, 1. 14, i. A (opposite the conclusion) r. E. 

P. 63, 1. 37, i. universal, r. universal. 

P. 82, 1. 4, i. prefer, r. profess. 

P. 100, 1, 39, i. fonnder, r. founder. 

P. 130, last line but one, i. w§3-«, r. K^ms, 

P. 142, 1, 1, read, " when we say, we perceive, are conscious, remember, or 
reflect, we refer to a present or antecedent sensation, idea or emotion, &c. 

P. 151,1.22. i. indifferent to them ; r. indifferent to him. 

P. 182, 1. 3, i. evidence; r. testimony. 

P. 206, 1. 24, r. E. no lion is ruminant. 

P. 210, last line but onei. ^uKKohtcrjuo;, r. ^vwoyts-fAoc. 

P. 292, i. Xenophon's analysis, r. Xenophon's Anabasis. 

P. 296, 1. 32, read, « But of this unseen thing the mathematician proceeds 
to declare the laws." 



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